APPROACHES TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
APPROACHES

to

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

A symposium introductory to problems and methods of village welfare in underdeveloped areas

EDITED BY PHILLIPS RUOPP

WITH A FOREWORD BY S. RADHAKRISHNAN

W. VAN HOEVE LTD. / THE HAGUE, BANDUNG
To

LEE GARVEY WELLS
(1919–1952)

who was passionately concerned
and expressed her devotion
to the human community in many ways,
giving the last years
of her measureless vitality
and searching intellect
to international service with Unesco.
The graver the crisis becomes the more earnest and consciously responsible is the knowledge demanded of us; for although what is demanded is a deed, only that deed which is born of knowledge will help to overcome the crisis.

Martin Buber
I am honoured by the invitation to write a short Foreword to this volume on Approaches to Community Development.

Since attainment of Independence in 1947 we have been struggling to raise the standards of life of our people. One of the principal means we have adopted for this purpose has been the Community Projects. We are starting with fifty-five Projects of rural development in selected areas. While the main objective is increased agricultural production, industrial development is not excluded. In certain areas where we have a large population of displaced persons, as in West Bengal and the Punjab, urban and rural developments are treated as complementary. In our first Five Year Plan it is said:—'The creation of new centres of small-scale industrial production, closely coordinated with rural development, is fundamental to national development, for in no other way can the present occupational unbalance between agriculture and industry, between village and town, be corrected.'

In a Community Project different types of activity are undertaken, such as agriculture, irrigation, communications, education, health and social welfare.

The essential feature of our scheme is the participation of the people in the Project from its very start. The villagers themselves are encouraged to take part in the execution of the Plan. Work which is normally done through governmental agencies is done under this scheme by the villagers themselves. We believe that this scheme will help us to rescue millions of people from the sub-human conditions in which they have lived all these years. The best way of securing the stability of a state from subversion from within or attack from without, is by promoting welfare and solidarity among the people themselves.

This book deals with approaches to community development as an effective contribution to world development. Whatever differences there may be between the industrially
developed countries of the West and the underdeveloped countries of the East, the Community scheme attempts to raise the welfare of the common people without imperilling the dignity and the liberty of the individual. If it succeeds, as it is very likely, then it will be a great victory for democracy.

S. R.

March 1953

(S. Radhakrishnan)

Vice-President's Secretariat,

New Delhi
A symposium is by definition a venture in mutual aid between contributors, editor, and publisher. It requires collaboration in the achievement of some central purpose which orders and unites its parts.

In the present case this purpose was a volume of essays which would introduce its reader to the salient characteristics of the peasant and pastoral societies of so-called underdeveloped areas; to the social reality of the village communities where development projects are being undertaken; to the problems of social change that inevitably accompany such projects; to the economic aspects of development at the village level; to the role of education—more particularly that of fundamental education and its practitioner—in stimulating self-help among villagers; and to the habit of critically examining the assumptions that undergird every approach to human welfare and community development.

It has been necessary to suppose that the reader is already convinced of the urgent need for aid to underdeveloped areas, a need so widely and ably presented during the past three or four years, and that he is now asking the important questions that are the logical outcome of such conviction.

The limitations of this venture are obvious. I, together with the contributors, am fully aware of the many relevant things that have not been and could not be said. What has been said is not meant to be comprehensive in any way: it is meant to suggest, emphasize, stimulate, guide; to encourage critical thought and right action. It is an attempt to provide some of the responsible knowledge out of which deeds should issue.

I have edited as little as possible, letting each contributor speak as he wished so long as I had no reason to query his conceptual coherence, factual accuracy, or stylistic clarity. That is the editor’s duty. His prerogative is to make changes according to his best judgement. Certain contributions required
extensive emendation, while others required practically none. I trust that I have not failed to take account of the contributor’s intention in every instance where editorial intervention seemed necessary. Responsibility for the book as a whole is of course mine alone.

I have tried to see that similar terms have adequate correspondence to one another, at least in similar contexts. Spelling and punctuation largely follow the practices of the Oxford University Press, though several words may be found which appear in more than one of their possible forms. Footnotes have been checked wherever there seemed to be good reason, but there are some which have defied absolute certainty that, for example, the correct edition of the book is indicated.

The contributors are citizens of eight countries, Eastern and Western; the editor American; the publisher Dutch. The symposium is unquestionably international. More important than our diverse nationalities, however, is our common interest in mutual aid and community development. The editing has been done in four countries, in the homes of as many generous friends, during periods of respite from travel and other work, a source of both pleasures and problems. Clearly my debts are many and great, and it is my happy obligation to acknowledge them here.

Needless to say, perhaps, my greatest debt is to the contributors. They have done their work without remuneration, participating solely because of their keen interest. Some of them have patiently awaited their contribution’s publication for well over a year; others have written their contributions only very recently to fill in lacunae or (in one case) to substitute for a long-overdue manuscript that never arrived. When he has read what they have written, I am sure that the reader will join me in thanking them.

Dr. Radhakrishnan has honoured us by setting aside time to write his foreword. He has long understood the right approach to community development. In his Upton Lectures of 1926, published as *The Hindu View of Life*, he said, ‘Our attitude to
those whom we are pleased to call primitive must be one of sympathy. The task of the civilized is to respect and foster the live impulses of backward communities and not to destroy them.' These words exactly express the persuasion that lies at the heart of this book.

Of those who have contributed to the book, though not with their pens, I should like to single out Miss Johanna Felhoen Kraal for special gratitude. Her support at a crucial point in its history has been in part responsible for its publication. And I should like to thank Messrs W. van Hoeve Ltd. for their belief that it was worth the risk always present in bringing out a publication of this kind. Mr. F. P. Thomassen of that firm has been a delight to work with. His personal concern and warm cooperation have not diminished through many months of detailed correspondence about various requirements and difficulties.

Without Professor E. E. Evans-Pritchard and Dr. J. G. Peristiany I should not have acquired the sociological discipline essential even to editorial work of this kind, and still more essential to teaching and field work. Professor Malcolm F. Stewart’s criticisms of my Introduction have been valuable.

I must record my dependence on Mr. Hart, friend and colleague, who has worked with me so unstintingly for almost four years as we have explored together what contribution the non-governmental organization might best make to mutual aid for the development of underdeveloped areas. I have met no one with greater knowledge of what both governmental and non-governmental organizations are doing in this regard, and few with a comparable imaginative grasp of what needs to be done and how it can be done.

The idea of this book originally grew of the Conference on the Role of the Non-Governmental Organization in Technical Assistance Programmes (Chicago, September 1951) initiated by Mr. Hart on behalf of Community Development Projects Ltd. and co-sponsored by fourteen universities, colleges, and voluntary agencies. The original versions of the chapters by
Drs. van Nieuwenhuijze, Samkalden, and van der Kolff were given as lectures at the International Summer Seminar on Problems and Methods of Technical Assistance in Community Development (Wageningen, Holland, July 1952) sponsored by the Department of Social Anthropology, Wageningen Agricultural University—which is under Dr. van Naerssen—in association with Community Development Projects Ltd.

Acknowledgements also are due to the following for their kind permission to use as chapters of the book articles which first appeared in their journals: The Editor of *African Affairs* for the chapter by Mr. Batten, which appeared under another title in Vol. 50, No. 201, October 1951, of that periodical; the Editor of *Pacific Affairs* for the chapter by Professors Stepanek and Prien, which appeared under another title in Vol. XXIII, No. 1, March 1950, of that periodical; the Director of Publications, H. M. Stationery Office, for the chapter by Mr. Dickson, which appeared in the January and February 1952 numbers of *Corona*; and the Editor of *The Middle East Journal* for the chapter by Professor Himadeh, which appeared under another title in Vol. 5, No. 3, Summer 1951, of that periodical.

P.R.
CONTRIBUTORS

S. RADHAKRISHNAN. Vice-President of the Republic of India; formerly Indian Ambassador to the Soviet Union; formerly Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics, University of Oxford; author of many philosophical works.

PHILLIPS RUOPP. Chairman, Community Development Projects Ltd.; Associate Director, Illinois College Programme in Community Development.

NORMAN J. HART. Executive Director, Community Development Projects Ltd.

C. A. O. VAN NIEUWENHUIZEN. Member of the Teaching Staff, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague; formerly Head of the Arabic Section, Netherlands Overseas Broadcasting Corporation; formerly Member, Muslim Affairs Section, Cabinet of the High Representative of the Netherlands Crown in Indonesia; author of Mens en Vrijheid in Indonesie.

T. R. BATIENT. Senior Lecturer, Colonial Department, University of London Institute of Education; formerly Vice-Principal, Makerere College, Uganda; author of Problems of African Development.

KENNETH L. LITTLE. Head of the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Edinburgh; author of The Mende of Sierra Leone.

M. A. JASPAH. Research Student in Social Anthropology, University of Oxford.

ARTHUR HAZLEWOOD. Tutor in Economics, Institute of Colonial Studies, University of Oxford.

W. H. BECKETT. Lecturer in the Economics of Colonial Agriculture, University of Oxford; formerly Senior Agricultural Officer, Gold Coast; author of Akokoaso, A Survey of a Gold Coast Village.

I. SAMKALDEN. Professor of Agrarian Law, Wageningen Agricultural University.

JOSEPH E. STEPANEK. United Nations Technical Expert to the Government of Indonesia; formerly Associate Professor, Institute of Industrial Research, University of Denver; formerly Associate Director, Agricultural Industry Service, Shanghai.

CHARLES H. PRIEN. International Projects Administrator, Institute of Industrial Research, University of Denver; formerly Technical Liaison Representative in the United States for Agricultural Industry Service, Shanghai.
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G. H. van der KOLFF. Formerly Professor of Economics, University of Jakarta.

ALEX B. GRAHAM. Research Student in Social Anthropology, University of Oxford; formerly Auckland University College Adult Education Tutor among the Northland Maori.

V. L. GRIFFITHS. Lecturer in Education, University of Oxford; formerly Principal, Institute of Education (Bakht er Ruda), Sudan.

A. G. DICKSON. Officer in Charge of the Community Development Training Centre, Man O' War Bay, Cameroons, West Africa.

RICHARD ATTYGALLE. Member, Education Department, Unesco; formerly Senior Master of English Language and Literature, Royal College, Colombo.

LEO SILBERMAN. Visiting Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Northwestern University; formerly Beit Memorial Research Fellow, University of Oxford; author of Analysis of Society.

SA'ID B. HIMADEH. Professor of Economics, American University of Beirut.

U. L. GOSWAMI. Officer in the Government of India Community Projects Administration.

S. C. ROY. Agricultural Extension Commissioner, Government of India.

F. H. VAN NAERSSEN. Lecturer in Social Anthropology, Wageningen Agricultural University.

JOHN GILLIN. Professor of Anthropology, University of North Carolina; author of The Ways of Men.
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Our is a world of village communities, of peasants and pastoralists who spend most of their lives within the small group of kith and kin, and whose values have their roots there. Thus all programmes for the economic development of underdeveloped areas are programmes for community development of one kind or another. All technical assistance is assistance that ultimately must be given to the villager and his community in one way or another. And it is only at the village level that we can adequately assess the consequences of economic development and technical assistance to the people who after all are the objects of our concern. How, in the eyes of those people, has their life been improved or impoverished by development? If we are rightly concerned, the kind of development most appropriate for the village community and the way in which the villager is assisted are problems which will be given our scrupulous attention.

Science and technology, commerce and industry, though dominant forces in the Great Societies of our day, have as yet urbanized barely a quarter of the world's population. The rest remain on the land. And although their traditional values, relationships, and usages have been confronted and undermined by conquerors and innovations from the West, as we hypostatize it, they still live in essentially agrarian communities which may have made some adjustment to their subordinate status in terms of the world market and world political power but maintain their solidarity and vitality, as they must, by reliance on their accustomed social systems and methods of production.

The sociologist calls these variously primitive, simpler, or
communal societies, though it is only through intensive field studies that he is able to describe and analyse them accurately and significantly. As Dr. van Nieuwenhuijze warns, it is difficult to establish a single category which will comprehend all societies of this type. It is only by studying a society’s system of values (i.e. interests), its structure (i.e. the network of relationships that binds its members together according to their reciprocal rights and duties), and the usages (i.e. customary activities) through which its structure functions and is maintained that we are able to see clearly its distinctive features, classify it with similar societies, and contrast it with dissimilar societies.

How we go about this, the number of categories we establish, depends on what we are looking for. That is, it depends on what questions we initially ask ourselves and, in turn, on what questions our observations suggest that we ask. We gather our data by exact observation of what people say and do, data which we then compare with those of other field workers. The manner in which we present them, and the conclusions we finally draw, should be guided by sound theoretical and analytical concepts. Whether or not we say anything worth saying about a society will depend on whether or not the paradigm or model we abstract from these data corresponds to the facts, has internal consistency, agrees with the findings of others or proves them inadequate, and is based on postulates that will stand the tests of logic.

I preface the discussion that is to follow with these methodological reminders because I shall be dealing with the abstract and normative rather than the concrete and descriptive, and I do not wish the reader to think that I consider the latter unimportant. It is absolutely necessary for the sociological knowledge and perspective which should precede community development projects, but I have chosen to confine myself to an examination of the approaches of certain philosophers and sociologists to the concepts of community and development, believing that among other things the history of ideas can enhance
our awareness of the human continuum and of the constant return in it to certain central preoccupations, to ideas which seem new to every generation whose situation happens to make them appear specially relevant.

This might be considered an essay in the discursive definition of community, of development, and of the combined term community development. If it makes any contribution at all to the reader’s perspective I shall be satisfied that it has accomplished its purpose.

In this connection I ask my friends in the underdeveloped areas two questions. Are you making the best use of the history of Western development and the present condition of the West to learn what you might best adopt and best avoid in your approaches to the development of your own countries? To repeat the mistakes of the West would be needless folly. Have you thoroughly and critically examined your own assumptions and those of your governments in approaching problems of development and welfare? These assumptions lie at the heart of practical decisions.

The Concept of Community

‘The village or township’, wrote de Tocqueville, ‘is the only association which is so perfectly natural that wherever a number of men are collected it seems to constitute itself’. 1 It is the smallest group occupying a common territory whose bonds are not essentially those of kinship, though as Aristotle points out, ‘The most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony or off-shoot from a family; and some have thus called the members of the village by the name “sucklings of the same milk”, or, again, of “sons and the sons of sons”’. 2

Aristotle of course wanted to prove that the polis—‘the final and perfect association, formed from a number of villages’—had its genesis in the family, which to him was the necessary

and natural nucleus of society. But neither evolutionary speculation nor distinctions between what is ‘natural’ and what is not concern us here. It is enough to recognize that the character of the village communities with which we are largely concerned in this book cannot be properly understood without reference to their kinship systems. They are composed of groups of kith and kin, friends and relatives, living together in the same place, sharing the same fundamental values, and participating in regular activities in which the frequency of personal encounter and interaction is high. Common residence, common values, and common activities—these form the tripod supporting the village community.

These groups may be either ‘open’ or ‘closed’. That is, they may be open for individuals and families to come or go more or less as they please, though many are related by blood or marriage, or they may be closed to anyone who cannot establish blood relationship, actual or fictional, with the clan or lineage which as a corporate kindred constitutes the village. Indeed, even in urbanized Illinois, where I am writing, rural communities cannot be studied without some regard for ‘the web of kinship’.

Unlike the word village, however, the word community is charged with ambiguity; its associations and meanings are many and subtle. It is not only the attribute of every group brought together by the fusion of certain integrative forces such as shared locality and shared interests. It is also something to be achieved, such as the national community or the world community. For it is at the same time a descriptive and a normative concept. It is as much an ‘ought’ as an ‘is’. When we use another of its forms, e.g. the noun ‘communion’ or the verb ‘commune’, we stress aspects which provide the philosophical overtones to be heard in so much discussion and debate about community development. And, indeed, most of us interested in community development draw sustenance from the wide range of meanings and insights suggested by this single, central word. It is part of the intellectual and imaginative grist, part of
the fascination, of our work. We could abandon the word, replacing it by one less rich, but to abandon the word might be to abandon the Concept of Community, which shows signs of becoming pivotal in the welfare programmes of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, of the governments of many underdeveloped countries (e.g. Mexico, India, Sudan, and Gold Coast), and of governmental as well as voluntary agencies in North America. Though whether the concept can be transformed into a social value that will counterbalance overcentralization and the further growth of monolithic economic and political structures remains to be seen.

The chief virtue of the Concept of Community is that it emphasizes the qualitative aspects of human development rather than the quantitative. It properly subordinates the quantitative to the qualitative.¹

Its metaphysical, ethical, and aesthetic implications are indestructible threads in the fabric of ideas about the problems and paradoxes of man in society. For example, in Plato's Laws the Athenian Stranger says of Persia under Cyrus, 'And the nation waxed in all respects, because there was freedom and friendship and communion of mind among them’.² Or in his Gorgias Socrates says, 'O Callicles, if there were not some community of feelings among mankind, however varying in different persons... I do not see how we could ever communicate our impressions to one another. I make this remark because I see that you and I have a common feeling... And yet, my friend, I would rather... that the whole world should be at odds with me, and oppose me, rather than that

¹ There are quantitative standards of development, to be sure, though they follow from the qualitative. If a country's population growth totally absorbs the increased national product, obviously poverty will not decrease. Jacob Viner has pleaded for 'statistical evidence or criteria of desirable economic development'. By desirable he means desirable vis-à-vis those aspects of a society and its economy that are functionally interrelated with a particular economic development. He proposes as the basic criterion of desirable economic development 'an absolute decrease in the numbers of those living at less than some minimum standard of income'. See his contribution to The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas. (Hoselitz ed.) Chicago, 1952.

Here Plato not only expresses our dependence on the symbolical systems which permit communication and communion between men, but also the tension which is inevitably present, whether veiled or revealed, between the community and the individual in his struggle to be true to himself. We discover this tension between the community, or its sanctioned authorities, and the individual in the tragedies of Sophocles and Shakespeare and Ibsen. It is the substance of the tragedy and martyrdom that in part define the human condition and therefore all of our art and history. No amount of social planning or re-organization can eliminate it, for as Raymond Firth has said, 'There is always a basic inconsistency in social activity at some points, between individual and group interests—that is, the interests of a number of other individuals. This is the real eternal conflict in the nature of society, far deeper than any conflict between classes, which is only one of its manifestations.'

The essence of every great religion consists of values which transcend the world and thus vigorously oppose the equation of God with society, the substitution of mundane purpose and allegiance for cosmic purpose and allegiance. But contrary to much polemic, no great religion rejects the importance of social justice and of service to our fellows. To the Hindu right action is superior to inaction. Such action, as Gandhi exemplified, implies selfless commitment to the loving support of others. It requires non-attachment to results, to the fruits of action. It is undertaken without domineering preoccupation with success, as a good in itself. The Tibetan Doctrine of Buddhism affirms that 'To live to benefit mankind is the first step'. And both Hinduism and Buddhism are popularly thought to be religions of inaction and the negation of social responsibility. On the

3 '...I see divinity nothing more than society transfigured and thought of symbolically', Durkheim wrote in his Sociologie et Philosophie.
contrary, they, like Christianity, contain values which provide the necessary non-material resources for the development of the human community.

A Christian theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, has perhaps stated the dual allegiance of the individual, to the City of Man and to the City of God, for all transcendent religions when he writes that the individual’s ‘creativity is directed towards the establishment, perpetuation and perfection of historical communities. Therefore the meaning of his life is derived from his relation to the historical process. But the freedom which makes this creativity possible transcends all communal loyalties and even history itself. Each individual has a direct relation to eternity; for he seeks for the completion of the meaning of his life beyond the fragmentary realizations of meaning which can be discerned at any point in the process where an individual may happen to live and die’. Such a view denies that the human community, of whatever kind or size, may command the exclusive allegiance of the individual.

For Aristotle the politically organized community was a natural organism more important and real than its individual members, and was thus justified in compelling the individual to conform absolutely to his station and its duties. His is an authoritarian theocratic community which forces its citizens and servants to be good (as Rousseau’s authoritarian secular community, with its civil religion, forces them to be free). Today we designate social systems marked by this type of relationship between community and individual as closed or totalitarian.

2 The use of closed and open in this connection, following Karl Popper, should not be confused with their earlier use in this essay as sociological terms to characterize the structural principles of non-literate societies, though there is some relationship between the two usages. For Popper the closed society is represented by Plato, the open by Pericles. Popper makes the mistake of placing tribal societies under a single rubric, which he could have avoided by acquaintance with the work of social anthropologists as well as political philosophers, but in spite of this I think his use of closed and open to distinguish totalitarian from democratic societies appropriate as long as its limitations are recognized. See his *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, 2 vols. London, 1945.
In contrast to the closed authoritarian society we find another theme recurring in political theory regarding the ideal type of relationship between community and individual. This is the open or free society. And this analytical dichotomy is not unknown to sociology, though it has undergone substantial modification at the hands of scholars who, unlike most political theorists, rely on systematic empirical investigation of social phenomena. Max Weber, for example, formulated two types of social relationship, the ‘communal’ and the ‘associative’, which are related to his two types of stable authority — the ‘traditional’ and the ‘rational-legal’ respectively. The student of comparative sociology discovers that every social system he examines manifests qualities of authority and liberty, tradition and rational innovation, in various degrees and combinations (and these will be different at different times).

The second theme, that of the open or free society, is to be found in interpretations of the community and its political institutions which pursue certain implications of the theory of social contract or consent as the ‘logical presupposition’ upon which a rationally-ordered society should be founded, the presupposition at the heart of much revolutionary apologia since the seventeenth century. According to this view, as stated by Locke in an influential passage, ‘The only way by which any one divests himself of his natural liberty and puts on the bonds of civil society is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it’.1

To the organic, closed, and authoritarian community Locke opposed the artificial, open, and libertarian community. In Locke’s eyes not only is the small community not the natural phenomenon Aristotle considered it, but ‘were it not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men there would be no need of any other [community], no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community [of man-

kind], and by positive agreements combine into smaller and divided associations.'

To him, then, the macrocosm is natural, the microcosm is not—a rather strange position for an avowed empiricist to take, though it may be understood as a corollary of his rationalism, the rationalism of his age, which was infected by the a priori predilections of all rationalism. The small community thus becomes merely an artifice of man's reason.

In comparing the theories of Aristotle and Locke we find that to the former the Greek city-state is the final and perfect natural community, while to the latter only the human community as a whole is perfectly natural. The investigations of sociologists and the assumptions of contemporary protagonists of the small community as the core of vital, democratic society both give, in this, more support to Aristotle than to Locke. In one form or another the debate regarding the nature of the human community and the individual's place in it has continued down to contemporary attempts to determine what values and relationships should shape and govern it. It is not only found among those who are principally occupied in advocating authoritarianism or defending liberty, but also among those who do not agree with St. Thomas Aquinas that 'The city is, in fact, the most important thing constituted by human reason. For it is the object and final aim of all lesser communities.'

They see in the small community the most satisfying and fully human relationships and call for its revival. They would reverse the Aristotelian dictum of St. Thomas, saying instead that lesser communities are the object and final aim of all greater communities. Of course, the civitas that St. Thomas had in mind corresponded more nearly to the polis of Aristotle, 'a small and intimate society', than to the urban conglomeration of our civilization. But, following Aristotle, he was saying that the lesser exists to serve the greater, that the 'final and perfect form' of the smaller was the larger, that the goal of the village community should be

1 Ibid. p. 63.
to become a city, and that it is only in the city that men realize
the significance and potentiality of their being.

We can now see clearly the different foci of the thinkers on
community whose ideas we have been discussing: mankind; the
intermediate level, in this case the city-state; and the small
community. Surely each of these can legitimately claim due
consideration. The task is to discover the appropriate rela­
tionships between them—socially, politically, and economi­
cally—in terms of the needs of human development, whatever
we decide those needs may be.

The Small Community and Social Renewal

Many voices have been raised in defence of the intrinsic value of
the small community to any life that is worth living, and, as we
have noted, to the maintenance of liberal democracy. It is not
surprising, and certainly significant enough to observe in pass­
ing, that democratic socialists, disabused by experience of the
notion (an article of faith for many) that nationalization and
centralized public control of industry *ipso facto* spell social
justice and the good society. They are beginning to realize
that the approach of the so-called utopian socialists to social re­
organization was less naive and reprehensible, more realistic
and critically sound, than has usually been conceded. For many
this has been the result of facing the fact that ‘Instead of regard­
ing social change as tending towards the enlargement of free­
dom, we must assume that increased concentration of power,
whether in the form of technological development or social
organization, will always produce exploitation, injustice, and
inequality in a society, unless the community possesses a social
conscience strong enough to civilize them’.  

The next step is to look for that level of society where a social
conscience of this kind and a mode of behaviour appropriate to
it can be cultivated as an awareness of and sensitivity to the re-

sponsibilities of free men. This will be found in the small group according to contemporary philosophers and prophets of community, for in the small group there is the least dissociation between precept and practice and the deepest discipline in responding adequately to the needs of others. 

Who are the proponents of the small community and what are they saying? Perhaps if we briefly, without any pretense of doing justice to the full measure of their thought, touch upon some of the crucial ideas of two of them, Martin Buber and Baker Brownell, we may gain some understanding of their mission.

They begin by attacking our complacent acceptance of the values and relationships of urbanized 'associative' society, in which the individual is fragmented and isolated in terms of his special functions and interests instead of preserving the social and spiritual wholeness that is to be found in members of the small community. Brownell speaks of community as 'the integration of the parts and functions of life as expressed in the group... It is the way whereby the multiple functions of men are made organically whole.' 'The community is less an attribute of some function or interest... than an integral whole which is organic in structure, limited in size, concrete in context, substantive in syntax.' Although Brownell derives his major philosophical premises from Dewey, I doubt that Aristotle would find this definition unfamiliar or uncongenial. They differ radically in this matter only at the point of Brownell's liberal egalitarianism.

Buber and Brownell agree that we can effectively cope with

1 A sociologist and historian, George C. Homans, concludes his recent study of the small human group on a similar note: 'At the level of the small group, society has always been able to cohere. We infer, therefore, that if civilization is to stand, it must maintain, in the relation between the groups that make up society and the central direction of society, some of the features of the small group itself. If we do not solve this problem, the effort to achieve our most high-minded purposes may lead us not to Utopia but to Byzantium.' The Human Group. New York, 1950. p. 469. Indian socialists, at least, agree. See Wofford, Harris and Clare. Indira Afire. New York, 1951. Chapter 12, esp. pp. 268-71.

the present human crisis at its deepest levels only by the regeneration, the structural renewal, of the small community as part of a communitas communitatum, a community of communities. Not only will this require the renewal of the small community, but, in Buber’s view, the transformation of ‘the town organically in the closest possible alliance with technological developments... to turn it into an aggregate composed of smaller units’.¹ Both he and Brownell specifically reject what has been romantic and utopian in the thinking of previous theorists of community, such as the destruction or abandonment of machines and towns. It is the use of the machine that is wrong, not something in the machine itself. It is the structure of the larger population centres, town and city, that is at fault, not simply the fact that large numbers of people live together in small spaces. The relationship between the small community and the wider community is one which requires continual reconsideration in the light of the values and purposes of a society. As Buber has realistically and wisely said, ‘The relationship between centralism and decentralization is a problem which, as we have seen, cannot be approached in principle, but, like everything to do with the relationship between idea and reality, only with great spiritual tact, with the constant and tireless weighing and measuring of the right proportion between them’.² Differences of opinion are inevitable even when minimal centralization is the generally accepted policy, for what is enough and what is too much under any given circumstance is always subject to dispute. But it is a dispute that must not go to the centralists by default. Every Hamilton should be balanced by a Jefferson.

In reading Brownell one is aware of an inclination on his part to make his ideal of community the touchstone of all human values, relationships, and activities. What furthers community


² Ibid. p. 137.
is good; what dissipates or disrupts it is bad. This is reminiscent of Durkheim, who wrote that ‘Everything which is the source of solidarity is moral, everything which forces man to take account of other men is moral, everything which forces him to regulate his conduct through something other than the strivings of his ego is moral, and morality is as solid as these ties are numerous and strong’. Solidarity meant to Durkheim what community means to Brownell. We may ask if the basic question is not, Solidarity for what? Community for what? It is not sufficient to assume that the quality of group life is good because the group has ‘community’. It is not sufficient that they participate in common activities frequently or share in the active management of common affairs. These are undoubtedly fundamental attributes of community, and as such are necessary to the realization of the values and experiences which are to man the justification of his existence. But it is only in furthering purposes proper to man that any community adequately justifies its existence, for it is by virtue of our rational faculties that we are men, and reason unashamedly asks such a justification.

For most men, as we have seen, community is more of a means to some purpose that transcends time and the limitations of the human condition than an end in itself. For them, in T. S. Eliot’s lines,

There is no life that is not in community,
And no community not lived in praise of God.

Their hierarchy of values reads: the Eternal Sacred, whether gods many or one; the Community, as the temporal aspect of the continuum embracing both the divine and the human; the Individual. Westerners have upended this hierarchy, placing at its top ‘the free development of each’ or some similar formula. The error lies in suggesting that any one of these orders of reality is more ‘real’ than the others, or that one can be seg-

1 The Division of Labor in Society. (Simpson tr.) New York, 1933. p. 399.
8 As did Aristotle of the polis, Locke of the individual, Marx of the class, and Durkheim of the ‘collective consciousness’ of a society.
regated from the others and in fact be made to fulfill their functions. The community is not prior to the individual nor the individual to the community. They are concomitants one of the other. There is no community rebirth, no community development, where individuals remain unreborn. There can be no justice for the community and no communal fulfillment unless there is justice and fulfillment for individuals. The community may not depend on John Jones or George Smith for its existence and health, though it is physically and morally diminished by their death or desertion. It does depend on individuals who share a common life.

The field worker does not question the reality or importance of the individuals among whom he works one by one or in small groups. He knows that community development can begin only in individuals, as a spontaneous response to the challenge he presents, or rather that the individual presents to himself. It begins with the individual’s acceptance of new values, or realignment of old values, and then spreads to other individuals. Often it happens in several individuals more or less simultaneously.

Always, of course, it is the communication of these values to a large enough group, and their assimilation by that group, which decides whether or not they will alter the relationships and usages—the social structure, the organization of activities, the mode of production and distribution—of the entire community. When they do not, conflict is likely to arise between the exponents of the new and the defenders of the old. In this situation they must agree to disagree peaceably until one or the other or both give way, or one group must impose their will on the other, or they must separate because the things that divide them are stronger than the things that unite them. In other words, there is either a discontinuity of development or its continuance by force, or there is structural fission in the community because the innovations are not accepted by enough people to maintain its cohesion.
Innovations must inevitably overcome the resistance of traditional forms, which are tenacious. Borrowing a term from Spinoza, we might call this quality of persistence 'social conatus'. 'Each particular thing, interacting with other particular things within the common order of Nature, exhibits a characteristic tendency to cohesion and to the preservation of its identity, a "striving (conatus), so far as it lies in itself to do so, to persist in its own being".'

It is the fact of social conatus or persistence which validates synchronic study of a community, i.e. of its uniformities in a 'slice of time', permitting the abstraction from empirical data of a logical model of its social structure which is both internally consistent and consistent with the behavioural data gathered in the field. In my opinion, if we are to understand any community, or the society of which it is a part, we must begin with such a model, delineated as simply and economically as possible. In this matter we should be Cartesian, but only in the sense that clear and distinct ideas, clearly and distinctly communicated, should be valued more highly than obscure and vague ideas obscurely and vaguely communicated (always assuming, of course, that these ideas accord with the facts or that they help us to obtain, categorize, and relate the facts in a significant way).

Thus we begin with what Comte appropriately termed social statics—the unbrokenly uniform structure and function of social institutions during any given period of time—but we do not stop there. Just as economists have found that the static analysis of the conditions of equilibrium in the economic system is inadequate for a full explanation of economic phenomena and must be complemented by the dynamic analysis of the conditions of disequilibrium and change in the economic system, so

1 Hampshire, Stuart. Spinoza. Penguin Books, 1951. p. 76. For Spinoza's own elaboration of this concept see his Ethics, Pt. III, Prop. VII.

2 Though we reject his mechanistic sociology.
Theoretical sociologists have long recognized the importance of social dynamics if the processes of social change, of broken uniformities and re-formations, are to be understood, though the number of good field studies by sociologists and social anthropologists of social change in particular societies is slight. This is partly because such studies are best based on diachronic or multichronic studies by the same investigator and the opportunities for such studies are limited, and partly because of preoccupation with static description and analysis. The sociologist who studies the process of social life through time, i.e. at different points in (or spans of) time, becomes a kind of historian. And, indeed, it is to history as a special discipline that we must turn at present for the most enlightening accounts of social change and development in particular societies (though they lack the concreteness of the few good studies by social anthropologists of change in peasant communities).

Theories of social evolution have been associated with the doctrine of inevitable, unilinear progress from 'lower' to 'higher', the intellectual deus ex machina that resolved with a single stroke all perplexities regarding human destiny in this world and the role of human reason, will, and responsibility in achieving it. But intelligence and experience have overcome dogma, no matter how refined. The stark limitations of our capacity to transform the world, the tenuous nature of every human achievement, and the bitter fact of recurrent backslidings have become painfully apparent to us. Progress as an absolute could not flourish long.

The fate of evolution considered as predetermined progress should not divert us from readiness to acknowledge and use development as a normative term in appropriate contexts. Descriptively, we use the term change.

Social development, as distinct from social change, is the purposive adaptation to altered conditions or the purposive alteration of conditions.

Development signifies change from something thought to be less desirable to something thought to be more desirable. It
further signifies an emphasis on the rational direction of human organization and skill towards the attainment of the desirable. Development, then, is purposive, and purpose in human affairs is moulded by individual and social values.

But development, like community, does not justify itself. It can be justified only by its purpose. Although it is true that ends are present in means, development is essentially a means to the ends determined by a society’s system of values. Both the concept of development and the concept of community are normative not in the sense that they automatically involve eternal absolutes but that in the configuration of language and thought of any society they will, by their association with the values of that society or some part of it, inevitably carry normative implications.

If the people of an Illinois village think of community in terms of the exclusive solidarity of established residents as opposed to newcomers or strangers, and of development simply as the acquisition of a cinema or a ‘supermart’, I cannot tell them that what they are interested in is not community development. I can only suggest indirectly that these words have other connotations which are preferable. To me personally community development may be associated with certain provisional spiritual absolutes by which I judge any specific example; to my hypothetical Illinois villagers it has other associations; to African villagers it may have associations that differ sharply from both mine and those of my compatriots. One of our tasks in a book such as this is to give similar content to similar terms (and between these covers there is at least encouraging unanimity about the principles which should guide our approach to the practice of helping people to help themselves).

Social and economic planning is an important part of development, but any development plan which attempts to impose an ideal system by fiat and compulsion is a bad plan. As Mr. Beckett concludes, ‘There is no blueprint, and there may not be any one road’. Also, it may at least be hoped that we will one day have the linguistic good sense to jettison terms such as ‘social engineering’. They are inapt and misleading. We do not engineer people; we work with them. To me it seems inherent in community development that it permits neither fiat nor engineering.
Morris Ginsberg has suggested three criteria of development: (1) the growth of man's control over the conditions of life—i.e. his natural environment, his society, and himself; (2) the growth of co-operation within and between societies; and (3) the growth of freedom in co-operative relationships. The first two of these satisfy the biologist's criteria of development, but the third may be thought to belong to ethics rather than biology. 'If, however, development is understood as consisting in a process whereby a full realization or fulfilment of human capacities is gradually attained, that society might be regarded as most developed which evokes the most spontaneous devotion to common ends among its members and releases the greatest fund of intelligent energy.' But in any case 'it is clear that ethical and biological criteria of development cannot be assumed to coincide without careful examination. Increase in power over nature, including human nature and social organization itself, may be used in the service of bad ends, and even intelligent and free co-operation within a community may be ethically bad in so far as it ignores or overrides the just claims of other communities. Clearly not all development, and not even all social development, is good'.

I should make the immediate distinction between biological and social development that human purpose is an inextricable part of the latter while it is not of the former. Social development is purposive in the sense that it implies conscious purpose or design ('directed change'). And it is to ethics that we must turn for the valuation of purpose, for what is good or bad in any social development.

The developmental differs radically from the cataclysmic, with the latter's delusive appeals to violent action. Development is gradual, but it is not a gradualness that lends itself as an excuse for inaction. It means growth, but it must be growth cultivated by unequivocal and constant witness to justice, liberty, and compassion.

2 Development programmes may inform political action, but they are not a substitute for it.
Social change is everywhere a constant fact of social life, whether caused from without or from within a specific social system. ‘There is no action without reaction; there is no exclusively one-way exercise of conditioning power, no mode of regulation that operates wholly from above to below or from within outwards or from without inwards. Whatever influences the changes of other things is itself changed.’ In this sense only is there a dialectic in the social process.

The traditional social systems of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America have almost all been exposed to the invasion of alien forces from the West, both material and non-material, since the Renaissance. The results of this have been many and varied. Change has been gradual in some cases, violent in others, beneficial to some, hurtful to others.

Westerners have been predominantly self-regarding and selfish in their relations with non-Western peoples. This fact is only underscored by the compassionate concern and sacrifice of some Westerners—all too few—for the well-being of non-Westerners. Our official acts of enlightenment and charity, the extension of our principles to our behaviour towards peoples who do not share them, have mostly been done in ‘fits of absentmindedness’ or when political exigencies forced them upon us. European imperialism carried within it the seeds of its own dissolution: colonial peoples, or more exactly their politically active elites, have found in the principles of their rulers a telling weapon with which to defeat the power of their rulers. For as René Maunier has said, ‘It is a law of all colonisation that civilized man should bring to the stranger the ideas of nationality and liberty’.

The dissolution of colonialism offers an opportunity for new relations between the former colonial peoples and their former rulers. But we must first exorcise the devils within us which cry for renewed conquest by the West on the one hand and for counterconquest and imperialism by the East, when the East

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shall be mighty, on the other. There is no brand of imperialism that is morally better than another. The goals of a political union containing both West and East, and of an international programme for mutual development—approached not from the top but from the bottom, through the small community and the region of which it is a part—are the only substitutes free men may countenance for the dominant-subordinate, master-servant, relationships of the past and present and their exploitive goals.

Community development, in which 'reciprocity, intimacy, and unanimity' are central, should be the beginning and end of all large-scale programmes of economic and technical assistance. This is not to say that the village community should be our exclusive concern. It is a question of emphasis and of the most fruitful means for enriching life everywhere and enabling men to fulfill their destiny in a way appropriate to their common humanity. The various levels of development are concomitants: the community of the region and the region of the community, whether in the Tennessee Valley or the Damodar Valley. It is in the nature of community development that it must come from within through the greatest possible participation of the people in accordance with needs determined by their values, relying on persuasion rather than compulsion, and mediating with the needs of region, nation, and world.

In this mediation the Great Society and the Small Community meet and sustain one another.
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION

NORMAN J. HART

This symposium contains contributions by sociologists, economists, educationists, planners, technicians, and community development officers. The present writer is an expert in none of these fields, but rather a layman concerned with the principles and methods involved in mutual aid programmes, and more specifically in community-level development projects.

Each of the four parts of this chapter will discuss one of the factors to be considered in connection with the contribution of the non-governmental organization to community development. The first part will sketch the nature of the non-governmental organization; the second part will briefly describe some of the major inter-governmental and governmental programmes currently under way and the extent to which non-governmental organizations are participating in them; the third part will give some examples of existing non-governmental projects; and the last part will attempt to deal with some of the general problems and considerations arising from the non-governmental approach.

I

The Non-Governmental Organization

The non-governmental organization is essentially a product of the nineteenth century. It is of a voluntary and non-profit character. The growth of the non-governmental organization
reflected the new social and political consciousness of the people in their struggle for greater power. Whenever reforms were demanded new organizations came to life, some to fade away after a short time, others to become permanent features of our domestic and international life. Many social services which are now taken for granted—general and free education, to mention only one—were pioneered less than a century ago by non-governmental organizations. In fact, in many fields non-governmental organizations preceded governments and by practical example showed governments what they should do, and often how they could do it.

In the international field, international non-governmental organizations were also precursors. Frequently it has been through their initiative that official action has been taken to create inter-governmental agencies. As the modern state grew, the character of many non-governmental organizations changed. The purely philanthropic, charitable, and propagandistic organization made way for the pressure group, the bargaining agency, and the specialized institution. As the state played a greater part in the lives of the people, so the non-governmental organization became a more influential body. Today few governments can determine their economic policy without consulting trade unions, employers associations, chambers of commerce, and co-operative organizations.

Similarly, on an international level the growth and influence of the International Labour Organization has been substantially due to the efforts and activities of the international trade union movement. In fact, the universality of non-governmental organizations was recognised before the universality of nations. The first international non-governmental organization was established in 1835. In 1910 the Union of International Associations was founded, and it anticipated in many of its functions the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations.

With the founding the League certain international non-governmental organizations were accorded a consultative status and made many important contributions, particularly during
the early years, to that body's work. This type of relationship was continued and extended by the United Nations, and today 212 international non-governmental organizations have consultative status with its Economic and Social Council and 99 with Unesco.

II

The United Nations Programme

The peoples of the underdeveloped areas require two kinds of assistance: (1) the help of qualified technical personnel; (2) capital investment.

Since 1945 they have received such assistance mainly from the Western industrialized countries through the United Nations Specialized Agencies, the United States Point Four Programme, and the Colombo Plan. The amount and the kind of aid given through these programmes is generally recognized as being insufficient, and private capital is generally not available, except for oil and certain other types of industrial development in the Middle East and Latin America.

Consequently the gap between the developed and the underdeveloped areas has continued to grow. As the United Nations World Economic Report for 1950–51 points out: 'In the underdeveloped countries, as a group, the level of industrial production increased less than the world average... there has been little or no further industrial progress... increases in industrial production between 1950–51 were with some exceptions small by comparison with those achieved in the other countries during this period'. And while this gap increases, the Report continues, 'world supplies of food continue to increase less rapidly than its population and far less rapidly than its output of industrial goods'. Furthermore, 'the consumption of food per capita is less now than it was fifteen years ago... inequalities in food consumption are now greater than before the war'.

What has the United Nations done to help meet this problem?
In 1949 the Economic and Social Council set up a committee of experts to enquire into unemployment and under-employment in the underdeveloped countries and to report on national and international measures required to deal with them. The committee of experts found that this problem could not be dealt with in isolation, that it was only one part of the general problem of underdevelopment. Accordingly, the committee's report suggested in its main recommendations that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development should gear itself to lend to the underdeveloped countries $1,000 million a year and that the United Nations should establish an International Development Authority to assist the underdeveloped countries in preparing, co-ordinating, and implementing their programmes of economic development. In August 1951 the Economic and Social Council requested the International Bank to consider what contribution such a body could make to the general scheme. The proposals of the committee of experts received warm support from the representatives of the underdeveloped countries but were strongly criticized by the representatives of the more developed countries. In January 1952 the Sixth General Assembly of the United Nations passed, by thirty votes to sixteen, a resolution which called for the preparation of a plan for the collection and administration of a large international fund for the economic development of underdeveloped areas. The United States representative told the General Assembly that while defence spending continued at its present level the United States could not make any contribution to such a fund. He challenged the committee of experts estimate that an annual inflow of $10,000 million would be required to achieve an increase of 2 per cent in the national income, per capita, of the underdeveloped countries. He estimated that a total fund of $500 million would bring about a noticeable improvement of living standards.

At the last session of the Economic and Social Council, May—

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August 1952, the report of the International Bank requested at the 1951 session was presented. The report was limited to an examination of the proposed International Finance Corporation, and outlined the role, operation, and organization of the suggested corporation. The Council, by fifteen votes to three, with three abstentions, commended the International Bank for its report, requested it to continue its examination of this proposal, and suggested that it should urge governments to consult with national organizations and business groups interested in stimulating the flow of capital to underdeveloped countries. At the same time it proposed that the International Bank, in the light of further examination, should seek the views of member governments on the desirability of establishing such a corporation. It further requested the International Bank to report the results of this examination to the Council in 1953.

At the same session the Economic and Social Council had to take action on the General Assembly resolution noted above. The Council had before them a working paper prepared by the Secretary-General which outlined a series of alternative proposals for a special international fund. The Council decided to appoint a further committee, composed of nine persons selected by the Secretary-General, who should meet not later than December 1952 and report not later than March 1953, to prepare a detailed plan for the establishment of a special international fund.

During the debate the United States representative expressed the view that an insufficient number of countries would be willing to make effective contributions to the proposed special fund. The French and United Kingdom representatives stated that for the time being their countries would be unable to make any contributions. Thus, after three years of delay and frustration, more committees have been appointed to ward off further action.

Meanwhile, the work of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies has continued to grow through the Expanded Technical Assistance Programme. For the initial financial period, the
Technical Assistance Board, the Programme's governing body, received pledges amounting to just over $20 million from fifty-five member states for the eighteen-month period, June 1950-December 1951. Of this $17 million had been paid in by the end of the period. For the twelve-month period of 1952, sixty-three member states have pledged the equivalent of nearly $19 million. Thus, while the total is greater in relation to the length of the period, the actual contributions made by member states, notably the United Kingdom, are smaller.

The Technical Assistance Board is the policy-making body and co-ordinates the work of the Technical Assistance Administration and the five Specialized Agencies participating in the Expanded Technical Assistance Programme. The Board is notified of all requests made to these Agencies by governments, approves projects and procedures, and allocates funds for projects not covered by the automatic allocations made to the six Agencies through this special account.

There are four types of activities undertaken through the Expanded Programme. Firstly, expert advice through the provision of consultants and field workers. This is the usual form of assistance rendered to governments. Secondly, fellowships and scholarships granted by the Specialized Agencies to nationals of underdeveloped areas nominated by their governments. Thirdly, training and demonstration centres in the underdeveloped areas, sponsored mainly by Unesco, FAO, and WHO, particularly in the field of fundamental education. Fourthly, the dissemination of scientific and technical information.

Certain broad principles have been established for the development of these programmes. Foremost is that technical assistance by the United Nations will only be given at the request of governments, and that such assistance will be given only to governments and not to private agencies. Furthermore, such assistance must not be used as a means of economic and political interference and the experts provided must be not only technically competent, but must also have a sympathetic understanding of the social and cultural values of the people they
assist. Governments so assisted are usually required to assume responsibility for a substantial part of the technical services provided, particularly the part payable in local currencies, though in certain cases the Board does exempt receiver governments from this liability.

The *Fourth Report of the Technical Assistance Board* records that to the end of 1951 some 797 technical experts, covering all fields, have been placed in fifty-five underdeveloped countries and communities. In addition, some 845 fellows drawn from seventy countries and territories have been placed in technical training institutions or otherwise provided with training facilities. By 30 June 1952 an additional 769 fellowships had been awarded. These figures do not include certain regional schools and seminars which were held in 1952.

How have non-governmental organizations fared in relation to these programmes? Firstly, the resolution adopted by the Sixth General Assembly of the United Nations on 21 January 1952 should be recorded. This resolution stated that in view of the fact that certain non-profit organizations were engaged in giving technical assistance to several underdeveloped areas, the Secretary-General should study the possibility of co-ordinating their policies and activities with those of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies.

Since this resolution was passed, however, little or no action has been forthcoming from the United Nations. Certain private agencies, not normally considered as non-governmental organizations, have initiated or participated in mutual aid programmes. The Ford Foundation, for example, has signed an agreement with the Indian Government whereby financial assistance will be granted for a rural extension service, including fifty community development centres.

In addition, certain non-governmental organizations have provided experts for field programmes and participated in technical assistance seminars. Other non-governmental organizations, through their consultants attached to the United Nations, have sought to influence the composition of technical
assistance teams and the type of experts used. But it is evident that the United Nations, so far, has made no concerted effort to utilize the services of non-governmental organizations, nor has it tried to stimulate non-governmental activity in this field. On the other side, few non-governmental organizations have sought to establish programmes involving practical co-operation with the United Nations. Certain organizations, such as the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, the World Veterans Federation, and the World Federation of United Nations Associations, have expressed their concern about mutual aid programmes, and have suggested certain principles which should underlie these programmes.

The Point Four Programme

How have non-governmental organizations fared with relation to bilateral programmes? The United States Point Four Programme, under the Technical Co-operation Administration of the Mutual Security Agency, is the only one for which detailed figures are available.

In January 1949 President Truman first made his Point Four proposals. He suggested that the United States should make available both technical knowledge and capital investment to the underdeveloped areas. These proposals were made effective in 1950 by the passing of the Act for International Development and the establishment of a new central administrative agency, the Technical Co-operation Administration, within the Department of State. From the start this Administration received the advice of a group of private citizens, the International Development Advisory Board. In March 1951 this Board suggested that there should be a unification of all major foreign economic activities of the United States Government under one inclusive agency. Subsequently, at the beginning of 1952, this body—the Mutual Security Agency—was established and the operations of the Technical Co-operation Administration were made subject to the supervision of its Director. At the
same time, the Technical Co-operation Administration remained an agency of the Department of State. A geographical division was established between the two agencies, the Technical Co-operation Administration being responsible for the American Republics, the independent countries of Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian sub-continent, while the Mutual Security Agency inherited from the Economic Co-operation Administration the countries of Southeast Asia and the overseas dependencies of European countries.

The Technical Co-operation Administration undertake their programmes in understanding with the United Nations, and maintain a special liaison unit with the Technical Assistance Board.

During the first year of operation, 1951, the Point Four Programme received $35 million, $13 million of which constituted the United States contribution to the United Nations programme. The balance was expended in bilateral programmes, the largest portion, $11 million, being allocated to the inter-American area, $5.5 million being allocated to the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, and $200,000 to the Far East. The balance, nearly $6 million, was unallocated geographically or covered executive direction, administration, and training costs.

In 1952 a grant of $210 million was made available for the Point Four Programme. Approximately $66 million, the major portion, were earmarked for programmes in Southeast Asia—$50 and $10 million for co-operative programmes in India and Pakistan respectively, which were matched by equal amounts from their own funds. A further $56 million were spent in the Middle East, of which $23.45 million were committed by January 1952 to programmes in Iran. $50 million were earmarked for relief and rehabilitation programmes for Israeli refugees, $19 million for programmes in Latin America, up to $12 for United Nations programmes, and up to $1 million for programmes of the Organization of America States.

The main efforts of the Point Four Programme have been con-
centrated in the fields of health, agriculture, and education. Approximately 80 per cent of the 1951 budget was spent in these fields, although co-operative and other projects were also initiated. The same emphasis will continue during 1952.

To March 1952 the Administration of the Point Four Programme had entered into sixty-nine contracts with non-governmental organizations. These were made up of thirty-four with universities and institutes situated in the United States, fifteen with private business corporations, and seven with non-profit, non-governmental organizations. The balance of the contracts has been made with private consultants and universities in other countries. The total sum involved in these contracts amounts to $4,200,000, or approximately 12 per cent of the initial Point Four appropriation.

The largest grants have been made to United States universities and institutes with programmes in the underdeveloped areas. Grants to such institutions account for 28 per cent of the funds made available to private organizations. Non-governmental organizations received only 16 per cent, and of this one agency, the Near East Foundation, received three contracts amounting to 9 percent of the total amount, or more than half of the general non-governmental grants.

The Middle Eastern countries constituted the main project area, receiving 42 per cent of the funds. Southern and Central America received 17 per cent, and Greece 11 per cent. Southeast Asian countries received only 7 per cent, while one country, Liberia, received 6 per cent. Unclassified world projects or comprehensive surveys accounted for the balance of 17 per cent.

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1 This is a minimum figure and excludes several contracts made on a per diem basis. From statistics supplied by the Mutual Security Agency and compiled by the author.
A breakdown of the projects reveals the following:

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<th>Type of project</th>
<th>No. of projects</th>
<th>Percentage of total allocation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Training programmes</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural, community, and agricultural projects</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>Photography and films</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Capital equipment and services</td>
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<td>Reports, surveys, and studies</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>Libraries, exhibitions, and conferences</td>
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<td>Municipal development, housing, town planning, and road improvements</td>
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<td>Specialists, advisors, and consultants</td>
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<td>Miscellaneous projects on per diem basis or no details of grant available</td>
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Total: 69 projects, 100%

1 Based on the figure of $4,100,000.

It can be seen from these figures that the Point Four Programme Administration has made few grants to the general non-governmental organization. This is due, in most cases, less to a lack of desire by the Administration to use such organizations, than to a general caution on the part of these organizations against receiving governmental funds.

While educational organizations are mainly concerned with programmes providing for technical training, non-governmental organizations are equally, if not primarily, concerned with social welfare, moral and spiritual development. In most cases United States universities do not have established and continuous programmes in the underdeveloped areas, whereas non-governmental organizations, often having worked in these areas for many years, are anxious to remain there in the future and
thus are more susceptible to local opinions and pressures. Furthermore, United States universities will tend to be more influenced by national considerations, while non-governmental organizations able to undertake such programmes generally have leaderships international in outlook, even if they are not international in structure. Thus non-governmental organizations tend to develop a longer-term world strategy.

Uppermost in the minds of many non-governmental organizations is the fear of being identified with governmental policies. This fear is not without point, particularly since the Point Four Programme has come within the orbit of the Mutual Security Agency. This problem of identification inevitably exists under all bilateral agreements, and no contracts, however carefully they may guard the autonomy and rights of the non-governmental organization can eradicate it. Except in a United Nations programme, having non-governmental as well as governmental participation, there is no escape from this dilemma.

The Colombo Plan

The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia was published in November 1950. The Plan grew from a meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers held in January of the same year, and envisaged a total expenditure of £1,868 million during the period 1951–57.

There is no single Colombo Plan, rather it represents the sum total of programmes formulated by governments included in the Plan. The projects vary from large TVA-type projects, such as the Damodar Valley Project, to community-type projects—particularly in India, where a large-scale community development programme has been established. Technical assistance provided under the Plan is arranged on a bilateral basis by agreement between the co-operating governments. The Bureau in Colombo acts as a clearing house for requests and offers of technical assistance, and the Council, composed of governmental representatives, acts as a forum for discussion of the prob-
tems which arise. In general, it has been the policy of the Council to concentrate on the supply of types of technical assistance which are not available from other sources. Since April 1952 a liaison officer of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board has been stationed in Colombo. No mention is made in either the original policy statement or in the first annual report regarding the use of non-governmental organizations in such projects. It is to be assumed, therefore, that no consideration has been given to this question.

The Norwegian Experiment

In May 1952 the Norwegian Parliament debated a Government paper on the nature of Norway's contribution to the economic and social development of the underdeveloped areas. Prior to this various groups and organizations had discussed the idea of an expanded Norwegian effort in this field, over and above contributions already being made to the programmes of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. The parliamentary debate ended in a unanimous decision recommending the Norwegian Government to investigate the possibilities of an expanded effort.

Accordingly, after consultation with the United Nations, in June 1952 the Government presented its report, which, with minor emendations, was accepted by Parliament. The main features of the proposals were the following:

1. The programme will be based upon principles laid down in a tripartite agreement between the Norwegian Government, the United Nations, and the government of the area where the project will be undertaken.

2. The principles of the programme will be the same as those applied by the United Nations to their programmes, namely, that the programme should be looked upon as mutual aid between all parties involved, and that assistance should be given only at the request of the country concerned.

3. In addition to close co-operation with the governmental
authorities and the people concerned, there is to be close collaboration with the United Nations and with its experts who will participate in the programme. (The United Nations agreed to pay for the services of certain experts, thus releasing Norwegian money for capital investment purposes.)

4. Where desirable, especially from the standpoint of the authorities in the area of the programme, other countries and organizations will be permitted to participate.

5. The first programme will be undertaken in India.

On 17 October 1952 a tripartite agreement was signed by representatives of the United Nations, the Indian and Norwegian Governments, and a delegation was sent from Norway to India to work out the details.

The programme will be concentrated mainly in the State of Travancore-Cochin on the southwest coast of India. Between 1921 and 1941 the population of India increased by over a quarter. During the same period the intelligent, industrious and well-governed people of the Indian State of Travancore increased from 4,000,000 to 6,000,000. The effect is noted in the Census Report of 1941, which stated that in the lowland agricultural areas the increasing density of population was reducing the people to "a level of sheer despondency". This was not surprising since there were from 1,800 to 2,400 people on each square mile of land, and, in spite of their distress, births still greatly outnumbered deaths.¹

In the beginning the programme will cover an area of some twenty-five square miles. The first project, with a budget of about £30,000, will be undertaken in a fishing community forty miles north of Trivandrum. Fish are plentiful but fishing practices and the preparation and distribution of the fish are poor. Health conditions are extremely bad.

The first tasks of the small Norwegian team of specialists which will be sent to the area will be to analyse the social and economic system of the community, to test various possible improve-

ments in fishing equipment, to install small motors in fishing craft (there are some four hundred) so that they will be able to go further offshore where the catch is richer, to introduce simple means of freezing ice so that fish may be kept fresh for thirty-six hours rather than six, and to develop a co-operative society for distribution, thus eliminating middleman profits and bringing down prices. The Norwegian contribution also will include scholarships and fellowships for Indian students in Norway.

Thus it can be seen that the programme will consist of two parts: technical assistance and capital investment.

To initiate the programme the Norwegian Parliament made an appropriation of £500,000 which will be administered by a special board headed by Professor H. Y. Sverdrup, Director-General of the Norwegian Polar Institute, and Dr. Karl Evang, Director of the Norwegian Health Services.

The special feature of the Norwegian effort, which justifies calling it an experiment, is the establishment of a non-governmental committee, composed of leading individuals from thirty-eight organizations, which will develop a broad popular campaign throughout the country in support of the programme. Headed by Mr. Arne Sunde, formerly leader of the Norwegian delegation to the United Nations, and directed by Mr. Aake Ording, formerly Director-General of the United Nations Appeal for Children, the committee draws its support from all important organizations and sections of Norwegian society. The trade unions, employers associations, farmers, co-operatives, religious and peace organizations, including the United Nations Association, are among the participating groups.

This committee has a two-fold task. Firstly, to conduct a broad educational campaign among the Norwegian public to bring home as far as possible to every citizen the importance and urgency of this effort, and to develop the idea of people-to-people world-wide co-operation. The campaign will be carried out through 530 information centres, mainly staffed by school teachers, which are now being established in all Norwegian municipalities. Through the campaign a basis will be established for
the second part of the committee’s work, the fundraising campaign scheduled for late spring 1953, when organizations, institutions, and individuals will be invited to match the Government’s contribution of £ 500,000.

As well as the conventional collection of donations and subscriptions, other popular participation may be fostered. The following suggestions have been made: to ask workers to give one day’s salary to the fund; the development of community-to-community programmes (Norwegian communities adopting Indian communities); the sponsoring by organizations and communities of suitably qualified individuals and teams to work in Indian communities associated with the programme; the promotion of ‘baby bond’ schemes enabling Norwegians to invest small amounts of capital in rural industrial development in India for specified periods, receiving little or no interest in return.

It is realized that while Norway can provide some assistance in the economic and social fields, the size of a contribution from a country of three million people can only be very modest. Nevertheless, it might well encourage a pattern of development which ultimately could form the basis for a World Development Authority. (And only such an Authority could begin to bridge the gap between the developed and underdeveloped areas of the world). It is further realized that India has cultural and spiritual values from which the Norwegian people might benefit. Such a programme, developed on a wide non-governmental basis, would go far towards establishing the social and economic foundations of world order and community. The Norwegian effort has already stimulated Sweden and Denmark to consider similar efforts. Perhaps it will become the prototype for similar joint governmental and non-governmental programmes in other parts of the world.
Some Non-Governmental Projects

In the preceding section we have described the nature and extent of existing governmental and inter-governmental programmes. Readers may well ask whether, in view of the limited type of contribution which non-governmental organizations can make to mutual aid programmes, it is worth the time, money, and effort for non-governmental organizations to initiate or participate in such programmes. Would it not be better to leave the practical aspects of such programmes to governments, the United Nations, and private investors? Cannot non-governmental organizations best use their influence in getting governments and the United Nations to expand their existing programmes?

This latter type of activity is one aspect of the work of many non-governmental organizations, and proposals for non-governmental projects in this field should in no way preclude such educational and propaganda work. On the contrary, direct participation by non-governmental organizations strengthens, by practical example, support for United Nations and governmental programmes. It is recognized that non-governmental programmes can never compete quantitatively with governmental or United Nations programmes, nor is it desirable that they should do so. They can, however, through the development of experimental techniques, bring to their operations a special purpose and quality which official agencies are unable to provide. They can make sure that mutual aid resources reach right down to the people in their communities and are not, for example, dissipated by corrupt officials. They can, through their work, develop the voluntary and community spirit, bringing into focus the fact that each small community is in some way a microcosm of the much larger world community they are seeking to build. They can demonstrate, concretely, that the peoples in the privileged areas of the world realize that they
have a common interest in the development of all mankind. In programmes of such a character one can find a correlation between the efforts to improve sanitation, build schools, develop rural industries, and supply irrigation, and the spirit of the people in their strivings for social justice and world peace.

Through such programmes one finds a natural successor to the work of the traditional relief and rehabilitation agencies, a desire to create a viable nexus between social planning and community development, and a belief that self-interest, enlightened or otherwise, is very much of secondary importance. No matter how much experience a non-governmental organization may acquire, it must never forget that any particular aspect of economic and social backwardness in a given area is merely a symptom of a fundamental cause. In other words, there must be a realization that prevention is better than cure. The non-governmental workers, by virtue of their status, are able to indentify themselves with the land, the people, and the implements they use. They can encourage experimentation by the indigenous people, and in taking any forward step they must take the people with them. Above all, they must develop self-confidence in the people themselves, for without the potency of hope nothing can be accomplished.

In this fundamental approach, the non-governmental organization will often come across situations that can only be remedied by governmental action, and wherever possible such action should be obtained and supported. Often, however, such remedying action will entail sacrificing some local vested interest, in which case governments may feel unable to act. Under such conditions the non-governmental organization can only encourage people to take what action they can, at the same time doing whatever is possible in the existing situation, which in many cases will be a good deal more than is currently being done.

In the following pages there are described briefly several types of non-governmental projects. These examples show some of the main problems confronting non-governmental organizations
in this field and the way in which these organizations are responding to them.

Certain missionary organizations have for many years laid substantial, if not equal, stress upon the material as well as spiritual needs of the people among whom they work. ‘Indian Village Project’, supported by American Congregationalists through Agricultural Missions, Inc., is a conscious attempt to develop a pioneer community project. Others, such as the Y.M.C.A., have found that schemes for general moral improvement produce poor results unless the material and physical well-being of the young worker is also improved. In other words, many non-governmental organizations concerned with spiritual development have found themselves moving, sometimes almost unconsciously, into mutual aid, community development type projects.

One of the outstanding examples of Christian action in the field of community development through the extension of missionary enterprise is the work being undertaken in Southern Rhodesia by the Anglican Mission of St. Faiths. Here, in an area of ten thousand acres, an attempt is being made in a pluralistic society to develop a multi-racial co-operative farming enterprise embracing the villages and smallholdings of the area centred around the Mission and its school.

This Mission was founded some sixty years ago, and during most of this period attention has been given mainly to traditional missionary activities. Now, with the support of the Bishop, an attempt is being made to develop African village agriculture on a smallholding basis, to teach respect for the soil and provide an education based upon agricultural techniques suited to central Africa, and to develop as a pilot scheme a ‘common farm’ which will ultimately be run on a co-operative basis.

Support for this programme is provided by a specially established United Kingdom trust which has the responsibility of raising capital and providing personnel and equipment for the scheme. Personnel accepted must have specific technical qualifications, a spirit of service, and a willingness to share a com-
mon life with the African workers, receiving only subsistence allowances in return for their work. So far three non-African workers have gone into the field, qualified single persons in their twenties. No period of service has been determined. In Southern Rhodesia such non-indigenous workers might well make the scheme their life's work, though in other underdeveloped countries this may be neither possible nor desirable.

Personnel for the project are selected from a wide area and emphasis is not laid upon the applicant's denominational ties. It is recognized that personnel requirements must be related to the provision of capital equipment. Thus in presenting the scheme to the public, its needs are expressed in a symbolic fashion: one pound of nails is one shilling and threepence; a tractor for village agricultural use is two hundred and fifty pounds. This gives the prospective donor a clear picture of the scheme's requirements and helps to establish a more intimate relationship between donor and receiver.

Meanwhile the spiritual work of the Mission continues, and both this and the development programme contribute in their own fashion to the total pattern of community living. In the words of the Rev. Michael Scott, one of the scheme's trustees, 'This is an effort to establish a co-operative pattern of life which might be followed elsewhere'.

And elsewhere it is being followed. The American Friends Service Committee and its United Kingdom counterpart, the Friends Service Council, constitute a unique example of non-governmental enterprise. Founded during the First World War to help war victims in Europe, they have quietly but with great effectiveness undertaken extensive relief and rehabilitation work.

Since the Second World War these organizations have been increasingly concerned with the problem of East-West relations and with the working out of a practical programme of peacemaking. This has led the American Friends Service Committee to develop as one of its major activities a demonstration pilot project, and it is hoped that the experience gained will prove
useful on a larger scale in inter-governmental and governmental projects.

After much consideration, based upon a preliminary survey, it was decided to undertake a pilot scheme in the State of Orissa, India, with possibilities of both immediate and long-term development and where the State Government was vitally concerned with community development. Accordingly, a ten-year programme was formulated, and a project area established in the Mahanadi River Valley, where a large-scale irrigation scheme is under way. A project centre has been established in Barpali, a city of 5,000 inhabitants, and work during the first year will be undertaken in some twenty villages totalling about 20,000 in population. At the end of the first year the project may be expanded until it includes up to twenty additional villages.

The project will centre round a village development programme, with emphasis on agriculture (using demonstration techniques on local farms), rural industry, public health, and adult education. It will be initiated by a team of ten Indian and Western technicians. Each technician will have a co-worker, usually a younger Indian who is appropriately trained but lacks field experience. Furthermore, about fifteen ‘village-level workers’ will be associated with the international team of technicians. These village workers, sharing with Friends an affinity for Gandhian principles, will be drawn from people who have grown up in the district and are willing to remain there to carry on the day-to-day responsibilities of the programme. All personnel will work and live on a similar basis, deciding policy and objectives together and receiving only maintenance. During the ten-year period the team will seek to cultivate indigenous leadership throughout the project area, so that at the end of that time the non-Indian workers may withdraw, leaving the project completely in the hands of the Indian workers under the probable auspices of the Orissa Government.

A small amount of capital investment will be provided for demonstration purposes, though no attempt will be made to en-
courage the mechanization of agriculture until developments in the villages indicate the likely value of a special effort to educate the villagers in the potentialities of mechanical farming methods. The full utilization of local materials, skills, and techniques will be stressed.

Non-Indian members of the team have been drawn from four countries, and from widely differing backgrounds. They all share a common attitude towards life, though without necessarily being members of the Religious Society of Friends, which the American Friends Service Committee represents. The task they are to undertake in Orissa is inspired by the religious faith of the Committee. As in the case of all work done by the American Friends Service Committee, the project will be undertaken within the framework of the existing religious faith of the people of Orissa.

The project is being financed during its first two years by a grant from the United States Government under the Point Four Programme and by voluntary contributions collected by the American Friends Service Committee. The Committee operates it as an independent agency. The Orissa Government has provided land and buildings for the project centre. Cooperation with the few indigenous organizations working in the area is being sought.

As the project is at an early stage, it is not possible to describe in more detail its development. It does, however, constitute an experiment of considerable significance, not only for one non-governmental organization, but for all organizations and workers concerned with this field.

Work camp organizations have been another type of agency which, during the past few years, have turned from programmes of exclusively limited reconstruction projects, mainly in Western Europe, to new types of work in the underdeveloped areas. Often this work has been undertaken in earthquake disaster, flood-ridden, or war-devastated areas, and in most cases short-term manual labour has been used. A few organizations, for example Service Civil International (International Voluntary
Service for Peace) have sent long-term personnel into the field for service involving other than manual labour.

Two projects undertaken by this organization are of particular interest here. In Algeria, where some twenty persons have given longer periods of service, the volunteers have undertaken road building, improved water supplies, and provided medical facilities. Sometimes this work has been undertaken in cooperation with French governmental agencies (though not without some criticism from the indigenous population), at other times with local non-governmental agencies. To the present this community-level work has been largely of a manual character, but the realities of the situation have caused the organization to consider using qualified technically trained personnel. With non-skilled manual labour there is a definite limit to the extent and type of aid which can be given. Unless reconstruction or simple types of construction work are continually multiplied, and often this can be done only by the use of qualified technical personnel, the effect of manual labour will after a short time be lost.

In India, Service Civil International has been primarily concerned with projects dealing with the resettlement of refugees. Here again the work is mainly of a manual character, though the additional skills of non-Indian project workers have been used. In Assam, Unesco has provided financial assistance, including some travelling expenses for the volunteers, while the Indian Government has provided maintenance costs.

Volunteers for service in India commit themselves to a minimum period of eighteen months, receiving only subsistence allowances. Funds for the maintenance of the volunteers, apart from governmental and intergovernmental contributions, come from members of the organization (some of whom undertake forestry and similar remunerative work in Europe), the major portion of which they donate to cover the costs of overseas service.

Members of all nationalities and faiths participate in the organization, which is non-sectarian in character. Before members
are accepted for overseas service they must usually be prepared to undertake a period of reconstruction service in their own countries, the minimum age for overseas service being twenty-five.

In the work of the Service Civil International one finds an example of a gradual change from emergency forms of service to more positive concepts of aiding social change through community development by the utilization of technical skills.

These projects are examples of certain types of non-governmental assistance to underdeveloped areas. What other forms might such assistance take?

IV

The Non-Governmental Contribution: Problems and Methods

After the Second World War many American towns adopted European towns, and provided community-to-community assistance running into millions of dollars. Such a pattern put into operation between developed and underdeveloped communities would not only be important as a source of funds and an educational medium, but would undoubtedly draw into the services of non-governmental organizations many persons who might otherwise remain uninterested or aloof. This pattern might equally be applied on a school-to-school, union-to-union, church-to-church, or co-operative-to-co-operative basis. ¹

Unlike relief and reconstruction programmes sponsored by

¹ The Foundation for International Economic Development and Education—recently formed by a group of concerned citizens in Indianapolis, Indiana—has undertaken as its first activity a programme on behalf of the Federation of Uganda African Farmers, an indigenous co-operative society. The officers of the Foundation particularly seek the support of American communities and community-centred organizations for the Uganda project, which they hope will "lay the foundation for development of the entire plateau area of East and Central Africa" by experiments in the best means of using its natural and human resources. Community Development Projects Ltd. and other bodies also are interested in a comprehensive experimental programme of non-governmental development in this part of Africa, and from their joint exploration of possible approaches have originated several proposals.
communities in the past, this kind of assistance, and the concern upon which its rests, would involve long-term planning. A minimal programme would involve sending international teams of voluntary technical personnel, similar to those already described, to assist underdeveloped communities with economic, social, and fundamental education projects. On a larger-scale, co-operative capital investment in agriculture and rural industries might be involved. It would be necessary for the organizers of a community-to-community campaign to make sure that the maximum public interest was maintained over the period in which the people of the community were giving assistance. This period should be determined in view of certain highly concrete objectives. All the media of mass communication would be required to ensure that the citizens in the donor city could follow the progress of the project in its various phases, and visits between the two communities could be arranged. The organizers in the sponsoring community would require firm financial commitments which would have to be sustained throughout its duration if the project were to be maintained. This would apply as much to small- as to large-scale efforts. Stability and continuity are prerequisites for the success of any project.

Such aid, it must be kept in mind, is not a one-way, giver-receiver proposition. In terms of material values, obviously European and American communities have much to offer underdeveloped communities which they cannot repay in kind. But the people of these communities have something to give the people of Europe and America—certainly friendship and gratitude, possibly other things as well. Underdeveloped communities might well send emissaries to the developed communities so that bonds could be established by personal contact. There will be little or no friendship, however, if the attitude of either community is one of patronization. Such community-to-community projects must constitute co-operation between equals to make one corner of their common world a more decent place to live in.
The great virtue of this kind of assistance is its concreteness. It is not diffuse. Contributions are not simply put into a pool to be dispersed by a small executive committee to vague and foreign parts. Contributors can know to whom they are giving and for what their money will be spent. They can become indirectly, and even directly, acquainted with all or some of the international team of technicians and with the representatives of the communities they are assisting. Such projects might well establish a basis for broader co-operation between the communities, e.g. in education and trade.

There are apparent difficulties and dangers in such projects. The major difficulty is that they require a continuous organization which many communities may find difficult to provide. Such projects require sound business and administrative experience behind them. Another danger is that by dramatizing the needs of one community, or set of communities, it is possible to loose sight of the wider needs and problems. There is a tendency to establish a garden city in the midst of a gigantic slum, to idealize the situation and thus take people’s interest off the main problem, and in the enthusiasm for the garden city to forget all about the needs of the slum dwellers.

The raising of capital for rural industries, particularly when it is undertaken upon a popular basis, likewise creates many problems. The major problem would be to establish a holding company which, while not interfering in the administration of the industry being established or developed, at the same time ensures responsible usage of the investors’ money. Attempts to maintain close supervision of such industries would leave the sponsors open to the charge of foreign interference or exploitation; on the other hand a few popularly backed failures of this kind would quickly destroy confidence in such schemes. Hence, such capital investment programmes, particularly if the investment bears no or only nominal interest, would have to be carefully formulated.

One of the major problems facing agencies concerned with undertaking mutual aid programmes is the shortage of qualified
experts able to give long-term international service. This problem is particularly acute for agencies promoting fundamental education in the villages.

The types of expert required vary from project to project. Generally speaking they should be persons with a suitable educational background and technical training; they should have qualities of personal character which enable them to adapt themselves to different cultural, climatic, and physical conditions; and they should have some experience of relevant work in an underdeveloped areas. In the selection of such personnel it is of supreme importance that emphasis should be as much on devotion to the task and the people to be assisted as on expertise.

While individual technicians may be able to give valuable assistance to the people of a given area, they will, unless they are exceptional tend to be looked upon as intruders rather than partners in a joint enterprise, and the philosophy which should underlie all non-governmental programmes, i.e. people giving to people, will tend to remain unexpressed. It is important, therefore, that wherever possible non-governmental projects should be staffed by international teams. While these teams will require special skills in medicine, agriculture, rural industry, and education, a general knack for fixing things, for making little out of much and using local materials wherever possible will often be as valuable as a specialized training.

Young persons will constitute the bulk of any non-governmental organization's personnel force. Experienced experts will be hard to obtain and expensive to keep, and their talents therefore should be largely kept for training project workers and for general supervision. Several non-governmental organizations, including Community Development Projects Ltd., have already established registers for young men and women anxious to do this kind of work. They have interested young qualified people from universities, laboratories, factories, and farms in many parts of Europe and the United States. Many of these young technicians, untied by domestic circumstances, are
willing to work for a two or three year period on a subsistence basis. Apart from desiring to make a contribution to the wider community, they see in such service a means of gaining experience which will stand them in good stead in later years.

Among the displaced persons of Europe there are many who could effectively be used in non-governmental programmes. hungrily searching for a permanent refuge, many of these people, with their professions and skills, would make first-class citizens in countries which are painfully trying to develop their economies. In some areas they could help build a firmly based multi-racial society where hitherto the white man has only been known as a master. Governments at the receiving end must be willing to accept these displaced persons as first-class citizens. And where they are imbued with the right spirit and have a definite contribution to make, the problems such people bring should not be too difficult to overcome.

Other potential sources of personnel exist. Certain countries having high-density populations could provide technical personnel more easily than low-density ones, though the skilled person, generally speaking, has the least desire to emigrate. Retired experts from governmental and academic service are a further group which might provide valuable service. Perhaps also non-governmental organizations will find a way of applying on an international level David Lilienthal’s suggestion that every man ought to give a year of his life to public service.

If work tenure arrangements were made with their employers, many people might be persuaded to interrupt their careers for a period of service in the underdeveloped areas.

But to find the personnel is only one part of the problem. Before they go into the field it is essential that they receive a period of orientation, and desirable, particularly in the case of younger technicians, that they should receive a lengthy period of training. It is also desirable that this period of training should be undertaken wherever possible under conditions not substantially dissimilar from those they will have to face when they begin their field work.
There is at the present time an understandable, but nevertheless short-sighted, reluctance by most governmental and inter-governmental agencies to use such personnel. This is at least partly because of the limited opportunities for training. The need for such training facilities is apparent to all, yet few academic institutions or agencies try to fill the need. Consequently these budding ‘non-commissioned officers’ of community development often have to turn to home employment in their own profession. In this field certain non-governmental organizations could provide a useful service by establishing the processing machinery and perhaps the further education needed for many of these younger technicians.

Three Queries

Within these various approaches there are a wide range of possibilities for non-governmental development. How and at what level can non-governmental programmes be undertaken? What should be their content? Where can they be carried out most profitably? Here we will consider only some implications of these queries.

Development means growth. The very use of the word development as applied to the concept of mutual aid implies that development as a process must be organic. The development of only one aspect of a given community may be less beneficial than no development at all. Nor should such methods of development necessarily be conceived in Western terms. Farming in the developed areas may be considered as a particular means of providing food and making money. But in many underdeveloped areas, as Professor Meyer Fortes has pointed out, farming is not only a way of getting food but a way of life.

1 The Graduate Curriculum in Social and Technical Assistance at Haverford College (Haverford, Pennsylvania) has pioneered in this respect, and other colleges and universities are following suit. As their number grows it may be hoped that there will be some division of labour, with academic and non-academic institutions each making their special and complementary contributions to the training of various types of personnel.
itself. Furthermore it is possible, by the destruction of existing cultural patterns and failure to replace them with new ones, for development schemes to do more harm than good.

Aid therefore must be given at the level of the maximum possible co-ordination of social, economic, and political factors, i.e. at the community level. It is only when things happen at a level at which there is a constant inter-action of all types of joint human endeavour that the stage is set for a healthy development process. When a village council decides to build a drainage system, to hold literacy classes, to organize a marketing co-operative, or to set up a communally financed industrial workshop, then something live, promising, and vigorous is under way.

When a non-governmental organization has chosen to work at a level at which integrated programmes are possible, it next has to see that integration really occurs. The organic view of development obviates the controversy as to priorities, i.e. whether education or health, agriculture or industry, transportation or power, comes first. Each should be a phase in the total development process. This raises the question of criteria. If, for example, an increase in agricultural output sufficient to give a community an exportable surplus is planned, roads to the nearest market will first have to be built or existing roads put in a year-round useable condition. Expensive and slow transportation is almost universal in the underdeveloped areas. Often the economic value of a commodity is dependent upon the methods of transportation available. There are instances where large coastal factories often find foreign markets thousands of miles away most profitable, even though shortages exist in their own hinterland.

Many rural industries can operate profitably in competition with urban industry because of the advantage, in the form of reduced transport costs, which their location gives them. If agricultural machinery or techniques displace workers, employment opportunities must be provided for those out of work. This problem is of particular importance in a country
such as India, where two-thirds of the people draw their sustenance from the land and less than one per cent from modern industry. Such unemployed workers might be partially used in developing cultivable waste lands.

Thus the principal criterion will always remain the need not to let any phase of development get too far behind or too far ahead of the others. There must be a conscious effort to link the future with the past in such multi-purpose development.

Nor should it be imagined that the stages from primitive to advanced techniques will necessarily follow the Western pattern. The rate of progress in the developed countries is such that the underdeveloped countries can never catch up merely by the importation of existing techniques. Many of them do not want to catch up in terms of the developed countries, but they do want to catch up in terms of the two prime indices, economic development and income distribution. Nor do they necessarily require the same kind of material needs that the developed countries require and demand. But the underdeveloped countries do want the same freedom from material want. To reach this they may well have to follow at least some of technological paths of the developed countries, but it is equally likely that some underdeveloped countries may ‘jump’ stages of development and perhaps so revolutionize their economies that within a few generations they may in terms of technological advance be ahead of the West. It is possible to see, for example, that India’s great hydroelectric installations, patterned on, but more advanced than, the United States Tennessee Valley Authority, may become the prototype for similar projects throughout the world. Furthermore, in methods of communication and transport the underdeveloped areas may move ahead. In the nineteenth century Europe had to invest millions in canals, railways, and highways over com-

1 The Gangapur Dam, the first earthen dam in India, might be considered an example of ‘jumped’ development. Only recently American engineers evolved techniques of earth dam construction to a height of seventy feet. The Gangapur Dam has a height of 125 feet and was undertaken entirely without the help of heavy earth-moving equipment.
paratively small areas. Today air transport opens up prospects for transportation and communication in the underdeveloped areas which nineteenth century Europe could not realize. To sum up, mutual aid, if it is to be of long range significance and utility, must be given in the year 1953 as if it were the year 2000.

This does not necessarily imply that non-governmental projects should be developed on the basis of Western techniques. In some areas modern farming equipment, or at least the type of equipment currently available, can only be introduced after long periods of development, and then only after substantial adaptations of implements and techniques have taken place. Simple adaptations often can meet present needs, and these can be made most effectively through multi-purpose development.

Large-scale engineering projects, or other projects requiring large amounts of capital, are almost certainly beyond the direct field of non-governmental initiative. Financial considerations apart, projects involving vast natural resources should rightly be the responsibility of governmental agencies. Even in these projects, however, non-governmental organizations have a peripheral contribution to make.

Projects involving a radical change in the economic structure of a given area create many secondary problems affecting the social values and usages of the people and their communities. And the people and communities most directly affected by such change may resist it most tenaciously. To them government servants in particular and development workers in general, even if well-meaning, may symbolize the destruction of everything they cherish.

The content of the non-governmental approach must therefore appeal equally to the minds and hearts of the people. Understanding must be a continuous element in all development, for without understanding the administrator or field worker, for all his technical knowledge, will only scratch the surface. Whether the field worker will be able to reach the people effectively depends, in part, on his relations with their
government. This leads us to our third question: In which regions of the world can non-governmental development best be undertaken?

Prior to this century, development—from the standpoint of the advanced countries—involved exploration and expansion into new territories. For commercial enterprises and missionaries it involved the establishment of the minimal institutions of government so that they might forward their interests. Only later did the European states colonize these territories, taking over the powers of traders and churchmen. Today, however, non-governmental development must be of a very different character. It must begin within the status quo but at the same time move in the direction of social change. Or to put it in contemporary terms for the underdeveloped areas, development means social revolution in practice. Social change can of course be reactionary, but community programmes aimed at extending the knowledge and power of the people inevitably tend to lead to an extension of the democratic process. Thus non-governmental development can be undertaken most effectively in countries where the assent of established authority, i.e. the government, can be obtained. Without this assent non-governmental projects are impossible. Nor can they be conceived in isolation. Ideally they should be part of a regional or national plan (some experts believe that projects born outside of such plans have insufficient raison d’être and little lasting effect), but where this is not practicable the survey on which the project is based must fully take into account all the features and resources (natural and human) of the wider community—the project’s matrix. The administrative branches of government must be sympathetic and prepared to grant reasonable liberty of action. Countries in which such liberty of action and the cooperation of the people can be obtained are in general those which have achieved political independence, where national revolution has made way for social revolution.

This should not preclude non-governmental organizations sponsoring projects in countries of a different character. But
the same freedom of action usually will not be apparent, and if apparent, unfortunately not real. In countries under non-indigenous administrations, non-governmental community workers may well be considered agents of the foreign government by the people, unless they make it extremely clear that they are not, and in many places this will jeopardize their chances of getting support from those they are trying to assist. In trust territories development ought to be the prerogative of the United Nations, but administering powers have shown strong reluctance to call for such aid. Administrative procedures relating to non-governmental teams in dependent territories will remain difficult because colonial governments have a marked tendency to believe that all independent activities are aimed at undermining their authority. Cultural interchange between indigenous and non-indigenous people arising out of common technical pursuits has in some cases met with strong hostility from government. And community development inevitably leads to demands for more political power, thus challenging the status quo. It can therefore be said, with a certainty grounded in experience, that the greatest scope for non-governmental programmes lies in those countries which have achieved self-government.

Challenge and Response

In the past few years a number of non-governmental organizations have been founded, among them Community Development Projects Ltd., ¹ whose purpose is to help meet the needs

¹ Community Development Projects Ltd., an international administration incorporated not-for-profit under British law, was formed in March 1951 (after a year and a half of preliminary discussion and investigation) to promote long-term development projects in underdeveloped areas at the level of the small community, and in particular to recruit, train, and subsidize international teams of voluntary technical personnel for such projects. It is directed by an international council of specialists and non-governmental leaders. Fuller information may be obtained from the Chairman, care of Illinois College, Jacksonville, Illinois, U.S.A., or the Executive Director, 23 Heathfield Park, London, N.W. 2, England.
of underdeveloped communities. They have grown out of the evident inadequacies, both quantitative and qualitative, of inter-governmental and governmental programmes. They seek to bring to the field of economic development and technical assistance the concept of a people-to-people contribution and the concept of mutuality, i.e. of a fully reciprocal venture ‘to make the world more nearly resemble a decent human habitation’, both materially and morally, through mutual aid.

Some well-established older organizations, as we have shown, are also moving in this direction, and the indications are that mutual aid activities will become an increasingly larger part of non-governmental programmes. These activities will almost certainly grow in a fragmentary fashion, for each organization believes it has a unique contribution to make. While recognizing the independence and integrity of the different programmes, it is obvious that there is need for an international non-governmental mutual aid service centre which can assist non-governmental organizations already engaged in this specialized work and encourage others to consider participation in it.

This service centre could be a source of basic factual documentation, including descriptive and analytical monographs, and a means through which administrators and field workers in various areas could exchange information of general interest. It could hold seminars and conferences to facilitate the direct communication of experience and to extend the network of personal acquaintances and friendships so rewarding in this field. It could assist organizations to find suitable field workers of all kinds, and could co-operate in their orientation and further training. In time it might, through an expansion of its services, undertake the promotion and co-ordination of joint projects. It is towards such a co-operative association that Community Development Projects Ltd. is working.

The non-governmental organization has, in the main, yet to prove the viability of its approach. There is a tendency for it to become over-burdened with untested theoretical assumptions
(a common criticism of United Nations programmes) and to minimize the crucial importance of helping people to help themselves.

The underdeveloped communities of our world, the village slums where hundreds of millions pass their brief lives, offer too great a challenge for concerned individuals and organizations to get lost in academic preoccupations. The need for action is too pressing. Indeed, what has now been said so often must be said again: Whether we Westerners will be able to avoid a violent reversal of our own unparalleled development, from which it is unlikely we could recover, depends on the way we respond to this challenge. The following pages suggest some tentative methods of response.

Addenda

The following notes supplement certain parts of what has been written above by bringing them up to date.

P. 25, para. 2. The report of the committee of experts, Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development, was issued in March 1953. The report recommends the establishment of a new inter-governmental fund, and in this connection considers four main problems: the income of the fund; its operations (principles and policies); the disbursement of its resources; and its structure, control, and management.

The report suggests that the fund be constituted as a separate administration within the framework of the United Nations, as was UNICEF; that its original capital be created by contributions covering an initial period of two years; and that it should only come into being when a minimum of $250 million has been contributed by at least thirty countries. It further suggests that the administrators of the fund should be authorized to accept non-governmental or private contributions, and to appeal for such contributions. To qualify for assistance, governments should be members of the fund. Also, they should move towards integrated economic development programmes, availing themselves fully of the technical assistance services of the United Nations. The report will be considered at the July 1953 session of the Economic and Social Council, after which it will go to the General Assembly.

P. 26, para. 1. For 1953, sixty-four member states have pledged nearly $21 million to the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Programme.
For 1953, $147 million have been authorized for the Point Four Programme, $63 million less than in 1952.

The first four members of the Norwegian team of specialists are now in Travancore-Cochin. Preliminary surveys have shown that one of the first phases of the project must include the building of jetties to check soil erosion. Each year much valuable soil is washed into the sea, forcing the coastal village where the first project is located further and further inland. With two or three jetties erosion can be greatly reduced.

At the same time two sets of deep-well drilling apparatus have been shipped from Norway, the programme's first equipment, and the Travancore Director of Fisheries is visiting Norway, where he is studying Norwegian fishing and marketing methods.

A six-week nation-wide campaign began, on schedule, with a festive opening in Oslo attended by the King and Members of the Norwegian Parliament and Government. This came at the end of four months' educational work, when the main responsibility for the programme shifted from the information centres to 590 fund-raising committees in as many municipalities. Under the slogan, 'A Day for India—Give Today', arrangements were made which enabled every Norwegian to give a day's income to the programme. Through the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions every union member was asked to give one day in overtime; the employers' profits from this overtime represented their contribution.

Arrangements with the country's creameries made it possible to reach 120,000 of the 140,000 farmers who deliver milk. The farmers were requested to give the proceeds of one day's milk sales. The fishermen also made their contribution, and a special one-day's pay scheme was worked out with the armed services. Industrial corporations made individual contributions. Teachers gave a day's pay. Churches contributed a Sunday's offering. The 'Give-a-Day' programme even reached seamen aboard Norwegian ships throughout the world. In addition, lapel emblems depicting a Travancore fishing smack were on sale in all municipalities.

Three Oslo newspapers and the country's largest weekly sent representatives to Travancore to report on the project's progress.

The Norwegian people's help to the people of Travancore is not limited to this campaign; the campaign is only the beginning of a continuous drive.
PART ONE

The Sociology of Community Development
Chapter 1
IMPLICATIONS
C. A. O. VAN NIEUWENHUIJZE

COMMUNITY development in underdeveloped countries is essentially an attempt to assist those members of non-Western communities who want to adapt their community life to new demands, by putting at their free disposal certain new possibilities—mainly of a technical and social nature—which, if sensibly used, may help the community concerned to become a stable element in the world society of communities.

In order to approach the problem properly, however, one first has to distinguish between ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ countries. In the second place, one needs some insight into the outstanding differences between their social systems. This ground having been cleared, there is a basis for discussing the possibilities and the risks involved in community development as a Western attempt to give assistance to non-Western societies.

‘Developed’ and ‘Underdeveloped’

The term ‘underdeveloped countries’ indicates, if I am not mistaken, the same areas which were denoted until recently, by we Westerners, as ‘colonial areas’. Quoting Ralph Linton, one might say that the areas falling under this category comprise ‘most of the world’. The metropolitan countries do not come under it; neither do some other countries having what is often called an advanced Western culture. Another exception is the bloc surrounded by the Iron Curtain, but there cannot be the slightest doubt that within that bloc, also, much of the

territory is underdeveloped. For deplorable reasons with which we are all acquainted, however, such territories usually do not count when Westerners discuss the problems under review here.

As an indication, the term underdeveloped has certain advantages over the term colonial. First, actual colonialism as a political structure is disappearing gradually but definitely. Second, the basic problems of the areas concerned are not just those of political dependence. The basic problems occur in countries that have never seen a colonial regime, as well as in actual colonial territories. Moreover, they do not disappear once national independence has been realized. As Professor Logemann of Leiden University has said, 'the world is in urgent need of a careful restatement of the problem'.

As a new term, offering a chance for such a restatement, the term underdeveloped may be welcomed. Yet there is reason to be afraid that it will not be very helpful. In fact, it has some weaknesses which may well outbalance its advantages. Its weaknesses are, in a way, parallel to those of the ethnological term 'primitive', and so can be its fate: used widely at first, then criticized severely, and finally avoided for better or for worse. Both terms start from a comparison, but from one that has no tertium comparationis. Westerners compare their own sphere with other spheres, using, not some objective standard, but their own values and prejudices as touchstones. No wonder, then, that the term resulting from such a comparison is inadequate. Moreover, it will be acceptable to self-conceited Westerners, but definitely unacceptable to non-Westerners. The term underdeveloped, just like the term primitive in the ethnological literature of a previous period, is a striking example of what Linton calls 'traditions of Western ethnocentrism' being applied to those areas which 'exist outside the main stream of so-called Western civilization'.

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that non-Western areas are not simply distinct from the West, but generally inferior.

In addition, both terms, and especially the one we are discussing now, tend to pin down some intricate phenomena at one certain point only—and this too is to be regarded as a serious weakness. Such over-simplification is bound to lead to false conclusions. And not only that. The point where this term tries to pin down the phenomena under discussion deserves particular attention. Development, especially in its more specific shape of progress, is a notion typical of nineteenth century Western thought. In our ears it sounds like the hobby of an old-fashioned people. Nobody amongst us is ready any more to believe in automatic progress as a singletrack, unilinear movement either in Western or in world history. Those who do still believe in it can only maintain their position by safeguarding it with Iron Curtains. We have learned by now that there is no such thing as one simple world-wide trend of development. And—remarkable coincidence!—one of the first to overthrow the naively optimistic philosophies of world-wide progress was the Russian historian Nikolai Danilewski, who rightly has been brought to the fore again by Pitirim Sorokin.¹

As early as 1869, he stated that 'the natural system of history consists in distinguishing different culture-historical types of development as the main basis of history's divisions'.

To compare ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ is feasible only within a given context. It can never be used effectively in order to compare separate cultures and communities which have different presuppositions and patterns. If one wishes to understand human life from the social and cultural point of view, one has to accept, first of all, that societies and cultures are realities in their own right. Whatever development there may be is development within the pattern of life of each community, to be understood properly only with due consideration for the pattern itself. All this goes to say that to make clear the differences between Western and non-Western by focussing

¹ In Social Philosophies in an Age of Crisis. Boston, 1951.
them at one point—'development'—is a most inadequate and unhappy thing. It is dangerous, moreover, as it may lead to ill-advised attempts to introduce elements at random. There is no need to point out the risks involved in such a procedure. There are already several reports on technical assistance in which the utter hopelessness of such attempts appears clearly. Professor Edelman of Wageningen Agricultural University marked this same point in a most striking manner when in a recent publication he stressed the fact that for any assistance there must be an adequate receiving apparatus.¹ This applies not just to administrative bodies, but to the whole social and cultural background that will have to absorb the assistance offered.

Summing up, it is clear that to speak of 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' is possible only if these terms have no more than paradigmatic meaning. They are as good or as bad as terms like 'Western' and 'non-Western'. We need some terms, and as long as nobody offers anything really adequate it seems that we shall have to make careful use of the inadequate terms we have at hand. It should be realized, however, that these terms do not teach us anything about the real differences between 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' countries.

Characteristic Differences between West and East

The special phenomena which today overshadow Western social and cultural life must not be overestimated. Speaking in terms of world history, they are recent events, more important for us than for those who will come after us. Moreover, they can be understood only if considered as part and parcel of a larger whole.

What then is that larger whole, or, in other words, the pattern of the West? Having to restrict ourselves to some brief characteristics here, we may say that the basic element seems to be a sort of rationalistic individualism or individualistic ration-

alism, a critical attitude of always searching for ultimate and absolute truth and never finding it (at least, never being able to put it in definite words, even if it is revealed through faith), and yet going on and on, verifying each new theory by experiment.

A very specific idea of freedom and a remarkable type of community life are among the main outcomes. In both cases Western practice seems to vacillate between two extremes that are never realized. Freedom is a road between two ditches: at one side is anarchy, at the other surrender to rigid authority. It is the human conscience which is supposed to steer the right course. The same metaphor applies to community: on the one side is the open society, on the other the totalitarian or closed society.1 The guiding factors, in this connection, are less clear, and that is why there is nowadays so much controversy about political and social ideals, or ideologies. So much is clear, however, that society or community, to us Westerners, is a reality whose importance tends to be outbalanced by the importance and value of the individual. There is some element of provisionality, not only in states, but in all communities. Frontiers, clearcut as they may be sometimes, have no lasting value, and thus membership tends to be fluctuating.

Metropolitan cities tend to ruin social and cultural life both within their walls and, indirectly, in the countryside. Under such conditions, new ways are looked for by Western man himself. Being the subject of his own social and cultural life, he looks for a new and fitting frame for that life. And one of the methods that has come into use recently for that purpose is community development. Think of experiments with religious communities in the U.S.A. Think of the new polders in Holland. There is no need to stress the fact that many difficulties and problems are involved in the practice of Western community life and its development, spontaneous or planned. Tendencies like those underscored by James Burnham—the managerial revolution—or by Alexander Clifford—the masses

wielding absolute power—are too serious to be neglected.\footnote{Burnham, James. \textit{The Managerial Revolution}. New York, 1940. Clifford, Alexander. \textit{Enter Citizens}. London, 1950.} They show that at the present stage it is by no means clear what direction the West will take in the near future. The internal problems of Western social and cultural life are too serious indeed to be forgotten whenever the relations between the West and non-Western countries are discussed.

Another typically Western phenomenon that deserves attention here is technology. Westerners have ‘mastered’ nature and are technically able to provide man—at least Western man—with the means to possess wealth, more wealth than any non-Western area can produce at the moment. Technology especially has contributed to the idea that the West is further developed than the rest of the world. For proper understanding of their respective situations, however, both Westerners and non-Westerners should take into account that Western technology is the direct outcome of Western science, which in its turn is part and parcel of Western cultural tradition as a whole. Characteristic of Western science is what Alfred North Whitehead says about a university professor—that he is ‘an ignorant man thinking, actively utilizing [his] small share of knowledge’\footnote{\textit{The Aims of Education}. New York, 1949. p. 48.}. Western science and technology cannot be understood if disconnected from its Western environment. Thus, whether they are transferable to other areas with different patterns of culture depends upon whether their proper environment is transferable too, or, if that is not the case, upon whether a new environment is available into which they may be introduced. As long as there is no certainty about these two questions, to export Western technology is a most hazardous experiment, even though it seems a necessary one.

A third phenomenon characteristic of the West is the way in which changes take place. The fact that changes do take place is by no means characteristic in itself. Life being process, any pattern of life will of necessity be subject to change. Seen this
way, there is no ground for the idea that the West is dynamic in contrast to the more or less static rest of the world. Any pattern of culture will have its own dynamics and its own statics. What is characteristic of the West is that change is the outcome of choice. The freedom of the individual person—or in other words, the fundamental human rights—tends to lead to a type of social life in which society or community as such has no supra-natural aims of its own. There is no pre-established aim of community life in the realization of which the human person has only a subservient role. Man has to find his own absolute truth, and the manner in which he does so is by consciously making his choice among ever-recurring possibilities. Community life, speaking ideally, is no more than the reflex of the totality of choices made individually. In individual life, and in community life as well (at least according to some theories), development results from choice. A certain situation raises a certain problem; that problem can be dealt with in more than one way; man is free to deal with it as his conscience sees most fit; the point is to choose the right way. Thus progress is the outcome of the ability to choose the right way.

The fourth and last phenomenon of Western life to be mentioned here is the one that is most directly related to our present subject. The West has managed to interfere with the affairs of practically the whole of the world. With its wealth, its technology, and its power it has made itself conspicuous the world over, and by doing so it has exerted an influence which, at least in our period, has led to some important problems of great scope.

The problems themselves being only indirectly relevant here, we may sum them up briefly by mentioning two contrasting tendencies. On the one hand we seem to be on the way towards world unification. A strike in the U.S.A. may tie Royal Dutch Airline planes to the ground in Amsterdam. A guerilla gang in Malaya may cause the price of some simple household article in an English village to rise by one penny. Certain youngsters in Paris may at a given moment like nothing better
than Zulu dance music. On the other hand, world interrelations are threatened by new conflicts. In this connection the Iron Curtain is only one example among many. Federative movements in Europe face serious difficulties. The fiction of absolute sovereignty is guarded jealously by some young states where up to a few years ago the very concept of sovereignty was unknown. The abdication of colonial power does not everywhere contribute to better relations between nations.

What is more important now is how we should consider the fact that Western influence has managed to make itself felt everywhere. There seems to be a tendency amongst Westerners to overrate it. That is only natural, in a way. One is too easily inclined to look at the present and to forget that things have not always been as they are. For a more balanced picture, however, there are three facts that should receive full consideration.

The first is that, especially for a Westerner, it is extremely difficult to measure just how deeply Western influence has penetrated the non-Western world.

The second fact is that Western hegemony in world affairs is a recent phenomenon. During three and a half centuries of Dutch meddling with Indonesian affairs, only half a century has seen real Dutch leadership in something deserving the name of a political entity.

The third fact is that world-wide Western influence is not so much the outcome of world development as it is of Western development. For a few decades the West has made the whole world its field of activity. Historically speaking, it seems that the way in which Western economies have developed accounts for this turn of events. Now, however, the situation seems to be this: Western culture develops from one stage to another by constantly facing new problems. To solve them—that is, to make the right choice—means progress, to fail in solving them means a set-back. It so happens that the problem the West is now facing is the improvement of the living conditions of the population of the whole world, or at least of those parts of the
world which are accessible to the so-called Western powers.

If considered in this manner, the existing tensions and the search for new relations between 'developed' and 'under-developed' countries lead to the following conclusions: First, they are the next phase in the historical course which began as imperialism and colonialism. This is true even if the aims have completely changed. Second, they are the outcome of internal necessities of the West. Insofar as they happen to be the outcome of certain concurrent non-Western developments, that may be considered a secondary phenomenon only.

Compared with the West, the 'underdeveloped' countries are more difficult to characterize. The reasons are obvious. We do not face one contrasting pattern of culture there, but many. Actually, it would be utterly impossible to sketch their characteristics if it were not for the fact that we need, for our subject, to find those that are common to all of them in contrast to the West. We are then faced once again with the unhappy situation of having to pin down complexes of phenomena at one single point. Having already rejected development as being inadequate to act as such a point, we must devise another and use it with the necessary reservations. For this purpose, I would like to pay attention to the relative importance attached to the individual human personality in relation to the community as a whole. The birth of modern Western society and culture was brought about by many forces, one of which was a new concept of individual freedom. An outlived socio-cultural pattern had disintegrated, and one of the accompanying phenomena—a most threatening one for the further existence of the then traditional community—was the fact that the members of the community started to act increasingly as individuals. As an independent factor, this phenomenon gradually assumed a constructive function, thus giving birth to a new pattern of culture—that of what we now call the West.

If we consider the autonomous individual as the nucleus of Western culture, we may say that non-Western cultures have different nuclei. Those nuclei themselves do not matter much
What matters is that the relative importance attached to the individual in relation to the community is different. In fact, it is less, and the importance of the community as a whole over the individual is greater.

If this be the major contrast between Western and non-Western, one may proceed from this point and elaborate some overall picture covering the contrasts as a totality in a more comprehensive manner. That overall picture seems to be something like this: Non-Western socio-cultural patterns are patterns of communal life which aim at maintaining a pre-established order of things which is both naturally and supernaturally sanctioned.

This statement needs be elaborated in two respects. First, some detail should be added to give it more reality. In the second place, it is restricted to characteristics of the non-Western areas without taking into account any alterations caused by Western influences. It is, therefore, subject to modifications. In order to gain a balanced picture of such modifications, however, the background of typically non-Western characteristics should first be presented in relief.

Summing up briefly some details filling out the statement made just now, one has to turn to characteristics that hold, taken roughly, for practically all non-Western communities. They tend to be organic units, having an aim and therefore an existence of their own.

Their aim is to maintain a pre-established pattern of social and cultural life. There is nothing accidental about that pattern, as in the case of sophisticated Westerners. It is the sole possible pattern. Putting things in an extreme form, one might say that to members of such communities those living outside the borders of their community hardly fall into the category of human beings in the fullest sense. Unlike the open society, mentioned earlier as one of the ideal types of Western life, closed societies are firmly surrounded by frontiers. These frontiers are manifold. They are geographical, for one thing. In addition, they are ideological. They are also structural—
structural standing here for the whole socio-cultural fabric of community life, for all habits, institutions, and traditions. In their more or less rigid isolation these communities follow their own course, trying to realize their own aims. They are predestined by their ideal pattern, which is embodied in traditions handed down by ancestors or in holy scripture, and which, in a way, is always the myth of the community—that is, its ultimate goal and utopia, which at the same time is regarded as its historical origin. Thus the processes of social, cultural, and religious community life have one main aim—to bring about and maintain the optimal realization of the ideal pattern. And thus the community preserves its existence. Its history, at least so far as it might take the shape of correct chronology, is less important than its present, and still less than its remote past, veiled in legend and myth. Actual life tends to be a timeless confrontation between present and past, between natural and supra-natural.

In this communal existence the actual size of the community is less important than whether all members comply with the traditional qualifications for full membership. Naturally, there is a bare minimum below which survival becomes impossible. For the rest, the size of the community may be that of one village or a group of villages (permanently settled or not) or, to mention the extreme at the other hand, a vague continental area comprising millions of inhabitants. Naturally, the differences between members and non-members, and the intricacies of the pattern that is maintained by the community, tend to be more rigid the smaller the actual size of the community. In the case of very large areas, local and regional variations of the given theme are normal. This implies that generally the village or cluster of villages lives as a self-contained unit, economically as well as in all other respects.

A few points may serve to complete the picture.

The state and political administration. The state is centralized in a most remarkable sense. Its head is not so much top and centre of administration, but rather the nucleus of all elements
which make for the specific character of the community and the embodiment of its values. There is a direct relation, for example, between the 'king' and the well-being of the community. Officials tend to be small-sized replicas of the 'king'; priesthood and nobility may be separate casts. Civil administration is maintained in direct consequence of these ideas. Privileges are normal and essential. Government planning is impossible even as an idea; the pattern of community life is a pre-established order. Maintenance of order—'law'—is a matter of incidental decisions, and for taking such decisions ability and knowledge are less important than status and rank.

Science and technology. 'It is... useful to regard the past history of Eastern science within its philosophical context, and to expect little emphasis upon technological development which the Western mind has today come to regard as the invariable deductive consequence of any new scientific discovery. The old term Natural Philosophy might well be revived and applied to it.' In non-Western countries science and technology have their own place, fitting the pattern of social and cultural life. Generally, knowledge as a spiritual possession to be amassed and maintained has met with greater respect and interest than the less spiritual applications of knowledge. Given the existence of a pre-established order of things, knowledge as such tends to be less autonomous, less pioneering, more scholastic. New ideas are less acceptable than in the West, as there is always the problem of how they accord with pre-established, unchangeable truth. Individual opinions need the sanction of public opinion before they are accepted, and in order to be accepted they often need to permeate public opinion stealthily and cautiously.

Change. Some Toradja tribes in Central Celebes were originally a seafaring people. Once they had settled in the mountainous region where they now live, they had to adapt or drop several of their customs. For example, their dead were put in

boat-shaped coffins and placed in narrow mountain-side clefts. This is characteristic of change in the areas under discussion. Life is process, and changes in geographical or other circumstances lead to exigencies that have to be faced. People try to meet two demands at the same time: on the one hand the demand of actual circumstances, and on the other the demand of the traditional pattern of life, which must not be changed. The inevitable changes are made in such a way that the pattern is not disturbed. Any new situations or alien influences are faced in such a way as to prevent a direct confrontation from taking place (the very thing a Western intellectual would want to happen, i.e. confrontation), and only after they have been made digestible, so to speak, are they given a place in society. Thus the social pattern itself is adapted in order to meet the new demands. There is only one situation in which a real crisis cannot be avoided: if alien elements overrun the traditional pattern with such force that no chance is left to work out a form of adaptation that holds.

So much for the characteristics of non-Western community life, without taking into account any changes that may have occurred in it as a result of Western impact. In order to get an impression of this impact and the alterations that have resulted from it, Westerners should be cautious not to overrate the effect of their own deeds.

This applies especially to development. There cannot be the slightest doubt that Western power, especially in the shape of economic and colonial power, has exerted a disequilibrating influence upon the normal processes of change by adaptation, and this in a period when the smooth working of these processes was urgently necessary. The West has affected non-Western life in a disruptive manner from two sides: by being an imposing alien influence, and by disturbing normal adaptation. The realization of these facts has led to a certain degree of pessimism amongst those Westerners who have made it their job to study the effects of Western influence on the non-Western world. In an article in *Der Monat*, G. F. Hudson states that 'the real
crisis factor in Asia is not the endless poverty of the masses—that is not new—but the social and cultural disintegration which for two generations has been the outcome of contacts between Asia and the West.... what Asia has gained is completely outbalanced by the loss of old values, and the vacuum that has come into existence in this way raises a first-class danger'.

Without asking who should feel most threatened, according to Hudson—the Westerners or the Asians—the fact remains that this pessimism is shared by other Westerners. But there are more optimistic views amongst non-Westerners (how could they live if they were completely pessimistic about their own future), and amongst Westerners, too. Professor Logemann, in the speech quoted above, says, speaking about the actual situation of oriental cultures: ‘Their spontaneous development everywhere has been intercepted by intruding Western influences, and they are all now moving in a Western direction. For this reason my compatriot van Baal speaks of “Western civilization as the constant factor in the present process of acculturation”...’ He cautiously adds, however, that ‘the face of Western civilization [itself] has radically changed’.

Less cautious people hold that Western intervention in the non-Western world has, by now, become so all-important that there is no escape from it. And in order to complete this opinion, they often hold in addition that it will be to the great benefit of non-Western societies by preparing them for the fruits of Western technology.

Having learned caution from Professor Logemann, I feel that neither utter pessimism nor naive optimism leads to a proper evaluation of the situation. Yet exactness is impossible. We cannot know how deep Western influence has gone and how disruptive its effects have been. That it has set into motion some enormous process is clear. Whether the outcome will be constructive or destructive remains to be seen. Thus

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2 Principles and Methods of Colonial Administration. loc. cit.
far the impetus imparted by the West to non-Western communities is both constructive and destructive. Western ideals have been turned into weapons against Western power. The right to self-determination, whatever may be the future interpretation for internal use within non-Western communities, has served effectively as one such weapon. Yet does this imply that, say, the Western notion of development has been adopted by non-Western communities? Before giving an answer to this and similar questions, let us never forget that the burning desire of non-Westerners to become free from Western power has had one all-absorbing aim: to become themselves again. The question, then, is this: what does ‘themselves’ mean?

Possibilities, Risks, Duties

The situation, if looked at in this way, holds possibilities as well as risks. Neither can be foretold accurately. We may only scan the horizon for some signs.

What can we see? Is it true indeed that all non-Western countries are on their way towards ‘acculturation’, with the West as the constant factor in that process? Do we have to think of the ideal of one world as something in which contrasts and differences tend to become more and more vague?

If personal opinion counts for anything in this connection, I would say No for several reasons. A world without variety is a concept that seems to negate life itself. Furthermore, to say that the West is a constant factor in a world-wide process, be it acculturation or something else, is a dangerous generalization. In Professor Logemann’s remark we heard some qualifications: the West now is not identical with the West four or five decades ago. Moreover, the West as it manifests itself in one part of the world is not identical with the West as manifested elsewhere. The colonial policy and practice of Spain and Portugal have been different in many respects from those of Britain, France, and Holland.

Finally, there is always the possibility that the process of
acculturation itself is something whose reality appears clearer in Western wishful thinking than in actual non-Western life. In other words, no accurate facts are available as to the force, depth, and relative importance of the acculturation process if compared with simultaneous but possibly contradictory processes. And in addition there is no reason to assume that all underdeveloped countries, with their highly divergent presuppositions, should undergo one identical process. Even if the West were a constant factor, their reactions to it would be different. To sum up, the theory of acculturation does not provide much certainty.

The only facts that remain seem to be the following.

1. The processes underway in the non-Western world will not stop abruptly at anybody’s wish. They are unavoidable realities. For better or for worse the future of non-Western countries will depend upon their outcome, and, implicitly, the future of world relations as well.

2. Whatever the outcome of present processes both in Western and non-Western countries, the future pattern of world interrelations will have to offer sufficient scope for fundamental differences between patterns of cultural and social life. The ideal of one world can be realized only if it is not predicated upon world-wide development in the direction of eventual uniformity in some, apparently essential, respects.

3. One world is to be envisaged as a network of interrelations based upon mutual respect between different patterns of culture. As such, its realization will need some important changes in outlook in many parts of the world. Yet even if such changes may appear in a certain respect as adoption of some originally Western notions, they are essentially different from total acculturation.

4. One world, conceived in this way, must be considered as our definite aim when searching for new shapes in which to mould our relations with non-Western areas. We are bound to do so because these relations exist as a historical reality and cannot be severed.
5. When searching for new, less destructive—and if possible constructive—forms in which to mould relations between Western and non-Western areas, two dangers must be avoided. One is that so many alien elements are introduced into non-Western areas, with so little circumspection, that they lead to complete disintegration and disaster. The other is a romantic policy of the conservation of traditional values which runs counter to social reality. Some accidents are bound to take place. All one can do is to try to see to it that no more harm is done than the unavoidable minimum, and that something comes out of it that gives hope for the future.

Thus far the facts. The consequences for we Westerners are obligations—moral obligations and practical obligations. Our moral obligations are very clear. When exerting influence in non-Western areas, Westerns must, whatever their direct interests, be aware of their first and foremost duty according to their own ideals. They must stand for the realization of fundamental human rights in a way that gives the ideas behind the slogans a fair chance to be understood before they are applied with arbitrary interpretations.

Our practical obligations are the following:

1. Just as we cannot pin down the contrast between Western and non-Western at one point without distorting the whole picture, in the same way we cannot approach non-Western societies by tackling one or two aspects only. Nothing less than a fully comprehensive approach will do.

2. When standing face to face with non-Western man or non-Western community life we must take them seriously in the fullest sense of the word. We must see their way of life as a whole and as something fully real. We must never forget the force of traditional patterns, even if present turmoil tends to focus our attention upon changes and tendencies that conflict with them.

3. We must recognize that practically everywhere in the non-Western world the community is thought to be a living thing, having its own character, and having its own procedures in
order to deal with problems of change and development. We must be aware that no two communities are the same and that our work, whatever we intend to do, can be effective only if it is fully adapted to the characteristics of the community we work in. We must realize that the traditional ideas and procedures of change and development, however antagonistic they may be to our own, must be given full opportunity to enable a community to adapt itself to the new needs which cannot avoided.

4. We must be aware that it is not we who are developing the community we work in. If development there is to be, it must be development of the community by its own members.

We need not testify about the truth we believe in, as ‘the Western way of life’ is no absolute truth.

We must simply suggest some ideas and methods which might improve the situation, try to show them in action, and explain them in such a way that they assume a shape which makes them fit. They must be understood and interpreted in the right way so that they can be grafted onto the existing social system. Real development, whatever direction it may take eventually, can only come from inside.

5. We must be cautious not to disturb the integrity of the community. One of the main faults of most colonial policies, if we look back upon them, seems to have been that the authorities were inclined to pay special attention to those individuals who showed some eagerness and ability to adapt themselves to the way of life and the point of view of the foreigner. The result was that they were segregated from their community and tended to act as pressure groups within it without having responsibility to either the traditional community or to the alien authorities. Eventually their fate was always the same. They turned against foreign power, and as nationalists or otherwise they took the masses along with them on the road to a future about which they themselves had not the slightest idea, save for the two great principles, independence and regeneration.
Such, then, are the tasks we Westerners are facing, tasks that are the direct implication of our present internal situation. At the same time, these tasks are directly relevant to the realization of our—and not only our—goals of world peace and prosperity.

In a recent issue of *Esprit*, Albert Béguin gives some impressions of a trip through India. He writes: ‘According to their secret preferences, or maybe according to the degree of their being certain of themselves as Westerners, travellers are divided over two possible attitudes when facing the mystery of India. Some of them believe in progress. They are convinced that the sole coherent example of such progress is European development. They feel scandalized in the face of motionless India. They think it is backward, and they decide that they have to awaken it from its slumber of ages, to equip it according to the example of our technical civilization and according to rules of social justice, in view of which Indian society is horribly inhumane. Others, however, think that our idolatry of progress and our pursuit of egalitarian justice are the cause of the whole historic drama that has come over us. They think Indian wisdom offers the example of less dangerous solutions. They give to the word tradition the capital letter which the former group reserve for the word progress. They invite us to draw inspiration from this fidelity towards ancestral structures, which has kept India from falling into our aberrations and from our course towards disaster.

‘This dilemma cannot be solved in a hurry. The daily reality of Indian life, moreover, puts it in ever new shapes, as a complex totality. A too simple choice would amount to brutal failure to appreciate facts that are extremely hard to judge. Between the monstrosity of a murdering stagnation, and the brutality of a rupture inspired by foreign examples, the choice must be left to India itself—if interdependence on our planet still permits a nation to determine its destination in accordance with its own vocation.’

In spite of the importance which is now attached to community development, most people, if questioned, find difficulty in defining exactly what they mean by it. It is a term to which a number of ideas have become vaguely attached. One of these ideas is that of ‘development’ towards better standards of living, more efficient use of physical resources, better health, and more education—and especially the provision of some minimum education for illiterates. A second idea stresses the community, rather than the individual, as the unit to whom the approach should be made, and the means through which development should be achieved. A third idea is that the community as such should be stimulated and assisted to progress by its own efforts and initiative. To this cluster of ideas there are also sometimes attached two others: the first, that success in stimulating communities to develop better standards and ways of living through their own efforts will help to reverse the existing trend towards community disintegration, which is noticeable almost everywhere where small clan and tribal communities have been brought into close contact with the forces of Western civilization and administration; and the second, that if communities can be encouraged to participate in development work by voluntarily providing free labour and materials from their own local resources, the enormous problem of financing the desired speedy and general development from inadequate territorial resources may be considerably eased.

These ideas by themselves do not provide an adequate or satisfactory working conception for community development.
We have to face the fact—borne out by the recent history of every dependent tropical territory—that the impact of Western religion, education, economic organization, and political authority has a strongly disintegrating influence on the pre-existing traditional tribal communities, and it may be doubted whether attempts to stimulate development within these communities will, by itself, be sufficient to reverse the existing trend. Even ‘successful’ schemes of community development, if planned on too small a scale, may themselves hasten the rate of disintegration: if through the building of roads and by the spread of mass literacy, for example, they open up more effective avenues by which disintegrating forces may act on the defenceless and unprepared community.

If community development does not mean the attempt to reverse the present trend towards the weakening of the original basis of the solidarity of the pre-existing tribal communities, in what sense can community development take place? What answer we can give to this question must depend on our definition of the word ‘community’. In ordinary speech it has a number of meanings, and we can talk of racial communities, church communities, tribal communities, and neighbourhood communities. We can talk of a national community and even, occasionally, of the world community. Underlying all these uses of the word ‘community’ there is the conception that a community is a social group in which the individual members have some shared values, attitudes, and interests. It is this element that assists them to cohere as social groups, and that gives some degree of order and predictability to their actions. The more strongly that its members identify themselves with their community, the smaller becomes the likelihood of serious conflict between them.

It is this element of solidarity that we prize in the concept of community and that we wish to safeguard and develop. But it has also another side that we cannot afford to neglect, for the stronger the feeling of solidarity between members of a social group, and the wider the range of values, attitudes, and
interests which they share exclusively, the more likely it is that the group will come into conflict with other groups whose values, attitudes, and interests are different from their own. Thus greater solidarity in the small group, while helping to reduce conflict between its members, may increase the possibility of tension and conflict between different groups. Warfare at the tribal or national level, racial troubles in plural societies, economic conflict, such as strikes and lock-outs, and even conflict between members of different religions and sects, tend to become more probable and more acute in direct relation to the intensity of the solidarity, or 'we-feeling', of the different groups in relation to different and incompatible goals.

So far I have not attempted to define community in any strict sense, but at this stage it is desirable to define it more precisely, and to associate this idea of group solidarity and reduction of conflict with localities and territorial areas. If we accept this, we must exclude from the definition of community social groups based solely on race, religion, economic or cultural interests, in so far as such interests are not representative of the interests of the whole of the territorial community. The development of solidarity in such sectional groups is a gain to the solidarity of the community in general only to the extent that the goals of such groups are not fundamentally in conflict with the actual or potential shared interests of the whole of the territorial community. In so far as such sectional groups exist within the community, but are pursuing goals incompatible with the welfare of the whole of the group of which they form a part, they present some of the most difficult and intractable problems which any realistic programme of community development must attempt to solve.

Nor is it possible to consider the idea of social solidarity solely in relation to small local communities; for in so far as this element of solidarity is increased, so also are the possibilities of conflict between them. And as modern development increases the scope for contact between different local communities, potential conflict is more likely to become actual.
The problem of community development can, in fact, be realistically studied only in relation to a large territorial area which itself must be regarded as an actual or potential community area. We can then see the problem as one of promoting the maximum degree of social solidarity, or community, in the whole territory, both in relation to the needs of the whole and to the varying needs of the smaller communities which are contained within it.

What does this mean in practice? It means that the 'development' of the existing small local communities can only be assessed in relation to the need for the creation of larger communities which include the smaller. It is unrealistic, and also undesirable, to attempt to reverse the existing trend and to re-create in the small traditional communities that degree of exclusive social solidarity which formerly characterized them. What is important is that to the degree that the solidarity of the local communities becomes less all-embracing of men's interests and less intensely felt, there shall be a compensating growth of a sense of community between local communities, i.e. that men shall create effective communities at the higher levels of the region and the nation.

This problem is both urgent and important, and it merits close study, for it does not follow by any means that a decreasing sense of solidarity over a narrowing range of human interests at the level of the local community is, in fact, accompanied by the development of a compensating solidarity at more inclusive levels. Western forces, as they impact on small communities, do not necessarily assist social integration at higher levels, although by introducing new values and interests they act powerfully to weaken local solidarity. Thus education usually presents itself to, and is valued by, members of local communities more as a path to individual material advancement and to freedom from the restrictions associated with life in the small community, than as a means of attaining shared values and interests within a larger community of one's fellow men. Economic development similarly emphasizes the enlarged prospects of individual material betterment rather than the social
problems raised by the increasing inter-dependence of ever-larger human groups. Even religion, with its message of human brotherhood, is presented in fact by what appear to be competing and sometimes even conflicting groups. Thus emergence from the bonds of an over-narrow and over-rigid small community most often means emergence to a greater or lesser extent into a field of relative social isolation, where men have ceased to be, in any effective sense, members of community at any level. This process of desocialization is nowhere more clearly to be seen than in the large towns and industrial areas, and it is here, as much as in the most backward of the rural areas, that the task of community development—or of 'community creation'—needs urgent attention.

The task of community development in relation to the problem as stated here has two sides. The first of these is educational, if we think of education in its broadest and most informal sense. The small local communities are now interdependent and in close contact with each other and with the Western world, but they are still unduly motivated by values, attitudes, and interests which were established in an era when they were largely independent and isolated from each other. Education is needed to enable them to reach a common basis of shared values and interests so that they can co-operate effectively for their common good, while retaining and adapting purely local values and interests which do not conflict with the conception of the larger territorial community. In addition, for the desocialized individual, there is the problem of educating him into values and interests which will assist the formation of communities where at present none may exist in any effective form. The present situation in the tropical areas provides ample indication of past failure to grapple with this task.

The second aspect of community development is that of social structure. The existence of common values and interests, if and when attained, does not by itself enable a newly-forming or adapting community to achieve its desired goals. While education can assist in the emergence of common goals, and
in the provision of the knowledge required to help the community to select the easiest paths towards them, the goals can be attained only if the community has, or can develop, the appropriate structure (machinery) for action. As the goals of the local communities change, so must they be able to adapt their inherited structure. As community is reached at higher levels, so appropriate structure at these higher levels is needed. Frustration and conflict are especially likely to ensue through failure to adapt with sufficient speed or flexibility the forms and functions of political authority; and the development of community will be hindered by any failure to provide or to encourage the development of suitable community structure in urban and industrial areas. On the other hand, community development may be assisted by the provision of structure—such as councils and committees—somewhat ahead of the actual emergence of shared interests at the higher levels, provided always that a real potential of shared interests lies beneath the surface situation, and that such interests can somehow be brought to the level of perception. Subject to these conditions, the early provision of structure may facilitate a speedier realization of shared interests, and assist community development. That is, the provision of the structure may be the means of providing suitable opportunities for community education.

So far I have been content to equate community with social solidarity, and have suggested that the sources of social solidarity are to be found in the existence of common values and common interests. I believe that it is important sharply to differentiate between these two sources. Development involves the extension of human relationships over wider and wider areas, a greater specialization and complexity of human interests, and a greater diversity of human interests and goals of human activity. All these trends are highly desirable, and provide the conditions by which individuals may reach a higher level of personality development than in the small closed group. Whether this higher level is reached, however, depends on the quality of the human relationships in which individuals be-
Come involved in pursuit of their varied interests. Is the same
individual pursuing conflicting and incompatible goals so that
he is inevitably involved in conflict within himself? How far
are individuals and groups pursuing goals incompatible with
those of other individuals and groups, and if so by what means
are they attempting to resolve the resulting tensions? How
far is some variant of force or power, or on the other hand of
education or persuasion, accepted as the appropriate means?
It is in this field that we come to grips with the underlying
values which permeate human relationships and which are at
the core of the problem of community development.

Fundamentally, community depends only secondarily on the
perception of common interests and the formulation of com-
mom goals. These indeed are the natural outcome of commu-
nity, but interests and goals may change with changing circum-
stances and thus provide only a temporary and superficial basis
for social solidarity. The essence of community lies in the
general acceptance of the rightness of human relations of a
particular kind in pursuit of any goal. If we recognize this we
find one basic problem in community development in the for-
mulation of principles of human behaviour which, if accepted,
will enable any group to reach a higher level of purpose and
participation—both internally between its own members, and
in its relationships with other groups. A second basic pro-
b lem is the development of techniques by means of which the
acceptance of such principles by individuals and groups may be
accelerated. If the problem is not seen clearly in this light by
those who wish to become active in community development,
the situation may well arise in which a community develop-
ment scheme is so applied that it teaches and exemplifies
qualities of behaviour in human relationships which are the
reverse of those from which the true essence of community
must come. But, in fact, a study of many community plans and
progress reports indicates that community development is more
often seen primarily as a problem of promoting material inter-
est and goals than as a problem of values and human relations.
Chapter III

SOCIAL CHANGE IN A NON-LITERATE COMMUNITY

KENNETH L. LITTLE

It is generally agreed that the development of so-called underdeveloped areas depends very largely on the adoption and use of up-to-date methods of economic production and distribution. There is need of mechanization and of new industrial skills, and vast improvements in transport are required. The great problem, however, is how to increase the earning power of the peasant without divorcing him too rapidly and too completely from his traditional way of life. It has required the costly and bitter experience of much unwieldy colonial planning to teach this simple lesson—that real economic progress, as much as any other kind of progress, needs a stable basis in society. It is now coming to be realized that the way to secure such a basis is not to disrupt the established tradition, primitive as it may be by modern industrial and commercial standards, but gradually to modify it according to economic requirements.

Special caution is necessary because the economic life of most non-literate peoples is so closely integrated with every other aspect of their culture. Very often the extended family or the local group which tills the soil is also responsible for the religious beliefs and for the general welfare and training of its members. In many cases such a group is largely self-sufficient as a social as well as an economic unit. It is almost impossible, therefore, to alter the methods by which this kind of community obtains its livelihood without disturbing its manner of life in other ways. If the change made is too drastic—if, for example, it brings about wide neglect of the obligations customary among kinsfolk—the whole social fabric may be shat-
tered, because this type of society rests very largely on the performance of reciprocal duties and services between blood and affinal relatives. It is equally sensitive to any fresh circumstance which affects its ordered pattern of authority and morality, whether that fresh circumstance be a government ordinance imposing a house tax or a local development spreading the use of money. Indeed, one of the principal contributory factors to the break-down of tribal life and its resulting social problems has been the tendency of governments to draw the younger men from the land by obliging them to earn money for taxes elsewhere than on their native soil. In a great many cases, particularly in Africa, industrial development has led to the creation of vast and quite heterogeneous assemblages of migrant labour.

Actually, the main dangers of social disorganization—e.g. poverty, over-crowded housing, laxity in morals—would probably be less if the industrial planners and other responsible persons were always in a position to test the objective in view. What is their ultimate purpose in seeking to develop the territory concerned? Is it primarily to obtain larger and larger quantities of groundnuts, palm kernels, minerals, and other raw materials for an overseas market? Or is it primarily to assist the general welfare of its inhabitants? It may be argued quite reasonably that the two aims go together, that any increase in community welfare will depend upon the community's ability to pay for it through extra earnings. Nevertheless, it is at least a moot question how far industrialization can usefully go among a people whose way of life is still substantially tribal. If the nature of industrial or economic development is such as to cause widespread problems of crime or juvenile delinquency or disturbed marital relations, what is gained, even financially? Quite apart from the social harm done, the likelihood is that any fresh assets will be largely expended in taxes to pay for the special social services then required.

It needs, therefore, to be emphasized that the kind of economic transition which non-literate communities are expected to undergo involves something more than new modes of thinking
and acting. It implies moving from a mainly subsistence to a mainly market type of economy, and therefore calls for a whole set of social values and aims basically different from those which are traditional. It means, in the long run, not merely a greater stress on economic as opposed to social incentives—that is, a desire for direct monetary reward opposed to a desire for personal esteem and prestige—but virtually an entire reorganization of human relations. This is because of the highly personal nature of social relationships in the older, traditional system compared with the contractual way in which such relationships are interpreted in a system largely influenced by economic standards of value.

Looking at this matter very broadly, in the traditional system an individual’s life is centred mainly in the particular kinship group or local community to which he belongs. His livelihood depends on the co-operation of kinsfolk and neighbours, and his general well-being on their approval of his actions. Such a community is characterized by a very strong sense of mutuality. There exists throughout it a sense of personal relationship analogous to the close ties and feelings of affection which obtain in a well-knit family in Western society. In traditional society, however, very distant relatives and persons with no kinship connection, as well as actual brothers and sisters, are all members of the intimate circle. Such a group may include several hundred persons, and the fact that relationships between them approximate to the family model means that the individual’s personal commitments are much more extensive than in a Western setting. Thus a person may have paternal responsibilities and obligations not only to his own children, but to everyone who is his social inferior. On the other hand, this system tends to be very exclusive and parochial. Its special respect for the individual as a human person, and its treatment of persons as human beings with human needs and wants, tends to be limited to its own members. The individual outside it is a stranger. He is to be regarded with suspicion and even with hostility.
The discrepancy between this outlook and the much more impersonal *laissez-faire* attitude and order of things in a Westernized society will be obvious. There is no need to expand on the fact that in a Westernized society relationships are much less comprehensive, and that personal ties are felt, not with a compact body of people, but with persons in their individual capacities as very near relatives or friends. Thus, in terms of this divergence, we are confronted with a problem which is profoundly psychological as well as cultural. How, then, granting both the importance of economic development and the relevance of traditional institutions, are the two sets of factors to be reconciled? What can be done to smooth the process of social change, and—this is the really crucial question—how are the people themselves persuaded to co-operate in whatever plans seem desirable?

I do not think that such questions can be answered usefully in a general way. Nor are specific formulae of much help in the initial stages of the problem. Concepts like ‘mass education’ and ‘mass literacy’ are revealing, but much of their significance lies in the use of what are, in the main, technical aids and devices. The psychological difficulties are taken largely for granted when, in fact, there may be many good reasons, from the community’s own point of view, why it does not wish to become literate, or to be ‘improved’. Not only are there conservative objections, often of a magical kind, to be overcome, but modern standards of health and hygiene usually require rules and regulations exceedingly irksome to people used to quite different forms of social discipline. It is equally a mistake to imagine that educating a people in what is ‘good’ for them is necessarily a solution. Most members of a non-literate community are perfectly able to comprehend the connection between, say, malaria and the *anopheles* mosquito, once it has been demonstrated to them, but this does not guarantee that they will feel disposed to act on the knowledge. If a change in

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personal habits in this or in any other similar matter is eventually brought about, it is far more likely that the underlying motives will be as much social as 'rational'. By this, I mean that the change may be made for the purpose of satisfying some desire for social prestige or social approval rather than for the immediate aim of avoiding disease. As a specific and, I think, relevant example of this point, there is the custom I have observed among non-literate members of an African community of erecting screens of raffia straw round their beds in emulation of the mosquito nets use by Europeans, African clerks, and other educated Africans.

This brings us usefully to the sociological principle which William Graham Sumner enunciated in general terms many years ago, when he drew attention to the way in which the manners and habits of the ‘classes’ are gradually assimilated by the ‘masses’. Sumner was thinking primarily of our own modern society, and it is doubtful if this principle would have much validity for non-literate communities, in which an individual’s actions are usually defined according to a fairly rigid social status, were it not that ‘culture contact’ is providing opportunities for the members of such societies to achieve new forms of status, often in terms of Western values. As a result, there is a good deal of imitation of the ways of Europeans and other non-members of tribal society. A further reason why personal influence is important can be seen by contrasting the respective attitudes of Western and of non-literate peoples towards the notion of rationality itself. In our society there is considerable social pressure obliging people to conform with the dictates of scientific opinion concerning such matters as health and hygiene. In non-literate society there are no sanctions of this particular kind, and the sanctions which derive from the opinions of scientists in our society are derived from persons in traditional authority. Such persons may be chiefs, leaders of religious cults, or witch-doctors.

Two things seem to follow from this. Firstly, in at least the initial stages of community development it is desirable to intro-
duce new ideas and practices as far as possible in the guise of what is already familiar and acceptable. Secondly, the task of introduction should be mainly performed by persons who are in an immediate position to influence public opinion in the necessary direction. The first point implies some deliberate effort at cultural re-interpretation on the part of the would-be planners. Put in its simplest form, the aim is to substitute a particular idea or practice possessing the same symbolical significance, in the eyes of the community, as the idea or practice it is to replace. A well-known and rather dramatic example of this was the substitution of boars’ heads for human heads in the institutions testing a young man’s fitness for marriage in Papua.¹

However, it is one thing to speak in a theoretical way about re-interpreting traditional values, and quite another to carry out the task. Any kind of change, great or small, material or non-material, requires a human agency, and this, as I have already suggested, means the co-operation of a suitable person or persons. In other words, in the final analysis the whole problem hinges on the question of leadership. But who is to be regarded as the ‘leader’ in such a situation? As I shall explain later, the very nature of ‘culture contact’ means that there is often more than one such candidate. Automatically, one thinks of such ‘natural’ leadership as the paramount chief, the village headman, the council of elders, or the head of a religious cult. But there are circumstances in which the leader might be the young man teaching at the mission school or the native clerk in government service.² It might even be the European missionary, the government agricultural officer, or the district commissioner.

It will be appreciated, of course, that in asking ‘who is the leader’, I am actually posing a more complicated question than

² For an example of indigenous ‘literate’ leadership, see my article in the *Journal of African Administration*, Volume I, No. 2, April 1949, entitled ‘The Organization of Communal Farms in the Gambia’.
at first seems evident. What I am really asking is which person or persons are most likely to fill ‘leadership roles’ in a given situation. The given situation we have in mind is likely to be somewhat different from the ‘normal’ cultural circumstances in which the leader performs his role. It is the situation created by the introduction of the community development project itself; thus, in all likelihood a fresh set of sociological factors has to be considered. What this implies, therefore, is a certain amount of prediction and rather more insight than can usually be obtained from available documentation. Anthropological information about the people concerned may already be at hand in monograph form, and also in government files and missionary reports, in a good many cases. The difficulty, however, is that so many non-literate peoples have been studied synchronously—as if their social systems were relatively static—and this approach is of limited help for present purposes. Nowadays, the possibility of rapid social change nearly always has to be taken into account, and so it is often more profitable to conceive a system of relationships inclusive of quite new social groupings.

These new social groupings may comprise various categories of Europeans, as well as educated and semi-literate Africans, Asians, or Oceanians, as the case may be. Only by appreciating the interaction of these new groupings with each other and with the more traditional ‘core’ of the society concerned does one obtain a proper understanding of the cultural situation as a whole, and of the functioning of the tribal system itself. Thus, in attempting to present a picture of a West African people as they are today—the Mende of the Sierra Leone Protectorate—I found it convenient to analyse the sociological situation in terms of four principal social components. These were ‘Europeans’, ‘Creoles’ (i.e. Europeanized African settlers originating in the nearby Sierra Leone Colony), ‘Literate Natives’, and ‘Non-literate Natives’. I found that various social values associated with the ‘Europeans’ and the ‘Creoles’, at the top of the hierarchical order, permeated the social system as a
whole and were largely instrumental in the changing organization of Mende society.¹

There is special need to take the dynamic factor seriously into account when the culture concerned is still mainly traditional. This is because the development project, in terms of the presence of European and native specialist staff and other alien workers, is likely to make a greater impact on the local scene than under conditions which are already fluid. Putting the matter more abstractly, in the traditional case there is less time for the newcomers and the local group to become adjusted to each other. This may seem a fairly obvious point, but a good deal of energy has been spent in past investigations on the painstaking examination of allegedly indigenous problems under conditions which were anything but indigenous. I know of at least one scientific survey whose object was to establish an economic and nutritional ‘base-line’ through intensive study of a single village. It was apparently unforeseen that the coming of a large staff of European and native technical personnel, and their employment of the villagers for personal and other services, would enlarge the village economy.

What I am suggesting, therefore, can be summarized in a few sentences. It is that before plans are finally drawn up for the development project, there should be an exploratory or ‘pilot’ investigation conducted on sociological lines. This pilot study would ascertain as much as possible about the existing cultural life and its social patterns, and would devote special attention to the possibility of new social groups and new roles of leadership being created out of the changed situation.² Such a procedure, as I have already remarked, necessitates some attempt at prediction; it also means foretelling the conditions under which existing leaders can continue to operate until such time as new leaders take over. As I have pointed out, a person with status


² For an example of such a ‘pilot’ study made with special regard to economic factors, see Mestaux, A. Making a Living in the Morbial Valley (Haiti). Occasional Papers in Education. Paris, Unesco, 1951.
as a leader in one kind of social situation may be quite unable to perform such a role when the particular social situation is differently ordered. The hereditary chief in non-literate society usually retains his authority so long as he is acknowledged by the controlling colonial government, but his position may become quite different if the government decides to give official recognition to, shall we say, a literacy campaign initiated by educated members of the community. It may mean that a part of the chief's authority, which he owes to government support is, so to speak, borrowed by the commoners concerned, who thus acquire means of influencing people not only educationally, but in other ways.

The two considerations I have emphasized in these latter remarks are the background of traditional institutions and the role of leadership. These, I suggest, are the principal factors when one is thinking of local development in a non-literate or relatively non-literate community. I have said nothing about the various modes and means by which 'development' is physically effected, because this is a special problem best left to the attention of educationists, agriculturists, nutritionists, and other experts with technical knowledge. The anthropologist should certainly be consulted about questions of education, agriculture, and diet, because such matters are part of the sociological situation; but assuming that the educationist, the agriculturist, and the dietician have an anthropological understanding of what is involved, it is their job, not the anthropologist's, to organize it.

However, this does not mean that the anthropologist's responsibility is over once he has supplied a definitive explanation and analysis of the sociological context. If he is bold enough to apply his anthropology to the initial situation, he must be prepared to cope in like manner with its consequences, because, as I have already stressed, 'development' is a dynamic

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1 I note that Mr. E. R. Chadwick comments on the role of leadership in reference to his work at Udi, Nigeria. Cf. his article 'Mass Education in Udi Division'. *African Affairs*, January 1948.
conception. The ball, once started, does not stop; it goes on rolling, sometimes at an increasing rate. It follows from this that the anthropologist should be kept closely in touch with each stage of the transitional process. He should be in a position, in other words, to review continuously the altering circumstances and to advise on the possible repercussions of each fresh move and innovation. He should be consulted, moreover, not only about the progressive effect of the scheme on indigenous life, but about the relationship of the scheme's administration and technical personnel to the local people as development proceeds. As the local people themselves acquire a greater appreciation of the technical and technological features involved, the likelihood is that the role of those directing operations will change its implications. It may become less 'authoritarian' and more truly 'collaborative', and it is for the anthropologist to suggest how group relations might be re-organized to the best advantage.
Chapter IV

A SOCIOLOGICAL CASE STUDY

Communal Hostility to Imposed Social Change in South Africa

M. A. JASPAN

This chapter sets out to provide a brief diachronic account of the social structure of a society—the Ekunene of South Africa—before and after conquest by Europeans. In considering the effects of European conquest, particular attention is directed to the reception accorded by the people to programmes of ‘uplift’ and development introduced by the European administration and by other agencies.

The people of Ekunene are a section of the South African Bantu-speaking peoples. Their culture, language, and much of their ascertainable history is closely linked to Zulu. Ekunene is the name given by the people to their ‘country’, a mountainous reservation officially described as a tribal ward of Location No 2, Polela District, Natal.

Ekunene at present comprises an area of approximately 19.7 square miles. Its population, according to the most recent official estimate, was 3,538 in 1938. The density of population was approximately 180 per square mile.

The Ekunene countryside, located about a broken escarpment rising from the Umkomazi River valley in the foothills of the Drakensberg Mountains, is characterized by rolling grassland with occasional thornbush and thicket in lateral clefts on the

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1 Report of the Reclamation Committee on Location No 2, Polela District, 1938 (ms.), kindly loaned to me by the Chief Native Commissioner, Natal. In 1949 the Records Clerk at the Polela Health Centre gave 4,200 as the Centre's own most recent population estimate.
hill and mountain slopes. Much of the top-soil is at present severely eroded, some of it so seriously that not even grass will grow in the bald stretches. Numerous water-cloven gullies traverse both the hill-slopes and the more level pastures and fields.

A Government road transport service links Ekunene with Pietermaritzburg, the capital of Natal Province, about 40 miles distant, and with Bulwer, the seat of the Polela Magisterial District, about 10 miles distant.¹

The Traditional Political and Social Structure of Ekunene

Before Shaka, the great Zulu general, unified the numerous petty chieftaincies in the area now known as Zululand and Natal in the early nineteenth century, Ekunene was an independent political society. Its territory extended north of the confluence of the Tukela and Umzinyathi (Buffalo) Rivers. There was a tradition of past kingship handed down patrilineally for hundreds of years. African informants in Polela, forty years ago, were able to note the names and order of succession of eighteen reigning ancestors of the Chief of Ekunene in 1914.²

According to the principle of primogenital succession from the issue of ‘the chief wife’ in a polygynous family, the ruler of the royal clan in Ekunene claimed to be the head of the principal or right-hand (ekunene) branch of the Dlamini tribe. Consequently his whole section of the original tribe came to be known as Ekunene, or ‘they of the righthand branchi’. According to tradition, the tribe was governed by the Chief (inkosi)³, his Great Councillor (induna), and by a convocation (ibandla) of extended family patriarchs (abanumzana). In times

¹ From Komkhulu, the ‘capital’ or Chief’s village.
³ The Zulu term inkosi has been variously translated as ‘king’, ‘chief’, or ‘prince’. Men of Ekunene with whom I discussed the question of opposite translation of this term said that their inkosi was to them as the King of England is to Englishmen. It is customary in South Africa, however, to refer to the inkosi only as a chief.
of relative peace the Chief maintained his position not solely as a despot, but as the hereditary representative of an aristocratic family closely associated with the history and traditions of the tribe. He was not only the co-ordinator of the machinery of government, but the religious leader of his people, constituting in his person, it was believed, the essential temporal link between the spirits of deceased kings and their living subjects. In addition, unless he was a minor, or clearly unsuited to the task, the Chief of Ekunene was the commander of the military forces of the realm.

A considerable body of special ritual values, and some exclusive religious and ritual practices, attached to the person and status of a Dlamini Ekunene king. He was not permitted to come into contact with sick people or corpses, or with people who had any relation of proximity (either through physical contact as neighbours or household members, or through any close degree of kinship, whether affinal or consanguineous) with a recently sick or deceased person. A number of specially chosen attendants administered to his personal and public needs. Such attendants were enjoined to be loyal and obedient to the king in all matters; failure to fulfil such functions properly, or the performance of any actions which aroused suspicion, endangered the life of the servant concerned. Legends and folk-tales about the rivalry that existed between men for appointment to these posts at the court indicates that special privileges and advantages were attached to official posts in the royal service.

Upon his death it was the custom for the Dlamini Ekunene king to be cremated. Everyone else in the tribe was buried at death. When Mafohla, the father of the present Chief, Vusindaba, died, many people said that he was the first ruler of Ekunene to be buried rather than cremated. It is said that the influence of missionaries, exerted through converts to Christianity, constrained his relatives and councillors from disposing

1 Except for persons publicly condemned as witches or traitors. After being stoned to death their corpses were thrown into the bush or forest.
of his bodily remains according to custom. In this way, as in so many others, the missionaries are said to have played a part in the general European attack against the culture, traditions, and political independence of Ekunene.

In the traditional social structure the highest status devolved exclusively upon the senior living representative of the main descent line in the ruling clan. Though this rule of succession was founded in custom and sanctioned by law, the brothers of the incumbent not infrequently challenged his position. Sometimes a rival succeeded in usurping the throne. The supporters of the usurper and their descendants rationalized the act of usurpation by ascribing fictional primogeniture to the usurper. In this way rebellions and political strife could develop and be resolved without the fundamental premises of law and custom being called into question or modified.

At other times, when such conflict developed, the contending lineal factions opposed each other by resort to arms. The outcome of the conflict was by no means certain, depending on numerous circumstances, including the personal qualities of each of the main contenders. Either or neither might win. The conclusion of the conflict almost invariably saw the secession of the losing faction or the division of the tribe into two or more parts. The splinter tribal sections either merged with similar groups or joined integral tribes. This oft-repeated process of bifurcation, a developmental concomitant of the rule of unilateral and primogenital succession, occurred among commoner families also, though to a lesser extent.

The ruling family in Ekunene was and still is the wealthiest in the tribe. Traditionally, riches were measured chiefly by the number of cattle and other stock that a man or group possessed. No one owned more cattle and goats than the Chief; no one had more wives or spears than he. No loyal subject was expected to possess or to have access to medicines and charms more potent than the Chief's.

Traditional African accounts of pre-Conquest social life in

1 See p. 116 below.
Ekunene always notice the large *umuzi* or hamlet, composed of an extended patrifamilial household, that existed in the past. There were no separate farms or disparate habitations consisting of elementary families living in comparative isolation, as there are in Polela today. Nor were widows and deserted wives to be found living with their children in separate *imizi*\(^1\) of their own. The *umuzi* consisted of a patriarch or headman (*umnumzana*) who stood at the apex of its internal social control system. If his mother was living, she wielded influence and power beyond that of his wives, even his 'great wife'. The mother, or if she was deceased, the 'great wife', was the 'lady of the household' (*inkosikaz' yomuzi*).

The physical plan of the *umuzi* reflected in its ubiquitous basic pattern the status and social control system of its inhabitants. A strong circular stockade made of stout poles, brushwood, and thornbush enclosed a rough circle of beehive-shaped huts of light and portable construction. The main gate of the *umuzi* (A) was placed furthest away from the section of the principal wife (*ekunene*) (B) and the hut of the headman and

\(^1\) *Umuzi*, household (sing.); *imizi* (pl.).
his mother (C). (D) was the section of the umuzi occupied by the wife ranking highest after the 'great wife'. Subsequent wives and the wives of married sons of the 'great wife' or other wives were accommodated in huts 'attached' to either (C) or (D) in two arcs extending around the internal circumference of the outer stockade towards the main gate. The huts (E) and (F) nearest this gate, and on either side of it, generally housed the adolescent boys and young men of the whole umuzi. This arrangement was believed to favour the defensive needs of the umuzi and to guarantee maximum safety to the umnumzana, to the 'lady of the household', and to other members of the intimate family circle who lived in the rear of the umuzi. The adolescent girls also had their special huts, not far from the boys' quarters. Younger children slept in their mothers' huts. In the centre of the umuzi there was a large cattle byre (isibaya) (J), with one or more smaller calf and goat pens leading off it.

There appears to have been no tribal police force, yet there were bodies such as household and clan councils capable of enforcing sanctions against civil and criminal offenders. Adultery, murder, slander, and theft were all regarded as civil delicts. Household or clan vengeance was frequently resorted to, but was generally limited and directed either by public pressure or the Chief's or induna's authority into the courts, where all efforts were directed towards reconciling the conflicting parties. Witchcraft and disloyalty to the Chief were the only recognised crimes. These were punishable by death.

There is no evidence of there having been a formal educational system, including a regular school of some sort. There is neither a tradition nor a remembrance of circumcision ever having been practised. Girls, however, attended an initiation school (umgonqo) soon after attaining puberty.1 The whole practice of education was (with the exception of the short-term girls' school) informal. Children grew up in age-sets, and were permitted first and enabled later to pursue those activities

1 Cf. Kohler, M., Marriage Customs in Southern Natal, Pretoria, 1933; for vernacular and translated texts describing traditional girls' initiation practices.
most beneficial to themselves at each age, and most useful to the economic needs of their parental households. Adults generally took a kindly and indulgent interest in children. In normal domestic life it was an accepted practice for children to be seen and heard. Respect for rank and age were, however, implicit in the general body of social values which were experienced and observed by children in the course of everyday life, and so adopted by them as necessary and fitting modes of behaviour in society.

The Shakan Invasion and the European Conquest (c. 1818–1850)

The integral political existence of Ekunene was abruptly terminated by the Zulu invasion of 1818. The people of Ekunene, together with other adjacent Dlamini tribes, made a rapid escape to the Drakensberg Mountains south of Zululand. By 1821, it is thought, these peoples were already settled along the higher reaches of the Umzimkulu River.\(^1\) Some sections, however, remained at various places along the route to the south, after their exodus from the Tukela-Umzinyathi region. The main body of the tribe, including the royal Ekunene clan, was forced to move northwards from the Umzimkulu about thirty years later. This last migration was largely the consequence of an unsuccessful struggle with the British colonial administration and with European settlers.\(^2\)

During this period attempts were made to resuscitate the Ekunene state as it was prior to the Shakan invasion. The emergence of a supreme Zulu monarchical state and ruling class, unchallenged by any other tribe or principality in Natal and Zululand, diminished the ritual and patriotic status of the Chief of Ekunene. Militarily, his army and state power were but a shadow of what they were formerly. It was now a refugee society seeking to re-establish itself by perpetuating the

\(^1\) Cf. Bryant, op. cit. p. 382.

\(^2\) This traditional account has some corroboration in the recorded material presented by Bryant, op. cit. pp. 388–89.
external forms of traditional custom and law in new and radically altered conditions. Many of the old ceremonies associated with the agricultural cycle were only partly carried out, and during the years of escape and wandering were often overlooked. The break-up of the tribe into several smaller units, often moving separately or seeking settlement in isolation from one another, led to the emergence of a new class of indunas or powerful abanumzana, who were relatively autonomous in their relationship to the old supreme chief. The basic family and household (umuzi) structure, however, underwent little change at this stage.

*European Settlement and Its Consequences*

European settlement appears to have begun in about 1870 in the Upper Umkomazi region, where the Dlamini Ekunene people had settled after their migration from the Umzimkulu region. It was viewed with apprehension both by the Chief of Ekunene and his people. Foremost among the European settlers were timber speculators who arrived in the area to clear the local forests of whatever good building and furniture timber could be found. Some of the wood-cutters who operated in the Polela forests could not legally claim any rights to the timber they sent away to Pietermaritzburg, or to the forests where the timber was cut. Resolute action by the Ekunene tribal court led the cutters to seek negotiated ‘concessions’ from the reigning Chief at bargain prices. The Chief and his council agreed—in return for rifles, liquor, and cash—to the settlement of certain Europeans in Ekunene. The people believed they were extending rights of usufruct, but not of ownership. When the actions of the settlers appeared to overstep the limits of customary behaviour in respect of communal pasture and forest usage, skirmishes occurred between the people and the settlers. In particular, recurrent friction was

1 The timber was required for building purposes, wagon construction, and furniture in the rapidly growing provincial capital at Pietermaritzburg.
generated by the settlers trying to enclose the land they thought most desirable for themselves.

The conflict did not develop on purely localized lines, however. The settlers banded together and called in police or military assistance, as the need for deciding an issue became pressing. The numerous petty tribes and ex-tribal fragments in the area were disunited and could offer no concerted resistance. One by one they were dispossessed of their land and brought into the tax-paying system. In Ekunene much valuable arable land across the Umkomazi was lost, together with the Nkumba, Marwaqa, and other forest areas in the heart of the 'country'. In the period 1875-1885 an increasing number of farmer settlers arrived and took possession of yet more land in and around Ekunene. Local European administration was set up in 1876. From that time onwards there has been a steady diminution of the political power of Ekunene, destroying its independence. These political developments were accompanied by the submergence of most of the distinctive culture of Ekunene, and the dislocation of the traditional closed system of institutionalized social rankings and relationships.

The significant changes in social structure occurred not immediately after the Shakan invasion, but after and as a result of European conquest. The Shakan invasion had not led to any fundamental changes in the techniques of production nor in the pattern of social relationships, for the social and economic system of the Zulu conquerors was hardly different from that of Ekunene. But later, when Europeans began to dispossess the people of Ekunene of their limited arable lands in the mountainous Umkomazi region, land shortage became a key issue upon which relations both within and without the society hinged. Bitter conflict occurred, on the one hand between European settlers and African peasants, and on the other hand between the African peasants themselves. The Chief also entered into the competition for land, and thus became a rival of his subjects. Such competition had not existed in olden Ekunene, where there was no land shortage.
The land shortage and the compulsion to find money with which to pay Government taxes drove men to leave their homes and seek work with Europeans. The necessity of being clothed while in employment, of purchasing food, and the desire for possessing various European commodities created new needs among the Ekunene peasantry. Young men were now able to procure imported material goods which older and more highly ranked men frequently did not have the means to acquire. Patterns of absolute filial obedience began to be supplanted by ambivalent responses which gave rise to conflict. Adult sons began to desert their fathers or to leave the patriarchal household, setting up smaller imizi of their own. The customary modes of showing respect to clan and family elders lost their binding character, since the sanctions which formerly guaranteed their effectiveness could no longer be enforced. The collapse of political power in Ekunene was not followed up by the establishment of a new and positive regime offering an alternative social and moral existence. Instead, the people were left to adjust themselves to a domestic economy impoverished through European spoliation, and to a decaying tribal life which scorned the present and looked back to moral and cultural values of the society before it was conquered. In place of a uniform and integrated moral system buttressed by law and custom, there were now alternative and conflicting possibilities of moral action and response. In this context uncertainty, ambiguity, and ambivalence in social relationships flourished, showing themselves in fear, suspicion, and anxiety.

Modern Political and Social Structure

In matters concerning the ideology of kingship, there is little of the former intense ritual and mythical emphasis on the function and powers of the inkosi. No one now thinks of Vusindaba, the present incumbent of the Dlamini Ekunene royal line, as the king. He is known to be a relatively unimportant and minor chief in the eyes of the European administration; besides, all
the inhabitants of Ekunene, like all the citizens of South Africa, are known to be the subjects of the Queen of England.

The principle of primogenital succession and status has now largely lost its traditional significance in the majority of families. More than 80 per cent of the people are converted Christians and therefore monogamists. With only one wife the conflict over inheritance has become transposed from rivalry between the first-born sons of the different wives and their 'houses', to the opposing claims of the first-born son and the subsequent children. Though primogeniture still determines the law of inheritance and succession, in practice most fathers attempt to divide their property between their children before death. Some of these parents favour the alteration of the present customary laws so that property may be equally divided between all the sons, or between all the children. In the Chief's family, however, the importance of the principle persists. The eldest son is jealously guarded, and is subjected to 'strengthening' from the dangers of bewitchment or poisoning by potential enemies or rivals. These latter practices are viewed with impatience by many of his 'progressive' subjects; others smile indulgently at his backwardness and credulity.

The Ekunene section of the Dlamini peoples is now no longer the 'principal' or 'right-hand' branch. The nearby Amakhuze section is now numerically larger and enjoys a higher status, partly as a result of its more vigorous opposition to European government both in the past and present. No one in Ekunene, apart from the Chief and some of his councillors, regarded this shift of political status as a structural inconsistency.

Though there is a tribal court, any subject of the Chief can appeal to the European magistrate\(^1\) at Polela against a judgement of this court. The Chief need not even be given notice of the appeal by the appellant. Furthermore, the Chief's court is not now legally competent to deal with criminal cases, or with civil cases involving Europeans either as plaintiffs or defendants. No European, to my knowledge, has ever appeared as a witness.

\(^1\) In his capacity of District Native Commissioner.
in the tribal court. These factors have combined to reduce the prestige of the tribal court. Some people told me that although in former times strict justice was practised, bribery and corruption now weigh heavily in determining the outcome of a suit. I was unable to validate or reject the correctness of this assertion, but intend to enquire further into the matter during a subsequent field tour.

In the field of ritual there are now few survivals of traditional practice. The first-fruit ceremony has not been practised since 1902, and no one nowadays awaits the Chief’s permission to eat new maize or other foods. Furthermore, peasants begin to plough and plant whenever they wish, without awaiting the inception of the seasonal activity at the capital.

The Chief still possesses more livestock—the traditional form of wealth—than anyone else. In a recent legal suit brought against him by some of his subjects, it was claimed that he had used his official position unlawfully to monopolize the grazing rights in a Government-trust farm where grazing is restricted by proclamation. Part of the reaction of the Chief to this unprecedented act of opposing him at a supra-tribal level was to accuse the leaders of the ‘opposition’ and their sympathizers of attempting to destroy him by sorcery and witchcraft. The Chief has for many years steered clear of the district in which the ‘opposition’ is centred; he neither eats nor drinks, nor attends any ceremonies or meetings there.

Some of his subjects now have larger cash incomes than the Chief. Most of these subjects have advanced their education considerably further than that of the Chief and the members of his family. They desire to be represented at the meetings and deliberations of the Chief-in-Council, but the latter body has not invited them to do so, nor has the European administration made arrangements for a more representative system of government to be introduced into Ekonene. The Chief, his Councillors, and the conservative section of the tribe are jealous of the material wealth of the rising professional and ‘middle’ class, and are apprehensive about its claims to greater participation in
the formulation of tribal policy and in the government of the tribe generally.

There has been no striking change in the internal production system in Ekunene since European conquest. No industries of any description have been established either in Ekunene or elsewhere in Location No 2, Polela. Within the ward traditional peasant agriculture and animal husbandry are practised. These occupations constitute the backbone of the internal system of production. Because of the land shortage (leading to food shortages and the absence of any kind of surplus produce) and the need to earn money for payment of taxes, educational fees, and imported foodstuffs, the people are constrained to depend for their subsistence, not on their peasant pursuits in Ekunene, but on cash wages earned for the most part outside the Location. The majority of able-bodied men in Ekunene are employed as unskilled labourers in the service of Europeans, generally a hundred or more miles from Ekunene.

Agriculture is confined to the cultivation of the cereal staples, maize and sorghum, amongst which beans and cucurbits are often undersown. There are no tractors or combines in use. The soil is worked by means of ox-drawn metal ploughs, and in the case of the Chief and a few other relatively well-off men, with harrows and disc cultivators. Many poorer people, especially widows and deserted wives, work the land exclusively by hoe. The severe land shortage has led to the over-cropping of existing arable lands, resulting in the rapid and unchecked depletion of soil and vegetation resources referred to above. It has, furthermore, induced men to bring under cultivation areas which were formerly reserved for pasturage, especially the steeper hill slopes.

The increase in the rate of migrant labour in the course of the last half-century is closely related to the changed economic needs and social patterns of family life and household organization. Sample studies indicated that there were between eight and eleven times more imizi in 1948 than in 1905. Older men
say that their fathers summoned neighbours to beer-drinks and other gatherings by blowing a horn which was heard far down and across the valleys. Nowadays groups of imizi are so closely packed together that one umuzi may be within calling distance of half a dozen others. The average number of inhabitants per umuzi has decreased considerably since 1905, except in the case of the Chief’s and some headmen’s imizi. In a sample study of two districts of Ekunene I carried out in 1949, the structure of the families composing 170 peasant households was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of family structure</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary family</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matrinuclear family</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended patriarchal family or joint fraternal family</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amorphous (bachelors, etc.)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no. of households</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Composed of a husband and wife and their child(ren).
2 Composed of a widow or deserted wife or unmarried mother with her child(ren).

The sample indicated that the dominant type of family nowadays is the simple elementary family. Polygynous, patriarchal extended family households have tended to break up, though still 21.2 per cent of the sample fell into this category. Most of the latter, however, were extended only in a horizontal sense, i.e. where married brothers were sharing a joint household. The second largest group is the matrinuclear type, with 24.7 per cent of the total. This type is a modification or incomplete component of the fully constituted elementary family. In the latter 42 households the actual household heads (abanumzana) are women, though the men in the society do not allow them to be considered as such officially.

The changed structure of the majority of families in Ekunene is reflected in the changed patterns of hut arrangement in the umuzi. Nowadays few imizi have a right-hand and a left-hand
section; only a handful are built in a circular formation about a central cattle byre, and none of the huts nowadays are shaped like beehives. Almost all huts are built either of brick, concrete blocks, or wattle and daub. Most are conically, but an increasing number are rectangular with internal room divisions.

![Diagram of a household layout]

Figure II. Plan of an elementary family household in Ekunene.

Generally the wife and mother nowadays have increased social responsibility in the home and in communal life. While many of their husbands are cooking and cleaning the homes of their European employers, the wives are felling trees, chopping wood, budgeting for the family, and arranging the children’s education, in addition to performing their traditional tasks under the old division of labour (housekeeping and hoeing). A small but growing number of women have, after obtaining a formal education in mission schools, entered professional life as teachers, health assistants, and nurses. The majority of women, however, are tied to the strenuous task of rearing children in conditions of poverty and malignant malnutrition, and amidst the widespread disruption of those traditional sanctions which guaranteed minimal standards of public and private morality. Medical personnel at the Polela Health Centre believed that there was a greater load of nervous strain upon women than upon men, and that the load is generally increasing. Neurotic illness, in the opinion of responsible

¹ The Polela Health Centre (P.H.C.), concerned with community health promotion in an area including most of Ekunene, was established by the Union Government in 1940. Its headquarters are within half a mile of Komkhulu, the Chief’s village.
persons in the society and of several of the P.H.C. doctors, is widespread in all sections of the society, even among 'progressives' and practising Christians. This latter fact is perplexing and irritating to many European missionaries and educators, because Africans believe these neurotic illnesses are caused by witchcraft or sorcery, things in which practising Christians and educated men are not expected to believe.

The Imposition by Europeans of Programmes of Social Amelioration

The chief work of planned European intrusion and influence exerted within Ekunene, pursuing a professed ameliorative purpose, has been in the field of religion and education. It is with these specific aspects of European 'contact' that the rest of this study will deal.

It is significant that neither the Government nor local European settlers played any significant part in the establishment and early development of either African churches or schools in Ekunene. The farmers often preferred converts to heathens in selecting their labourers. The former were considered more amenable to those forms of labour organization and management that have evolved on South African farms. Since the earliest times European farmers in Polela have individually and sometimes in organized groups deprecated or distrusted programmes and actions directed towards the extension of education among Africans.

Christian evangelizing activity commenced soon after the arrival of the first missionaries in neighbouring districts. A few settlers had previously converted some of their African labourers. Informants in Ekunene, however, believed that the significance of these early conversions was small because the converts remained 'uneducated people'. This refers to the fundamental linking of religion and education in the minds of the people. Only by grasping the close historical affinity and interdependence of these two cultural forces in their impact upon Ekunene society can the present-day ambivalence of al-
most all the adults in relation to education be comprehended.

The first Christian missionaries combined evangelism with education. Until recently most people in Ekunene considered a Christian and an educated person to be synonymous. If you wanted to receive an education you had to be a Christian, or at least to adopt the external semblance of a practising Christian. The missionary churches themselves soon realized that the strength of each particular denomination and local station depended more on the kind of social service it could extend to the African community than on any other factor.

In the light of experiences derived from their first contacts with Europeans, the people of Ekunene were ill-disposed towards receiving into their midst any Europeans. Every action of the missionaries was viewed with the utmost suspicion. Every personal ‘contact’ in Ekunene was regarded as a collaborator and potential enemy of the people. When the missionaries attempted rational argument with the people they usually found that the facts of revelation were treated with matter-of-fact incredulity. Only through offering to educate the people did the first missionaries make any headway whatever. Aged informants told me, in 1949, that the Chief and his Councillors in this period advised their people that since they had been overcome by the military weapons of the white man, they should henceforth try to master his book knowledge and so prepare to overcome their conquerors.

The Presbyterian Church was the first to initiate religious and educational work in Ekunene. The first church-school buildings\(^1\) were erected in about 1905. A few years later the Roman Catholic missionary organization initiated work in Ekunene, starting schools and even opening a nunnery\(^2\). There was a considerable movement away from Presbyterianism towards Roman Catholicism. Later the Anglican and Methodist Churches followed suit in establishing themselves in Ekunene.

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1. Nowadays in Ekunene are there any buildings which were constructed or used exclusively as schools. All the five present-day schools are housed in churches.
2. The nunnery closed down before the outbreak of the Second World War.
There was a period of bitter rivalry between the various missions. Although the Presbyterians lost much ground, they still retain considerable influence. Their chief asset is the Presbyterian missionary headquarters in Polela, situated just outside the western boundary of Ekunene. At this centre there is a model primary school, a secondary, and a technical school, objects of high regard to most people in Ekunene. It is instructive to note, however, that owing to the concentration of resources on the development of their central secondary education centre, the Presbyterians have neglected the development of the primary schools within the Location. The result of this policy has been a steady decline in the proportion of Ekunene to non-Ekunene entrants to the post-primary college. The teachers and parents of school children in Ekunene, while desiring the progressive development of the college, are displeased about the backwardness of the schools in the Location. It is said that the missionaries are concerned only with building their own renown; that they behave autocratically and are hostile to Africans in refusing to be guided by the expressed needs of the people, or at least to plan development with, rather than for, the people of Ekunene.

Teachers in Ekunene complain about the severity of the moral code demanded by mission school teachers, the autocratic manner of mission school ‘grantees’, and the slow progress of extending educational work. All the teachers with whom I discussed the question, with the exception of some Roman Catholic teachers, preferred an exclusively state-controlled educational system to missionary control or surveillance. The missionary programme for the advancement of education is considered sluggish and inadequate to the needs of the community. The mission churches, on the other hand, witnessing a tendency towards the rejection of Christian religion and ideology, are more determined than ever that they should retain control or supervision (in the case of state-aided schools) over the schools in Ekunene. The Christian programme of providing an attractive and needful service for the people has
miscarried. Neither the common people nor the intelligentsia have been able to feel themselves part of the central planning and directing authority of Christian enterprise. The early enthusiasm of the first converts who helped to build the church-schools has passed. It is said that the missionaries themselves have been overcome by the prevalent racialist conceptions of the majority of Europeans in South Africa.

The movement towards a rejection of European and mission control has been growing generally in Natal during the last thirty years at least. Numerous independent or 'separatist' African churches have come into being, many about a nuclear parent church congregation, or centred about a recalcitrant ecclesiastic. In Ekunene, though the success of the separatist and the independent churches has not been as marked as elsewhere, their influence has been felt. The 'Bidiya Church' is said to have been the first independent church in Ekunene which broke away from the Presbyterians. Here a complex association of modified Christian concepts and practices with aspects of ancestor worship has occurred. Bidiya adherents told me that they are the 'true' Christians, since the 'white' missionaries and other 'white' Christians have turned against God and Christ in their treatment of Africans. They assert that all the children of God are equal, but that the 'white' and 'black' members of the 'European denominations' are not treated in this way.

On the whole the separatist churches have achieved even less success than the 'independents' in Ekunene. In the case of the Presbyterian Church, the tendency to fission was forestalled by the official establishment of a separate 'Bantu Presbyterian Church'. This move met with limited success for a few years. But conflict between African ministers of the Church and the European missionaries is still present. The indications in 1948–49 were that it is increasing.


2 The word 'Bidiya' is a corruption of 'Presbyterian'. 
Church attendance everywhere in Ekunene is very small. On some Sundays I have seen less than a dozen men, women, and children at a church service. Some men told me that the church is 'the women's club'. By contrast, a hundred or more people may attend a feast and beer-drink in the same neighbourhood. Most preachers attack the 'backsliding' of their own adherents, rather than the non-Christian ancestor worshippers, for as we have noted above, more than 80 per cent of the population has been formally converted.

In advancing the work of evangelization, the missionaries have sought to attack and undermine almost all the basic values and customs of pre-Conquest Ekunene society. Sermons from the pulpit, exhortations to the parents of school children, school dramatic performances—all have been used to wage a constant war against the practice of polygyny, girls' initiation, ancestor propitiation, and the holding of traditional ceremonies associated with the life and seasonal cycles. Traditional dress was condemned as the mark of savagery. In political matters the churches did little more than justify the political dominance of Europeans and the poverty of the people in their congested reservation, by referring to the sins of the people before European Conquest, and more especially in the pre-Shakan era.

Although such dogma is unrelated to the central religious themes of Christian belief, it has profoundly influenced the view men have of the worth of their own society and culture. For many years there tended to be a resigned acceptance of the rationale, if not the truth, of this dogma. During the last ten years the growth of industrialism and the African national movement in South Africa have influenced the thinking of both the intelligentsia living in Ekunene and the migrant labourers employed in the cities. Esteem for the values, customs, and traditions of the past, especially the pre-Christian ideology, is being recovered, even among pious Christians. The latter are less afraid to admit a practical toleration or interest in traditionalism (which everywhere conflicts with what is officially described as Christian dogma), and have attempted to justify
their attitudes and actions before the enquiring or rebuking missionary. The expulsion from the Protestant Churches of prominent members of the congregation, for sins which are not treated as unethical in the traditional moral system, is not uncommon. I was always surprised by the equanimity with which a punished person and other lay members of the congregation accepted the decision of the missionary authorities. In some cases, however, expulsion or suspension has not encouraged penitence, but, on the contrary, has stimulated separatism or agnosticism.

The unilateral aspect of the Government's administration in Ekunene has, in matters of education, as in other spheres, induced a characteristic reticence towards the whole edifice of education as it is now constituted. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of parents want their children to be educated in schools. They believe that education will enable their children to obtain better jobs and increased incomes. Education is valued and sought after in the belief that it offers some prospect of departure from the chronic poverty, material inadequacy, social dislocation, and cultural vacuity of contemporary life in Ekunene.

The education of the people did not concern the Government in the first years after the administration began to operate effectively in Ekunene. This was regarded as a sphere of endeavour best handled by voluntary agencies, in particular mission churches. The latter undertook the task of educating the people, regarding their work of enlightenment as a sacred trust. Each mission church, as it commenced its educational work in the area, developed a programme of activity (modified subsequently in the light of actual experience, and of the financial resources and broad lines of policy of each of the parent Churches), either implicitly or explicitly. In no single instance where I was able to record the history of the establishment of the five elementary schools in Ekunene was there any evidence

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1 There is only a distant link between religion and ethics in non-Christian life.
2 See p. 112 above.
of the mission authorities having sought the active co-operation of the Chief or his Councillors in determining how the school should be planned and built, what the curriculum should include, what the specific aim of the education to be provided should be, and so forth. The most that was done was the securing of the Chief's permission to erect a structure (of wattle and daub, or corrugated iron—in four of the five schools), and to convert him and thus win his support for the plans and actions decided upon by the European missionary.

What part in the work of encouraging educational and other 'progressive' works do the 'educated' members of the society take? Most of the men and women who have received a post-primary education at mission schools outside Ekunene have been attracted by the possibility of obtaining professional employment in or near their homes in Ekunene. Less than a third have been able to do so because of the small number of professional posts available.

Those teachers, health assistants, and others employed in Ekunene place a fundamentally positive evaluation upon many but not all the plans and programmes for social and material amelioration. They oppose the Government's attempts to cull cattle and to impose compulsory 'betterment schemes', which they regard as calculated attempts to impoverish the people. But they support the cause of education, scientific, medical, and health work, agricultural improvement, and soil conservation. In none of these spheres, however, do they consider that genuine concern for the people's welfare and progress are the prime considerations which motivate Government policy and administrative practice. Such concern would inevitably have expressed itself in the principle that the active co-operation of the people through its chosen representatives is a sine qua non of progressive social interaction.

1 There are no facilities for post-primary education within Ekunene apart from the post-secondary training course for health assistants at the P.H.C.

2 The proportion employed in Ekunene increased considerably after the establishment of the P.H.C. in 1940.
Notwithstanding their well-formulated reservations, however, the teachers and other professional workers generally work conscientiously and courageously to make the Chief, his Councillors, and the more conservative members of the community receptive to the work of education, social medicine, and so forth. The reaction to such efforts is ambivalent, as is so much else in the attitudes of the people to the agents and vehicles of social change as it is conceived and practised by Europeans. The teachers and health workers often earn the reputation of being collaborators or traitors. The teachers have defended their actions in supporting the missionaries who built the churches, by pointing out that every additional church has become an additional school. The teachers have also approached the Chief and Councillors with a view to enlisting their support for encouraging better school attendance. Many parents connive at their children playing truant since they do not value the kind of education their children are receiving; others say that the three or four years required in the primary school to acquire the three R’s are wasteful; yet others believe that the local schooling is unlikely to equip a pupil for his post-school life. But it is again necessary to stress the fact that everyone I know in Ekunene wants education for their children; many adults want to educate themselves also. Some people, including both educated and ‘conservative’ individuals, place much faith in the educational and political advantages to be derived from a ‘tribal school’. The Chief has been urged to promote the establishment of such a school, but nothing concrete has yet been achieved (October 1952), owing to the organization of the people’s forces and resources for other, more important, activities.

In the course of the past five years the Government has grown alarmed about the increasing congestion in the Location, and the accompanying soil erosion and denudation of vegetable resources. Plans have been prepared for the ‘rehabilitation’

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1 At least eight adults I knew were pursuing secondary or post-secondary studies by correspondence in 1949.
of native agriculture. These are based on a programme of stock culling and pasture control. Fencing and limitation of pastures for stock grazing were introduced some years ago. In most cases the regulations have been systematically flouted. The Government has threatened the offenders, but usually delayed taking punitive action. More recent concrete plans for commencing stock culling have been drawn up. The Magistrate, in his capacity of Native Commissioner, and officials of the Government Native Affairs Department have tried to persuade the people and their representatives of the necessity for agreeing to stock culling. The Africans do not believe, however, that with less stock and fewer grazing rights they will be economically or socially better off. The determination of the Government to impose this ‘betterment plan’, despite popular opposition, is transforming the character of popular opposition from reticence, negativism, and subtle sabotage to more overt and direct forms of resistance.
PART TWO

The Economics of Community Development
Proposals for the economic development of underdeveloped countries are the subject of lively discussion at the present time. The United Nations is actively concerned in encouraging such development, and many countries have produced economic development plans. The peoples of the poor countries are looking for a way out of their poverty, and their obvious political importance compels the advanced countries to take heed. In Britain interest has mainly been centred on the development plans of the British Colonies and of the countries taking part in the Colombo Plan, as well as on the various proposals emanating from the United States, such as President Truman’s Fourth Point. But economic developments in China and Soviet Asia, and in the countries of the Middle East and Latin America, should not be forgotten.

Contemporary enthusiasm should not allow us to lose sight of the fact that economic development, in one sense of the term, is nothing new in underdeveloped countries. In the past a leading motive of advanced countries in their relations with colonial and other underdeveloped territories has been the desire to secure economic development. It has been customary to point with pride to the increase in foreign trade, in public revenue, and in similar indicators. Supposedly these showed the economic progress of a territory as a result of its being ‘opened up’ and brought into the world economy. The impact of this process on the inhabitants of the underdeveloped countries was indeed great, their existing economic and social structures being deeply affected. Cheap manufactured imports
displaced the products of native craftsmen; new crops were grown, particularly for export; mining enterprises were established; in many places foreign labour was introduced on a large scale; and modern transport systems were set up, usually oriented in the direction of the export trade. As a result, the fundamental economic characteristic of many underdeveloped countries came to be the extent of their specialization in the production of primary commodities for export to the advanced countries.

For the populations of the underdeveloped countries these economic developments were by no means wholly satisfactory. There are difficulties, both conceptual and practical, in evaluating their economic situation after they had been drawn into the modern world economy as compared with their previous position, not to speak of the important social and cultural changes. A more fruitful and relevant comparison is with the advanced countries, and here it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the advanced countries gained most from the economic relations they established with the underdeveloped countries. The advanced, industrial countries gained supplies of raw materials to make possible the expansion of their economies, and investment outlets to stimulate it. The underdeveloped countries remained poor and their economies became highly susceptible to the effects of demand fluctuations in the industrial countries which consumed their exports.

Where modern highly productive, capital-using techniques were introduced, they were commonly confined to foreign companies operating in the export sector, particularly in mining, and did not spread to the rest of the economy, which continued to use primitive methods of low productivity. And in the high productivity enterprises a substantial proportion of the incomes produced went to the foreign owners of the capital, thus bringing neither direct benefit to the local producers nor increased demand to stimulate the local economy. Moreover, during the sixty years ending with the outbreak of the recent war, the prices of primary products in terms of
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Manufactured goods moved unfavourably for primary producers, so that nearly sixty per cent more primary products were needed to buy a given amount of manufactured goods in the 1930’s than in the 1860’s. It appears that over this period of time the benefits of increased productivity in primary production were passed on by lower prices to the consumers, whereas those of increased productivity in manufacturing were absorbed by higher incomes in the manufacturing countries themselves.

The interests of the peoples of underdeveloped countries require that further economic development shall serve to correct the ill effects of past developments and not merely to continue the old tendencies. It should reduce the excessive dependence of their economies on foreign trade, raise local incomes, and diminish the international inequality of wealth.

An increased stock of capital is the obvious and basic condition for economic progress in underdeveloped countries. Capital is accumulated by devoting resources to the creation of instruments of production instead of goods for current consumption. The difficulty facing the underdeveloped countries is that they are too poor to spare resources easily from satisfying current needs. Yet in many countries resources are under-utilized, so that a more efficient utilisation of them would make some available for the creation of capital, without reducing the output of consumption goods.

This is the situation where the population engaged in agriculture is too large relative to the area cultivated, it being possible with existing techniques to produce the same output with fewer workers. But the existence of surplus labour is not the sole requirement for capital accumulation. It is insufficient that the output of consumption goods should not decrease; it is also necessary that an appropriate amount be made available to the labour occupied in capital works. This is essentially a problem of organizing a marketable surplus of food. In addition, it involves allocating the available supply of manufactured consumer goods. Surplus labour also must be fur-
nished with instruments of production before it can be set to work. These generally must be imported, and this requires, in the absence of foreign loans, an increase in exports or a decrease in other imports, both of which may be difficult to achieve. The constraint thus imposed will in part depend on the character of the investment programme undertaken.

If considerable attention is being given to the creation of capital goods industries, the reliance on foreign sources will eventually diminish. This path of development is a hard and long one so far as the consumption standards of the people are concerned, and it will be particularly difficult to follow in a country not richly endowed with a variety of raw materials, though it may later lead to a faster rate of progress than would result from a development programme which puts greater stress on the early expansion of industries producing consumer goods. If foreign loans or gifts are available to underdeveloped countries their road to economic development is made easier. Capital equipment can be imported without creating balance of payments difficulties, and consumers’ goods imports can be permitted to increase so that real consumption can keep in step with the rise in money incomes generated by investment expenditures. But in the present international situation adequate help from abroad cannot be relied upon, for, even if financial assistance is given, the necessary capital equipment and other imports may not be available. Many countries may have to base their economic development programmes largely on their own resources, and stern measures may be necessary to mobilize them for investment.

Given the possibility of capital accumulation, what forms should the capital take? In other words, in what directions should investment be undertaken? Although shortage of capital in existing productive activities, particularly in peasant agriculture, is severe, it would be undesirable in most underdeveloped countries to restrict investment to these. In the advanced countries economic progress came mainly through the accumulation of capital in new forms of production, par-
particularly in various types of manufacturing. And there is reason to believe that in the underdeveloped countries of today, if adequate economic progress is to be made, it will be necessary to develop manufacturing as well as to raise productivity in agriculture.

The case for manufacturing is most apparent where, owing to shortage of land, there is a surplus rural population of unproductive agriculturalists. These people, together with unemployed or unproductively employed town dwellers, can contribute to the economy if manufacturing employment is provided. Indeed, such employment may be a necessary condition for raising the incomes of those remaining in agriculture. In many countries a higher standard of living could be obtained by agriculturalists, even with existing methods of cultivation, if they had more land to work on, and if investment and technical progress is to take place, still more land may be required relative to the numbers engaged in agriculture. If the area of cultivation cannot be extended, higher living standards can be obtained only with fewer agriculturalists. In fact, even where no surplus rural population exists at present, technical progress in agriculture may displace labour, making it necessary to create openings for non-agricultural employment. While, at a later stage, the growth of industry can further assist the rise in agricultural productivity by supplying fertilizers and equipment.

When land is plentiful priority cannot be claimed for the development of manufacturing which it must have where rural overpopulation is rife. Yet manufacturing still will have an important part to play in the economic development of such countries. Perhaps the most important reason is that modern skills and techniques are peculiarly associated with manufacturing industry. In part, this arises from the fact that they are often an integral part of the process of capital accumulation, and not something separate which can be grafted, so to speak, onto an economy independently of its capital endowment. As the scope for accumulating capital in agriculture (at any rate,
without displacing labour) seems limited as compared with the possibilities in manufacturing, full use of modern skills and techniques cannot be made by an economy which lacks a growing manufacturing sector. A country which remains overwhelmingly agricultural will tend to remain a poor country unable to take advantage of many modern technical innovations, limited in its ability to accumulate capital, and lacking the powers of economic growth inherent in a country possessing modern industry.

Once it is granted that economic development through capital accumulation must be carried out on a wide front embracing both agriculture and industry, as well as the complementary transport and power services, the question arises of what types of development within the main fields should have priority. The usual answer is that investments should be of the type which utilize most economically the resources which are most scarce. This would mean, in countries where labour is plentiful relative to land, concentration on intensive agricultural developments—such as irrigation and the use of fertilizers—which tend to be complementary with labour, rather than on extensive ones which enable the available land to be cultivated with less labour. But the purpose of agricultural investment is to raise the incomes of the agriculturalists, and it may be that innovations of the intensive kind cannot do this adequately. In such circumstances it would be incorrect to refrain from mechanizing agriculture on the grounds that it displaced labour from the land. The correct conclusion would be that an expansion of non-agricultural employment was necessary if agricultural incomes were to be raised.

In industrial investment the precept of economizing the scarcest resources points to the establishment in underdeveloped countries, where capital is particularly scarce, of those industries, and within each industry the adoption of those methods, which require a comparatively small investment for a given value of output and employment of labour. Yet it would be absurd to adopt the most primitive, low productivity meth-
ods merely because they needed little capital. Similarly, in the choice between industries, it may be desirable to undertake a high capital-using project if it results in a great increase in output and facilitates further expansion. The precept implies concentration on consumer goods industries rather than on the production of capital goods, for on the whole they use less capital. But to devote resources to the production of capital goods is precisely the way to increase the stock of capital. Although doing so will postpone the time when consumption can increase, it will make possible a greater rate of increase in the future.

This brings out the main inadequacy of the rule we have been discussing. It is static, concerned only with the allocation of existing resources of land, labour, and capital, whereas the fundamental problem is a dynamic one, concerned with augmenting the capital stock, and it may well be that this is accelerated by just those projects which contravene the static precept.

One aspect of the choice between methods of production deserves special attention in the present context. Is there a place for small-scale domestic or village industries in the development programmes of underdeveloped countries? Even primitive domestic industries have the advantage of supplementing farmers’ incomes and giving occupations during slack seasons in agriculture. Experience has shown that village industries, using improved equipment and techniques can, in some circumstances, hold their own against large-scale production. There is also scope for small-scale undertakings to work in co-operation with factory industry, e.g. as suppliers of components or in the finishing stage of production. Encouragement of such development should certainly not be neglected. It needs centralized research combined with diffusion of the results, and training, at the village level. Also, there is probably a place for producers’ co-operatives in the scheme. But development of this kind cannot by itself suffice; it must be supplementary to more radical economic changes.

Small-scale industry has the attraction that it seems to offer scope for progress with the minimum dislocation of the ex-
isting economic and social structure. The trouble is that the demands of the situation cannot be met by small measures. Fundamental changes in the economic and social structure are needed if a serious attack is to be made on the poverty of the underdeveloped countries. Only if the magnitude both of the problem and of the measures needed to solve it are appreciated, can the true role of action at the level of the small economic and social unit be fully understood.

In the final analysis the economic relationships we have been discussing are determined by the behaviour of people, and the process of economic development is one of the organization of people in productive activity. It surely must be agreed that the leading and initiating role in the economic development of underdeveloped countries must be played by governments. Even those who visualize an important contribution being made by private enterprise rely on governments to create favourable conditions, beyond the mere maintenance of law and order. But however wide the functions of government in relation to economic development are conceived to be, planning from above cannot by itself ensure success. Decisions must be translated into action at the lowest level. To achieve this the enthusiasm of the masses of the people must be enlisted, their initiative encouraged, and belief in their own abilities fostered.

Progress occurs only where people believe that man can, by conscious effort, master nature. To develop this belief is partly a matter of political leadership, perhaps requiring reform of the agrarian structure and other drastic political and social changes. But it is also the job of education, in the broadest meaning of the word, and this is essentially a job to be carried out in the basic units of the economy.

It was argued above that the development of new techniques and increased productivity was primarily the result of capital accumulation. Nevertheless, there is scope for improvement of methods independently of large investments, and the benefits

of these must be demonstrated in practice if they are to be adopted by producers and to spread by force of example. If local enthusiasm is sufficiently stimulated, many of the capital works necessary for the adoption of some improved methods, involving perhaps irrigation or the prevention of soil erosion, could be constructed by volunteer labour. In peasant communities the advantage of co-operation in applying productive methods impracticable for individual family units is something to be demonstrated on a local basis. Skill in the use of new methods and techniques is acquired by using them. That is why the shortage of skilled labour in an underdeveloped country does not mean it cannot begin economic development. People learn to be efficient factory workers by working in factories. In agriculture the same thing is true. But someone must introduce the new methods to producers and create awareness of the possibilities. It is in this process that trained personnel from outside the community can play a part.

Our discussion inevitably has been concerned with the broader issues of economic development, for it is only in relation to these matters that the scope and limitations of work by governmental and non-governmental agencies on the level of the small community can be understood. Such work can certainly play a useful part, in proportion to the resources available for it. But it must be realized that unless it is part of a larger scheme for the regional development of resources, organized at the governmental or inter-governmental level, it can only alleviate the problems facing underdeveloped communities and not even begin to solve them. The more detailed economic problems relating to this type of work can be usefully discussed only in terms of specific projects. Before these are begun it will be important to consider their economic rationale and to assess their place in the general economy of the area concerned. Unless adequate attention is given to these questions a great deal of enthusiasm and effort is likely to be dissipated to little effect. But an investigation of this kind must always await the formulation of specific proposals.
Agriculture is an art and a craft, a science and a business. In the earliest state of a completely subsistence agriculture the peasant cultivator uses the art and the craft. He looks at the sky and carries out his operations according to a farming calendar largely dictated by the seasons, developing his art. He learns to use simple implements, domesticates some animals, and in various ways extends his craft. Thus far he produces little more than bare subsistence in food. The introduction of science and business stimulates a major leap forward in increasing his productivity and in organizing the distribution of his produce, which now amounts to more than he consumes but depends on outside supplies which he does not produce. Progress beyond pure subsistence farming and the division of labour go hand in hand.

This simple analysis might be complete if it were not for two other important aspects. Firstly, the land plays a dual role in agriculture. It is, as in industry, a site for production, but it is also soil, the basic factor in a biological and reproductive process in contrast to a mere extractive or manufacturing one. Secondly, the farm implies the farmer in his capacity not only as a unit of labour but also as a person. These two aspects together have given rise in the subsistence stage of development to religious and magical connections, and in the later stages to many social problems. It is no exaggeration to say that any major change in agricultural production brings with it a social revolution.

In the agricultural development of a community, in the sense
in which the word is used today, all these factors must be considered. In the older countries innovations and inventions which brought about technical changes in agriculture, and consequent large increases in productivity, came over a long period of time and allowed social changes also to come gradually. In the newer, underdeveloped territories, particularly in the tropical countries, progress has been initiated and accelerated by outside agencies, the time factor being telescoped both for the technological and the sociological changes. In the first large expansion, a plantation industry built either on slave or on indentured labour was technically efficient but socially unfavourable to community development. It was not the latter, however, which brought the first plantation phase to an end, but economic forces: slavery had disappeared in the face of public opinion and the supply of indentured labour dried up as resistance grew both in the countries supplying the labour and in the countries receiving it. Expansion through cheap labour no longer was possible and a new phase began. This phase is exemplified in the extensive government-sponsored schemes based on a large input of capital and a relatively small demand on labour. With safeguards, and long-term policies, it might be socially satisfactory, but the failures of the East African Groundnut Scheme and the Gambia Poultry Scheme have shaken faith in the technical and financial possibilities of such projects.

The negative results of attempting to realize quick returns on agricultural investment by large-scale mechanical farming in tropical and sub-tropical areas have emphasized the dangers both on the physical and on the social side. In some cases, for example, the replacement of the native method of random planting and mixed cropping by regular machine cultivation, even with contour ploughing and other soil conservation practices, has not prevented but increased soil destruction. In others, the relatively high wages on the mechanical project have attracted the male youth away from the village to the detriment of the village economy. These experiences have added weight
to those ideas, ably expressed by Professor W. Arthur Lewis
and others, that progress will most profitably come through
the development of peasant agriculture.

It is in this restricted sense, of development through peasant
agriculture, that the problems are considered here. There
have been agrarian revolutions in the past few decades based
on the introduction of, or the return to former, communal
types of farming and making use of technical advances from all
parts of the world. Some of these have been remarkably success­ful: the settlements in Israel, the collectives of the u.s.s.r.,
and the ejidos of Mexico. Since the recent war, particularly
as a result of governments with new political ideas in several
European countries and of governments of Asian countries
which have recently achieved their independence, there has
been a vigorous attack on low productivity and large-scale
experiments in agrarian reform have been undertaken. In
some of these considerable assistance, both technical and ma­
terial, has come from international agencies. In all cases, major
social as well as agricultural changes are taking place with
varying degrees of social upheaval.

The other extreme, of a major advance in production but
with a comparative absence of social upheaval, is exemplified
in the rapid growth during the twentieth century of the cocoa
industry in British West Africa, particularly in the Gold Coast.
Here a cash crop, cocoa, was introduced in the farming calen­
dar smoothly and easily, as it called for no radical change. The
forest people carried out their subsistence food farming by
cutting down the forest, burning off bush, and planting food
crops. The returns were high, cashing in on the built up fer­
tility of generations of forest cover. After a few years, as
yields declined, the farms were abandoned and new patches of
forest were cut. The major work was in the felling and
clearing. Cocoa seedlings raised in a nursery bed were planted
in these food farms, and when a farm was abandoned simply
left there. In a few more years the secondary bush had grown
up with the cocoa trees, and clearing this new growth, a
much less arduous operation than the original felling of the primary forest, gave the peasant farmer a bearing cocoa plantation at very little additional cost over his subsistence food farming alone.

It is doubtful if many more instances of such happy accident will be seen, and development must be considered mainly in conditions lying somewhere between the complete upheaval of present organization and practice and the natural grafting of new methods without disturbance. In the change from subsistence agriculture certain basic aims should be kept in view at all stages. The more important of these are (1) to ensure the food supply, (2) to conserve the natural resources, (3) to plan the use of the land for optimum returns, (4) to produce types of organization which will allow capital investment, (5) to diversify the crops and so broaden the economy as an insurance, and (6) to organize the processes beyond the farm gate—marketing of products and purchase of supplies—with the aim not only of stability and fair return for the farmer, but of fair prices for that section of the community no longer having a subsistence food supply.

Furthermore, the problem is not the uniform one of moving from a state of pure subsistence agriculture to a highly productive commercial agricultural-cum-industrial economy. The underdeveloped peoples have already moved different distances and in different ways along the line of material progress. In some cases the methods are defeating the ends: instead of living on the income from the soil by assisting the reproductive processes, they have been living on soil capital and have allowed serious erosion to destroy the soil on which their food depends. In others, population growth has overtaken the food production potential of their customary methods of husbandry. In both these cases, with the present actual level of productivity and the present population, there is the problem of man/land ratio to be solved. Somewhere the vicious circle of low production—inadequate diet—under-nutrition and disease—low energy—low production has to be broken.
The systematic appreciation of the problem by the military technique of Intention, Information, Method, and Administration has much to commend it. The Intention is community development (agricultural aspects), the Information required is demographic, economic, and sociological. It is necessary to know the population distribution in relation to the distribution of soil types, water supply, etc.; to know the present systems of agriculture and their productivity expressed in terms of the area required to feed a man at the present nutritional level; to have a measure of population trends; to have estimates of potential production levels with improved methods and crops and stock, and the maximum production both at present and potentially if the different conditions and qualities of land were put to their optimum use. Further, it is necessary to know the organizational structure of agriculture; to know the system of land tenure and inheritance; to know the degree of divergence from the pure subsistence pattern in which each family uses just sufficient land for itself; to know if one section of the community has already obtained a lien on the output of another through indebtedness or trading. It is necessary to consider these and other data as a whole to appreciate the present pattern, and to formulate a clear idea of the future pattern which is the aim. This ‘pattern concept’ helps in seeing factors in their correct perspective throughout the period of change. Another useful concept is that of ‘basic needs’—food, clothing, shelter, fuel—which provide the corner-stones of material welfare. The future pattern must therefore assume minimum levels for these needs before other wants are satisfied, and aim at an agricultural-industrial relationship which can supply them.

Let us consider first the case of local population pressure within a territory where there is still room for extending the agricultural area. The approach might be along two main lines. First, the surplus population, considered not as individuals but as groups not smaller than the family, might be transferred and resettled in one of the remaining open spaces.
The time gained by this transfer might be used to develop agricultural productivity in the original area so that the future increase of population could be absorbed naturally and an adequate diet maintained. In the second case, where the population pressure is already such that the available area of arable land (at present or at any reasonably possible future level of productivity) is too small to provide the four basic needs at the standard of living sought, the problem has no agricultural solution. Reduction of population or industrialization efficient enough to induce other areas of the world to produce food for it in exchange is the only way out. In the third case, where there is no immediate population pressure, the problem is solved more easily by improving productivity and raising the standard of living by fair distribution of the national income.

Before considering methods of increasing the peasant farmer's productivity, it is as well to define more exactly the meaning of 'peasant farmer' in the developed community in which his status is regarded as satisfactory. Peasant farmer in this sense is synonymous with 'family farmer'. The farm unit must be sufficiently large to allow the full use of the labour potential of the average family and also to provide a reasonable standard of life for that family. As technical improvements are introduced, particularly if mechanization is adopted, the minimum size must be larger than this in order to allow efficient use of machines and implements. This might at the same time entail employment of labour, either occasional or permanent, in addition to the family labour supply. It would not cover the exclusive ownership of elaborate machines, the use of such being organized on a collective basis as state machine-tractor stations, machinery contracting services, or co-operatively run machinery pools.

This conception of the peasant farmer implies a larger area per farm than is usually understood, but perhaps not so much larger than the area actually used except in conditions of gross under-employment through acute population pressure. Peasant food consumption is usually low. As agricultural productivity
increased the same diet would be produced by a smaller area, and alongside this development there would be an improvement in the general standard of life and in nutritional levels with the introduction of more animal protein. This demands a greater area, as animals consume roughly seven times as much in crop food products, expressed in calories, as they produce in animal food products. Furthermore, community development requires a level of production per man greater than subsistence. There will be the creaming off of the surplus of the agricultural population for industrial, commercial, and social services, all of whom must be fed. And agriculture will be required in most cases to provide cash crops and live-stock products, either of the food or non-food class, for export and exchange for products which the community cannot economically or physically produce for itself, but which, with the raising of the standard of life, become conventional wants.

Peasant agriculture in the underdeveloped community varies from nomadic herding to shifting cultivation in tropical rain forest, in a wide range of types which precludes any exhaustive treatment in one short chapter. Some broad characteristics can however be picked out, and plans for improvement considered in two main categories—technical and organizational. The main characteristics are (1) a low level of productivity with no effective system, often with wasteful shifting cultivation; (2) rising population leading to pressure on the land; (3) limited knowledge and rudimentary tools; (4) incidental livestock and consequent low nutritional diet; (5) a diversion of effort to cash crops, resulting with other factors in indebtedness; (6) absence of conservation measures, (7) scattered holdings and fragmentation; and (8) completely inadequate marketing arrangements. A general increase in production is required to improve the health and wealth of the people, to feed an increasing population, both rural and urban, at improved standards, and to provide income to support a higher standard of living through increased purchasing power and better social services. In short, more food of a wider range,
together with larger cash crop production, is wanted from the land, not at the cost of using up soil capital, but through a balanced agriculture. This can only come from better use of cultivated land or by increasing its area.

*Technical Improvement*

Technical advance may come through (1) scientific improvements, (2) improved methods of husbandry, and (3) improved farming systems. Scientific improvements include the control of animal and plant pests and diseases, and breeding for resistance to these. Better varieties and types may come from importations and from selection and breeding of indigenous types. New plant and animal importations may result in startling improvements; some of the most important commercial crops have come from other continents, but there are still many possible crops which have not been tried in many territories. Much production is lost through lack of control of vermin in field and store. Soil science and problems of soil fertility have received little study as yet.

Improved methods cover all husbandry operations: methods of cultivation, drainage, irrigation, and the use of manures and fertilizers. The differences between the advanced and the underdeveloped parts of the world are great, the continent of Africa using at present only some 2 per cent of the world output of nitrogen, phosphate, and potash. Better animal management implies improved feeding and housing and efficient exploitation of by-products. In many places poultry and animals are merely scavengers. There is room for improvement in the simple tools, and in the increased use of the wheel. In some cases power through animals would be a move forward; in others, perhaps animal power could profitably be replaced by mechanical power, liberating the animals for production of meat and milk, etc., while still retaining the advantage of animal manure. Although mechanical horse-power applied to the land has doubled each decade since 1930, half the culti-
vable area of the world—in Asia, Africa, and South America—uses only 2.5 per cent of the world’s tractors. In agriculture, 85 per cent of the draft power is still provided by animals. Mechanization of cultivation is in most circumstances a great advantage, but the application of power may perhaps most profitably be directed last to the actual cultivation of the soil, after other uses having a greater and more rapid effect in the removal of drudgery have been met. The problems of mechanization in the wet tropics have not yet been solved.

The volume of experiment and trial is rapidly increasing, and the adoption of mechanized methods may have a much greater secondary effect than mere removal of drudgery. Many underdeveloped peoples have readily taken to motor transport. The tractor may be the key to keeping on the land the keen, more progressive elements in the developing village communities, in arresting the drift of the best to the towns or mines. Their retention in the countryside may produce all-round advances; mechanization might be sound social policy even though it could be shown to be non-economic at the ruling price of labour. The light wheeled tractor with mounted implements gives such complete mastery of a wide range of operations as to provide a counter attraction to the bright lights of the town. Now that these tractors are being produced with diesel engines, it may be possible and profitable in future to feed the tractor from the soil by using vegetable fuels such as groundnut oil in places where the long haul of fuel at present precludes their use. Although it would appear retrograde to use a high-grade protein instead of mineral oil from a world food standpoint, the loss is insignificant against the cost of the socially wasteful arms race now underway. Unfortunately, reasonable and rational technical, economic, and social solutions to the problem of the development of the underdeveloped regions of the earth are only possible after political differences, which condemn the majority of the world’s inhabitants to an unnecessarily low standard of life, have themselves been resolved.
Improved farming systems involve more upheaval than improved methods in an existing system. In spite of difficulties of persuasion or coercion, nomadic herding must give place to settlement and the economic cultivation of stock and stock products. Long rotational systems using a bush fallow as a soil rejuvenating process must give place to shorter rotational systems using, perhaps, a grass ley and relying for maintenance of fertility on a more balanced agriculture with stock: the crop cultivator in an extensive shifting cultivation system must become a farmer with an intensive permanent form of rotational mixed farming. In commercial plantation and estate systems using the peasant as a labourer, or in peasant plantation systems concentrating on non-food cash crops, improvement lies along the road of diversification and of the widening of monocultural practice, both to safeguard soil fertility and to provide the food for a high nutritional diet.

Organizational Improvement

Quite apart from providing an umbrella under which capitalized plantation industries could flourish, the local governments of colonial territories administered by the large metropolitan powers in the past half-century have developed agricultural services for the native agricultural sector mainly devoted to (1) fostering export cash crops and (2) technical improvements. In the second theme there has been more frustration than achievement, due in part to a reluctance to interfere with tribal laws and customs in such affairs as land tenure, and to a lack of experience in dealing with non-technical or organizational problems. An inspection of any colonial agricultural department’s list of officers will reveal a galaxy of highly trained scientists but a comparative absence of agricultural economists or sociologists. A shift of emphasis has taken place as regards cash crops and food crops, but the overemphasis on the science, in contrast to the business and organization, of agriculture persists both in training and personnel. There is, however, an
appreciation of the problem and all administrations are groping after organizational forms which will lead to the release of the latent energy and resources of their underdeveloped areas. This appreciation has led world opinion as expressed in international action, and is at the same time an expression of the now general appreciation of a world problem.

Two trends in this world opinion are noticeable in the post-war period. The first is an appreciation of the necessity for rapid development of all the backward areas so that they can make their full contribution both to desirable higher standards of living of their own and to the maintenance of present living standards in the advanced countries. Some would claim this to be an essential element in sheer survival. The second is the slow realization that industrial expansion based on cheap imported food is now outmoded: the terms of trade between food products and industrial products have turned for good. Born of this there are imaginative development schemes in many countries whose germ is perhaps to be found in T.V.A. or the U.S.S.R. five year plans. There are also the co-ordinated technical assistance programmes of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations and the United States ‘Point Four’ programme. These only scratch the surface, however, as the capital available is less than one-half of one per cent of the amount needed to finance the known requirements of the underdeveloped countries, which are estimated at 5,000 million dollars a year—a large total, perhaps, but only a fraction of the cost of the re-armament programmes. The British Colonial Development and Welfare Funds, the Colonial Development Corporation, and the Colombo Plan are expressions of the same desires, but implementation lags behind goodwill. The same world resources cannot be applied to destructive and to productive ends at the same time.

To attempt to produce any sort of organizational blueprint would be futile, as the conditions and problems of the different areas are diverse. In the following paragraphs some lines of approach, with examples, are given. They do not form a com-
plete whole but are rather a disconnected series of observations and suggestions.

*Gold Coast cocoa farming.* In this, the largest cocoa producing country, the dominant pattern is the forest village with small cocoa farms scattered throughout the village land up to three miles away from the centre. Communication between the village centre, or the roadside, and the farms is by paths and tracks. And as one farmer may have several patches of cocoa and a food farm in different places, the waste of time in walking to and from the farms, and the cost in labour of head-loading the produce, sets a low limit to productivity, expressed in output per man-day. The output per acre and the output per unit of capital may be satisfactory, but without high output per man the standard of life cannot be raised to any extent.\(^1\) In this forest country the village structure with its social advantages, derived from scattered residential holdings, might be preserved but much time saved by a reorientation of the farm land and ownership.

The model village could consist of the cleared area with the houses, school, church, etc., surrounded by a ring of cleared land devoted to rotational food crops and stock, the stock being fed and kept in fields instead of roaming the village area as scavengers. The outer fringe of forest would shelter the cocoa farms, but with a reshuffle of ownership so that each farmer had his crop area in one place. The labour saved could be spent in improving the main bush paths to make them suitable for bicycle traffic, and in improving housing by using local materials—clay and wood shingles—with very little call on imported materials, these being limited to a few nails, hinges and locks, glass and lime. A second stage might bring a village tractor to do the main ploughing in the farmed area (i.e. in the large fields used rotationally), in which strips were allocated to the individual farmers. As a stationary power unit

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\(^1\) At the present time inflated cocoa prices mask the effect, but may in the long term be a deterrent to the progress necessary to meet the situation of lower prices.
it might be used for grinding corn, pumping water, and perhaps hauling produce to the central market in the area. There would be advantages in organizing shared services as co-operatives.

Collective farming systems. In areas with annual crops—in contrast to permanent tree crops such as cocoa, tea, and rubber—some degree of collective, communal, or co-operative organization could win some of the benefits of scale. The simplest form is that of the group farm. A number of holdings of the ‘family farm’ size are grouped round a central organization, with or without an actual central farm, but able to supply services and information beyond the capacity of the individual farmer. There may be bulk purchase of requirements, bulk sale of produce, central hatcheries and rearing units supplying the stock for production and fattening on the individual farms, special tools and implements for contract work or for hire, and also perhaps an organization for thrift and credit.

With a crop like sugar cane, which is grown in some places continuously, the central farm might be large in comparison with the individual surrounding farms, devoted to the main cane crop and farmed as a co-operative, each farmer sharing in the returns from the sale of the crop or of sugar produced from it in a central crushing and processing plant, according to the work he put in during the year. The other part of his enterprise would be his own personal undertaking, and would produce his food crops and livestock products.

Where such a crop as cane is produced on the individual farms, but sold to a factory, there is still an advantage in combining forces during the harvesting period. The individual cane farmers could form themselves into voluntary companies, cutting cane together in each member’s farm on an agreed rota, saving transport, and regularizing the delivery to factory. Each farmer would be credited with the whole cane from his own farm and be debited with the value of the work done on his farm by his companions.

The full co-operative farm carries the collective process a stage
further. In this each farmer puts into the co-operative land, or stock, implements or capital according to his resources. Central, authoritative day-to-day management is then essential, though policy is decided by an elected committee. Each member carries out the duties delegated to him, and receives reward according to agreed schedules for his labour and the use of his stock, implements, land, and capital. The landless peasant may thus become a full member, supplying at first only his labour.

The collective is a type of large-scale co-operative farm. In the Russian form, workers earn 'work-days' according to the type of work done and their efficiency, a day's work being remunerated on a basis of merely a part of one or of several 'work-days'. The organization is debited with the services supplied by a central machine-tractor station, run by the State, and contributes to revenue by a procurement system, handing over an agreed percentage of the produce. The workers receive their reward according to the number of 'work-days' earned during the year, at a value worked out after final accounts have been made up at the end of the year. Each worker also has his own private small holding to maintain a limited number of livestock and to grow his vegetable produce. In such an organization the community is the collective, which organizes social and cultural activities. In the final phase, by amalgamation of smaller into larger collectives and developing local light industry, it may become a new 'agro-town'. In the Mexican ejido the private holding is absent, each member drawing supplies from a central vegetable farm. These types are efficient and may be a satisfactory solution where large-scale re-settlement is being undertaken, but their institution and development in an established peasant system will necessarily be accompanied by social upheaval, either as cause or effect. The collective is unlikely to become established as the result of gradual change.

The communal farm, in which each member gives according to his ability and receives according to his need, may be a highly efficient organization if knit together by some fervour—re-
ligious, national, or defensive. Such are the Israeli settle-
ments. But as the necessity behind the fervour recedes, ‘party
political’ differences lead to a lessening of the enthusiasm for
this type of living and the commune deteriorates into a less
purist organization. In Russia the commune was the ideal
sought in the first plan, but only the diluted form in the shape
of the collective was acceptable to the mass of the rural
population. In Israel the small holder type of settlement
is gaining favour over the Kibbutz. Tribal villages have many
communal characteristics and would appear at first to provide
a basis on which to build the commune, but the introduction
of a cash economy after association with the ‘West’, community
development in the shape of local government authorities, and
international agreements against the use of ‘forced’ labour,
have tended to push communal efforts, in building a road or
clearing a village, into the background. Where tax is paid the
villager feels that the services formerly performed communally
should be carried out for him and not by him. This is perhaps
an unfortunate result of well-intentioned interference with
tribal custom. There does not appear to be much future in
community development along the road of the commune.

Capital. Of the four factors of production in agricultural
enterprise—land, labour, capital, management—land and la-
bour are present in any peasant system. Capital and management
are almost negligible quantities. To management there is no
short-cut except by importation of the expatriate manager as
in the plantation system, but the perpetuation of a system
which condemns the peasant to the permanent role of paid
labourer is not true development. Management is an end pro-
duct of education, in which fundamental education and wide-
spread literacy are the foundation stones. To lay them requires
time. The limitations on the injection of capital are not so
absolute, but the rate of development nevertheless is bound up
with the supply of capital. Any form of capital—machines,
fertilizers, seed—coming from outside the village is the result
of a gift, a loan, or an exchange for something produced in the
village. In the last case development must necessarily be slow because the capital must come from saving, from consuming less than is produced, and as production is perhaps either at or only a little above subsistence level, the saving will be small. The high capital investment economy pursued by the U.S.S.R. in the initial period was at the expense of the standard of living. So must it be in the village. Rapid development therefore means capital from outside—from the central government or a foreign source. This is not to despise the local building up of capital resources, but rather to accept the role of outside capital as a ‘pump-primer’ leading to higher production which will in itself then make possible a greater contribution to capital accumulation. The acquisition of outside capital is beyond the scope of this chapter. The method of injection is the problem.

Capital in the form of a loan presupposes security for the credit. Where the peasant farmer has a free title to his holding, the land is his security, but where his rights are occupational and usufructuary, are bestowed by the community, he has no security to offer for a loan to cover buildings or other permanent improvements on his holding. This is a dilemma produced by customary systems of land tenure, which are jealously guarded. To suggest that the community must provide the security is merely to restate the problem in different terms. The answer lies in change. It is perhaps significant to note that at the Jos Conference 1, a local ruler stated categorically that if tribal law and custom inhibited progress, they would have to be swept aside.

The provision of working capital for implements and stock can be secured by a form of chattel mortgage, and subsistence capital supplied against future delivery of crop. The development of marketing schemes, in which there is one statutory outlet for the produce locally, provides a satisfactory framework for this type of credit. The peasant farmer's income from

sales is badly distributed throughout the year, although his needs are relatively evenly distributed, and between-crop accommodation is necessary. The way of the money-lender and store-keeper is usually bad, leading to indebtedness. Credit must be adequate and at reasonable cost, but it must be provided only for a productive purpose.

Co-operatives. Perhaps the most useful single tool in rural development is the co-operative. It can at the same time function as an economic system and as a cradle for the growth of social attributes essential to development of a community, such as self-help and democratic organization and management of affairs. On the economic side, in the sphere of agriculture, it can organize thrift, credit, marketing, and consumer supplies at the village level, and through federations and central organizations provide the whole framework of banking, insurance, wholesale trading, and import and export services in an efficient manner, making possible the maximum rate of agricultural development and ensuring to the farmer the optimum fair return for his productive effort.

It is interesting to note that co-operatives are recommended by practically every commission on development of underprivileged areas, even though the advisers concerned may not be favourably inclined to the working class co-operatives of the advanced countries they represent. The argument as to whether governments should actively organize co-operatives, or whether they should 'come from the bottom', can be resolved in the acceptance of the time factor. A community will in due course cultivate its own progressive leaders, but until such leaders do emerge, government or some external agency must assume the role. In face of a particular need—e.g. an inefficient, parasitic marketing structure, with far too many middlemen, which battens on the back of the peasant cultivator—marketing co-operatives might be the first approach, but in general the natural and best entry for co-operative method is through 'better-living' societies, thrift and loan, or thrift and credit societies. In each case the start should be along Anti-
gonish lines—discussion and appreciation of the problem and its solution before any hasty organization of registered societies themselves. 'Better-living' societies can organize village sanitation, the digging of a well or latrines, where such activities are not already organized by any local authority or accepted as obligatory communal work. For the paid worker, thrift societies to which he allocates a small regular amount, only withdrawable on retirement and against which he can obtain a loan for some special purpose, may counteract improvidence. For the peasant cultivator, societies for thrift, which also build up capital by shares and deposits, can provide a fund from which loans for productive purpose can be made. In more primitive conditions unlimited liability is advisable, and everywhere liability limited only to an amount equal to several times the share holding is an advantage.

From these beginnings marketing societies could be developed, either as an enlargement of the activities of the original societies, by which they become multi-purpose societies, or as separate single-purpose societies. The advantages of the latter are in practice reduced on account of the scarcity of able literate members who can form the committee and serve as officers of the society. From this point growth will depend on agencies beyond the village, in the grouping of societies into unions and central organizations for marketing, supply, and storage, such organizations being able to raise funds from outside the farm community to enable a more rapid expansion of production through credit and other services. Where credit is available for the farmer, the system should aim at preventing him from living on soil capital, while allowing him a reasonable standard of living. Too easy access to credit may engender a too rapid rate of expansion. Too much can be as harmful as too little, create rather than eradicate indebtedness, and lead to the loss of his farm.

In many rural and urban communities capital is locked up in the savings of individuals, who year by year add a little to the structure of a house which they will complete over a period
of ten years or more. Co-operative building societies, in which the members give their labour and invest their savings for the construction of a limited number of houses at a time, for serial occupation as they are completed, releases this locked up capital and makes it productive.

Pilot schemes. Where any programme or scheme involves social as well as technical change, it is sound policy to run a pilot scheme first. Whether the pilot scheme should represent the full project, or whether the technical aspects should be tackled first, will depend on the circumstances. Where the technical change is experimental the latter is probably the wiser course. A failure on the technical side, which could be turned into a success as the result of knowledge gained in a pilot scheme, may easily have the effect of invoking stubborn resistance to the whole. Thus there is some justification for using paid labour in the pilot scheme although the pivot plan envisages action by individual peasant farmers or some form of cooperative or settlement organization. A greater danger, perhaps, is a too complete reliance on the results of a pilot scheme. In agriculture the problem of scaling up is complex. A crop which will grow well in small areas, or stock which will thrive in small numbers, does not necessarily produce similar results when the quantity is greater. Pests and disease and beneficial insects acting as pollinators are all part of the balance of nature, a biological complex which cannot be completely nor easily controlled.

Where the pilot scheme, on the technical side, is incomplete in that it tests only the additions or alterations in the customary farming practice, the economic aspect must be specially studied. A technically successful crop or stock introduction must fit into the whole farm calendar and system to produce a net gain. A new crop which competes for labour with the old at the same times during the year will disrupt rather than increase output. Changes should be viewed first in their capacity of complementary production, making fuller use of the slack periods. Similarly, changes which liberate labour by bringing
in machine power, should liberate the labour at the peak periods. Labour saved which cannot be profitably used is no net saving to the community.

Resettlement schemes. In any settlement scheme involving the movement of people from one area to another, the idea of moving family or clan groups is generally accepted as preserving community spirit. Where the type of farming to be developed in the settlement area is a new or improved type, some form of training scheme is essential. There is some virtue in organizing the training settlement as a co-operative, bringing in the entrants at short intervals and passing out a stream of trained family units spread over the farming year. By running the farms as a co-operative, and organizing marketing, supplies, savings, etc., in a series of co-operatives, during the training period the families may learn the benefits of such organization. At all times there will be both experienced and untrained members, the former helping the latter, and all going on to their permanent settlement with some knowledge of democratic organization, mutual and self-help, business methods, and many other useful attributes beyond the mere acquisition of new technical skills.

State farms. Large-scale state farms, the labour force for which may come from one or more village communities, have the aim of gaining the whole benefit to be derived from large-scale organization, but savour of the plantation system. The organization will necessarily require people of many different skills and levels and organizing abilities, and if the spur to achievement is promotion within the large state farm management staffs, with all other community activities centred in the village, a healthy and satisfactory development should take place. Farmers everywhere might be divided into three groups. The first man can manage himself and his family; the second can manage himself and as many workers as he can supervise personally every day; the third and rare type is the man who can not only supervise efficiently but delegate authority to others. It is a matter of opinion whether each of these types
should be allowed to find his métier, or whether there should be a low or high, or even any, maximum area which an individual farmer should be allowed to farm.

Conclusion

The underdeveloped parts of the world are predominantly agricultural, so that agricultural productivity is the major economic factor. On the technical side there is a great deal which the advanced countries can give, but at the same time there is a tremendous disparity in the supply of capital aids to production between the materially retarded and advanced halves of the world. In some places population growth has produced a pressure on the land which precludes any agricultural solution to the low per capita income, but in many others there is still time, if the inflow of capital can be organized.

There is, however, another side, after all the technical problems have been resolved. Technical advance may be at the expense of community. New forms of organization which will allow efficient exploitation of the natural resources cannot in any great measure be borrowed from the advanced countries. Organization of peasant agriculture is in an experimental stage. Many avenues are being explored, but the horizon is not yet very clear. There may be many answers to the community side of agricultural development. There is no blueprint, and there may not be any one road.
Chapter VII

LAND TENURE AND LAND REFORM

1. Samkalden

On 20 November 1950 the General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution stating that "agrarian conditions which persist in many underdeveloped countries and territories constitute a barrier to their economic development because such conditions are a major cause of low agricultural productivity and of low standards of living". It asked the Secretary-General to submit to the Economic and Social Council an analysis of the extent to which unsatisfactory forms of agrarian structure and, in particular, systems of land tenure in underdeveloped countries impede economic development and depress standards of living, especially those of agricultural workers and tenants, and of small and medium-sized farmers. Finally, it requested the Economic and Social Council to make recommendations based on the report to be submitted by the Secretary-General. Particular attention should be devoted here to the recommendations dealing with appropriate land reforms.

In accordance with this resolution the Secretary-General appointed a committee of experts to consider those aspects of agrarian structure which are obstacles to economic development. Their report was presented and discussed at three United Nations conferences (Economic and Social Council, September 1951; Food and Agriculture Organization, November 1951; General Assembly, January 1952).

Another United Nations document also should be mentioned. At the invitation of the Economic and Social Council, the Secretary-General appointed a committee of experts to prepare proposals on national and international measures for the econom-
ic development of underdeveloped countries. Their report, *Measures for the Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries*, published in May 1951, covers a much wider field, but also contains some concrete recommendations on land reform. It is not at all fortuitous that the reform of agrarian structure has become a topical problem in many countries. Everywhere it has become essential to increase production and to abolish poverty and starvation. To increase production, agricultural productivity must be raised first: fifty-nine per cent of the world's population finds its subsistence in agriculture. In South and Central America, Asia and Africa, the average is almost seventy per cent. 'Whereas in Europe only one person out of three, and in North America only one person in five is dependent on agriculture, in Asia and Africa three out of every four obtain their living from the land.' But in taking the first step towards reform, the agrarian structure is the first obstacle encountered, and it does not respond to rational needs. Antiquated systems of land tenure, the most excessive wealth, and on the other hand the greatest poverty act as impediments to more effective land utilization. Everywhere there is unclaimed land due to shortage of labour, or land where so many peasants try to make their living that no one can emerge from destitution. Everywhere social conditions dissipate the fruits of labour, and there is little incentive for improvement.

In short, we are confronted at once with many aspects of the institutional framework of agricultural production, such as the legal or customary system under which land is owned and operated; the organization of credit, production, and marketing; the system of taxation; the organization of government services for water supplies, transport, etc. Amongst these, the legal framework is the most important and at the same time the most bound to tradition. It is intimately interlaced with the social structure of the community and therefore is most resistant to reform. This can be exemplified by the unsuccessful endeavours of the French Governments between 1863 and 1883.

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LAND TENURE AND LAND REFORM

to individualize indigenous land tenure in Algeria by dissociating it from tribal relationships and substituting a Western system of registered titles. ‘No legislative endeavour in Algeria has ever involved such a tremendous task, and none has been such a lamentable failure,’ said Senator Franck Chauveau in a report published in 1893. On the other hand, abuses in this legal framework, particularly on account of their persistence, corrode the community so deeply that many insurrections originate in regions where they are most common. The revolt of the Filipinos against the Spaniards in the nineties of the last century originated from long pent-up discontent with the conditions of tenants on the ‘friar lands’, large ecclesiastical estates that had been granted in the past to several religious orders. In Indonesia, the revolts of 1926 originated on the large land-holdings in West Java, with their antiquated seigniorial rights.

The part played by this legal framework is very remarkable indeed. It delineates, as it were, the area and the history of a community. Once it has been established it puts its mark on the future development of the community. When a delegate of the United States declared on 3 September 1951 in the Economic and Social Council that in his country the belief has always existed that the man who tilled the soil should own it, then this conviction cannot be dissociated from the way tracts of land in the Plains were ‘settled by hardy pioneers under the homestead laws which enabled private individuals to obtain a title to 160 acres merely by staking a claim, building a house and living and working on the land for a year or more’. Natural conditions and the availability of land encouraged the individualism of the American settlers. Quite another influence is exerted by natural conditions in tropical regions, where the variation of the ground, the irregular water supply, and the often uncongenial climatic conditions are frequently an inducement to the communal element. But do not imagine that such an emphasis is irreconcilable with the inclination to individual ownership.

During more than fifty years we Dutchmen have considered
the land titles of the Javanese as individual rights of occupation on communal land owned by the village communities. Only after the investigations of van Vollenhoven (1918) and, later, of ter Haar did we get an insight into the peculiar function of these village rights, which are entirely different from Western proprietary rights. They increase or decline in strength as external forces menace or foster the solidarity of the village community. Thus it could happen that in those regions of Java where during the depression in the sugar cane industry of the years 1929 to 1936 no paddy fields were rented by the factories, individual title rights gained and village rights lost more than in regions where renting of paddy fields was continued. A much stronger village authority may be essential for the distribution of the labour necessary for the water supply and for the distribution of land belonging to the village area. In many regions of India communal organization is stimulated by the nature of the soil, which needs collective cultivation.

Yet geographical conditions are not the only decisive factor in the legal framework of the agrarian structure. The social and economic evolution of the community also plays an important role. Examples can be drawn from any part of the world. The existence of a class of large landowners in Central Europe and South and Central America and the development of the sugar cane industry in Cuba represent only two among many examples of special social and economic factors which may have a substantial effect on the agrarian structure of a community.

A third group of factors can be indicated as the national-political. These factors are associated with periods of colonial domination by foreign powers, which imposed on their subjects a new legal form and status, affecting the evolution of the agrarian structure. The adoption of Roman law in a large part of Europe, the introduction of the feudal system in England by William the Conqueror, the Mastery of Islam over large parts of South-East Asia and North Africa, exemplify the influence of political history on the legal framework of agrarian structure.
To these many external factors should finally be added the diversity of culture and religion that causes different communities to react differently to external forces. Innovations which are willingly adopted in one cultural region are rejected elsewhere, or give rise to social conflicts that often have a revolutionary effect on the community.

I thought it would be opportune to preface a discussion of the United Nations report on *Defects in Agrarian Structure as Obstacles to Economic Development* by these remarks. As a matter of fact this report aims at an economic analysis. It records phenomena that are decisive to economic development. (Though demonstrating the factors that check development does not mean that you have counteracting measures in hand.) There are very few more harmful misconceptions than the idea that the same faults can be corrected by the same means everywhere. Reforms of agrarian structure in diverse regions seldom produce the same effects, even if the faults of existing structures were similar. It should not be assumed too eagerly that if uniform government measures were implemented everywhere they would act as a panacea.

Poverty in many countries is most clearly demonstrated by comparing the productiveness of agricultural labour, and the proportion of the labour force on the land, in several regions. In doing so some conclusive and revealing data is gained. In North and Central America the production computed in quantities per capita of the agrarian population is three times that of Europe, over twelve times that of Asia, and over twenty times that of Africa. Moreover, if it is realized that of each sixty people, in America twelve, in Europe twenty, and in Asia forty-five must earn their living in agriculture, then it is obviously no overstatement to say that ‘to a very large extent, the problem of the underdeveloped countries of the world is the problem of the poverty of their farm population’ (p. 6).\(^1\)

There is an important common feature in the agrarian struc-

\(^1\) This and all subsequent references in the body of the text are to *Defects in Agrarian Structure as Obstacles to Economic Development*. New York, 1951.
ture of these communities—the excessively small size of the average farm holding and the contrast between average small farms and large estates. Comparative figures on this are of very little use, as soil conditions and management practices are so widely divergent.

In India, for instance, population pressure on the available area of cultivated land is lower than in Japan, Egypt, Haiti, Korea, Java, Lebanon, Indo-China, Ceylon, and China, but the effect of population pressure on the Indian standard of living is a more violent one because the level of productivity per hectare is far lower. Crop yields are far smaller, and double cropping is only practised on a small proportion of the land. In Egypt, Japan, and Java, in contrast, yields are very high and double cropping is general.

Where population pressure on the available area of cultivated land is high, as a rule very little will be achieved by legislative measures for redistribution of land amongst the owners. After a drastic redistribution in Japan in 1946, 41 per cent of the farms now occupy an area of less than 0.5 hectare\(^1\), compared with 34 per cent formerly. The equalization of the size of farms need not imply that the average size will be higher than the minimum required for subsistence. In these regions less is to be expected from changes in the system of land tenure than from improvements in agricultural education and research, control of the water resources and supply of equipment, credit facilities and marketing organization. For these purposes large funds will be required, but will prove to be remunerative only if the progress of other means of subsistence—in particular cottage industries—eases the pressure of the population on agriculture.

\[1 \text{ hectare} = 2.471 \text{ acres.}\]
attention to two phenomena which have a direct effect on this legal framework, and which prevail almost everywhere inadequate new land is available for agricultural purposes: fragmentation of holdings and insecurity of tenure. The fragmentation of holdings is a feature in both European and Asian countries, but its causes are different. If a tightly closed community can command only dissimilar soils; if the available water irrigates only a part of the village lands; if it is the custom that an inherited estate is as far as feasible divided between all lineal relatives; if to supplement the inadequate area of the farmland owned other land can be rented or purchased—then fragmentation of holdings is rife. It is clear that the possibility of fostering consolidation by enforcement of statutory provisions depends on the cause of the trouble. In cases where the ties of the village community are slackening, statutory measure on individual freehold titles can provide a counterpoise. This seems to have happened in Jordan, where the semi-communal system had to a great extent lapsed and the granting of individual freehold titles corresponded to the desires of the cultivators (pp. 36–37). In India consolidation has been successfully based on the experience of voluntary reform in the Punjab from 1921 onwards. In more recent times legislation has been enacted entailing enforcement of consolidation on a partly compulsory basis, provided a majority of the farmers (usually two-thirds) agrees to it. The U.N. report says that in 1949 an area of 640,000 hectares was consolidated in the Punjab, the number of blocks of fields in that region being reduced from 4,250,000 to 646,000 (p. 21). Also, several Western countries where fragmentation is particularly encouraged by the ruling system of inheritance have issued statutory provisions to achieve consolidation of scattered fields. The difficulty to be solved is not consolidation itself, but the continuation of the improved conditions established. In a new Swiss Agriculture Act, dated 3 October 1951, it is laid down that fields brought into improved conditions from public funds shall not be withdrawn from the objects imposed for a term of twenty
years other than by licence issued by the cantonal authorities. Any landowner breaking this rule will be forced to reimburse the subsidy he was granted, and above this he will have to pay for all the damages resulting from his action. In the Netherlands, where enforced consolidation was introduced in 1924, so far the feeling has been that no provisions to counteract fragmentation after consolidation are necessary.

A second undesirable feature, against which the help of the legislator is usually called in, is insecurity of tenure. According to the U.N. report it is estimated that in Burma, India, China, and Japan about half the land was worked by tenants prior to recent changes. It is an important feature of the land system in Burma, Cochin-China, Central Thailand, and the Philippines. Tenancy is also the prevalent form in Syria, Iran, and Iraq (pp. 22–23). In Cyprus, Turkey, and Lebanon, on the contrary, most of the farmers own land. In the South American countries, notably in Argentina, about 60 per cent of the land is leased. According to a statement of the American representative to the Economic and Social Council, the percentage of leased farms in the U.S.A. has decreased from 42 per cent in 1935 to 21 per cent in 1951. In many European countries the incidence of land tenancy is growing. In England it amounts to over 60 per cent and in the Netherlands to about 55 per cent of the cultivated area.

Insecurity of tenure is reflected in three items of a lease: first, the rent; second, the duration; and third, compensation for improvements made by the tenant, to be paid at the expiration of the lease. As far as the rent is concerned, share-cropping is the usual system in many Asian countries, the Middle East, and South America. The share of the landlord is usually more than 50 percent, at least in highly over-populated countries. In Argentina the share is a little less. There, before compulsory reduction of rents to 20 per cent of the gross yield was enforced in 1948, the customary share was about 36 per cent.

In the exceptional cases where cash rents are due in underdeveloped countries, usually for specific crops, they often rep-
resent almost half the market value of the crops, whereas most of the expenses of cultivation are borne by the tenant. Labour rents are still encountered in some parts of South America, in India, and in Iran. However, they are not usual.

Control of rents is very difficult to enforce. It has been introduced in several Western countries, but by no means brought into effect everywhere. In Belgium, for instance, it was provided by the Act of 7 July 1951 that the present rent must not exceed the rent ruling in 1939 by more than 40 per cent. But even the official calculations of production costs in agriculture are based upon a rent of twice the allowed maximum. In England and the Netherlands rents are more rigorously controlled, and this control is maintained by the registration of all leases.

Insecurity also exists as regards the duration of leases, but this insecurity is not always felt by the tenant. Particularly in underdeveloped countries patriarchal conditions still prevail. In these circumstances the tenant need not fear that he will lose his means of subsistence. The landlord is not very much inclined to take advantage of his rights, which would mean risking the community’s reprobation. Tenancy relations become more commercial if either the land becomes scarcer or the holdings of landlords expand. If land becomes scarce, its value is increased, whether this scarcity is due to a growth in population or to a decline in the area available for cultivation. If holdings expand, the personal relation between landlord and tenant will be weakened, and a middleman, sometimes acting as an agent, sometimes as a tenant, concludes the contract with the farmer instead of the landowner himself. The same position can exist in the case of absentee landlords, a feature so common in Eire at the end of the nineteenth century. This change in relations between landowners and tenants is brought about without any alteration in the legal framework of agrarian society. Authors on English and Irish land law at the end of the nineteenth century could only state that though there were great differences in the landlord-tenant relations in the two parts of the Kingdom, the legal framework was identical.
Under such conditions a tenant loses almost all interest in land improvements. He is quite right in fearing that improvements would hardly ever benefit him, as they would induce the landlord either to raise the rent or to change tenants, if such a change would result in a higher rent. An investigation conducted in Burma brought out that a maximum of only one-third of the tenants occupied their land for more than three years. A substantial part, fluctuating between one-half and one-sixth, occupy new fields every year.

In several Western countries, where similar conditions prevail, attempts have been made by enforcement of statutory provisions to give the tenant more security of tenure for a longer time. The French, Belgian, and Dutch laws prescribe a minimum term for leases: nine years in France and Belgium; twelve years for land with buildings in the Netherlands, the minimum lease for loose land being fixed at six years. In these three countries legislation on the subject is only of a recent date (France, 17 October 1945; Belgium, 7 July 1951; the Netherlands, 12 November 1941), and consequently little experience has been gained from it as yet. In England, where the tenants represent a high rate of the number of occupiers (about 67 per cent), the statutory provisions on the duration of leases have also been tightened up in recent years. While the Agricultural Holdings Act of 1923 prescribes a term of notice of at least twelve months, the new act of 1948 goes much beyond this by requiring that any notice to quit given by the landlord, but against which the tenant protests, must be sanctioned by the authorities. Either party can appeal against their decision to the Agricultural Land Tribunal. The solutions contrived by the Western countries show clearly that they are only of practical value (1) if the tenant knows his legal status; (2) if written leases are the rule; and (3) if a competent, reliable, and prompt administration is in charge of the enforcement of statutory provisions. Therefore it is not at all sure that a similar method intended to strengthen the position of the tenant would also be workable in all underdeveloped countries.
In the third place, insecurity also exists as regards the improvements carried out by the tenant on his own account and which will pass to the landlord when the tenant quits the holding. This is a feature not restricted to underdeveloped countries alone, but has been noticeable in developed countries for a long time. Provisions meant to compensate the tenant for the value of improvements introduced by him at his own cost are already of rather an old age (England, 1875; Portugal, 1868; Switzerland, 1911). In other European countries the provisions are of a later date (France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, 1941–1951). In most underdeveloped countries a single statutory provision that a landlord shall compensate the tenant for expenditure on improvements would not bring substantial relief. Considering the lack of capital amongst tenants, only facilities for the supply of adequate credit would be helpful to them in implementing improvements.

III

After this digression I may gather up again the threads of my argument. As I have said, the most salient feature of the agrarian structure of underdeveloped countries is the excessively small size of the average holding and the contrast between small farms and large estates. Wherever the pressure of population is high, I presumed that not much can be expected from reforms in the legal framework. I admitted the existence of two important exceptions to this presumption—the measures taken to avert fragmentation of holdings and those to eliminate insecurity of tenure. The opposite number of the small average farm is the large estate. Large landownership may, but need not, run hand in hand with over-population. Where this condition does not exist large holdings easily lead to a lack of intensity in cultivation, there being inadequate incentive for increased productivity. As to the small size of the average farm, I stated that as a rule statutory measures do not exert a counteracting influence, but as to the unfavourable consequences of large
landownership, I feel obliged to say that only statutory measures can have a counteracting influence.

As a matter of fact this has been tested. In Hungary one-quarter of the land belonged to 1,500 landowners before the Second World War. The Counts of Esterhazy alone owned an area of 117,000 hectares. In Poland 15,000 landowners owned half the land, and in Germany 34,000 junkers owned one-third. Since the war a statutory redivision of titles has been implemented on a large scale in these countries. Very few details are available on the way this redivision has been accomplished and on its effects. Ourliac and Juglart state that in Poland from 1944 onwards holdings of about five hectares have been allotted to farmers who did not own any land, and those who owned smaller areas had it increased. The scheme was financed by a national agricultural fund—seed, fertilizers, and implements being supplied from it.

By 1948 about one-fifth of the area had been redistributed, but the fact that the new landowners became dependent on the National Agricultural Fund seemed to arouse great dissatisfaction. The way in which the necessity of collectivism in agriculture has since been emphasized in Russia and Eastern Europe gives rise, as a matter of fact, to the presumption that redivision has been nothing but a stage in the struggle for collectivism in agriculture. Also, the way the objective has been achieved and the effects of it on the agrarian population are hidden from view—the worst introduction imaginable to a system that has been advertised so widely.

More particulars are available on the redistribution of landownership in Japan and Mexico. Before enlarging on these, it should be said that large landownership by no means leads to an agrarian structure characterized by one type of farm. I think that three main types can be distinguished. The first type is very frequently encountered in South and Central America; it is the extensive type of farm employing relatively little

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labour. The second type is represented by farms managed by tenants and sub-tenants. To this type applies what I have said already with regard to tenancy relations. Such estates were common in Iran and India, and they prevailed in Ireland before 1900. The third type is the plantation intensively managed by employing mainly cheap labour, e.g. as found in the West Indies.

With regard to the first main type the U.N. report states: ‘In Latin America as a whole, about one and a half per cent of the individual landholdings exceed 15,000 acres (6,000 hectares). The total of these holdings constitutes about fifty per cent of all agricultural land.’ ‘One obvious effect of this type of structure is that agricultural production is not adjusted to the demand for food, particularly for foods of high nutritional value. The prevalence of large estates devoted to extensive grazing prevents an expansion of food production to meet the needs of the urban population as well as the needs of the rural population itself.’ ‘In Venezuela, for example, there are fertile regions within easy reach of the capital now utilized for extensive grazing, which with a different system of land tenure could become a market garden area for Caracas. In other regions, all the produce from the areas of intensive cultivation on less fertile and steeply sloping hillsides has to be transported by human beings or pack animals across extensively cultivated fertile areas to the town.’ (p. 29)

From an agricultural point of view the consequence of this is clear. It is ‘the reverse of that which market conditions and natural resources require’. This situation ‘depresses the living standard of the majority of the farm population’ (p. 65). In spite of these numerous adverse effects, reforms—in the sense of statutory provisions to achieve a redistribution of landownership—have not taken place on a considerable scale, except in Mexico. There, between the years 1922 and 1945, 30 million hectares belonging to large estates have been expropriated and redistributed. The total area of cultivated land is about 14 million hectares, and of this almost half has been re-allocated.
The legal instruments of this redistribution are remarkable. The title allotted to the new cultivator is based on an ancient indigenous right, *ejido*. Its proportions are comparable to the individual right claimed in many regions of Asia by the individual villager in land in which the community also holds rights. Ejido is assigned to a village, implying that every one belonging to that village is allowed a piece of the land under the control of his ejido as long as he or his descendants continue to work that land properly. The incumbent, called *ejidotario*, has no right to sell or mortgage his land to avoid the danger that newly allotted farms might be sold to landowners. Villages which in the past had sold their ejido land to big landowners got it back without paying any compensation, as it was enacted that all sales of village land after 25 June 1856 would be null and void. Restitution of the former purchase price would most likely be all that a landowner could claim.

Relying on the judgment of the U.N. reporters, this reform has had an excellent effect from a social point of view. The number of agricultural workers decreased substantially, and in consequence the conditions of labour improved. Also, the conditions incorporated in leases improved considerably as the number of tenants was reduced. Education progressed rapidly, as every village to which ejido had been assigned was compelled to reserve land for the establishment of a school.

Seen from an economic point of view, the results appeared to be less satisfactory. The legislation did not make any provisions with regard to the size of the individual ejido farm. This size, therefore, was determined by common law. According to the established tradition a farm on ejido land was a midget holding to supplement the wages earned in labour on large estates. As a matter of fact it did not suffice to ascertain self-support, though self-support had been the intention under the new law. For that reason, reforms without enforcement of special provisions for credit facilities, improvement of irrigation, and organized marketing, measures at present being duly contrived by the Government, did not produce at
once the results anticipated from an economic point of view.

Still more difficult were the prospects when reform of the large holdings, the intensively managed plantations, was contemplated. These are encountered in regions with a high population. Large, intensively cultivated holdings prosper most in regions where labour is cheap. They imply a one-sided type of husbandry—monoculture—characterized by high yields. The small ejido holdings substituted for them can never produce such high yields, and, what is worse, there is not sufficient land available to allot a small holding to every claimant. A census held in 1940 brought out that of the 1.6 million claimants about one-quarter could not get any land, while a little more than another quarter did not cultivate their land for lack of funds and tools. In 1945 the number of claims that could not be granted was over 450,000. This proved clearly that in densely populated regions land reform, by itself, is not a definite solution. Measures resulting in a reduction in the pressure of population on the land will be essential in such cases. On the other hand, it can be concluded from the Mexican example that in regions where an extensive type of husbandry prevails, redistribution of landownership which also includes credit facilities can result in considerable improvements in rural life (pp. 76–81).

In Japan large landownership had mainly the character of the second main type, i.e. concentration of landownership under population pressure and cultivation of the land by many tenants on midget holdings, for which very high rent had to be paid. The average area occupied per family was only one hectare. 34 per cent of these agrarian families farmed less than 0.5 hectare. Rents representing the value of 50 to 60 per cent of the gross yield were not at all rare. 46 per cent of the total cultivated area was worked by tenants, and these represented about 70 per cent of the Japanese farming population.

The objective of Japanese land reform in December 1946 was the removal of social and economic inequalities in the agrarian structure by transfer of landownership from landlords to
tenants. For that purpose a differentiation was made between land cultivated by an owner and land cultivated by a tenant. All tenanted farms exceeding 1 hectare in size (4 hectares on Hokkaido, the most northerly island, where agriculture is carried on more extensively) could be expropriated by the State on compensation. This land was sold to tenants. All land of owner-occupiers exceeding 3 hectares per owner (10 hectares on Hokkaido) was also purchased by the State. Village committees of ten members were empowered to implement the reform scheme, the commissioners being chosen by the three classes: landlords, owner-cultivators, and tenants. The village commissioners elected a prefectural land commission of twenty members from the same classes. The forty-six prefectural commissions functioned as commissions of appeal on decisions of the village committees. The latter decided whose land was to be purchased, at what price, and to whom it would be allotted (as a rule, the sitting tenant). On 1 January 1950 the transfer was accomplished. Nearly two million hectares, one-third of the total cultivated area, was redistributed, and three million farmers were allotted land. 70 per cent of all farmers have become full owner-occupiers, and only 6 per cent farm exclusively tenanted land. Contrary to Mexico, adequate data are not yet available to judge the results of the redistribution on their social and economic merits.

Post-war redistribution of landed property based on reforms in the agrarian structure has also been carried out recently in China (Agrarian Reform Law of June 1950), in Korea (North Korea, March 1946; South Korea, June 1949), in Burma (1940), and in Turkey (1945).

It is, of course, not possible within the scope of this chapter to deal with all of these reforms. I will therefore restrict myself to saying that they all have specific natures of their own. In Burma, for example, they were intended to counteract the accumulation of land titles in the hands of money-lenders. In Turkey they were aiming at reclamation of uncultivated land. From the examples cited on redistribution of land titles it
will have become evident that landownership is commonly thought to be the most desirable form of land tenure. This idea is apparently adhered to in the parliaments of some Western European countries; since 1945 tenants in France have had the right of preference when landowners have the intention to sell their land. In the Netherlands similar proposals are incorporated in a bill introduced in the House of Representatives. It would be wrong, however, to conclude that ownership is considered a better type of land tenure than tenancy for ensuring proper management of a farm. The proposal referred to has quite another purpose. It is not intended to prevent non-agriculturists from owning land, but, on the contrary, to vest tenants with powers to prevent land from becoming the property of a farmer who intends to give notice to the tenant as soon as the lease expires. It does not belong, therefore, to the measures aiming at a redistribution of land titles, but to those intended to reduce insecurity of tenure.

In the foregoing I have put a great tax on the reader's patience by explaining the various modifications of the legal framework of agrarian structure in several parts of the world. You will have already noticed that I could not aim at completeness, and I shall have to cause perhaps another disappointment. This is that in my conviction reforms in the legal framework should by no means occupy first place among efforts to assure that agriculture will contribute as much as possible to an improvement in the standard of living. The other prerequisites can be classified in four groups.

In the first place, the commercial foundations of farms. Of these I mention credit facilities, supply of equipment, and fiscal system.

In the second place, advancements in the technique of production by research, advisory work, irrigation, forest management, acquisition of new land, reclamation, control of animal and plant diseases.

In the third place, the marketing of produce, including improvements in communication and transportation, advance-
ment of co-operation, prevention of wide fluctuations in prices by providing short-term storage facilities and by long-term contracts of sale for agricultural commodities.

In the fourth and last place, the distribution of the surplus agricultural labour force over other industries.

Changes in the legal framework should be considered only where the ruling legal relations hamper a fruitful approach to these matters. Even then, great care should be exercised because a psychological factor of paramount importance is involved in these changes. Farmers in developed countries have been well aware of their individual weakness but of their collective strength for many decades. Organization prospers, and it has made farmers and agricultural workers familiar with the main provisions of the legal system affecting them.

Very little or nothing of this is noticeable in underdeveloped countries. There, as I pointed out at the beginning, the legal system can hardly be distinguished as a separate institution. Often it is so intimately interwoven with other aspects of the social structure that there is much truth in the phrase, 'agriculture is not a profession nor an occupation; it is a way of life'. Alterations suggested or introduced which are not understood are easily considered as foreign aberrations to be repulsed as soon as convenient. As, on the other hand, it is not possible to postpone reforms until the general dissemination of knowledge, certain conditions conducive to the success of these reforms must necessarily be fulfilled. These conditions are the existence of a national administration, well organized and competent, and trusted by the agrarian population, even though measures are enforced or recommended which may be understood only by a few.

With all objects of land reform—national or international, legal or social, economic or technical—this problem will arise. It should receive the continuous attention of all who occupy themselves with community development.
Chapter VIII

THE ROLE OF RURAL INDUSTRIES

JOSEPH E. STEPANEK AND CHARLES H. PRIEN

Politicians, social scientists, and others concerned with the future of democratic institutions in underdeveloped areas agree that the basic requirement is an improvement in general living standards. The suggestion of technical and financial assistance to such areas advanced by President Truman of the United States in his Point Four programme has such an objective in view. Promotion of small rural industrial units processing local raw materials with simple equipment, together with improvement of agricultural techniques, represents one method of increasing production, and hence of raising living standards, directly and speedily.\(^1\) The present chapter, based on the authors' personal experience, describes certain procedures that should be observed in the development of new and the extension of established small rural industries, and examines the condition and prospects of such industries in underdeveloped areas, with particular reference to Asia.

A country that has abundant labour but little uninvested capital must be particularly careful to employ its limited funds in such a way as to obtain maximum productivity and profit. In small industries the capital cost per unit of production is

\(^1\) Obviously, rural industrialization alone cannot achieve a balanced industrial complex or accomplish rural reconstruction in a broad sense. Equally necessary to this end is development of educational facilities, public health services, agricultural techniques, means of transportation and communication, etc. Nevertheless, rural small-scale industrialization frequently may be undertaken first since it affords a quick return on the initial investment and does not require much capital, skilled management or labour, imported equipment or elaborate means of transportation.
generally low. Thus, the productivity of the most efficient hand loom per unit of capital invested is five to ten times higher than that of a power loom. Moreover, it is generally easier to raise capital for many small industrial units than for a few large ones. Where capital has traditionally been invested mostly in land, people are reluctant to risk investment in remote manufacturing enterprises though they may be induced to join a local industrial co-operative. The amount of unemployed local wealth available for such purposes is unknown, but the fact that Asia has long been an importer of bullion suggests a large sum. Thus, contrary to the view expressed by certain American capitalists, a nation need not await a proper economic ‘climate’ to attract large-scale foreign investment, but should put available capital to immediate use.

Capital investment in large industries is uneconomic unless utilized by a qualified and properly organized staff. Inefficient use of equipment due to improper management is common in underdeveloped areas. Although the labour supply in such countries as India, Indonesia, and China is vast, it is unskilled and wholly unprepared for the requirements of industrialization. To make skilled technicians of labourers who are unfamiliar with anything more complex than a hand tool demands a large investment in training. As an industrial unit becomes larger and more complicated, there is a corresponding increase in the amount and degree of skills required. Yet a labour force that would be useless in modern industry might be ideally suited to operate the simple equipment of a rural plant. Where the traditional unit of production has been the family, recruitment of able administrators for large organizations is extremely difficult. If, however, the unit of operation is not much larger than the traditional size, managers are easier to obtain and low efficiency becomes less of a problem.

The potential labour force in the average underdeveloped

1 A small group of residents of the Chinese village of Shaoyang, in a rural area of Hunan Province, were willing to spend 10,000 silver dollars for an interest in a manufacturing plant.
country lies in the rural areas. In India, where perhaps seventy-five per cent of the population lives in small villages, unemployment and under-employment have been estimated at twenty-five per cent of the total labour force. Any improvement in agricultural practices may be expected to increase rather than decrease this latter figure. During the harvest season much of the urban labour force returns home to help in the fields. The productivity sacrificed by this practice is not so serious for rural industries, which have less to lose if their equipment lies idle during a few months of the year; such industries, in fact, are excellent instruments for relieving seasonal rural unemployment. Moreover, the return of technically-trained workers to their home villages may provide the skills required for the management of local industries.

Even when capital is available, acquisition of equipment for large industries often presents difficulties. In China, the Agricultural Industry Service preferred to design small-industries equipment that could be manufactured locally from mostly local materials. Frequently the villagers themselves are able, with little or no aid, to manufacture improved equipment. For more complex rural industries the facilities of market-town machine shops are available. A few parts may have to be brought from elsewhere in the country, but very little will be needed from abroad.


2 Using its own hand-powered machine tools, the Mass Education Movement in China built 3,000 semi-automatic looms. The gears for these looms were hand-forged, wrought-iron disks in which teeth had been cut with hacksaws. Even these crude looms produced cloth which, when sold through co-operatives, cost twenty-five per cent less than machine-made cloth. Similar gears were later cast directly, thus eliminating the need for hand-cutting or machining.

Lumber and sheet metal available from discarded tin cans were used to manufacture a foot-powered cotton-spinning machine for as little as U.S. $5. Replacing the old-style hand spinner, this equipment quadrupled a man’s output. A cast-iron sugar-cane crusher was introduced into an area which for centuries had used a crusher made of stone. The increased efficiency of some ten per cent paid for the cost of the machine (U.S. $150) in a single season. This crusher
agriculture, small industries employ today by far the greatest number of people in underdeveloped areas. An estimated eighty-five per cent of all industrial employees in India work in small plants; more than twenty million persons obtain their living from such enterprises. Although only one-fourth of the cotton cloth used in India is woven by hand, its manufacture alone provides employment for seven million weavers and auxiliary workers. In China probably close to fifty million persons are engaged in rural industries. During the war with Japan nearly all industrial enterprises were small. Extremely varied products were manufactured by more than 2,000 small industrial co-operatives which had been organized to offset the loss of coastal factories. Even at present, small plants process about eighty-five per cent of the country's sugar output and at least half of its paper and cotton cloth. Because they have less competition and in some cases use more advanced techniques, these Chinese rural industries are in a better position than their Indian counterparts. The consumer-goods industry of Japan is based largely on small units. Many of the Japanese textiles which before the war sold widely in foreign markets were woven on simple electric-powered looms. Three-fourths of the textile workers were in factories employing fewer than fifty persons, and the majority worked in units of fourteen or fewer persons. Although these illustrations are drawn from only three countries, the main problems of rural industrialization appear to be similar elsewhere, particularly in Southeast Asia. Any country with a diversified but backward agricultural economy must also have small industries.

II

Although President Truman's Point Four proposal offers 'a bold, new programme for making available the benefits of [American] scientific advances and industrial progress for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas', in fact,
regardless of the field of assistance involved, no foreigner should attempt on his own initiative to formulate or execute an over-all development programme of such a kind. While foreign consultants, especially technicians, can be of great assistance, the initiative must come from within the country if the enterprise is to have lasting value.

Any programme for the introduction of new rural industries must include (1) experimentation under controlled conditions (i.e. development), (2) indoctrination of a select group of nationals with the new procedures that have been developed (training), and (3) education of the rural population by this trained personnel (extension). These three activities are essentially distinct and should be so treated. (The Agricultural Industry Service in China had been established for two years before it decided whether it was a development or an extension organization. Only after it had become apparent that there was virtually nothing to extend did the Service concentrate first on development, then on training, and finally on extension.)

Most underdeveloped areas contain established organizations, such as local government agencies, co-operatives, schools, or mission service units, with experience in some phase of rural industrial development. It is generally preferable to employ these as nuclei for later expansion into full-fledged development centres rather than to ignore them and create major new centres. A co-ordinating agency is, however, desirable, and if one does not already exist, the government should establish one.

At this point foreign technicians—economists as well as engineers and scientists, familiar with the process with which they are to work and possessing an aptitude for rural life—should be hired to demonstrate the best approach to the problems at hand. Most underdeveloped areas can provide scientifically trained young men to serve as apprentices. Because of the expense involved, foreign technicians will have to be employed sparingly; they should not be allowed to assume control, even though greater efficiency might temporarily result.

If a previous survey has shown that certain small industries
should receive first attention, the development work should be distributed over several centres, each located in an area that is noted for the particular industry contemplated or that produces the necessary raw materials. Each centre should be situated in a rural area to afford its staff daily contacts with the practical problems of village production. The centre should remain small, no larger than will justify the expense of a laboratory and shop. Equipment needs can be sharply limited since operations will for the most part be simple and much of the machinery can be improvised on the spot. A library will be necessary, and fairly complete sources of technical literature should be available within the country.

The direction taken by the development work will depend on local conditions, but in most cases the final approved technique will combine the best local practice with modern methods. There will be little need for basic scientific research, since fundamental data will generally be available in the technical literature, or for the services of a metropolitan laboratory, which, though better equipped and staffed than the rural centre, would as a rule be relatively uninformed regarding local conditions.

Development work cannot stop at the door of the laboratory if its product is to be introduced successfully. The new equipment or technique must be demonstrated in the countryside in repeated field tests. It should be possible to induce local artisans or industrialists to use the equipment, either on a loan basis or after purchase with a 'money-back' guarantee. Although less spectacular, this procedure is more effective than the use of demonstration plants, which demonstrate only that the process will work under ideal conditions and, perhaps, with a concealed subsidy.

Development is a slow process of trial and error which can be accelerated through knowledge of similar programmes undertaken in other countries or elsewhere in the same country. If such information is available, the main function of any centre becomes one of adaptation. Thus, the Chinese foot-powered,
cotton-spinning process must be modified before it can be introduced successfully into the arid climate of Western Pakistan; the Chinese semi-automatic loom must be widened to be serviceable in India; and a man-powered loom developed in Hunan required modification before it was acceptable in Chekiang, where women operators need a loom with less internal friction. In 1948 the Government of Pakistan, having learned from a missionary of the can spinner being used successfully in China, sent a representative to Shanghai to obtain details. Since he was not permitted to take a model away with him, he had to be content with photographs and sketches. Although a model was assembled in Lahore on the basis of this information, it has never worked satisfactorily. It was not known in Pakistan that the Agricultural Industry Service in Shanghai had available both drawings of the spinner and facilities for training persons in its operation and manufacture.

Unquestionably the most difficult phase of any rural industrial programme involves training, in comparison with which the development phase represents a routine application of the best known scientific methods to a fairly clear problem. No underdeveloped country has enough agricultural extension workers, and staffs for rural industrial work are almost non-existent. Where competent foreigners are available in sufficient numbers, barriers of custom and language normally limit their usefulness for this purpose. Personnel must therefore be trained locally.

Long training periods are essential. Rewi Alley, who, as director of the Shantan Bailie School of the Chinese Industrial Co-operatives, was training 400 rural-industry technicians in 1949–1950, has stated that a person needs eight years of organized preparation for such work. The belief at Shantan is that a village youth who has been trained in a city is spoiled for rural work, and that therefore all of the schooling should be provided in a village environment. The experience of the Agricultural Industry Service indicates that it may be possible to find youths whose previous training qualifies them for the
technical aspects of introducing new methods into villages. One class of fifteen apprentices at Shaoyang was selected on the basis of written and oral examinations from a group of 130 graduates of high schools or technical schools of equivalent grade; after a year's training in the operation, testing, and manufacture of rural industrial equipment, only seven were found to be properly qualified for extension work. All too often a formal education gives an individual so much prestige that he is reluctant to engage in the semi-manual labour involved in extending rural industries.

In the interests of administration and of joint use of facilities, it is advantageous for a government to train its extension workers at development centres. Some college graduates will have to be recruited, but the majority of trainees should comprise students who have the equivalent of a high-school education. One year, or preferably two, should be devoted to preparing these students to use, and in some cases even to manufacture, rural industrial equipment. Too many extension programmes are required both to train their own personnel and to rebuild villages, with the dual result that the training process is retarded and the mistakes committed by the partly-trained staff make it more difficult later to gain the confidence of the villagers.

An extension programme enables a government to make practical use of its investment in development and training, with relatively little expenditure other than on loans for the purchase of capital equipment. Experience has shown that a team composed of a leader and two assistants can, with the villagers' co-operation, modernize an entire rural industry. As is the

1 The apparent contradiction between this view and the policy of the Bailie School may be explained by the fact that the latter produces men who are competent in both the organizational and technical aspects of rural work. See Training Rural Leaders. Washington, D.C., Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1949.

2 The Agricultural Industry Service placed three men in Taiyuan village, Chekiang Province, in 1948. Within six months these men, living in daily contact with the villagers, had succeeded in modernizing the local textile industry.
case also in agricultural extension work, it is not enough to send out drawings and instructions for the manufacture of new equipment; ordinarily new techniques can be transmitted only through personal contact.\(^1\)

Extension workers should always stand ready to offer assistance to any group requesting it. Their efforts may be supervised by a development centre, but will be better co-ordinated if directed by a local or central government bureau, thus permitting integration with a general development programme. This is not to say that programmes involving agriculture, rural industries, public health, and education should be launched simultaneously in a single area. The resultant shock might be fatal to the entire plan. Local programmes should make haste slowly. For example, a cursory survey of a rural area will often reveal conditions which can be easily changed and for the changing of which local co-operation can be readily obtained—the ‘conscious needs’ of the sociologist. Entrée to the village may be through a malaria-eradication programme, a clean-up campaign, or instruction in grain storage. By doing the simple, obvious thing, and doing it well, it is usually possible to obtain the villagers’ confidence, thus facilitating further advances. The experience of projects in India and of the Mass Education Movement in China indicates that a village cannot be remade by force. And co-operation is never secured unless the villagers are made to feel the need for change and to demand outside assistance. (The same may be said of the relationship between a nation receiving foreign aid and the donors of such aid.)

Although most progress will be made by satisfying primarily conscious needs, it may sometimes be to the villagers’ ultimate advantage if the local development programme does not accede to all of their demands. That only the extension worker can give advice based on considerations extending beyond the village horizon was recently demonstrated by events in a Chekiang

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\(^1\) See Hopkins and Stepanek, loc. cit.
village whose local textile industry had suffered for some time from competition provided by nearby Shanghai factories. Responding to a request for assistance in modernizing the weaving equipment, the Agricultural Industry Service discovered that the relief thus afforded might be only temporary since the industry had to import its raw cotton and sell most of the product outside the village. Instead of modernizing the established industry, as was in fact done, it might have been better to construct an entirely new industry more closely integrated with the local economy.

Education at all levels will assist development. Thus, at Shaoyang advertisements of a new insecticide evoked scant response from the farmers, who were content to pick bugs off their fruit trees by hand, and were resigned to having their vegetable crops infested with insects. Only through demonstrations on carefully selected plots over a period of two years were they made to see the advantages of insecticides. The subsequent response was heartening.

In many localities the problem of population pressure will demand the full attention of extension planners. Since in the first stages of industrialization the death rate tends to fall faster than the birth rate, it is possible that the present high rates of population increase will accelerate during the coming years. In England, for example, the Industrial Revolution had been under way for more than a century before death and birth rates approached equilibrium; in Japan the time lag exceeded fifty years. Many areas in Asia must attain population stability more quickly than this if general living standards are to rise appreciably. If rural development efforts are too widely dispersed, the small increase in per-capita production may be swallowed up by the extra mouths waiting to be fed. (The Agricultural Industry Service observed that the provision of jobs in new or revived industries resulted in earlier marriages and larger families.) By concentrating the efforts in a few well-defined localities, however, it should be possible to increase total production by five or even ten per cent per year—
considerably more than the population increase. Such a rapid rise in the standard of living should be conducive to a lower birth rate.

III

The following paragraphs outline a plan of action that might be followed by any agency—whether affiliated with the United Nations or not—in establishing a rural industrialization programme in accordance with technical assistance proposals. In the first place, a long-range view must be adopted from the very outset. Two years at least must elapse between the conception of a new technique in the development laboratory and its introduction in an agrarian community. Too often in shorter-term programmes so much emphasis is necessarily laid on producing a quick, spectacular result, as justification for a second-year budget, that little of lasting value is accomplished. A programme that must operate on short-term appropriations might suitably divide its outlays between relatively simple operations productive of immediate results and other more basic projects whose effect may not become apparent for several years. Results cannot always be forced by the expenditure of more money or by hiring a larger staff. Implementation of a very small initial programme may reveal errors which, if recognized, will make the later expenditure of large sums more efficient. Successful completion of the first step will automatically point the way to the second.

Once the areas that are to receive aid have been selected, an immediate contribution can be made by a small number of technicians, who should personally visit those villages requesting assistance. One month should afford sufficient time in which to establish the laboratory and begin field tests. Thus, during a period of several months a few men can stimulate development over an increasing area while at the same time collecting valuable information on current programmes and assessing local needs. The programme thus far should be conducted at the
village level, where it is wise to start with some simple undertaking that satisfies a conscious need of the inhabitants. No attempt should yet be made to introduce new industries. Although a programme of this kind should be undertaken only at the invitation of the government concerned, actual personal contacts must be made at the lower, development-centre level if quick results are to be achieved. In order to minimize the risk of failure during this first stage, only a very few of the highest calibre technicians should be employed; others should be added only as demonstrated need for them arises.

In the second stage of the programme, provided that funds and personnel are available, several technicians can be assigned to the more effective development centres for longer periods in order to assist in development, training, and economic studies. Grants-in-aid might be given for the more promising research projects, but not over-all support for any one centre. All such activity will lay the foundation for an extension programme. Until this preparatory phase has been completed, it will be most hazardous to join other groups in a general development scheme. Rural-industry technicians can give some assistance to the administration of an extension programme, but they will be of even greater help indirectly, through training extension workers. Small teams, operating in conjunction with others trained in organization, finance, etc., are most suitable for initiating rural industrial development.

At this point it may be useful to examine briefly the social, economic, and political environments in which rural development programmes must operate under present-day conditions. Rural populations in any underdeveloped area can be educated ultimately to the changes demanded by development. Adult education to a level permitting new ideas to be absorbed through the printed word is a prerequisite for such changes, as was demonstrated in the case of China by the experience of the Mass Education Movement, which found that it was necessary to operate a paper mill as part of the programme of aiding the Chinese farmer.
Stratification of society by a caste system, as in India, or its compartmentalization due to rigid adherence to family relationships, as in China, constitutes a considerable handicap to rural development. The art of leather tanning has not progressed in India because hitherto only the lowest classes would perform such work. The inferiority of women to men of the same caste has often required separate organizations to promote rural industries among them. Education and a liberal government can go far, as in India today, to eliminate such obstacles. In the case of China, the establishment of co-operatives can improve organizational efficiency without destroying the necessary social stability provided traditionally by the elaborate family structure. China shares with many other underdeveloped countries the problem of how to train young technicians without at the same time causing them to shun practical work. In the past the educational system has produced scholars rather than agriculturists, engineers, and scientists. That technical training centres can help to overcome this problem is shown by the results obtained in the Bailie School.

There is no shortage of sufficiently skilled labourers since Asian peasants generally augment their incomes by engaging in handicrafts or small industries during the slack farming season. A short training period suffices to prepare any part of this large segment of the population for jobs in simple new rural industries or in improved old ones.¹

Where inflationary conditions are present, they seriously handicap small industries because the falling currency values represent a heavy ‘hidden tax’. It is nonetheless possible to establish rural industries during a period of inflation if their operation can be made sufficiently profitable. One way of increasing the profit is to provide them with improved equipment that will increase their output. Another way of stabilizing small industries is through government assistance in

¹ The Agricultural Industry Service found that weavers experienced in the operation of a throw-shuttle loom needed only two weeks of training to become proficient in the use of a semi-automatic loom.
respect of taxation. It is traditional in China for villagers who possess liquid capital to invest it either in land or in precious metals. Reports indicate that the Communist Government is seeking to change this investment pattern by increasing the tax rate on income derived from land rentals. This policy may attract capital into small industries, on which taxes are lower.

Some of the tax revenue can be diverted to rural areas for use as loan funds. In India, the hand-weaving industry of the United Provinces has been highly favoured during recent years by the Government loan policy. Small co-operative enterprises have been able to obtain Government loans at low interest rates for the purchase of looms and cotton yarn, and thus to continue operations in the face of competition from the large Bombay mills. Public, rather than private, credit agencies are necessary because the lure of high, quick profits from commodity speculation discourages private capital from entering productive enterprises, in which the risk is no less and the return much lower. Moreover, the extension of credit in the form of currency rather than in that of goods can ruin a village economy through inflation. The sound of an airplane bringing paper money for the operation of the Agricultural Industry Service was the signal for prices to double. Foreign loans, in the form of capital equipment, are useful in underdeveloped areas to the extent that the latter are able to supply the necessary labour for the construction of installations, appropriate buildings, and the like. But such an approach must be made with care: in China the influx of capital goods during the UNRRA period was much too large for the country to absorb.

The economic and social factors discussed above are, of course, shaped by political developments. Political stability is necessary for constructive, long-range economic and social change. Thus, India, whose Government is stable in comparison with those of Southeast Asia and—even more important—may retain for some time the confidence of the people to whom it is answerable, is in a relatively good position to undertake rural development programmes. Where there is less stability but
some government interest in the basic reforms required for increased agricultural and industrial production, as in the Republic of Indonesia, it should still be possible to render aid effectively. It is difficult to distinguish between countries that will and others that will not benefit from rural development through assistance programmes, but it would appear that progress in such countries as Indo-China, Malaya, and Burma, where political stability does not exist, will be greatly handicapped. Technicians brought from abroad will find very little in these countries to catalyze, and the prospect for future political stability is so dim that the flow of private capital will be inhibited. In the case of such areas, the amount of foreign aid and the size of any programmes undertaken should be small initially, and should be increased slowly, in direct proportion to the stability achieved.
Chapter IX

AN ECONOMIC CASE STUDY

Sugar and Welfare in Java

G. H. VAN DER KOLFF

When touching upon community development we must first establish its goal and its methods. To my mind, the goal corresponds to that of the enlightened colonial policy dating from the turn of the century. About that time systematic action was undertaken to express the moral duty of imperial powers towards peoples living under their supremacy. The purpose of this action proves to tally pretty well with what community development has in view according to its definition. Does not the first part of this definition, as coined at the Second Summer Conference on African Administration, in 1948, read: 'a movement designed to promote better living for the whole community'? And is this not further elaborated as improvements in agriculture, health, and education?1

If there is something new in community development, it must and does concern the tactics of approaching the problem, of realizing the assignment.

Formerly the conception was that of a paternal foreign government as the only agency capable of raising the standard of living of the economically backward peoples in a direct way, more or less behind their backs and without their approval. It overlooked the fact that human beings are not simply separate individuals, but are socially linked with one another. Thus it

neglected the connection of all segments of life and acted as if a change in one corner would not inexorably rouse responses in many others.

Nowadays—and very purposefully so in the circles of community development—there is an endeavour to have all improvements emanating from the initiative of the people concerned, even though this initiative must first be kindled from without. Furthermore, there is a clear understanding of the social ties in human existence and an emphasis on group life. And finally, it is seen that one cannot discard or add cultural elements at random.

It would be unfair not to acknowledge that this awareness of a better policy did not come all of a sudden, but gradually ripened in the latter colonial days. I for one know that in the then Dutch East Indies the agricultural extension service adopted such an approach about thirty years ago, serving as a model and pace-maker to other welfare institutions.

Having so far reminded ourselves of the broad principles of community development, we may tackle the particular aspect with which I have to deal. Economically speaking, the central idea amounts to boosting the standard of living to a higher plane. This standard of living is the quotient of the yearly value of goods and services produced (this being the dividend) and the size of the population (the divisor). Consequently, one can search along two lines.

The first point is: what can be done to raise the dividend, i.e. to increase output? The second point is especially important in a densely populated country or in countries in the phase of rapid multiplication. One can put it as follows: is it possible that the pressure of population will ease off by a slowing down of the birth rate?

This is not the place to discuss the problem from a demographic angle, though how momentous this intricate question is. Therefore this study will remain within the range of the first point, which stresses the necessity of increased production. Also, my considerations will exclusively apply to agricultural production.
In the picture of agrarian development there is room for the estate as well as for the farm. I shall not explain here the difference between those two types of organization, but only mention that hitherto the agricultural estate in Indonesia—the site of our case study—has been predominantly run by Westerners, while the management of the farms coincides with Indonesian agriculture.

Under such a system, whether the country in question is officially a free nation or a colony, there is the constant danger—dormant or already visible—of a tragic conflict between the restricted interests of foreign capital and the full mobilization of the latent productive capacity of the rural population. Unless those concerned solve the dilemma of how estate enterprise can co-exist harmoniously with indigenous farming, instead of pretending that each can and must exist and develop in the same region, they perpetuate a situation fraught with social tensions, which in the long run damages production as a whole. Indonesia, with her abundance in many forms of Western agricultural industry in pre-war times, is instructive in this respect.

In attempting to analyse what we have to learn from Indonesian experience, I shall restrict myself to one single example. I prefer this to a brief survey of several, which would compel me to only skim the relevant issues. Making a choice, I am in favour of the Javanese sugar industry, which in a way may be called a scape-goat. But be it distinctly understood that my chapter is not a challenge to the sugar interests to justify themselves as culprits before the bench. What I want is an instructive example of the delicacy and intricacy of the problem we are facing. In this respect the sugar industry—once the most disputed problem of colonial economics in Indonesia—is a good illustration. It is a special manifestation of the so-called clash of cultures, in the form of a clash of cultivations, a barging of Western commercialized big business into an indigenous subsistence economy.

I have already alluded to the fact that a solution of the difficul-
ties issuing from the separate existence of Western estates and native agriculture in a region premises that in one way or another both types of agricultural organization have to be harmoniously interwoven. It is here that community development comes in. If I look closely into the historical process, with its rather fatal prospects in present-day Indonesia, this is done on the one hand to point out the catastrophic consequences of not paying timely attention to the impending danger in such a situation, and on the other hand so that the why and wherefore of reform proposals may be fully grasped.

There is a sound and practical reason still to consider possibilities of future development and to venture thoughtful efforts, late as it may be. It would be more than a pity if the Java sugar industry, after its almost matchless achievements in the field of production and organization, should not be preserved as a source of Indonesian wealth for the future, albeit in a modified form.

In approaching the subject I have had to pay due attention to those elements which might prevent the rehabilitation of the industry, and to criticize them. This might quite unintentionally give the impression of being partial in overdoing the dark side.

As an objection to my choice, I imagine that I am addressing a public for the greater part not versed in agricultural conditions in Indonesia. By plunging into the very heart of a special issue, by focussing all his attention on it, a writer runs the risk of falling short of making his point in adequate proportion to other features and to the whole of the problem. My readers might unwittingly gain the wrong impression regarding, for instance, the money value of sugar in present-day Indonesia. Thus it will not be superfluous to state beforehand that the part played by sugar in the Indonesian economy is relatively unimportant, comparing very unfavourably with the palmy pre-war days. Indicative of this, though not a very exact standard, is that the sugar export value of the combined years 1948/49—amounting to 40 million rupiahs (Indonesian guilders)—con-
stituted only a fraction of that of other products, rubber at that time being worth approximately fifteen times as much, copra eight, palm oil three, and tea and tobacco each about twice.

In accordance with this, the area occupied by the sugar cane plantations is small in proportion to the total acreage under cultivation in Java, the only island where the sugar industry occurs in Indonesia. And even in its golden days this industry, which had and has to grow its crop on so-called sawahs or wet rice fields belonging to the Javanese people, hired yearly no more than six per cent of the total extent of these fields.

Another point possibly giving rise to confusion and misconception is that by limiting my study to the Javanese sugar industry the idea might suggest itself that all that I say about the various factors, good or bad, will invariably come into play, and always in the same proportion, in every instance of European intervention in Indonesian agriculture. This would be a mistake.

Firstly, almost all the other branches of foreign agricultural industry are practised not on the actual fields of the Indonesian people, but on long-term leased lands which were lying waste and had to be cleared before tilling. While leaving—unlike sugar—the existing indigenous agriculture intact, the estates created the possibility of supplementary earnings, and in addition, by linking the estates to the road system, many districts in remote parts were opened up.

Secondly, one has not even settled the question when narrowing it down to the interaction between Javanese small growers and big foreign units of agricultural industry. One should not forget all that was done by the former government on behalf of Indonesian agriculture. It may suffice to mention cursorily the legal protection of the Indonesians by declaring their land inalienable to non-natives, the institution of the irrigation service, the official organization of the people's credit service, the agricultural extension service, and the development of an Indonesian co-operative movement.

For decades the mainstay of Javanese economy was its sugar
industry. It had reached such a high level in its development of organization and technique, and such a low level of costs, that on the world sugar market—when there was still a free market—it was a chief competitor. A brief survey of this industry, and possible ways for it to develop in the future, is therefore of great importance in forming a picture of present-day Indonesian economics. Furthermore, it provides a concrete demonstration of the relationship between economic organization and social welfare.

II

The sugar industry, as it was developed in Java, varied in some ways from our Western concept of a concern: the land was not bought but leased from its traditional owners, the Javanese peasants, who in turn provided labour for the factories. But it was typically Western in its methods of production and refining, in its system of management, and in its financing. There was, therefore, a Western stamp imprinted on the industry as a whole—so much the more so because the Western preponderance was sufficient to make all factors serve the end of gaining as much profit as possible.

Much has been written regarding the influence of the sugar industry on the Javanese people. Given the situation as it was, one cannot deny that there were essential benefits. The administration required great amounts of revenue if it was to apply a policy of welfare government to its millions of poverty-stricken people, and these great amounts could be supplied only by large modern concerns built on imported capital. Furthermore, the enormous growth in population resulting from Western measures made it necessary for the Javanese national income also to be enormously enlarged. Whenever sugar production (and so more money) was introduced into an area with little possibility of further agricultural development along traditional lines (especially in areas with a majority of non-landowners or of very small holders with a loose right to their
lands, so that they showed practically no attachment to their property), then the population was certainly benefited by the larger wage-earning opportunities. But in regions with fertile soil and favourable hydrological conditions, coupled with a favourable acreage for each farmer, the introduction of sugar production was not altogether propitious, and especially not in areas where land tenure laws, providing a balance between private initiative and communal supervision, had been developed.

What I mean to say is that the vested rights in the land must enable the holder to use personal initiative to the fullest extent without the possibility of abuse, thanks in preventive supervision by the community. Thus the introduction of sugar production was a chief obstacle to the development of a strong middle class of land-owning farmers—a Javanese yeomanry, if I may borrow that English term. A class of yeomanry could have greatly benefited Java, a land in which agriculture is the most important occupation and ninety per cent of the people live in rural areas. There the absence of a virile yeomanry is practically equal to the absence of a middle class as such. A chief function of the middle class in any society is that of a consolidating factor; in this case, the lack of one left between the Javanese small farmer and the commercially-minded sugar concerns an unbridgeable gap which could at any moment become the cause of social unrest. The yeomanry is also a source from which a nation can rejuvenate itself as it becomes more and more urbanized. Such a class, with its sense of balance and its sound conservatism, tends to counteract the revolutionary theories of demagogues and to promote stable conditions. And it is largely in such a group that one can expect to find a status anxiety and an urge for economic betterment which will lead to open-mindedness regarding self-improvement and to sound advice on better agricultural methods.

Let us consider what the actual result was when the sugar industry came into areas favourable to the development of such a middle class. In such areas a new agricultural system was introduced, the sugar concern leasing land from the farmer for
the period of one cane crop, in a rotating cycle, and returning the land to the disposal of the Javanese owner between periods. In case the tenant wanted to secure sawahs for a longer period, he could conclude lease contracts up to twenty-one and a half years (seven periods of occupation). The sugar cultivation of the estates and the rice and other cultivations of the population were in effect co-ordinated in one large-scale agricultural enterprise, the management of which was practically in the hands of the sugar factory. The demands of the sugar industry therefore received first place in the crop rotation system. For example, farmers were persuaded to plant an early ripening variety of rice for which they were indemnified in money, though they often would have preferred a late ripening one so that the field would be clear for cane growing at the time set by the concern. The result in these regions was definitely retrogressive—in place of peasant ingeniousness came a new coolie submissiveness.

It may well be asked what effect the tendencies emanating from the concerns in these sugar areas have had upon Java as a whole. It would not seem an important one, when the whole acreage of arable land on the island, 7.7 million hectares, is compared with the approximately 200,000 hectares under yearly industrial sugar production in former top years, or with about 80,000 hectares in the last years before World War II. This is a very small fraction—only 2.6 per cent. But there are other factors to be taken into account.

1. The company's rotating system meant that a different area was planted each year of its three-year cycle. With some allowance for variation in other years, one may estimate the overall sphere of influence as perhaps three and a half times as much as the annual figures given.

2. The land was important not only quantitatively but qualitatively. The sugar cane gardens were almost exclusively laid out on the sawahs or wet fields which form the most valuable and fertile part of all the cultivated land. But even if the amount of

1 1 hectare = 2.471 acres.
land within the sphere of the sugar industry—let us say 3.5 \times 100,000 or 350,000 hectares—should be set over against the total arable area of sawahs—3.3 million hectares—one would still form a mistaken notion. To appreciate things at their proper value one has to compare the total area of the best irrigated and finest sawahs, occupying about 1.3 million hectares. The sugar industry was chiefly located in these last districts, but it is only fair to acknowledge that it has directly and indirectly, in the form of taxes, contributed to a considerable extent to the execution of irrigation works by the Government. Meanwhile it is here that one finds—if social factors did not act as counteragent—a suitable natural environment out of which a middle class of farmers, a yeomanry, could be expected to develop.

III

It is easy to understand that in a time such as the present, passionate but not altogether fair judgements are made regarding the sugar industry of pre-war Java. It was a parasitic tree of gold and, while it yielded a fruitful income for Holland, sapped away the productive strength of the Indonesian people—a sound farming middle class and the principle of self-help—leaving them only a growing pauperdom.

Whether this picture is true or not, the fact remains that it seems psychologically impossible to rebuild the sugar industry in Java on its old basis. Any lasting solution must now work in two directions: investors must receive a return for their money, but also the productive forces of the Indonesians in the sugar areas must be developed. In this relation the question often arises: Is there not a solution to be found in the system of division of production used in many sugar-producing countries, a system in which the cane is grown by independent farmers and processed by factories? On consideration, this question leads to another: Did there exist in Java any independent cultivation demonstrating such a form of co-operation?
The answer seems disappointing. Before the war the area of land annually put to cane production by independent Javanese farmers totalled only 11 to 19 thousand hectares,\(^1\) while on the plantations the area put to that use before the depression was 200 thousand hectares, and after, 80 thousand hectares. Part of the cane grown by farmers was used for chewing, but roughly two-thirds to five-sixths was partially refined in small primitive mills.

There are a number of reasons why the Javanese peasant did not grow more cane. It meant, in the first place, taking up land which would otherwise be used for growing rice, and not all fields were suitable for growing cane by the cheap, extensive methods used by the peasant. Furthermore, while cane fields require a great deal of water in the dry season, the Irrigation Service considered peasant-grown cane as a so-called second crop, which therefore was allotted only half as much water per unit as plantation-grown cane. But there were other factors hampering the spread of cane cultivation among the peasants. As a rule civil servants were loth to permit extension, and at best tolerated only the continuance of the same amount of peasant cane cultivation as had existed before.

This policy was rationalized in a number of ways, of course, but underneath the rationalizations lay the desire of sugar interests and Government to maintain the status quo. The sugar interests had much too profitable a position to wish any change, and the Government did not want to allow any new source of conflict between plantations and peasants; officials had already a good deal to do in preserving the existing balance.

There are two other possible lines which the Government could have followed instead of checking the expansion of peasant cane cultivation completely. It could have given free rein to peasant cane cultivation, thus diminishing the plantation area. Or it could have kept a finger in the pie by giving guidance and aid to a limited expansion. The former of these two

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\(^1\) Figures from an article by Dr. O. Posthumus in *Economisch Weekblad voor Indonesië* (Economic Weekly for Indonesia). 22 February 1947.
policies would have led to reluctance on the part of the peasants to lease their fields to the plantations, and thus to higher rentals, a higher standard of living in the peasant community, and an eventual rise in the level of coolie wages. The result would have been, finally, a pulling down of two chief pillars supporting the sugar industry—cheap land and cheap labour. If the second policy, that of guided expansion, had been followed, conditions would have led towards a relationship of co-operation between equals in place of the dominant-subordinate relationship of plantation and industry to lessor and coolie. Of course, this would have resulted in less profit for the plantations and other serious difficulties.

The Department of Economic Affairs, and especially the Agricultural Extension Service, did in fact make some attempts at helping the peasants, but both organizations were still in their infancy. Eventually the Department was able to take the lead in spreading a more enlightened policy, but by that time the condition of the world sugar market had deteriorated to such a degree that only a drastic regulation of the Javanese sugar industry could keep it alive at all, and no experimental risks could be taken.

To some people it may seem best that peasant cane cultivation was not stimulated, as that would have meant involving the peasants in the risk of falling prices. But the plantation system and its method of response to the world depression of the thirties did not by any means leave the peasant unaffected. The total wages paid by the sugar industry to peasants fell drastically, and many long-term leases of peasant-owned land were cancelled, so that actually the people were affected very directly. On the other hand, a middle class of Javanese farmers, a yeomanry accustomed to looking after itself and taking its own risks, would have been able to withstand the shock of the world depression far better than the people as they were, actually an impoverished, dependent proletariat.

Let us now turn to the related question, are there any examples of a division of labour between the population as cane
growers and the factories as sugar refiners? It should be rather clear by now that the sugar industry was not very much interested in such a division of labour. Furthermore, in the 1920s a law was enacted putting a stop to what little progress had been made spontaneously in this direction. This law, it is true, checked some excesses which had sprung up. Through Javanese go-betweens who could mould the people to their will, the plantations had been able to effect what was actually an extension of their area, fixed by Government, by getting peasants to use their lands for cane instead of food crops. But the excesses could have been prevented by administrative inquiry and adjustment in specific situations, instead of by tossing out the whole institution of peasant cultivation of cane for factories. The abuses which occurred only prove the rule that inequality increases whenever two economically disparate parties meet and government maintains a policy of laissez-faire. The standard system of land lease, accepted as the only basis for the sugar industry, was no less open to abuse, and needed all possible juridical niceties and fine points to make it workable. But the administration did not want to take upon itself the task of supervising the buying of peasant cane; it did not want any such close relationship between the Javanese and the Dutch branches of the sugar industry. And so, by outlawing all buying of peasant cane, it also sacrificed those special cases in which the relationship that had been built up was more satisfactory than in other areas because the peasants were economically stronger and the two parties therefore more nearly equal. At the beginning of the war, then, the sugar industry was based completely on the leased-land plantation system, and any foundation on which to build something like a fair division of labour between farmer and factory was completely lacking.

One of the effects of the war was to stimulate self-confidence among the rural classes, another to arouse discontent with the low standard of living. These are not unnecessary elements in the development of a divided system such as we are considering,
and they have made any attempt to carry on the sugar industry in the traditional way almost impossible. But they are not in themselves a guarantee of success. Another effect of the war was a hatred of the Dutch and of the capitalist system they symbolized. This hatred gave rise to a great deal of damage and destruction of fields and factories, and is a stumbling block to future co-operation.

IV

However, despite the lack of a past tradition on which to build, and despite the obstacles growing out of the war, any plan for the future of the sugar industry must look to the possibilities of co-operation, of division of labour between farmer and factory, and must consider the difficulties involved.

In this relation, two special areas should be given first consideration. As regards the interests of both the Indonesian people and Western investors, the best place to begin development of farmer-factory division of labour would be in the areas most highly developed agriculturally. There the interests of the two groups would appear closely enough allied to be easily linked, and there the best possibilities for developing a sound yeomanry should exist. On the other hand, it would seem to be in the poorest regions, where for long the scarcity of landownership has been a disruptive factor, and where even the pre-war sugar industry was a beneficial influence, that a reorganization is most urgent. As Mr. K. L. Smith, director of a sugar factory in Pasuruan, has written: ¹ 'When special factories and industries in certain regions are destroyed by their own people and their own workers, then it must be investigated why this happened and what grievances—perhaps unconscious ones—have long been smoldering in the people's hearts. Perhaps these are just the regions in which a new pattern must be sought out'.

¹ In Economisch Weekblad van Nederlandsch Indië (Economic Weekly of the Dutch East Indies), 26 October 1946.
Any application of a system of farmer-factory division of labour will make necessary a less intensive method of cultivation than that used under the old plantation system. To many who have put the dogma of intensification on a pedestal as an ideal to be worshipped, this is a disagreeable thought. But the dogma of intensification must be recognized as nothing more than a dogma. The pre-war aim of the sugar industry was a maximum of return on investments, and even the social environment could be moulded to this aim. In such a situation intensive cultivation seemed the best solution. But today all that is changed. If the sugar industry is to survive at all, it must be based on a dual principle, the financial interests of the shareholders and the social interests of the people. It must fit itself to the social environment rather than moulding that to its own will; it must recognize the people as an end in themselves rather than a means of greater productivity, and foster their productive energy as a national Indonesian interest.

In measuring the decline in production involved in a farmer-factory division of labour, with its less intensive methods of cultivation, just as in evaluating in general the virtues and vices of the plantation system and a farmer-factory division, one is inclined to take pre-war figures as norms. These figures show that the yield in sugar of peasant-grown cane averaged 70 to 75 quintals per hectare (2.8 to 3.1 tons per acre). That is less than half the yield of plantation cane, and even that may be thought too high a figure, as native sugar may be taken in its crude form whereas factory output relates to pure sugar.

But it would be fairer to compare the possibilities of the two systems for development under present conditions. The plantation system must now face the threat of arson, of theft, and of strikes on a scale undreamed of before the war.

Furthermore, it would now be far less privileged than it was in the past: irrigation rights, leasehold, and labour are all less easily obtained. (Post-war reports from Java pointed out that inhabitants were not eager to lease lands to plantations for rents proportionately double those of pre-war. High market prices
for rice and risks involved in working with the Dutch no doubt contributed to the situation.)

Any realistic calculation of future plantation yield must therefore consider these facts of small acreage, higher land rents, and higher wages. On the other hand, now that peasants can cultivate cane on the well-irrigated fields formerly used by the plantations, their yield is certain to be higher. Moreover, under a farmer-factory division the peasant-grown cane, when refined in modern factories, will have a higher sugar yield than was possible from the primitive mills used in the past.

V

Even more important than these factors in increasing the productivity of cane cultivation by peasants, may prove a new factor—the co-operative movement. This factor is, in truth, so important that I am inclined to say that the success of the whole plan of farmer-factory division is directly related to the success of the co-operative movement. But co-operatives are no panacea for all social ills, for a co-operative movement can go no further than the knowledge and willingness of its members. Therefore education in this direction is necessary, even urgent, for time is running out.

Concerning the policy to be followed, the co-operative groups for growing sugar cane do not differ in principle from the other co-operatives developing in Indonesia. The whole co-operative movement is conceptually a Western one, but one appropriate to the Indonesian temperament; and to a nation with no time to seek its own way independently it offers a system well worked out by trial and error. A further short cut open to Indonesia is that of the guided co-operative, with Government training co-operative managers and disseminating information about the system.

The aim and the result of any co-operative movement should be a right relationship between the individual and society, a balance between self-interest and communal interest. In West-
ern countries, where co-operatives arose in the midst of a capitalist system, individualism was a powerful factor which could only gradually be channelled into co-operation under slow, careful guidance. In Java the situation is reversed. The leader of a co-operative will be accepted easily as a guru, a teacher, but one of his chief tasks is that of teaching his pupils the more individualistic qualities of self-confidence and self-help. On this point there is perhaps a precedent of importance for Indonesia in the 4-H Clubs of the United States and the West Indies.

In considering the whole problem of a guided co-operative movement as it occurs in our case, two questions come to mind. In the first place, does not such a system demand an exceptional leadership in order to be realized? And can a system depending to such a great extent on its leader really be co-operative?

To begin with the second question, the answer of course depends on whether the leader is able and willing to work at making himself superfluous, relinquishing authority in direct proportion to the progress of his pupils. Such a leader can find a pattern in some Eastern countries, and something of a basis in the policy towards co-operatives of the pre-war Dutch East Indian Government. He need not reach the co-operative ideal before some positive results and further leadership can develop, and a ‘one-man co-operative’ is not so objectionable at an elementary stage.

As for the other question: Is there such a man to be found? It is true that the qualifications are high, but such teachers are to be found—gurus with the spirit of a man like Raiffeisen, founder of a special type of co-operative. One can only hope that the Javanese sugar industry may be willing to consider financing the training of such gurus, for they can become a real asset to the Indonesian people and a sound industrial investment as well.
A few detailed comments may illustrate the way in which a sugar growers’ co-operative movement could be developed in practice. The nucleus of any sound movement must be the local co-operative unit of all the cane farmers in a single village, under the leadership of a foreman. These nuclear groups can give each member a feeling of belonging and of ownership. Furthermore, they can be a medium for education in agricultural techniques and, through promotion of free discussion and election of co-operative officers, of democratic methods. In order that the co-operatives may stay free of ties to traditional sentiments and scandals, the village headman generally should not be allowed to be an officer.

The chief activities of the local co-operative groups will be those of selling cane, buying seedlings and fertilizer, and administering credit. For the first two of these activities a central union of all the co-operatives within the sphere of a single factory would be useful. As for administration of credit, experience has shown that the local co-operative group is in most cases the only workable unit.

Consumers’ co-operatives for household goods are equally to be recommended for the peasants in the sugar factory areas. They should, however, be kept separate from the credit co-operatives. Their basis should be one of cash payment.

The most important part of the task of the cane growers’ co-operative will be that of delivering cane to the sugar factories. Certain factors in this respect will be more favourable than before. A reduction of the crop rotation cycle from three years to two may be a means of extending the yearly surface under cane and of some saving in transport by greater concentration. (These will be further encouraged by the fact that the larger fields resulting from the more extensive type of farming to be used will necessitate fields adjoining each other as much as possible.) A basic contract between the factory and the farmers’ co-operative is, of course, fundamental.
Furthermore, with the fields being farmed by their owners or by sharecroppers, the old institution of leaseholding, with all of its traditional and often demoralizing practices, will give way to a new financial system. Side by side with the old lessor-lessee relationship as a source of social unrest, the coolie-master relationship will also necessarily be replaced by a new, more satisfactory worker-employer relationship under different working conditions. And many other old stumbling blocks—troubles over irrigation rights, theft of fertilizer, and so on—can be satisfactorily adjusted under a co-operative system.

The chief problems to arise will probably be those of time of harvest and of accounting methods. To solve the first, the two organizations involved—the factory management and the growers' co-operatives—must work out an over-all crop plan and train their working units to comply with this plan. By using canes permitting double cuttings (a thing more feasible under an extensive system of cultivation), and by allocating early and late ripening varieties of cane to different farmers, much can be done to make such a plan economical for all.

As for accounting, it is essential that the purchase price of cane have a close connection with the sugar price on the open market; for this, having a direct effect on the growers, will lead them to take an interest in price fluctuations and the whole complex of sugar production, and their resultant development in initiative will give more elasticity and strength to the entire sugar industry. The whole question of price settlement is, however, a very complicated one, one that will be a test of every co-operative leader's patience and ingenuity.

That can be said, in fact, of the problem of co-operation as a whole. If the leaders do not meet the test, then we can say of Indonesia, as the Agrarian Commission said of India in the 1920's, 'If co-operation fails, there will fail the best hope of rural India'. But if they succeed, if the leaders really feel themselves gurus of their people, then the divided system of co-operative cane growers and factory refiners may well prove to be the way to a new triumph for the Indonesian sugar industry.
Then it will again have been proved that in truth 'the purpose of production is the service of man'.

I hope to have made it clear that the formation of co-operative societies is a powerful and necessary means to social peace and wealth in those agricultural parts of underdeveloped countries where hitherto foreign estates have been living too much to themselves and are now, in their isolated and often privileged position, becoming more and more exposed to hostile feelings.

Promoting co-operative organizations is one of the best applications of community development. Where the individual farmers stand helpless against the big estate, closing their ranks shapes them into a not negligible negotiator. While the selling of native-grown cane by a single farmer is of no significance at all to the factory, the whole relationship between farmer and factory changes when this is done in common, and thus develops into the basis of a new and equitable system. ¹

¹ Recently some form of co-operation between factory and growers has been seriously initiated in Java. So far it is to be found only in small-scale experimental efforts of a local character, but these are welcome.
PART THREE

Education for Community Development
Chapter X

SOME AIMS AND METHODS OF FUNDAMENTAL EDUCATION

ALEX B. GRAHAM

I do not propose an elaborate enquiry upon terms and definitions, particularly in a field where the boundaries are incurably vague, for we are concerned with activities as wide as society itself and adapted to diverse levels of need and attainment. Thus I shall not speak of 'adult education' (though much of what is said may treat of it), preferring rather to include it in the wider term 'fundamental education', which, neither implying age limits nor carrying over associations from more industrialized societies and traditional techniques of teaching, seems more to our purpose.

In a like manner I shall prefer not to use the term 'mass education', as connoting at once too much and too little—too much in that no great 'mass' may be involved (e.g. in an underdeveloped pocket in an otherwise developed country); too little in its insistence on quantitative aims and results. It is clear that no one term can give an adequate account of this field, just as it is clear that what is fundamental, what is mass, what is adult education, and so on, cannot be wholly disentangled. In this situation we make our choice faute de mieux, as it were, but we make it also for its more positive implication of what is in some way fundamental.

What are the aims of fundamental education? I can do no better than quote from an early statement in this field: 'Any

1 The writer wishes to thank Mr. Abou-Zeid Musa, whose experience in fundamental education and community development in the Sudan has made him a valuable adviser.
minimum fundamental education must enable men and women: as workers—to control their physical environment, and to conserve and exploit the natural resources of the earth so as to raise their standard of life; as citizens—to live together in harmony in their communities—family, group, tribe, and nation, and eventually in a world society; as individuals—to bring out the best that is in them to achieve physical health, and to develop self-respect through spiritual, moral, and mental progress and the formation and fulfillment of noble aspirations. ¹

These aims, of course, imply no order of priority. There are writers who have wished to debate this question of priorities in what seems to me a profitless way, some saying that physical conditions have the greatest urgency, some stressing the claims of spiritual progress, as if men were somehow parcels of separatenesses.

I do not deny that in some cases health may be the question of greatest urgency, in others literacy, and so forth, and that response must be made accordingly: assessments of first things must always be made, but based on empirical rather than a priori grounds.

Fundamental education must enter a particular society or community wherever it can do so most profitably, advancing by a kind of situational logic adapted both to accident and to awareness of complex social interrelationships, and having as its goal the satisfaction of men’s needs and wants as social, individual, physical, rational, moral, and spiritual beings.

The word ‘wants’ refers to aims and values, as well as to the active participation of the people of underdeveloped areas themselves in the work of fundamental education. Fundamental education, as we say, seeks to help people to help themselves; it is an activity by the people as well as for them, coming from within, even though supplies and guidance may come as catalysts from without. This further reminds us that vital though some ‘outside’ project may be in terms alike of achievement, example, and the skilled knowledge available from more developed areas.

there remains the need for local leaders and workers of all kinds, men sympathetically aware of the patterns of their own people and able to enlarge upon and continue the work of such projects. Accordingly, fundamental education must fit into the total system of education—primary, adult, technical, and higher—for these are the sources from which such leaders will come.

In the light of these considerations, we may see fundamental education as a continuing process from within, helped as may be needed from without.

The title of this chapter registers an excessive claim; it clearly cannot be met within the limits of a summary treatment. Thus I shall in the main leave aside questions of organization and administration, some of them indeed, e.g. the use of the team, being covered elsewhere in this book. One factor, however, which will influence organization is the need for an adequate survey both of the particular area of work and the total background, regional and national, against which it is set. Convenient areas of operation will emerge from considerations of geography, language, culture, industry, political structure, and so forth. In particular, there is a need for the analysis and guidance afforded by social anthropology, not only as giving a rounded perspective, but also as bearing vitally on social structure and values. Quite apart from the duty of an underdeveloped community to examine its own traditional standards in the light of new conditions, we should recognize that the technology and skills of more developed areas carry with them the values of their origins. From the disruptive possibilities of such a freight the trained social anthropologist may help to deliver us.

In framing my remarks I have had in mind—although I have not thought it necessary to differentiate them completely in the body of the text—certain broad type-headings under which a fundamental education programme will fall. It may be limited to a village or a group of villages or a province, because of factors of geographical or cultural importance, and because the sheer size of the problem in the face of the resources available makes a beginning imperative and any larger operation impos-
sible. Such a programme is likely at first to depend almost entirely on outside help. In the second place, a programme may be of a national kind. At a later stage, and with relatively more resources available, the state may seek to remove some particular deficiency, or may undertake some necessary task of rationalization and co-ordination, in the education system as a whole. Again, the task may be one either of rural education or, as in large city centres in many industrialized areas, of urban education. In the latter case fundamental education may take the form of co-ordinating many already existing agencies, as well as filling in the serious gaps. The nature of the specific educational problems of rural and urban areas will be very different: the goals quoted at the beginning of this chapter will in both cases apply. Again, some fundamental education programmes may be the work of an inter-governmental agency such as Unesco, some the work of a national government, some of a non-governmental organization, and others of a combination of all or any of these. Each of these type-headings will have implications, which I cannot now discuss, for administration and organization. A definitive account remains to be written of such matters in this most complex field, and we await with interest data on programmes such as the pilot projects of Unesco and the work of other inter-governmental, governmental, and non-governmental bodies.

A general discussion of the field worker and certain of his problems may help us to cover by implication some of those things which otherwise cannot be discussed in our brief compass.

What may be said of the field worker, his problems and his methods? Apart from his own particular skill, which I do not consider here, there are other more general qualifications of the greatest moment. I mean the temperament of the field worker, his emotional attitude to his duties and to the people among whom he lives and works.

Fundamental education requires of its workers a genuine humility and compassion, and a flair for 'public relations', for it is here that the core of the work lies, at the point of contact be-
tween old and new. This is not to open the door to attitudes of romantic idealism or vague ‘uplift’; these miss the point, for not only are they notoriously susceptible of discouragement and disillusionment, but also they too often imply the inability of the field worker to meet the people on common ground. These attitudes have a further declension, that of a paternalism which, however benevolent it be, is readily sensed and widely resented, sometimes indeed as being the inverted expression of some concealed premiss of superiority, racial or other. The field worker is not a paternal angel of light, nor the harbinger of a messianic kingdom; he is a worker with certain relevant skills engaged in the slow, plodding, often discouraging task of helping people to help themselves.

In the nature of the case he will often be in situations where he is teacher and others taught—a temptation to delusions of grandeur. It may be a useful antidote to remind himself that he too has much to learn from the people as he goes along. This interaction is one of the secrets of successful work, and by it the field worker achieves an effective practice otherwise denied him.

Or, inversely, he may nourish notions of persecution, working, as he may, in a far province, removed alike from co-workers and headquarters, who, he begins to feel, neither understand nor care about his problems. It is an important task of administration to maintain liaison between field worker, colleagues, headquarters, and workers in allied fields, whether by newsletters, visits, conferences, refresher courses, or other means. The field worker himself has the duty of furthering such liaison so that he may become more efficient and useful. This is particularly important as touching workers in allied fields with whom conflict of aims may sometimes arise. It has been my experience that no matter how good the legislation from above, or how cordial the relations of administrative heads, such liaison depends in the greatest measure on the field worker. If he cares about it, it may exist though high level directives do not, while the latter alone do not suffice to ensure it.

I have spoken of public relations. The field worker should
know the people and the district thoroughly. He should have at his disposal, and perhaps indeed have helped in the preparation of, the preliminary survey. This survey, whether national or regional, should include data of an ecological, geographical, demographic, economic, historical, cultural, social (including political and legal), educational, medical, and linguistic kind. It should inform him of other similar agents in the field, and, if a regional survey, of the wider national background of which his area is a part. All this may seem counsel of perfection, not to say pretentious and wasteful preliminaries, but in my opinion such a survey is vital.

The field worker may then fill out this information with his own more personal experience of the area, with a view to reaching that nice amalgam of sympathetic identification and objective awareness which his work demands. This may come to seem a long and idle process, much of it consisting of standing about and talking. If, however, what I have said above about the importance of the attitudes and initiative of the people is accepted, then we shall think these preliminaries neither slow nor idle.

How long should a field worker stay in a particular area? I hesitate to state a definite period since there are many variables, but as a very general approximation I might suggest a period of from five to eight years. Below this he may in general find the time too short to enable him to grow into the place and its problems, or to look for even small results. A rapid parade of field workers may also hinder the continuity (and hence the appeal) of a programme from the point of view of the people among whom they work. Particularly in the early stages of a programme, continuity and progress may be largely a matter of the relationship to one another of field worker and people, and the task is to shift acceptance from this more personal basis to one of structural and institutional integration of the programme within the society, although even at this stage, of course, the personal relations aspect remains of great importance. (We may note that this problem of integration within the social framework is a
constant which confronts novelty in any society. It faces adult and international education, for example, in many developed countries.)

Above this term of work it has sometimes been found that the field worker talks himself out, that he may lose his initial impetus or the critical objectivity which must complement his sympathetic identification of himself with the area and its problems.

It will be obvious that these considerations of time admit of the widest variation. Thus the particular stage of development of a country or region, the nature of its problems, the psychological stamina and personality of the worker himself, are all important variables, while in the case of a project drawing heavily on outside personnel, such a duration as I recommend will not generally be possible or even perhaps relevant. It should be added, however, as touching this last consideration, that once the initial stages of such a project are passed, its acceptance and continuation as an integrated internal activity will raise the problem of duration in the way I have indicated.

What about planning? Everywhere this will be a question of great importance, and following our practise we shall consider it at the field worker’s level. On the basis of the preliminary survey and the overall plan of development, he should be able to construct a plan of work for his district. This plan does not imply either rigidity or the imposition of aims on the people from above; on the contrary, it is necessary that it be flexible and adaptable in operation, and that it rest on the co-operation and advice of the local people. It will almost certainly be a changing document, as we have seen, because of the dual aspect of the worker as both teacher and taught, a consideration which will lead him and the people to new assessments and effectiveness as the work progresses.

The discussion of planning leads us easily to the evaluation of work and results, since it will here provide a valuable yardstick. The evaluation of work is essential from an administrative point of view, where, in conjunction with the particular plan, it admits of effective budgeting and the most efficient use of resources.
This is as important to success as it is to the peace of mind of administrator and field worker alike. Evaluation is not merely an administrative device, however. It is an integral part of the process of education—in the last analysis a part of what we mean by education. Of any fundamental education programme we are always entitled to ask, 'Fundamental education for what?'—a most valuable question, since, fluid as the particular plan must be, it forces us constantly to revaluate both work and plans in the light of basic aims. The field worker is thus more likely to follow what is fruitful and to avoid what is not.

In certain cases some statistical evaluation of results will be possible, as in the fields of health or agriculture (using the preliminary survey figures as a base). There will be, however, many results of a more imponderable kind, in terms of happiness, mental attitudes, and so on. These are as important as they are intangible, and the field worker must evaluate them through such behaviouristic data as he may observe.

In general, results will be slow, as I have said before, and the tempo and organization of the programme must be geared to this slowness. No field worker will look for speed who sees fundamental education as a process aimed at bringing the community to an awareness of its own problems and the fixing of its own ends. This is the road to responsibility, not to mere conformity or obedience, and this is the longer road.

It will have been noticed that nothing has been said about training the field worker, though if what I have said of his function be correct, then this is a matter of great importance. The question of training demands the closest attention, at a length beyond my present scope, even if it were within my competence, and I must hope, as elsewhere, that readers will draw out the implications of these very general and introductory remarks. Patience, humility, compassion, the dual roles as teacher and taught, the importance of public relations—these all point to what is in some sense a vocation, and any scheme of training must make this clear, as well as teaching the worker something of social anthropology, administration, organization, pedagogy
in his own particular technical field, and so on. We may urge
again that although at the moment underdeveloped areas must
rely on personnel (as well as resources) from more developed
areas within their own countries and abroad, it is nonetheless an
integral part of fundamental education that it should early train
those local leaders and workers who may emerge. By a natural
extension, training in the aims and methods of fundamental
education should become, as it were, a basic training for ad­
ministrators, doctors, agriculturists, and others in various tech­
nical fields, so that while remaining primarily administrators,
doctors, and so on, at the same time they gain a more rounded
approach to their functions and duties in the new social pattern.

One last consideration and I am done. Fundamental educa­
tion does not erupt gratuitously into static societies completely
untouched by, and disdainful of, outside influences. It seeks to
perform no works of supererogation. The problems arising
from both diffusion (or ‘culture contact’) and want exist ready­
made, as witness the widespread cries of nationalism and the
revolt against poverty, ignorance, starvation, and disease. Its
efforts may in part be a work of conscience, but they are also a
matter of the most immediate practical urgency.
Chapter XI

THE FIELD WORKER

V. L. GRIFFITHS

The subject of this chapter is the field worker in community development—not the highly trained specialist, but the man who is the final contact with the peasant in the village. He may be a health officer, a co-operative society official, schoolmaster, adult education tutor, home economics worker, agricultural extension worker, or health visitor. What sort of man should he be—or perhaps one ought to say, what sort is it possible for him to be in the conditions of an underdeveloped area? (We include, of course, woman in the term ‘man’.) On the answer to our question depends the kind of development programme that is possible. The field worker is, as I hope to show, a much more important link in the chain of men who bring technical assistance to the underdeveloped areas than is his opposite number in the more developed countries. I have based these general considerations in the main on my own experience in the Middle East, but I believe that they have relevance to conditions in many other countries which are in need of technical assistance.

Limitations

Very often people approach technical assistance programmes by first seeing what needs doing and then looking round for someone to do it. We shall approach the problem from a different angle: not because the first way is wrong; in fact it is a very reasonable way and has been remarkably successful in the United States, where projects are planned, then the technically
qualified men are hired for the duration of the project, after which they move on to other jobs. But it may help to cast some light on the special problems of underdeveloped areas if we make our approach by first considering the available staff and then what sort of things they can be expected to do after some training.

When we compare the type of field worker available and the conditions in which he works in an underdeveloped area with his counterpart and his counterpart's situation in more developed countries, three differences stand out.

First, because underdeveloped areas have for long been poor they have very few men with a good general education, and especially lack men with that judgment and understanding which comes from having been brought up in a varied and intellectually stimulating environment. The few men of this quality who do exist are relatively expensive to employ, because their pay rates are usually tied to, though not identical with, that of foreigners employed in their country. Recruitment for a nation-wide development programme must therefore rely on the poorly educated field worker.

Second, to the extent that the field worker is given some general education and a wider outlook, he becomes attracted by the lively 'modern' civilization of the towns. This alienation from the country and from village life is not peculiar to underdeveloped areas, but it is more marked in such areas. The difference between the amenities—and not only the amenities, but also such civilized necessities as hospitals and schools—that are available in the towns when compared with those of the country is so much greater than the difference between town and country in the more developed areas. And for the young man the apparent freedom of modern town society is so much more attractive than domination by the aged, which characterizes the villages. Thus it is very difficult indeed to obtain field workers prepared to remain for long periods in the villages. Even the best hanker for the town after a spell in the country and, indeed, look upon such transfer as a right.

The third great difference is in the attitudes of the villagers.
In a highly developed country the problems of improvement are mainly material ones of finance and ‘know-how’. It is true that villagers almost everywhere are conservative, but in a developed country there are always some individuals prepared to take up a new idea and give it a trial, to adapt themselves if necessary to alterations in their way of life, even to move to new parts of the country. These receptive individuals respond to new ideas, they even take the initiative and ask for technical advice. The rest gradually follow. At the start of development work in the underdeveloped areas this is not so. In fact, the lack of progressive individuals is their basic problem. Society is usually too closely knit for individual peasants to break easily with custom. Technical changes in farming or in hygiene or in any other side of village life almost always mean upsetting the social pattern, the hallowed round of duties, the leisure for celebrations of domestic events, the dominance of conservative leaders. Besides, with time pressing the changes wanted of them are so much more radical than are those suggested in most Western countries. So instead of the field worker finding a number of people coming to him for advice, he has to go to them and press his ideas on them.

The field worker’s audience have various ways of avoiding the action he suggests, depending on how much they fear him. If they do not fear him at all (because he has no connection with government nor any sanctions at his command) they may react by adopting an attitude of complete incomprehension, perhaps even a sulky glumness. If they think that he may do them harm in some way, e.g. by influencing the government to increase their taxes or otherwise harry them, they will react with enthusiastic agreement, followed by long months of evasive inaction punctuated by incredible excuses. One of their greatest protections is the assumption of stupidity—when, in fact, they are not at all stupid but have some half-conscious social reasons for not following what has been suggested. Perhaps because I was myself brought up in an English village and have lived most of my life amongst country people, I have
on occasions adopted the ‘enthusiastic’ method with troublesome government officials—and it has proved eminently successful. Before I could be found out, my particular tormentor would be transferred somewhere else in the usual way of governments.

Remembering the type of man we have for a field worker in underdeveloped countries, his lack of an educationally rich background, his desire for the town, we need not be surprised if he is apt to treat his job as something to be got through rather than as a lifetime mission.

In view of the objections which may be arising in the reader’s mind, it should be emphasized that we are not considering the conditions which exist in a project covering a limited, perhaps experimental, area, where the total number of field staff is comparatively small, where supervision and inspiration by senior staff is more concentrated, and where the salaries of individual workers need not be kept down to the minimum. We are considering the problems which arise when any attempt is made to raise the standards of living, and to raise them quickly, over a large area amongst people who are unused to taking the initiative. It is then that the difficulty of securing the right kind of field worker becomes truly formidable.

Methods and Objectives

It may help further to clarify our problem if we turn now to consider the possible methods of work and the objectives for which our field worker may be the agent. We then may see how far such objectives are practicable within these limitations. We are again approaching this problem from a less usual angle—i.e. we are considering feasible methods and then their effect on objectives, rather than declaring objectives first and then finding methods which may or may not be feasible with the staff available.

For simplicity we may consider three types of method—force, persuasion, and stimulation.
Force. It is usually not difficult to recruit a sufficient quality and quantity of field workers who can act as moderately efficient agents in enforcing government orders for the material improvement of the people's lives. This is the method which many governments of underdeveloped areas are compelled to use in order to bring immediate material improvements in the lives of their peoples. Malaria for example, may be reduced or even stamped out through these agents. Such agents need careful supervision, they are inevitably poorly paid and are prone to take bribes from those who want to avoid carrying out the orders. But those who support the method of compulsion argue not only that it is the only practicable method in a poor and backward country, but that it also has two other advantages. First, they say that unless outstanding material needs and ills are dealt with quickly no development of civilization is possible, and second, that enforcement over a long period does much to inculcate new habits and is therefore educational and of permanent value. The danger is, of course, that such methods may seriously set back the development of local initiative.

Persuasion. Mass persuasion has come much into favour in the modern world through the development of broadcasting and the cinema. The radio, the cinema and other visual aids seem to offer a ready means of influencing the opinions, and eventually the behaviour, of large populations. With comparatively little training it is possible to produce teams of demonstrators who can tour the country, explaining and exhorting. Their weakness usually lies in their inability to adapt their material to local prejudices and peculiarities. The effectiveness of their persuasive methods are often difficult to judge because in the eyes of villagers these agents are all a part of the government machine. How far fear of government enters into their response to this kind of field work will vary according to the relationships of government with the people.

Stimulation. The third method attempts to get the people themselves to take the initiative in their own development.
The field worker, in this case, does not suggest any one single measure to be taken, but throws out ideas, pretends to no convictions of his own, and acts 'as a catalyst setting in motion the activity and resources of the community'. This is work demanding the highest qualities of tact, judgment, restraint, and patience (particularly in bearing with the criticism of observers that no results are being achieved or that progress is too slow). Most underdeveloped countries have not got suitable men for this method in anything like sufficient quantity for action on a large scale.

As a schoolmaster, I find myself frequently comparing these problems with those which confront us in educating the young. There we have to use compulsion, we certainly use persuasion, and we try through the years to stimulate initiative in the pupil. The same staff use all these methods, but a very much higher quality of schoolmaster is required if the third method or objective is to be included; it is well known that to persuade schoolmasters of poor quality to adopt a stimulating approach, such as the project method, only leads to disaster. In underdeveloped countries the ordinary village schoolmaster rarely reaches this level, perhaps partly because the whole climate of local opinion is against the encouragement of initiative. Nevertheless, the task, difficult as it is with children, is much easier with them than with adults. In school we have an artificially created community; it has its own traditions, but they are uncomplicated ones and restricted in scope when compared with the community life of a tribe or village. Again, the staff-pupil ratio in school is high compared with the number of field workers who can be afforded for a village. All of these considerations lead one to the conclusion that the task of those who wish to get the community moving, and moving quickly, of its own accord is much tougher than that of the educational reformer.
So far our conclusions are rather depressing. We have taken for our basis the fact that in most underdeveloped parts of the world the people desire better times but are not prepared to take the initiative themselves because of physical lassitude (which may be caused simply by malnutrition) and/or the hold of a closely knit social pattern. There are certain material improvements in their lives which can be enforced, but if the active and keenly willing co-operation of the people themselves is desired, and especially if it is to set them on the road to taking the initiative themselves, then the quality of the field worker is of supreme importance. In most underdeveloped countries such field workers are not available in sufficient quantity; the few who are available cost a lot and want to live in the towns. Are there no hopeful lines which may be explored?

The emphasis in discussions on technical assistance has tended in the past to be on what material improvements should be undertaken. It is changing to an emphasis on the human problems. This is in itself a hopeful sign. Unesco’s programme of training centres is a move in the right direction. But let us take this tendency one stage further and conclude with a brief review of organization and of the possibilities in better ‘nursing’ of the field worker after training. For in this may lie at least a partial solution to our problem.

Usually community development projects begin with an experiment in a single village or a small group of villages. This is very right and proper, but such experiments, while they pose many of the questions of community development, such as the attitude of the villagers, their desires and needs, do not pose the crucial question of staffing. The staff situation in an experiment is peculiar. The head is sure to be a man of enthusiasm and vision, and any who are associated with him, whether whole time or only co-operating from other organizations and departments, are affected adversely or favourably by
the knowledge that they are taking part in an experiment. They are affected adversely if they feel that work for the experiment is keeping them away from other work more helpful to their future careers, favourably if they feel that it will help their careers and if they are attracted by the personality of the leader.

But when this stage has been successfully concluded and an attempt is made to extend the work over a large area, perhaps on a national scale, the problem of the quality of the field staff and its morale becomes crucial, that is if anything higher is aimed at than the compulsory introduction of material reforms.

We may here draw attention to two common faults which are then revealed in organization. Probably one of the greatest causes of lack of quality in the services of countries administered by Britain is the lack of continuity in staff. Officials are constantly being transferred from one district to another, so that village people come to accept the suggestions of officials as of momentary importance only. Officials are to be humoured about their ideas—unless, of course, they are giving an actual order—after all, they will soon move on elsewhere. Some of this damaging movement is unavoidable when services are expanding rapidly (as they are doing in most of these countries) and some is necessary for ordinary efficiency. But there are certain posts where no man can do good work unless he has six or eight years or more in the one post—so that he becomes emotionally involved in the job. This is particularly important at the lower supervisory level, where a man may be looking after the work in an area with a number of men under him. Here neither is he remote from the field work, as is the administrator at headquarters, nor are the numbers of workers at this level so great as to make their cost prohibitive to a poor country.

These are the posts where it is above all necessary that a man should become involved in his job, not just a mechanical inspector, and the type of man chosen must be one who is capable of this extension of his personality. It is also necessary that the
organization or government which employs him should see that he does not lose financially or in seniority by being kept in one place for a long time.

Countries which have become newly self-governing are faced by a further problem. The acquisition of self-government is a great stimulus to all kinds of development, but an inexperienced public often demands immediate and spectacular results. The temptation is to go ahead with grand paper schemes. So far as they are carried out at all, they are undertaken by hastily recruited field staff who are controlled by a bureaucracy, the members of which have not yet had time to build up any tradition of service. They have little interest in anything but manoeuvring for their own advancement. The young men coming into this field work, often with high ideals and enthusiasm, are quickly discouraged and lose their inspiration.

The limitations and the dangers in the early stages of a nationwide organization of community development have been all too briefly reviewed, but they clearly point to the need for as much attention to be given to experiment in the kind of organization, and particularly in staff management, as to the methods of work and the material objectives. It may be that in many countries the right thing for this first stage—i.e. the stage before initiative begins to come from the people themselves—is to recruit a comparatively cheap and uneducated field worker and maintain his morale through a few highly selected field supervisors working from one or more central research and training centres which would be the centres of local inspiration, nursing the whole area. The writer has had experience of this kind of organization working successfully in the rather narrower field of village schools.

Such an approach would have to be tied in with a reasonable transfer policy and sound career scales. Those who administer would have to be constantly aware that in all work above the level of order enforcement, the morale of the field worker counts for more than anything else at this early stage.
Chapter XII

THE CONCEPT OF A TEAM

A. G. DICKSON

Directly after the war some of the most valuable relief work amongst displaced persons and refugees was undertaken by Quaker and UNRRA teams. In the last few years the work carried out by Moral Rearmament Teams has made itself increasingly effective. There are Social Development Teams in the Gold Coast and Demonstration Teams in Uganda. No meeting of colonial officers takes place these days without some reference to the need for the 'team approach'. More profoundly, perhaps, an ex-member of the British Colonial Service has suggested that 'the Service in these latter days needs to be organized into "Orders" of a semi-religious character'. It may be of interest to others engaged in this work to consider generally the place and idea of the team in mass education and community development (the terms are used interchangeably in the belief that education for citizenship and the development of a sense of community are nearly equivalent).

In some territories the word 'team' is being used to denote the periodic consultation of all officers who find themselves posted to administrative headquarters or a development area. This form of staff conference is clearly of immense importance: in achieving any concerted action it is as vital as a board meeting is to a company's workings or a commander's briefing to a military operation. But a committee is not necessarily a team: some psychological effect, some emotional undertone, may be gained by so calling it, but there would seem to be a danger in letting people believe that they are more dynamic than they really are. If this inter-departmental and
administrative co-operation at district and provincial level is called the team, then the word ceases to have quite that quality and significance that I would attach to it in this study.

What is the purpose of a team? It is essential to ask this question because, in our enthusiasm for the work, methods can so easily become confused with aims; indeed, it is often difficult to make up one's mind whether mass education is a technique or a spirit. There are some, for example, who tend to regard the potential contribution of the mobile cinema, the literacy campaign, or the community centre as though it were an end rather than a means. The part that a team may play does not represent an aim in itself. It is a technique—one amongst very many—and as such is only valuable in relation to the end it is designed to meet. Its limitations are fairly obvious—only too obvious to anyone who has had to employ the method. Nevertheless, under certain conditions the general conception and example of working in a team probably can come as close to the heart of the matter as any other approach.

The concept of a team is not without its critics. A mobile unit, it is said, may well arouse temporary interest, but in the nature of things it is not the medium for organizing sustained efforts of self-help in any community. Surely it is better, if resources are limited (as they always are in this work), to focus them on a chosen area, where concrete results may be attained, rather than dissipate them in peripatetic 'circuses'? And, again, the impetus for community development should come from the people themselves, it is said, rather than from outside agencies. 'Comparative strangers to the villages will not command any respect', Mr. Carpenter, the Adult Education Officer in Nigeria, has written, 'and it is not possible to "blitz" an African village.' There is so much truth in these criticisms that it is important to present the defence.

Far from it being more economical and practical to focus energies on one particular locality, I believe that there is a danger in concentrating resources on a chosen area, and there achieving something which could never be carried out over a
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wide region—and which therefore cannot, if we are honest with ourselves, be considered as really constituting mass education. There is, similarly, in carrying out experimental schemes, the danger of selecting some special area that will be favourable, but which may well have no general significance. There must be, of course, innumerable projects of every description whose essential worthwhileness will require and justify the concentration of special resources (even if that takes the form of European guidance only). But it is surely in the nature of mass education that our attention should be directed primarily to evolving ways and approaches that will have as wide and general an application as possible, without the concentration of special resources, rather than to achieving results, however spectacular, in isolated schemes in particular areas.

These aspects apart, there is also the element of time. The note of urgency, of ‘making up for lost time’, that sounded throughout the original British Mass Education Report of 1944, may not have been struck so resonantly in more recent communications, but no one labouring ‘at the coal-face’ in this work could have read unmoved that poignant passage in Alan Paton’s Cry the Beloved Country—‘My one great fear is that by the time we get round to loving them, they’ll have turned to hating us’—and not have wondered whether the clock might not be against him, too. ‘The education of all sections of the community for citizenship must be treated with the greatest urgency’, declared the Cambridge Summer Conference on Mass Education in 1948. ‘It is not merely a situation in which urgent action is required to do the job well—it is rather that the utmost effort is essential to avert failure.’

Much of this misunderstanding regarding the efficacy of the broad approach, in contrast to the localized concentration of effort, springs, I believe, from our conceiving community development in relation only to a geographical area—generally a somewhat primitive one—rather than in relation to common interests. So long as we think of community development as village betterment, based on the traditional communal labour,
refurbished and stimulated by modern needs and targets such as maternity homes, then the task—though it may be by no means easy—is at any rate comparatively straightforward. But what of communities where it has become the custom for the able-bodied young men, as in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, to leave for employment in the mines or on European estates? What of communities where it has become the tradition to depend for most of the manual work, as in parts of the Cameroons, upon the womenfolk, or—as in the greater part of Buganda, Ashanti, and the Gold Coast—on migrant labourers of a different race? And what if the desires for development voiced by the people cannot in any way be satisfied by their own self-help (and yet are perfectly legitimate expressions of a community's urge for progress)—such as the establishment of a postal telegraph office, the staffing of a secondary school, or the opening of a trade training centre? (Are we to tell them that what they really need, in contrast to what they want, is a piggery, a water tank, or de-stocking measures? For it is what the people themselves desire, we are frequently reminded, not what we think they ought to desire, that counts in this work.) And what of the new social groupings—I have in mind particularly the ex-Standard IV-VI youth—who stand, metaphorically speaking, aloof on the touchline, critical and cynical spectators of our schemes for community development? Their numbers (and their potential influence) grow daily, as does their feeling of unwantedness in the general plan of things. Where do they fit in? What is to be our approach to this new social stratum and potentially inflammable element of the community?

In territories where a cash-crop like cocoa and widespread schooling have effectively killed the old communal labour which elsewhere is the basis of community development work, the view is held that it is impracticable now—or too dangerous—to devise ways of inducing the educated youth to make their contribution of service to society, even though responsible African opinion is prepared to support such measures; and
community development is being interpreted there in the form of financial devolution, with cash allocations to local commit­tees or district officers. But if the actual physical work is left, as it almost inevitably will be in such regions, to impoverished, illiterate, immigrant labourers, material development may well ensue—but not, surely, that feeling of community and sense of common citizenship which are our ultimate aims. This seems to be a policy of despair. Unless we can find imaginative ways, and find them rapidly, of integrating the educated youth in our social development plans—whilst the clay, so to speak, is still moist—then our present schemes of community betterment would seem to bear within them the seeds of extinction—to be, in fact, a doomed rearguard action. For the road that is built to link the village with the main stream of traffic, and the school that is erected with voluntary labour and local pride, may well destroy the very spirit which has made them by opening the community to the disintegrating forces of materialism and individualism, to the 'mammy-lorry' and the middleman, to the struggle for the 'testimonial' and the flight of the young job-seeker to the towns.

Community development on the Udi model emerged from economic necessity: since there was insufficient money available to finance expanding needs, the people themselves had to provide, through communal labour, at least the man­power. It is my conviction that it is the richer areas and more favoured elements of the population that need this most. We want young Africans to give service to the community not so much because the area itself may be economically poor as because they themselves are socially privileged. The work of the Student Christian Movement, of International Student Service, of our Harvesting Camps, are all indications of what can be achieved in this direction. Perhaps it is an opportunity that the new universities—constituting, in their independence, a Third Force in Africa—will seize; for political administrations tend to regard the enthusiasm of educated youth as a djin that must on no account be released from the bottle.
What processes of development do we envisage, then, as operating amongst the increasingly numerous groups in Africa which have either long-since abandoned communal labour or have outstripped the stage where their desires can be satisfied by manual self-help or have broken loose altogether from their moorings (and their mores) and lost all the old sense of community? (There are those who would ask, I know, what processes of community development were considered applicable to ourselves in Britain and other ‘advanced’ countries, and would suggest that in this respect we stood today in at least as great a need as Africa.) These new social groups that are crystallizing today, unconfined to any one locality—ex-Servicemen, trade unionists, an emergent clerical intelligentsia, unemployed ex-schoolboys (and, in the larger towns, ex-schoolgirls, too), plantation labour, and squatter communities in East Africa—present us with the problem of how best to develop amongst them a new sense of community, of collective responsibility and co-operative action at increasingly higher levels, and not least a sense of common citizenship, no less urgent than the task of village betterment; of considerably greater urgency, in fact, since they represent infinitely more dynamic forces. At all events, they call for new approaches and new techniques very different from the relationship that has hitherto existed between the administration and the geographically demarcated district.

Earlier the question was asked, what is the purpose of a team? Extremely effective work for the betterment of the community is capable of being performed by teams of technicians—such as the school-building team in Northern Rhodesia, and the water-boring and well-digging teams in other parts, no less than by the anti-trypanosomiasis teams organized by Dr. Saunders in the north of the Gold Coast. It is not, however, this contribution that I have particularly in mind. ‘There are other sides to our civilization than the materialistic and the expedient’, wrote Elspeth Huxley recently, ‘and we shall fail in our efforts to raise the standard of living if we present to the
African only the wash-behind-the-ears, dig-deeper-latrines and drink-more-milk aspects.' Or in the more pedestrian words of the Land Utilization Conference at Jos in 1951: 'It was recognized that the building up of morale was the important contribution... morale precedes Community Development.' To create and keep alive a capacity for feeling and moral judgment—against neglect and callousness in the hospitals, against incivility and dishonesty in the public services, against venality in the police, and, generally, against gross exploitation and malpractices amongst traders—this pre-eminently is the task of the team. For it is these things (the things that moved Dr. Walter Miller to write *Have We Failed in Nigeria?*) that imperil the establishment of local government and self-rule in Africa today.

It is often advanced against the idea of a team that concerns itself with this concept of morale (and morality), that there is a danger in colonial territories of arousing enthusiasm if it cannot afterwards be maintained through the existing organizational machinery. There is, however, just as great a danger in maintaining in existence unaltered organizational machinery that is no longer capable of arousing enthusiasm or evoking a response. This was explicitly recognized by the Colonial Summer Conference of 1948, which considered the question of incentives in African society, when it concluded that 'if the adoption of mass education methods is found to necessitate modifications in the existing organization of Colonial Government, we hope that these modifications will be made'. Again and again the report of that Conference returned to the theme that 'we have to supply the spark and to kindle the flame', and stressed that 'there is really only one master technique in our task of Mass Education: it lies in the persistent and determined drive to this end, backed by enthusiasm and inspiration, on the part of every official and non-official, by every means available to him, even where those means are no greater than his own mind, heart and hands'.
The strength of a team lies, it is of course true, in spreading a gospel, in awakening interest and inspiring enthusiasm, and not in meeting organizational demands. But to the question so frequently posed by administration—‘What about the “follow-up”? ’—the answer must be returned that the machinery is there in the majority of cases, even if it touches as yet so very few. ‘Mankind needs reminding more often than instructing’, said Dr. Johnson, and the role of a team lies in the recharging of existing batteries, rather than the creation of new ones. There was a place in the past for the itinerant order as well as for the monastery; there is a place today for the visiting teacher as well as for the school. The travels and preachings of Wesley did not in themselves postulate the establishment of the Methodist Church—only the inertia and reaction of the Church of England as it then was made that inevitable.

In the social development work that was started in the Gold Coast, various measures were proposed for consolidating the work of the teams, such as the ‘shedding’ of two of a team’s staff to remain behind in each locality to spread and assist the work, the maintenance of contact through a bulletin or newsletter with those who had attended the courses organized by the teams, and the ‘servicing’ of those working in the field with advice and material from headquarters. But these were devices of a supplementary character, for it was our conviction that the instruments for the ‘follow-up’ lay ready at hand. The police post stood already there, whose younger constables might be induced to run a boys’ club, as the police in Leicester and Norwich have done. The school stood already there, whose staff and children had it in their power to carry out almost every form of mass education. The dispensary, round which first aid instruction or even a Red Cross detachment could be organized; the churches, whose members could include so many social activities in their guilds; the Native Authority or Council; the tribal age-group; and the administrative station—these instruments of action, some traditional and some modern, were there already to a greater or lesser extent. And some-
times, too, there was the embryonic nationalist association of young men, waiting for the germ of the idea to be fertilized that they themselves might undertake some of those social reforms which they were demanding of government. It was just this that our team strove to achieve: our object, as we saw it, was not to construct a new power station, but to see that the existing hurricane lamps burnt with a new intensity.

It is surely time that there should be a close season for the use of the phrase: ‘What about the “follow-up”? ’ Levelled at a critical moment in debate by the sceptic, it can be a weapon to destroy almost any proposal of any kind. Perhaps it was directed, for all we know, by some member of the Council in Jerusalem, at St. Paul’s journeys, with the implied criticism that he would have been better employed in establishing a follow-up organization at Tarsus. There is no ‘follow-up’ to Oxford or Cambridge, to Makerere or Ibadan, no ‘follow-up’ to the Festival of Britain or climbing Mount Everest. Some experiences and endeavours are worth while just in themselves, whether in the wider field of education or elsewhere. The history of recent development plans has surely shown that if one is too preoccupied with the ‘follow-up’ or ‘follow-through’, one may fail to hit the ball at all. Somewhere Mr. T. S. Eliot has written: ‘Attend not to the harvest, only to the proper sowing.’

In his book The Ancient World, Professor Glover attributes the decline of Rome not to organizational or administrative deficiencies but to a scepticism and moral atrophy, quoting Longinus as saying that ‘the curse of Empire is want of spirit’. The causes of our chief anxieties today in Africa, as in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, are not concrete things, but ideas: those whom we fear are dealing in ideas—ideas of such astonishing mobility that riots in Uganda four years ago can be attributed in a recent government report to a former native lay-brother living in Hampstead—and it surely behoves us to harp a little less on the ‘concreteness’ of our schemes, and to give the deepest and most urgent attention to developing ways
and approaches that build community morale and inspire devotion.

There are, however, two real dangers in the employment of a team. It is not enough, experience of such work in East Africa during the war has convinced me, for a team to demonstrate only. If it were just ignorance that we had to overcome, if all that were required were to show Africans what needed to be done, how simple the task would be, and what different people we ourselves should be! That, of course, is what philosophers call the Socratic fallacy—the belief that if a man only be brought to recognize his duties, he will perform them. Africans will come, certainly, to see imaginatively presented demonstrations of contour-ridging, drain-digging, and the like; they will come and be interested—but will they go and do likewise? Some may, but not enough, I believe, to merit the expenditure of energy and money in organizing such efforts. The function of a team lies in its capacity not so much to demonstrate technical expertise, as to arouse initially an emotional response and thereafter to train a group of potential leaders in that area for a sufficient period to enable some of them, at least, to carry on this work when the team has left. If this is not done, then I feel that the somewhat opprobrious epithet of ‘circus’ may, to a certain extent, be deserved. This was the great lesson that the pioneers of this technique, the Mexican cultural missions, have taught. Make of your work, by all means, a demonstration to interest the entire neighbourhood, but let your team’s emphasis be upon the training of local leaders who will best be in a position afterwards to pass on what they have learnt. In Mexico it was the rural schoolteachers who were brought in for the courses, the Federal Government holding, in company with the Jeanes Schools, that it would be principally through their efforts that enlightenment would spread. The role of the rural school in this work is quite vital, and unless the educational authorities are sincerely co-operating in our schemes of mass education and community development the work can never really progress. In Africa, notwithstanding, I believe we should endeavour, by a discreet form
of nomination, to induce others as well to attend such courses—clerks, storemen, subordinate administrative staff, Native Authority employees, junior officers, etc.—so that they too may become infected with enthusiasm for this work and pass it on.

The second danger, which arises from the previous one, is that a team, in its zeal to achieve results and render service, may actually carry out all the work that has to be done itself, leaving the local people to sit and receive the benefits. Anyone who has worked in teams providing for displaced persons or refugees knows this danger. In Africa, teams of students and teachers from colleges like Komenda in the Gold Coast and the Dennis Memorial Grammar School at Onitsha have had the same experience of finding villagers apt to submit passively to having good done to them, without lifting a finger to aid themselves. Even if it be only ‘shaming’ individuals or groups to participate (a powerful incentive in African society certainly), the efforts of such teams must be directed towards stimulating a local nucleus to share in the work and training it to carry on afterwards. In such a synthesis I see enormous possibilities in Africa: teams of students and others from the universities and colleges, on vacation, joining with young villagers doing communal labour on some imaginative project. Such a concept might prove to be the catalyst we are seeking to fuse the old communal labour of remote non-literate village communities and the newer ideas of social service of literate communities. This was, virtually, the approach that the Swedish and Swiss universities adopted so successfully in the great economic slump, students labouring beside young unemployed on some athletic stadium for a poor quarter of Stockholm or a road through some mountain forest. This, too, was what Dr. Lowdermilk, the great soil expert who was adviser to the Civilian Conservation Corps in America, saw as a solution to both our soil and social problems in West Africa during his visit.
The most obvious need for the team approach arises, I think, simply from this: that the individual worker in this field—be he a social welfare assistant, mass educationist, community development officer, or missionary, be he European or African—is afflicted sooner or later with such a feeling of loneliness that his morale (and with it, of course, his effectiveness) is seriously affected. This frustration may come from a feeling of futility at the individual's contribution in the face of the immensity of the job ('What can I do?—I'm one against 60,000!' I remember a district commissioner exclaiming at Lundazi, on the remote eastern border of Northern Rhodesia); it may equally, however (and perhaps more insidiously), assail the individual worker charged with this task, upon whom what he feels to be the indifference and scepticism of his colleagues weighs more heavily than any resistance or apathy of the people he is working amongst. To this feeling of loneliness and despair, the team provides an answer, sustaining its members by their companionship. But it can make also another contribution.

Community development, it is true, does imply the encouragement of the desires which the people themselves voice, and may involve the fostering and guidance of a popular movement. But, in its deeper sense, the development of a sense of community may well demand (if not today, then certainly in the near future) moral leadership in causes that are not immediately understood or popular at all—in campaigns to combat a tacitly and universally accepted system of corruption, in calls for voluntary service and the sacrifice of individual or group interests, in efforts to overcome apathy in regard to soil erosion or sanitary measures or parental indifference to their responsibilities towards juvenile delinquency and destitution. To put one man (or woman) on to the job in any area, as is frequently done, is to court failure: so often the carefully selected African who has undergone a course of training at the capital or some instructional centre, where he himself may really have glimpsed
the vision, finds himself—on posting to a locality which has no notion of what he is striving to attain—quite unable single-handed to convey that vision. Here is where a team can be of inestimable service, ‘breaking up the ground’ before the individual sower of the seed can effectively get to work, and stimulating an understanding, at least, if not appreciation, of what he will aim to achieve.

I would summarise briefly as follows some of the other advantages which may accrue from the use of this technique:

1. A practical example is afforded of what team-work really means. For over a decade in British despatches and other official pronouncements, there has been talk of provincial and district teams, without it signifying very much to us or anything at all to Africans. A social counterpart of a football team—visible, personal, and within the understanding of Africans—is needed. Those trained on a course organized by a team have a direct example of what a community can do and what a community can be, and can perceive this not as a pious abstraction of what mass (or fundamental) education ought to mean, but as a tangible reality. In the words of the Cambridge Conference: ‘Mass education tries to work... with a deeper understanding, a broader vision, a stronger emphasis on popular participation, and a greater sense of team work on all sides... we must secure a co-ordinated team approach to the problems of community development by all... working in the field.’

2. Membership of a team for a period constitutes, for those themselves undergoing instruction, an extraordinarily effective form of training on the job. In addition, it enables an estimate to be made of the individual’s ability and temperamental aptitude for field work, which may be difficult to perceive at an instructional centre and difficult to correct afterwards.

3. Many activities can be introduced or conveyed more convincingly by a team than by an individual worker, as for example through singing, physical recreation, and acting. Plato would have it that gymnastics and music serve the same end, the production of a harmonious temperament, whilst the
Pilgrim Players of Tanganyika, the Uganda Demonstration Teams, the Coloured Shakespearean Players in the West Indies, and the East African Unit that performed to Pioneer Askaris in the Middle East have shown how effectively social themes can be dramatized. Still more can a team, being alive and human, evoke and maintain a greater response in most parts of Africa than mechanical media of mass education such as the mobile cinema. I hope it may long be so, for this personal quality in our work of community development would seem to me to be infinitely precious. It is not the model village but the model villager who is our aim: Anchau in Northern Nigeria and Ajeluk in Uganda are examples of ideally planned centres of habitation, but yet seem dead, with their people having the air of puppets in a showpiece, without that vital element of community participation. There can be no evangelism without evangelists, and no mass education without mass educationists.

4. The team enables a form of training, however short and superficial, to be given to very many in rural areas who would otherwise never have the chance of undergoing instruction at a larger urban centre (and who, if they did get the opportunity, would probably not unnaturally expect not only board, lodging, and pocket-money to be provided, but possibly also some offer of salaried employment afterwards—thereby vitiating the whole aim of the work’s emphasis on service to the community and education for citizenship). This intensive training ‘on the site’, where not only is it more real to the participants, but the neighbourhood sees what can be done on its own doorstep, is of very great value.

5. The formation of a team lies within the capacity, I believe, of so many—of missions, schools, voluntary service organizations, government agencies, and others. In the field of social service in Africa, paradoxical though it may sound, team-work can be more easily achieved, I am convinced, than the individual approach. The young teacher and the senior boys in any school to undertake this approach in a holiday will find it easier for one very simple reason—they will enjoy it. In the same
way that a university or public school exploration society provides a chance for our young people, which they would never have as individuals, to embrace physical hardship and danger as an adventurous challenge to their manhood, so the team offers an opportunity to young Africans of a privileged class to undertake service to the community as a disciplined adventure. (In the words of Kurt Hahn, Headmaster of Gordonstoun, the foremost champion of this belief: ‘Formal Education is not enough—we have to stir in our young men a sense of being on active service for their community, to find what William James called “the moral equivalent of war”.’)

The most important aspect of all, however, is the influence that participation in a team may exercise over its own members. All over Africa immense sacrifices are being made—by parents, guardians, Native Authorities, and governments—for the education of the young: I feel we need to stress, per contra, that the greatness of a nation depends on the sacrifices that the educated young are prepared to make for the community. In these days when it sometimes seems as though ‘education’ and ‘mass education’ were at cross-purposes, the one resulting (no matter its intentions) in an anarchic individualism and mutinous materialism, the other doing its humble best to engender a sense of community, the effect that a team of this kind can exercise on those who take part in it may be some small contribution in the right direction.

A favourite quotation of mine is from Lord Elton’s war-time book, St. George or the Dragon: ‘It was not so much the Crusaders who made the Crusade, as the Crusade which made the Crusaders’. The Africans who formed our first Social Development Team in Togoland and the Gold Coast were not, at any rate at the outset, a band of practical idealists, of *hommes devoûés*, or ‘dreamers with spades’ (to use the memorable phrase of David Lilienthal of TVA), so much as a group of young people, some of them with a definite sense of privilege in having been specially selected, and all of them filled with curiosity regarding the outcome of the project. Yet as the
work proceeded, a morale was developed that was equal to any
difficulty or disappointment encountered. Before three weeks
had passed, the teachers in the team had volunteered to give up
their Christmas holidays to continue the work. More re­
warding to the writer, however, were the letters received
from some of these men expressing their gratitude for an
experience which they felt to have marked a point in their
lives. Baden-Powell was emphatically right when he said of
the Scout movement: ‘They come for what they can get—they
stay for what they can give.’

For those who may feel that the formation of a team might
have some contribution to make to their work (whatever it
may be), I would offer the following suggestions for the main­
tenance of morale.

1. Initial training of a team—preparatory to its launching a
campaign, taking the road, or itself conducting instructional
courses—should provide for each member, irrespective of his
own technical qualifications and experience, to take part in
every activity, the more educated being encouraged to join in
any physical work or recreation, and the less educated to share
responsibility (as best they can) in any discussion group,
literacy, or lecture work—thereby developing a co-operative
spirit and a sense of humour, and bringing home to the team
that the art of mass education may lie in their ability to make
unattractive things attractive and hard things easy. Similarly, I
have found that the joint participation by all members of the
staff in all demonstrations (whether it be medical or village
drama) and the encouragement of one’s driver or clerk to con­
tribute as best he can—in running perhaps a small class for
illiterate women or games for village children—enable the
humblest members to feel that they have something to give.

2. The inclusion in the staff or team of men with compara­
tively very simple backgrounds, but of alert and cheerful dispo­
sition (in our case, the nearly illiterate P.T. instructors) can
definitely enhance not only the representative nature but the
corporate feeling of the team, and bring out the best from
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themselves and—perhaps surprisingly—from the more educated and qualified members too. (This is also the experience of Dr. Saunders in organizing anti-trypanosomiasis teams in the northern part of the Gold Coast.)

3. Teams should not be organized as part of a civil service machine, operating to routine schedules, or response to each return visit will progressively decline, like a patient’s reaction to a drug. Nor should those who take part in a team be permanent members. No one can maintain indefinitely the intensity of effort, vitality, and conviction which such work rightly demands without going stale. Those who may come from government departments or similar organizations risk losing their technical efficiency—and their chances of promotion if permanently transferred to work in a team. It should be our claim in theory—as I sincerely believe it to be true in practice here in Nigeria—that a short period of service with a team provides for those attached a splendid educational experience, broadening their horizon, providing them with ideas of what they may attempt on return to their normal employment, and giving them a new conception of practical citizenship. This is an experience which should be made available to as many as possible—not a permanent few: it is the amateur, in the original sense of the word, who is needed.

4. Character and temperament are of supreme importance in the selection of staff—and technical proficiency only secondary. Of all the educational influences, G. M. Young has written, ‘the attraction of the admired type is the most effective’. This is very true of young Africans today: it is, therefore, so vital that those admired should be worth admiring in themselves. ‘How shall we wash clean, if the water itself be dirty?’ runs an African proverb. Experience of three unforgettable years with an army unit in East Africa engaged in this work during the war, convinced me that it was not what the men did or said that mattered, but what they themselves were. The two qualities that should be sought are an ability to inspire others, and a sense of compassion. They are not always found
together, but they can be developed—if we do not believe that such qualities can be developed in the individual, how can we believe in community development? Young men under military discipline, such as soldiers or police, can be welded into an élite for this work: a chosen few, a group of people intellectually convinced of the need for this work and fired by missionary devotion, can attain something far higher. Military discipline—or missionary devotion: but it can not be undertaken by petits fonctionnaires, African or European.

5. No self-consciousness or embarrassment should be felt by active European participation in this concept of a team. As Africa draws further from us politically, it behoves us, surely, to be seeking—socially, and in heart and mind—ways of drawing closer. In the past our exhortations have sometimes tended to be on the basis of: ‘If you people will do this, I on behalf of government will undertake... etc.’—and this approach may well have been necessary. On the eve of our team’s departure on trek to Togoland three and a half years ago, I addressed them at night, asking that they should do their best for the scheme, but adding that responsibility was mine if the technique proved a failure; whereat the senior African rose and said simply: ‘There is no question of your responsibility: we leave tomorrow as a team—either we succeed or we fail.’ In this ‘we’ lies, I believe, the whole future and adventure of our work.
Chapter XIII

AN EDUCATIONAL CASE STUDY

Education and Social Change in Ceylon

RICHARD ATTYGALLE

The recurring theme of scholars who have turned their attention to the problems of tropical society, appears to be that in the tropics ‘education is all dressed up and does not know where to go’. It is perhaps not wholly accidental that this theme carries with it overtones that suggest the perplexity and irresoluteness so characteristic of these times. But it has also a particular truth for those areas of the world that lie beneath the constant sun and which are, without exception, in the economy of the day, dependent territories.

In his novel A Passage to India, E. M. Forster portrays an Indian doctor, Aziz. What is most characteristic of Aziz is the tension that constantly arises within him between the world of his learning and the world of his immediate surroundings—a cultural dichotomy that manifests itself in the surgical efficiency of his hospital and the higgledy-piggledy of his home, with its indifference to the hygiene he professionally stresses; his helplessness before the petty slights of provincial officialdom and his self-indulgence in dreams of Persian grandeur, the easy refuge in nostalgia to compensate for the irritations of the present. That is one level of experience. At another, there is the villager, the peasant, who finds his traditional values broken by the emergence of new gods and new sanctions. Both of these levels of experience are, however, aspects of a single problem, a problem that has always been posed to educationists in tropical areas, but not always understood.

Education in the tropics has reflected economic and social change and sought to interpret its needs. ‘The economy of Central Africa today is part of a world organization; there is no longer any local self-sufficiency. Foreign cloth and foreign hoes have now become necessities of life for the majority of the African people while foreign bicycles and sewing machines, tin dishes and ploughs and padlocks are increasingly bought. Even the most remote villages are intimately affected by the fluctuations of prices on the world market. Not only is Central Africa a specialized unit in the world economy, importing some goods and exporting others, but internationally also its economy is much more specialized than before. The raising of food is no longer everyone’s business.’

The advantage of approaching present discontents historically is that it enables one to see them in perspective. The vast economic forces that were unleashed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries drove gigantic fissures into the social structure of tropical society. In Asian society, which had already developed a considerable culture and civilization, the disruptive effect of the new forces was to break the sense of continuity which had sustained the order of things, destroying the equilibrium between the individual and his environment. Commerce created a new world within the heart of the old. The dichotomy within was the reflection of the dichotomy without.

Economic necessity inevitably affected the school, which had hitherto carried out its function of preparing the child for the traditional mode of life. ‘Western statesmen had looked to transform Oriental society by education. They brought into existence a new society, not however by education, but by economic forces, and the new economy transformed the character of education.’

New forces have arisen in Asian society today, and they are being felt among peoples over whom the shadow of the classroom has never fallen. The impulse is the same as that which

2 Furnivall, op. cit.
disturbed the mind of Aziz, the impulse to achieve self-mastery and integration. The present enquiry therefore is concerned with seeking the nature of the approach that educational policy must make to this task, and with attempting to establish the relation of education to the major agents of social and economic change.

II

The term 'changelessness' is one that comes readily to mind when Asian society is discussed. Naturally, this does not mean that the centuries of its long and sometimes sombre history have been eventless; it bears the scars of civil war, invasion, dynastic rivalry, and peasant rebellion. But while the untamed energies of frontier peoples stormed the fortress citadels of the Rajputs, fired the holy city of Pagan, or forced the Great Within, the unvarying economy of agriculture remained unshaken and the technique of generations remained unaltered. It could not be otherwise. Whenever rude visitors violated the civilizations of the Gangetic plains or the Yellow River, they eventually were absorbed, the old being invigorated by the new. So the Rajput bore down on the Gupta and the Mogul ruled Rajput, and the Ming gave way before the Manchu. The peasant alone remained.

It is, then, in the village commune, with 'its infinite capacity for self-renewal', that one finds the key to the structure of Asian society. For the peasant, to whom the passing of kings and dynasties were remote events, the land he tilled and the mystery of nature, which returned the labour he gave in the produce it yielded, were the only enduring realities. Kismet or Karma bound the complex hierarchy of society with hoops of steel, answering all things and explaining all things. Asian theology and philosophy resolved the struggle between man and nature by the injunction that the mastery of nature lay in the mastery of self. The sage was the person of holiness and the mendicant its symbol.
We have here an all-embracing philosophy which pervaded the whole of economic, social, and political life, binding the intricate mesh of man’s relation to man into an integrated whole. The nearest comparison is medieval Christendom, but it surpasses that in the depth and rigidity of its form. The very character of Asian thought did not permit a Reformation. There could be no conflict between man and religion since religion intervened so decisively in man’s attitude to nature. Traditionalism was the wisdom of the East, and in that wisdom lay its faith.

Asian society, whatever its other qualities, contained within itself a principle of harmony. Man’s relation to man, and man’s relation to nature, were defined in the usage and custom of generations and found formal expression in the traditional systems of religious thought. In such a context the community was organic in a manner that the impersonal relations of modern society do not make possible, and education, whether it was the teaching of skills or the transmission and preservation of inherited and accumulated knowledge, could carry out its essential aim—the adaptation of man to the non-human environment and the individual to social life. ‘In pre-white days indigenous society had a definite system of education in the broad sense that every generation took steps to transmit the cultural heritage to the growing youth.’

The main point about this type of education is that it was not, and was not intended to be, an instrument of change. There was no necessity for it to be so. The economy of Asian society was not subjected to any far-reaching developments in technique which altered social relationships. The precise structure of Asian society allotted to each man his due place, while the comprehensiveness of Asian religion—embracing as it did past, present, and future—enabled him to come to terms with his environment. The individual expressed himself as part of the group, and the economic activity of the one was the complement of the economic activity of all. The function of the

teacher was to train his pupils in the ethic which enabled them to accept and understand the unity of their society.

This intertwining of economic activity with a commonly directed social purpose, the organic character of Asian society, is best illustrated in the quality of its production. The objects which are today the treasures of art were often the common and familiar instruments of everyday life. This was not because pre-industrial man was art-conscious, but because the divorce between the artist and the artisan, between the fine and useful arts, did not exist for him. The craftsman was the artist, and ‘art involved the whole of active life’. As Professor Raymond Firth has remarked of the men of New Guinea, ‘their art was the expression of complex social values’.

The active responsibility for organising and conducting education devolved upon the priesthood. ‘Besides the relation in which the priests stood to their tenants as landlords and the religious influence of their possessions, they have other holds on... their people. The pansalas (monasteries) are the schools for the village children, and the sons of superior headmen are very generally educated at them. They have frequently some knowledge of medicine, and when this is the case they give the benefit of their advice gratuitously. Their influence among the people is from a social point of view usefully employed.’ It was even the custom in some areas for the adolescent, before entering adult life, to be attached to a monastery as the personal attendant of a priest, for that period engaging in study and contemplation. ‘The monastery is also in many cases the village school, and in Burma it is the custom for almost every young man to take the monastic vows for a short time and to reside for a period within the monastery walls.’ Endowed by the state and freely supported by the populace, the priesthood was a peculiarly suitable instrument for the task of transmitting and

2 Report of the Service Tenures Commission (Ceylon), 1872.
ensuring the continuity of the cultural heritage of the people. And this arrangement was logical and natural precisely because, like the medieval world of the West, Oriental society was not a secular society.

But with the period of the Renaissance in the West and the epoch of the Merchant Adventurers, Oriental society was for the first time confronted with a culture fundamentally different from anything it had ever known, a type of society which by separating science from ritual and metaphysical trappings had initiated far-reaching technological developments. The vicissitudes of invasion and the yoke of conquest which Oriental society had suffered at the hands of earlier invaders had never altered the basis of its economy and the religious and philosophical system which was thought to order that economy. But that very self-sufficiency was to prove fatal. The individualism of Renaissance philosophy, the aggressive character of the merchant class it inspired, the technological achievements of the empirical sciences, and the vitality of an economy of commodity production breached the walls of Oriental traditionalism. With the introduction of private property in land, there was initiated the first great social revolution in Asian society. The essence of this change was that Asian society, in which 'religious philosophy formed the essential and intelligible basis of popular culture and national polity',¹ was set on the road of secularization.

III

We are accustomed to speak of the Renaissance as marking the beginning of the modern world, not merely in Europe, but also in the Asian continent, which remained until this time unaffected by the fever of intellectual curiosity, technical advancement, and social change which convulsed medieval Christendom. And the influence that the events of this period had on the subsequent history of Asian society justifies our regard-

ing the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as marking a climacteric in the history of man. But exactly because this period saw the emergence of forces that were to draw the entire habitable globe into a single economic system, it is necessary to make a distinction between the way in which social change took place in European and in non-European society. To express it more concretely, one must take note of the difference between the decline of medieval society in the West and the disintegration of pre-capitalist society in the countries outside Europe.

The gradual and cumulative process of social change which took place in Western Europe between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries is perhaps comparable to a geologic change which, taking place in one portion of the earth's crust, alters 'the winds that blow about this pendant world'. It was a change that was not without violent and sudden incident, as its political revolutions demonstrate. Nor was it without tragedy and pain. But though poverty and misery enthroned themselves among large sections of the population, and the dignity of man was often caricatured by his subordination to market and machine, what emerges as most important to our study is that these changes were brought about by forces that were native to the society in which they were at work. Despite the misery and evil that accompanied these changes, Western industrial society by the end of the nineteenth century was comparatively homogeneous. The effect of these forces on Asian society was far different.

The apostles of the Renaissance in the East were not the scholars of the Eastern Roman Empire, but the captains of Portugal, the merchants of Holland, and the agents of the Court of the East India Company in London. In these persons and the forces they represented Asian society was confronted with something new in its history, for here was no invader who conquered its territory and then settled among its peoples as the Moguls had done in India and the Manchus in China. The invaders were interested in trade, and sought to create and maintain those conditions most favourable to their business.
But commerce has a logic of its own, and Asian society was soon witnessing social and economic changes that brought it into greater conformity with the pattern of modern industrial society. Land became a commodity, the industrialist and the wage earner appeared. Behind these changes lay the methods and incentives of industrial production. But unlike the West, these changes were carried out in Asian society by agents that were external to it, primarily in their own interest. They are incomplete in character, and therefore Asian society lacks homogeneity. When we speak of the special problems of tropical society, it is to this unevenness of economic and social development that we refer.

It would indeed be foolish to ignore or underestimate this basic characteristic of tropical society. In his Hobhouse Memorial Lecture, Professor Carl Mannheim has stated the problem in its most general terms: ‘Wheelbarrow, carriage, automobile and plane are each typical of the means of conveyance in different phases of historical development. They originate in different times, they represent phases of technical development; and yet they are all used simultaneously. This particular phenomenon has been called the “law of the contemporaneousness of the non-contemporaneous”. However well these different phases of history exist side by side in the picture before us, in certain situations and under particular circumstances they can lead to the most convulsive disturbances in our social life.’

These tensions exist with special force in tropical society, and if they seem charged with a higher potential than in Western countries, it is because of the historic conditions which brought about social change there. In his daily journey to school, the child often passes between divided and distinguished worlds. In school the qualities of citizenship and co-operative effort are impressed upon him. He returns to the anarchy of a city slum or the poverty of a village victimized by the injustices of an uncontrolled economy. He learns the

necessities of hygiene and contemplates the open gutters that flank his home. All that he only too often acquires is a crude knowledge of the three R’s and the destiny of a drudge.

It is recognized today that the child is part of a changing society. This has led to a dynamic concept of education. ‘Education is activist or it is nothing,’ Grierson has said. In other words, we no longer think of education merely as a means of ensuring a continuum of ideas and imparting the social discipline imposed by a universally accepted set of conventions and beliefs, but as an instrument of conscious change directed towards achieving a balanced society in full mastery of the methods that science and modern technology have made possible. The business of the educationist becomes in part the business of the statesman and legislator. He becomes, with them, a social planner. As W. B. Curry has pointed out, ‘the most important problem that educators must face is that of the fundamental social attitudes produced by education’.

Referring to the problems of a changing world, he notes that ‘Education and society mutually interact and it is therefore impossible to devise an educational philosophy which is not in some degree dependent upon a social philosophy’. With such a responsibility and such a purpose, the educationist in tropical society will find himself engaged in a difficult discipline. In expecting too much from education he may achieve too little.

Tropical society is characterized therefore by three features which are mutually interdependent, and which are common to all tropical territories. There is first the ‘combined’ nature of economic development, in which primitive modes of production co-exist with the advanced modes of modern industry and science. Since this is the economic consequence of its colonial or semi-colonial status in the world economy, another important feature goes with it—its plurality. The need for cheap labour of various kinds fostered the growth of a different type

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1 In the introduction to his The School and a Changing Civilisation, London, 1934 (1st ed.).
2 Ibid. p. 2.
of community and affected traditional communities as well. The need for cheap labour on tea and rubber plantations fostered the growth of socially and economically important communities of Indian labour in Malaya and Ceylon. At the same time, the operation of the open competitive market has given to plural society in tropical areas a socially unstable character. Finally, there is the emergent force of nationalism, which concerns the educationist most immediately in the question of the medium of instruction and the development of a national language.

Naturally the exact correlation between these forces varies from country to country, and the difference of emphasis one places on them will depend on the degree of industrial development in the country or its absence, the nature of its exports, the occupational distribution of its population, the system of land tenure, and so on.

With these general considerations in mind it will be possible to consider some of their aspects in one particular country—the island of Ceylon.

IV

Commanding a favourable position on the Eastern trade routes, Ceylon attracted, in the course of its history, merchants from the lands of the Mediterranean and beyond, as well as from the Far East. It was inevitable, therefore, that the mercantile energies of the seventeenth century should bring the Portuguese and the Dutch, who built settlements along the coast. But with the intensification of commercial rivalry among the Western nations, and its expression in India, it became evident that even more important than trade with Ceylon was its strategic importance. Consequently, when in 1815 the British took over the entire island, it passed under direct authority of the Crown and not under that of the East India Company. This fact is of no little significance since it partially accounts for certain differences in the economic and social development of India and Ceylon.
The pioneers of Western education in Ceylon, as in almost all the colonies, were the missionaries. Their main aim naturally was the propagation of the Christian faith. At the same time their schools trained personnel for the lower ranks of government service. This was especially so in the coastal areas, which had already been under Portuguese and Dutch rule for some two hundred years before the British took possession. With the setting up of British administration in the island it became necessary to train natives of the country in English, and as early as 1796 Governor North instructed the Rev. Charles Cordiner to draw up a scheme for educating the sons of Mudaliyars and other chiefs for posts in the Government. In 1833 Col. Colebrook, in the course of his report, which was responsible for finalizing British administration in the country, stressed the necessity of ‘training respectable natives for administrative posts in the government’.

The effect of this policy of drawing the sons of families of social standing into the administrative services had far-reaching consequences. It meant that the prestige attached to these families by virtue of their caste and position now became associated with an English education, and the type of education provided enabled many to enter the professions of law and medicine after completing their studies in England. This connection between the established families and the professions helped to fix the academic trend.

These educational opportunities were necessarily limited to the few. The vast majority of the people lay outside their scope, while the profound economic and social changes that were taking place left them frustrated and without anchorage. ‘The Dutch and the Portuguese had already broken up the social [structure] of the Sinhalese in the sea-bound districts, though [it] survived intact much longer in the Kandyan Highlands... Today, this social structure is falling to pieces; service tenures are disused and becoming neglected and the land formerly so held becomes free-hold; the use of money is becoming more general and personal relations are replaced by pecuniary
ones. There has sprung up a class of agricultural labourers. Agricultural life tends to become more uninteresting each year.\textsuperscript{1}

Despite the nostalgia that informs the style, the fact remains that the plight of the people here referred to was the result of the absence of any industrial development which would have been the logical corollary to these economic changes had they taken place as a result of forces operating within native society. And the upper classes, serving as they did the new administration, could not offer to the people any decisive leadership. If, therefore, English and English education carried with it a privileged economic value, it was because service in Government was economically the most stable form of employment as well as the most advantageous socially.

In the course of the last one hundred and thirty years there was therefore built up a system of education in which ‘the schools were divided not on the basis of race or nationality but according to the medium of instruction provided’.\textsuperscript{2}

The emphasis on English schools is to be accounted for by the fact that the business of government was conducted in English and the Government’s policy in this matter, as we have seen, inevitably gave it a special and privileged position. Nor was this all. The absence of a policy of industrialization, and a revision of the system of land tenure which would give agriculture a position that would enable it to compete in the open competitive market, placed much of the population at a disadvantage. Traditional occupations died out or became economically insecure, while the subordination of the local economy to the world market severely restricted the range of new occupations available. And the character of the English school established in the country served to emphasize the gulf between the English-educated and the rest of the population as well as to restrict their functions to limited and specialized fields.

In an address to the Education Society of Ceylon, the Rev. Coomaraswamy, Ananda. ‘Kandyan Art. What It Meant and How It Ended’.\textsuperscript{1} Ceylon National Review. 1906. p. 8.

\textsuperscript{2} Report of the Special Committee on Education, 1943.
R. W. Stopford commented, ‘When I arrived in Ceylon I was surprised to find how closely the English Public School has been copied here, even in details which belong to the realm of the school story rather than the reality of school life in England’.¹

This similarity between schools in Ceylon and the English Public Schools was to be expected, since the missionaries responsible for the establishment of the early secondary schools were drawn from the Public Schools of England. They therefore sought to give to the people of the country a type of education which seemed ideal to them, and which, if universally applied, would produce a social stratum with the values which marked a gentleman and which would contribute to the formation of a civilized society. That these values, often born of the industrial competitive world of the West, had no relation to the home environment of the pupils seemed irrelevant, for it was felt that their intrinsic superiority would remove all such difficulties. But social tensions were inevitable. ‘More subtly, the school often contravenes accepted indigenous usage and values, even when deliberate efforts are made to nativize its programme. The children are taught to be self-reliant and competitive in the school room while in their communities they are expected to be co-operating units of a family and to take orders from elders or chief.’²

If in Ceylon the clash of cultures did not produce such marked social dislocation as was for instance true at one time in Burma, where the percentage of crime recorded in a given year was greatest in that area in which literacy in English was the highest, it has to be partly accounted for by the fact that, especially in the coastal areas, the people has been under Western influence for some two hundred years prior to the arrival of the British.

The incidence of social maladjustment must in part be referred to the artificial imposition on the country of a system of education which bore no planned relation to the policies of

¹ Bulletin of the Ceylon Education Society. No 7, 1938, p. 103.
² Keesing. op. cit. p. 250.
social welfare and economic development. More especially, the fact that the direction of policy came from without and was determined ultimately by the impersonal relations of the world market and not by the internal needs of the country sharpened the sense of social insecurity. Briefly, the situation was one which called for the expression of individualism in public and social life, but with limited opportunity.

The rising degree of unemployment among the English-educated is therefore the result of the one-sided character of their education. It has led most particularly to overcrowding in the profession of law, since the financial cost of a medical training was until recently prohibitive to most parents. Further, in a raw material economy, land is the main object of capital investment, and consequently the frequency of litigation over titles to land lent to the practice of law the attraction of a lucrative profession.

On the other hand, to the vast majority for whom the vernacular schools cater, education becomes purely the means of obtaining employment in the minor posts of the public departments. To them opportunity appears reserved for the English-educated, for their own training is wholly inadequate for modern purposes.

It would appear at first sight that the crux of the problem lies in the use of English as the official language and the development of a system of schools divided on the basis of the medium of instruction employed. In the context of recent political developments in Ceylon, as well as in Asia generally, and the emergence of the spirit of nationalism, the question of the medium of instruction takes on a special importance.

V

The granting of universal adult franchise by the Dhonnoughmore Commission in 1931 is without doubt the most striking and significant event in Ceylon's political history. Before this the franchise had been confined to those who possessed a Cambridge
School Certificate, which meant that the economic value that an English education possessed was further enhanced by the privilege of a fundamental political right. It was not long before the political articulation of the masses expressed itself in a demand for increased social services. More particularly, Government was compelled to carefully consider the educational system of the country, with a view to providing increased facilities for the ninety per cent who, until then, had had no political identity.

In 1943 the Special Committee on Education, appointed some years earlier, presented to the State Council its report. It recommended free education from primary to university level and placed upon Government full responsibility for the educational services of the country. It further recommended that education at the primary stage should be conducted in the mother tongue of the pupil. These recommendations were accepted by the Council.

In September 1945 the State Council appointed a Select Committee to consider and report on the steps necessary to effect the transition from English to Sinhalese and Tamil, with the object of making these languages the official languages of the country. The Committee recommended the 'gradual adoption of the national languages as the [media] of instruction and simultaneous development of the languages themselves. We feel that it is imperative that the Government should make clear its policy by declaring that ten years hence, in the year 1957, English shall cease to be the official language of the country and that Sinhalese and Tamil shall take its place...'

The movement for obtaining greater recognition of the national languages goes back much further than the Select Committee on Education. In 1906 the Ceylon Reform League addressed a memorial to the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum, requesting that provision be made for the inclusion of Sinhalese and Tamil in the curriculum of the Royal College. It is significant that this move was made, not by the non-English-educated, but by a group of the English-educated. It was, in fact, a
reflection of the growth of nationalism among that section of the people who, precisely because of their English education, felt most strongly the limitations that a colonial system of government imposed upon them politically and economically. To the majority of the people English commanded a higher market value over the national languages since it formed the bridge between economic drudgery and social anonymity on the one hand, and economic security and social opportunity on the other.

The main aims that the Select Committee had in mind may be briefly summarized as follows:

1. To counteract the denationalizing tendency of the English educational system and to resurrect the ancient culture of the country.
2. To ensure that every child begins his education in the medium of his mother tongue.
3. To remove the economic value that was attached to English.

However, the Committee recognized that 'in Ceylon today and for many years to come, English will be the most important foreign language; it will be through the medium of English that currents of world thought will stream into our languages; it will be English that will keep our business men in touch with the world of commerce and our government with the governments of other states'.

Few will contest the fact that the interests of popular government and administration demand that the affairs of state and the business of society should be conducted in a language and in a manner which enable them to be understood and shared by the people of the country. It is evident, for instance, that not only should justice be accessible but that its language should be intelligible to those who have recourse to the law. Of even greater importance today is that to the majority of people who do not speak English its continued use as the official language

1 Report of the Select Committee on National Languages, p. 3.
denies them one of the realities of independence and self-government. Because of the limitations it places of their access to public and social life, its perpetuation must inevitably be felt as a form of political and social oppression.

This last factor especially is the key of reconciliation to what would otherwise be a contradictory situation. The demand for learning English was probably never so great as it is today. Academies and correspondence colleges for teaching English flourish throughout the country. Only recently an educationist attached to a community development scheme in the North Central Province was asked by the peasants to teach them English. At the same time, the demand that the vernacular languages should immediately be declared the official languages is strong enough to have become a political issue.

This discussion on the vernacular languages is not, as it may at first sight appear, irrelevant to the theme of 'rural uplift' and village development. It should be clear that until recently educational policy was almost exclusively concerned with the town dweller, and the countryside was left to be contented with such sops as the needs of government and social conscience demanded. With the emergence of a parliamentary system of government based on universal adult franchise, the need to develop a consistent and unified pattern in education brought the village into the central orbit of policy. Today, when it has become necessary to make fuller use of the resources of the country, including man-power, and to extend the acreage of cultivated land and improve and develop methods of cultivation, it has become essential that the peasant receive the training which helps him to be an active and more productive member of society. Such an education must enable him to find his place in a rapidly changing society in an increasingly interdependent world. This necessity links educational policy with a general social and economic plan, but as often happens in these territories, the link is concealed by the most deceptive of veils—that of language.

Independence has placed upon the Government of Ceylon the responsibility of providing the people with a community of
purpose or a national ideology by which it can justify its political and economic programme. But the statutory changes that have taken place have in no way altered the fundamental colonial character of Ceylon’s economy in relation to the world economy. And there exists today in Ceylon a social class that was completely foreign to classical Asian society, the industrial working class, as well as the landless peasant. The political pressure exerted by these groups in order to achieve their economic and social emancipation inevitably comes up against traditional vested interests. In the development of a colonial economy this situation creates a high degree of social tension.

A comprehensive approach to economic and social welfare threatens conservative interests. Educational policy accordingly suffers. Rural education, for instance, means nothing unless it trains the student in more profitable and efficient methods of agriculture and animal husbandry. But such an education presupposes for its success that opportunity will be available for the application of this knowledge in adult life. This requires land reform, availability of equipment, and security of market. Even in the industrial metropolises of the West the blight of spiritual despair and frustration hangs heavily over society. In the backward economies of tropical areas it is felt with even greater keenness. The appeal to the past achievements of Asian society becomes then the logical means of removing the edge of social discontent. The declared aim of resurrecting national culture, often stated in terms of the ancient culture, is an expression of this.

The Education Act of 1951 made English a compulsory second language in all schools, whether rural or urban. Sinhalese and Tamil remain the media of instruction up to seventh grade. With education free, and in the primary and post-primary stages compulsory, the implications of this step are far-reaching. The effectiveness of its application, however, depends upon the extent to which problems such as the methods of instruction, the planning of curricula, and the training of teachers are intelligently tackled.
But it is only by the courageous execution of such a measure, with due regard for all its complications, that it will be possible to advance the general educational level of the masses of the people in terms of the contemporary world. 'Whatever worthwhile elements [the national culture] has will demonstrate their survival value in the changing order whether the school attempts to bolster them or not... To filter the new ideas, to withhold the linguistic and other tools with which the affairs of the... world... are handled, and to fall short of giving the fullest possible schooling to all children who can be reached is to assume a grave moral responsibility for handicapping the native in his struggle for adequate adjustment.'

The development of modern society depends upon the development of specialization in production. The educationist is faced with the task of providing for instruction in skills and techniques as well as helping the individual to adapt himself to society. Pre-industrial society accomplished the latter by means of the social philosophy that was implicit in its very structure. It ensured the transmission of skills by means of the craft guilds which were intimately linked with the social structure. But the crisis in modern society, whether in the West or in the East, arises from the inadequacy of the traditional values to provide for the adaptation of the individual to society, and consequently for self-integration. The school, as the organized instrument of society for training the child for adult life, reflects this crisis in contemporary values.

In tropical society, because of the very nature of its development, this crisis is felt with unmistakable sharpness, for here older habits and earlier modes of thought, clinging with the persistence of inertia, oppose themselves to the forms of behaviour and attitudes of mind which the social and economic organization of urban life have determined. Just as iron filings which have patterned themselves along the lines of force of a particular magnetic field begin to agitate violently as they feel the influence of a new magnetic field, so in tropical society the

1 Keesing, loc. cit.
outmoded past and the uncertain present, opposed and yet combined, exert their double load upon the perplexed mind. Today, as man seeks to understand the social process and consciously direct it towards achieving a balanced and rational society, the individualism of our economic morality stands challenged by the demands of social purpose. Yet in our schools competition still remains the spur with which to prick the sides of our intent. In the world outside clerks and lawyers flood the land, and the play of economic forces makes the business of living daily more difficult. Yet within the classroom the world is still an oyster to be cracked and plucked.

To educate for what is and for what may be is the difficult task before educationists in Ceylon. But this task can be approached and accomplished only if education is conceived as an integral part of a general policy of social and economic welfare. By such a conception of educational policy alone will it be possible to relate the curriculum to the needs of tropical society, and to make the school an instrument of conscious change. Reacting against the present academic bias in the educational system in Ceylon, with its increasing numbers of educated unemployed, the Government plans to set up technical and vocational schools. But technical and vocational schools do not in themselves provide a solution. Unless these schools arise as part of a programme of social and economic development which will make technical and vocational training an economically felt need, they will merely transfer the burden of unemployment and wastage from an army of clerks to an army of unplaced technicians.

Change seems to be the keynote of our age, even as changelessness seems to have been the keynote of a past society. It is for this reason that the formulae of an epoch of liberalism are so inadequate for tackling the problems of education today, particularly in tropical society. 'In the age of liberalism, educational practice was over-compartmental; the main shortcoming of its theory was that it was society blind. It could not see or did not want to admit the existence of society as a rele-
vant factor in human affairs. It did not want to assess the impact of society on the aims and methods of education. But an education for change presupposes a knowledge of what we are seeking to change and a sense of direction. It means that the school can no longer be thought of as an isolated unit training men to earn their livelihood, but as an organic part of society whose function it is to develop that community of purpose which will make integration possible. Then, what temple and church accomplished for medieval society by training men how to live, the school of today, aware of its environment, will accomplish for contemporary society.

Nor is this merely a rhetorical wish. Too often one detects in community development plans a bias towards the restoration of the village as a more or less isolated and self-sufficient economic unit. There is, however, a dangerous if not deliberate contradiction in the thinking from which such an attitude is derived. The decay of the village as an economic unit and the changes, modifications, and even dissolution of its traditional ties and patterns of living were themselves the results of those great social and political changes whereby feudal societies were drawn into a modern industrial economy. While, therefore, much of the debris of their past still lies unswept, these shattered village communities are far removed from the pattern whose design may yet be remarked in their contemporary backwardness.

To interpret the rehabilitation of rural life in terms of the restoration of the village as it was historically known, is to betray what might be politely called sociological romanticism. The least introduction of modern technique—the appearance of a tractor, the use of a threshing machine, the conversion of a cart track to a motorable road—is to alter traditional social relations in the community. The earlier forms of behaviour, attitudes, ideas, and beliefs were valid in a world of whose living stuff they were made, and that world was not one in which mechanization figured or technical assistance was an

active programme. Fundamental educationists must take account of the fact that they can only work towards a new pattern which will reflect and harmonize the economic and social relations created by the introduction of modern techniques with a more conscious and active recognition on the part of the people of their role in a changing world.

In other words, the village itself changes, the village and all that that term connotes. It may well be that in the long process of economic and social re-integration what that term connotes will also pass away.
PART FOUR

*Regional Considerations*
The community worker in Africa is the direct descendant of the long line of militants who campaigned against slavery, deaf to official prophesies of ruin in the colonies. When emancipation came, the humanist minority fought for the resettlement of the ex-slaves on small farmsteads. To stamp out the continued slave trade in the interior they ensured a more rigorous system of policing and new economic opportunities. Strong government, plantations, and mining were, however, insufficient to achieve the next aim—well-balanced, self-governing, and democratic African societies. Secondary industry and social services, legislation protecting labour, and universities producing native doctors and scientists were called into being. The industrial and scientific revolutions had in turn to be humanized, and even the establishment of the self-governing African welfare state, a goal now accepted by colonial governments, is only a beginning. It does not possess certain key institutions and positive concepts central to a modern society.

1 A pre-war book on the Sudan, written by a Colonial Secretary, estimated that the Sudanese would not be self-governing before some two hundred years had elapsed. As this is being written the postmark on all letters going through the Sudan Post Office reads, in Arabic and English, 'Work for Self-Government in 1952'.

In earnest about devolution of responsibility and movement 'from below', the 1948 Colonial Office Summer Conference at Cambridge wished to see activities in every locality to promote better living for the whole community with active participation and, if possible, on the initiative of the community, but if this initiative is not forthcoming spontaneously, the use of techniques for arousing and stimulating it in order to secure active and enthusiastic response to the movement. These Summer Conferences, in which field workers, technicians, and Colonial Office officials participate, are in themselves an interesting development in the formulation of democratic policy by executive groups.
The test of the modern community worker is to be found in his ability to evoke sustained effort and organization among the people. For the African is quite clear from what he wishes to be liberated, but, like others, he is not very clear for what he wishes to be liberated. ‘All will be well when we are rid of the white man’ is a prevalent cry. His political ideas are not very coherent and their advocacy not sustained. In order to draw a political programme from the people, the older democracies developed party organizations. It is true that in Europe, as much as in Africa, the initiation of constructive policy rests largely with the civil service, but in a country like England the parties are able to maintain public interest in political affairs and they can raise administrative issues to a more general political importance. They see to it that discussion not only precedes decision, but also leads it. The newcomer to public life meets in his party experienced members who make him aware of the range of his responsibilities and the relative importance of the matters which arise. They teach him the procedures of public bodies, that code without which the accidents of public life would be more numerous than they are. None of this exists in Africa, where party ties and loyalties which cut across kinship and tribal affiliations are hardly known. Not even among the advanced European communities in Kenya, for all their insistence on self-determination and leadership, do more than three out of four electors bother to register, and voting for the Legislative Council, the national parliament, is below the level of an English local government election in an apathetic constituency.

It is the task of a community worker to balance the constitutional progress, of which there have been encouraging examples in Africa over the past ten years, with local organizations in which immediate objectives as well as more ultimate problems can be discussed and implemented. The idea of local groups is inherent in the very concept of community development. That this approach is radical should not be overlooked. Until quite recently technical officers were responsible to their own
central headquarters; they approached the local community only through the district commissioner. If local government and welfare organization should become a reality, the local authorities will have to be permitted to consult the technical staff at their discretion, and this staff must be primarily responsible to the local authorities. This will create many difficult situations, e.g. when the community is opposed to measures deemed imperative by the central government, epidemiological control and the dipping of cattle may be resented. Only an organization of the people, deeply rooted in the community, will be able to overcome these difficulties and to educate the populace for new duties and practices, often against the private interests of some of the local leaders. It may have been educationally sound to charge the Native Authorities of the past with the business of collecting taxes, of hearing petty court cases, and of safeguarding law and order. These functions should be taken over by specialist departments, while the community devotes itself to welfare work, the need for which is great in Africa and the objectives of which can be usefully elaborated in the traditional village moot or council.

**Indirect Rule and Community Development**

Until quite recently the philosophy underlying the Native Authorities was that of ‘indirect rule’.\(^1\) A minimum of interference in social institutions and customs was considered consonant with the maximum of contentment, especially since tribal Africans seemed to have reached an ‘ecological climax’, i.e. found an adaptation to their formidable environment which guaranteed survival and social security for the family within the limits set by their simple technology and personal wants. So

\(^1\) In its explicit form it was accepted only by the British and the Belgians. The French preferred to court an élite and accept them as black Frenchmen. What is significant, however, is that the French and the Portuguese also recognized chiefs, and, while they changed the personnel to increase efficiency, they built on the traditional framework. In fact, the general run of administrators until recently has accepted native institutional forms without substantial amendment, discouraging dissident organizations.
real and durable was the love of the tribesman for his ‘brother’ that African sergeants could never quite be trusted to enforce discipline on soldiers of their own tribe. In Johannesburg the native servant often urges another to act as his banker; however spendthrift his ‘brother’ may be with his own money, he will not touch the savings of the other. At home the old were respected; the young enjoyed conventional liberties in dress and behaviour often beyond the dreams of modern educationists; strangers were made welcome; theft was unknown. Traditional social wisdom benefited the many, whereas Western innovations, at best, only benefited the few. By the light of these values a chief in the bush was rated higher than two évolutés in an overseas university. It soon became evident, however, that under changed conditions this outlook had grave deficiencies.

The chief was confirmed in his powers but cajoled into acting as an agent of the administration. Native courts were given jurisdiction in cases never envisaged by native law or custom. The compromise worked badly and in any case could be only a temporary measure. As the rate of progress increased ‘de-tribalization’ became general. One consequence of this was an inescapable emphasis on local government, with its implication of ‘community development’. Having accepted modern democratic forms, it is necessary to support them by a party system which includes both the traditionalist elements in the population, centring on the chiefs and the older age groups, and the modern African technicians and workers. It is important to give representation to both sections. With all the progress which Africa has made, the continent has never been in a hurry and has proved itself resistant to many innovations. Conservatives and progressives can both be given their party platforms without disrupting the community; on the contrary, the party system can give life to the community. Aided by the community worker, party organization balances the new official machinery called into being with the demise of ‘indirect rule’, because it embodies the valuable features of old and new.
However, it would be misleading to lay our main stress on political development and to forget its economic foundations. It is here that the community worker must play his most vital role, cautioning as well as initiating.

Progress

In these days most of us are ‘social engineers’ determined to raise the standard of living and diversify economic opportunities. It has been thought that any step forward, in the social services or in industry or in politics, would have beneficial ramifications. The theory informing development activities is that of ‘cumulative change’, a concept first advanced in Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma.¹ It seems applicable to America, where the negro’s lot has undoubtedly improved since Myrdal analysed the situation before the war. He found that Negro low standards of living and white discrimination were locked in a vicious circle, mutually ‘causing’ one another. Prejudice forced the Negro onto a lower plane of living. And the lower plane of living of the Negro people, their lower earnings, their bad housing and food conditions, their inferior levels of education and health, in their turn give support to white prejudice. The negative factors in the Negro’s status ‘justify’ segregation. According to the principle of cumulative change, improvement anywhere in a long chain of factors—in nutrition, housing, education, or organization—pulls the other links in the chain with it and thus ultimately also decreases racialism.

What this belief in automatic all-round progress overlooks, despite its vaunted employment of dynamic concepts, is that progress is never an absolute good. It inevitably sets up its own opposition. The eroded areas of Africa, where moon-like landscapes take the place of the fertile hillocks and rich pastures of the past, are the products of a single-minded ‘progressive’ policy of developing intensified agriculture and export crops to raise the standard of living. The growing friction

among the racial groups in South Africa despite the Union's rapidly expanding economy, and the vacant lives of suburbia in Africa and elsewhere, mirror the loss of purpose and poise in spite of increased security and comfort. These are examples which should warn us against hasty optimism and the disregard of balancing measures. The finest malaria-elimination campaign will be nullified if no permanent organization for epidemiological control is set up. In fact, having lost their relative immunity the native population may be in a worse plight. The best literacy education will have wasted sparse social energies unless books and newspapers are printed in the languages which the newly literate can read. A creative (or recreative) pause must be an element in every project. The conservationist attitudes of indirect rule have more than a grain of truth, although this is exemplified in the treatment given to man's physical environment in Africa rather than to man himself. Thus the community worker must revaluate the truths of yesterday. In the heat of present controversy they are apt to be forgotten. In this he will be assisted by the hydrological engineer and the agriculturist. Their advice pursues the following line of thought.

Water conservation is the best cure for the spreading danger of soil erosion. Control of grazing by means of fencing is an expensive but important supplementary provision. To segregate the endangered areas and to delay the run-off of water with the help of water tanks and rills and brooks, so that the water seeps slowly into the ground, are one important aspect of agricultural development for the coming years. It may mean reverting to the use of the water-wheel so that underground water can be tapped. It certainly means that the giant swamps of Uganda and other territories should not be drained (though something more useful could be grown in them than reeds and papyrus). If the centralized empires of Antiquity were founded on the vast irrigation works of those days, local water conservation is the basis of community development today.

As in agriculture, so in industry. Economic development is forced ahead under complicated circumstances. Private capital
AFRICA

is hesitating as colonial rule declines and nationalists take command, but rearmament sets up a need for more raw materials, while inflation and full employment offer a good market for sugar and coffee, cotton and tobacco, and other colonial primary products. Thus there is a market for exports but little internal entrepreneurial activity which might make the areas more self-sufficient. Political advance retards to some degree economic diversification, and thus in fact increases dependency. Political institutions have greatly benefited from recent exigencies of world politics. They may be threatened for want of economic support—from the same quarter. The economics of community development require small capital formation—a savings and investment programme which municipal enterprise and co-operative societies might very well furnish.

In an address to WHO, Myrdal himself warned us of the present hazards. The hopes awakened by United Nations technical assistance, Point Four, the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, and the more recent Development Corporations may be frustrated if they cannot procure a sufficient flow of goods into underdeveloped territories on account of an increased concentration of capital in the industrialized countries. Defence outlays in the leading industrial countries of eastern and western Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States, are likely soon to reach levels where they will together equal or even exceed the aggregate national incomes of all the underdeveloped countries and will be some twenty times the investment financed out of these countries’ own domestic savings. The effect of these expenditures will probably be to increase substantially the production capacity of the industrial economies (particularly the metals and engineering industries) at a time when plans to promote economic development elsewhere are being held back because of competing demands on financial resources and industrial capacity. The most serious implications of the intensified concentration of capital are felt by the

underdeveloped countries... whose populations continue to expand faster than their capacity to produce food and other necessities.¹

The Wound and the Bow

Granted that political and economic trends could move towards harmonious development of the African continent, community work will have to go on, shift increasingly towards the spiritual and aesthetic realms which has been so badly neglected. Human relations in Africa are often twisted and torturous.² Even if this situation should improve (and our experience allows some measured optimism), the community worker must bear the legacy of the past in continued isolation, for neither the administration nor the people ever will give him unstinted support. The reasons are not far to seek. By definition the community worker breaks through the strict partitions dividing government departments. Perversely, he rocks no particular cradle. This is a nuisance to the neat, bureaucratic mind. Sometimes, of course, a benevolent, powerful figure will lend him his support, but such men are few and always in danger of being promoted into higher office elsewhere. Moreover, the British governor, the fountainhead of power, is (however democratic the Home Government may be) a ‘charismatic’ figure, who, as the Queen’s representative, can do no wrong. The French, Belgian, Portuguese, and Italian governors, though not sustained by such fictions, are equally ready to suspect subversion among critical spirits.

The native population also shows itself suspicious. Unused to an egalitarian relationship between European and African, they

² The present tragedy in Kenya, like that in South Africa, is a dramatic example of tension, fear, and hostility between dominant European minority and subordinate African majority. The Mau-Mau terrorists in Kenya are the offspring of the disintegration of Kikuyu tribal society under the impact of its encounter with alien forces.
may misconstrue the community worker’s friendliness. Unfamiliar with white men who are neither missionaries nor government servants, neither business men nor recruiting agents, they are puzzled. And divided among themselves between the young, who do not like their prestige stolen, and the old, who have an infinite amount of time and maliciousness at their command, they may turn on their friend. The more so since he must work with them as a community but prevent their lapsing into the errors of communalism. He must awaken in individuals an enlightened self-interest but knit more closely the ties which bind the people together. His role is hard. ‘Madness’, said T. E. Lawrence, ‘is never far from the man who sees reality through the eyes of two systems of law, two educational ideals, two milieus.’ He is an expatriate—whether he comes from abroad or has received an education which inevitably creates differences between himself and the community.

Others naturally share in this psychological difficulty. The colonial administrator speaks of the two masters whom he must serve, or the ‘dual mandate’, which he has received first from his African ward and second from the world interested in Africa’s wealth and trade and strategic position. If he is intelligent he will also admit that his difficulties are smaller than those of the community worker, and that his services are also more limited and in need of supplementation by minds more

1 When I was visiting the American missionary mentioned below, he had just been through the painful duty of investigating cases of embezzlement among his native craftsmen, who had misappropriated tools and sold, on their own account, products of the workshop. On the other hand, the Africans felt that he was too narrow in his interpretation of their own ambitions. For instance, he upbraided the native praise singer for being an artist first and following native custom second.

2 So-called ingratitude may be, of course, no more than an inability to express it in a form known to Europeans. The Malgache consider European appreciative behaviour ‘childlike’. An adult’s proper form of showing recognition for services rendered is to place himself in a state of dependency, as if to say, ‘You are my European now; henceforth I shall ask favours only from you’. Gratitude presumes a state of equality which the Malgache does not presume for himself; only children are so arrogant. Cf. Mannoni, O. Psychologie de la Colonisation. Paris, 1951, p. 41.
sensitive to the wants of the people. The dual mandate has
given rise to much exploitation, and many wounds survive un-
closed. The resistance of the African (nationalism is but the
most recent manifestation of a century-old antagonism), even
to healers, is an eloquent testimony of the hurt he has suffered.

One is reminded of the Homeric myth of Philoctetes, the
outcast and wounded owner of the magic bow, which the
Greeks so dearly covet for their Trojan campaign. He will
not give up his bow, although he cannot himself make good use
of his possession and although he knows that without it the war
will not be brought to an end. He refuses because he loathes
the Greeks for their duplicity. The hypocrisy of the coarse-
grained Odysseus, sent to wheedle the bow from him, only
confirms him in his refusal.

The impasse is only overcome by the guileless Neoptolemus,
who involves himself in a promise to Philoctetes which
carries with it the risk of losing the bow and becoming an out-
law himself. By taking this risk, by treating Philoctetes not
as an instrument, but as a man different from himself, he ‘cures
[Philoctetes] and sets him free, and saves the campaign as well’.¹

In building up a community of friendship, we add the African’s
contribution to our common endeavour to free ourselves from
all those encumbrances which prevent us being ourselves and at
the same time developing the full and different powers of all
men.

The Community Worker as Explorer

Africa has been fortunate in summoning a few men of every
generation who consider it an honour to do what they can to
heal the wound. From Livingstone to Albert Schweitzer,
whether they come in horror and disgust, turning their backs
on the Old World, or because they seek to spread the message
of a gentler life ideally associated with Europe, Africa is
greatly enriched by them and so is the world at large. Their

work will survive the passing of colonialism and will greatly add to that sense of unity and of essentially complementary values which men the world over require.

The continent’s attractions are not difficult to explain. In many ways Africa offers a hopeful milieu for social reconstruction. Africa’s problems are not so vast and ‘insoluble’ as Asia’s. Even the population increases at a less dizzy pace than in other underdeveloped regions, and birth control, if it eventually becomes necessary, should be relatively simple to introduce. The tribesman has for centuries practised his own method of birth spacing. Africa’s main problems seem to be associated with poverty and physical isolation, two conditions about which twentieth century man can do much.

The first function of the social worker in Africa is to raise the standard of living of the African and to provide opportunities for him to apply his intelligence to some useful purpose. His other, subtler, task is to soften the shock of the innovations brought about by the accelerated pace of change, which, however beneficent it may be in its ultimate outcome, disrupts families and violates human rights in the transitional period. What we today call ‘community building’ provides a much-needed corrective through the unique challenge of exceptional leaders—the community workers—and the response of local groups composed of ordinary men and women consciously trying to link the social knowledge acquired in more static times with the ineluctable demands of the present. It will be sufficient if we concentrate here on one aspect of community building—the human relationships which it fosters. We shall disregard the legislative and physical efforts, for there has

1 E.g. sub-economic housing schemes in African municipalities are extremely costly. To make them possible at all the local authority must persuade the African to restrict his native generosity and refuse to give the customary hospitality to relatives who usually come to live with him, often for months at a time. ‘He must accept housing meant for the natural family of parents and children only.’ Cf. Rheinalt-Jones, J. D. ‘Native Housing in Urban Areas’. Race Relations Journal, No. 2, 1951.
been perhaps too much insistence on these factors and too little on the human.¹

A great deal of experience is accumulating nowadays on the art of community building. It is interesting to see how governments and religious denominations, far-sighted companies and military commands are posting welfare officers, development workers, municipal African affairs officers, and mass educationists to the field,² and the United Nations, in their Technical Assistance Programme, think almost exclusively in terms of despatching ‘missions’ to underdeveloped territories. There are, moreover, a number of individuals, initially occupying positions in no way marked out for community action, who venture outside their routine obligations and concentrate on neglected features of social growth, and often their experiments are imitated later by administrators, plantation and mine managers, and technicians. A few thumbnail sketches of some of these voluntary community builders may characterize this kind of worker and his approach to community development.

Our first sketch is that of an African padre who runs a collective farm outside Pretoria. He is the religious head of some 500 resident farmers who are subsidized by another 500 families who work in town and remit some of their wages to the joint enterprise. The padre and his council of elders, elected representatives whose opinion he ascertains before he takes a step,

¹ ‘We are sometimes surprised, and a little pained, that the immense benefits we have conferred on the so-called backward races have not been received with more whole-hearted enthusiasm. Is it not that we have concerned ourselves too much with material things: communications, trade, physical well-being, material prosperity? In Africa, in the Pacific, as well as in Asia, we are dealing with people to whom spiritual and aesthetic values are often more important than they have come to be for the average modern European. Might it not be worth while to try to teach our future administrators more about the aesthetic and spiritual background of the people amongst whom they live?’ Furse, Sir R. in Post-War Training for the Colonial Service. Colonial No. 198. London, Colonial Office. para. 21.

² ‘Community Development is now accepted as one of the central features of British African colonial policy, and the movement is spreading elsewhere.’ British Information Services. Community Development in the British Dependencies. London, 1952. p. 5.
are Sutos who trekked north from the Orange Free State some twenty years or more ago under the leadership of his father. The old man believed in work-sharing and began the communal experiment in response to the oppression meted out to his people in the Free State, somewhat as the persecuted Jews took to building collective settlements in Palestine. The community’s revolutionary ideas are not confined to the economic field; they are as progressive about women and education as about modernization of their farming implements and methods.

Similarly inspired by his religious faith, but utilising the latest type of equipment available, is an American missionary I met in the French Congo, who has harnessed the magnificent waterfalls below his station for the generation of electricity with which to run a machine shop which has no equal in the colony. A wealthy friend has supported him financially in establishing his community of 3,000 Africans. Not only does the mission supply large engineering orders, but it also finds secondary employment in catching and taming gorillas (the missionary was once with a circus), in raising new hybrid fruits, and in giving vocational training. Or there is the recent report of a certain businessman who resigned from his company because he disagreed with its policy towards its African employees and now devotes his time to the Student Welfare Association in Onitsha, Nigeria. He has taught the Niger boatmen to sail in Norfolk wherries, which are well adapted for navigating this stream; he fosters technical interests by taking young Africans to refrigeration plants and electrical power houses in the district. (How many—and this is important—will decide to become engineers or agriculturists rather than lawyers or politicians?)

Others work on behalf of the outcast sections of Africa’s population: the divorced Moslem girls; the enslaved tribes who pay tribute to other Africans; the pauperized veterans of yesterday’s wars who are reduced to selling illegal native gin on the outskirts of the larger urban centres.

The common characteristic of these men is that they are
determined to salvage valuable traditions, to discover unsuspected riches in the indigenous population, to promote new industries, and new forms of living, making use of ancient, as well as modern machinery. Their backgrounds could not be more varied: old timers with a wealth of good sense gained the hard way in the 'bush', young bloods who came out with the army during the Second World War, or professional men deploying their science in strange situations—they all flout the defeatist's prognostications. They are dissatisfied with humdrum administration and its impersonal relationships.

As solitary and nonconformist as Livingstone, who disdained to be 'rescued' by Stanley as ingenious as Schweitzer, who built a hospital at the edge of the primeval forest on the proceeds of his concert tours in Europe, they claim only one virtue: to appreciate truths which will be generally accepted tomorrow. They decline to be called 'experts'; they are explorers—not of what is to be found in Africa, but rather of what is to be done for, and with, Africans.
Chapter XV

THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST

SA’ID B. HIMADEH

The major social problem in the Arab countries of the Middle East is poverty, with its normal concomitants of malnutrition, poor housing, bad sanitation, and disease. It is also the chief social problem in the more developed countries, but there are differences in degree, extent, and permanence. Poverty in the Arab countries is so extreme that it often endangers physical subsistence; it embraces a very large proportion of the population; and for the most part it is chronic, not temporary or cyclical as it is in the more advanced countries.

These characteristics of poverty in the Arab countries and the resulting misery are mainly due to peculiar adverse economic factors, most of which have been operating for centuries. Outstanding among these is the meagerness of natural resources. The Arab countries are poor in fact, and with the exception of Iraq and Syria, potentially poor as well. The most important resource is land, but only a small proportion of it is cultivable, the remainder being desert or semi-desert. Moreover, the short rainy season in all the Arab territories, and the scanty rainfall in most places, prevent or hinder the growing of more than one crop in two years or at most two crops in three on the same plot. The exception is in territories where water can be controlled, notably in the valleys of the Nile, Euphrates, and Tigris.

Mineral resources, apart from oil, are insignificant. There is only one known deposit of iron ore¹ and practically no coal; and while river water can supplement oil as a source of power, its use for this purpose must come after domestic needs and

¹ In the Aswan district of Egypt.
irrigation have been met. Accordingly, agriculture is and will remain the main source of livelihood in all the Arab countries; and industrialization will largely depend upon agricultural production.

In spite of the relative meagerness of natural resources, much waste occurs. In Iraq and Syria potentially productive areas are left uncultivated or lie fallow, while large quantities of water which could be used economically for irrigation are wasted. According to investigations carried on from 1946 to 1949 by the Irrigation Development Commission of Iraq, the area irrigated by the Euphrates and Tigris rivers could be increased, by storage and canalization, from 3,200,000 to 6,400,000 acres, i.e. by 100 per cent.\(^1\) In Syria the irrigated area could be increased from about 800,000 acres to at least 1,500,000\(^1\) or by about 90 per cent, mainly by a fuller use of the waters of the Euphrates, Khabur, and Orontes rivers. Even in the densely populated Lebanon and Jordan, there is considerable waste of water resources. The irrigated area in Lebanon can be increased by about 90 per cent (from 110,000 to 210,000 acres),\(^3\) chiefly by a fuller use of the Litani River in South Biqa\(^4\) and the coastal plain between Sidon and north of Tyre, and of the Nahr al-Kabir, Nahral-Arka and Nahr al-Barid rivers in the 'Akkar plain. No estimates are available of the possible increase in irrigated area in Jordan (now about 65,000 acres), but it is believed to be large. Furthermore, much waste results from unsatisfactory water rights and deficient control of irrigation. Water from springs in Lebanon and Jordan are owned by individuals who can use it, lease it, or leave it to waste as they please. Water rights in small river-irrigation schemes are mostly regulated by custom; each landowner has a share in the water supply, measured as a

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unit of time, which he may use economically or lavishly. In addition to waste of water, there is also considerable soil erosion in some countries, chiefly in Lebanon and Jordan.

Irrigation and drainage works have been and are still being undertaken, but on an inadequate scale in comparison to needs—particularly in thickly populated areas—and with little or no regard to the interest of the cultivators.

A further important economic factor contributing to poverty in the Arab countries is the great pressure of population on cultivated land. The pressure is partly mitigated by raising more than one crop on the same piece of land in one year, chiefly on irrigated land; but also enhanced by the need to leave part of the land fallow on most rain-fed lands, and by the shifting of cultivation in irrigated lands as the soil becomes saline because of lack of proper drainage, as in Iraq. The cultivated and crop areas per rural inhabitant in the Arab Middle East, excluding the Arabian Peninsula, may be summarized roughly as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultivated area per rural inhabitant (in acres)</th>
<th>Crop area per rural inhabitant (in acres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan (a)</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Palestine</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (b)</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) The large difference between per capita cultivated area and per capita crop area is due to the fact that the cultivated area consists largely of land, with little and irregular rainfall, which needs to remain fallow every other year.

(b) The wide difference between per capita cultivated area and per capita crop area is due both to low and irregular rainfall, and to frequent desertions of land when it has become too saline for growing crops.

As regards Saudi Arabia and the other territories of the Arabian Peninsula, though figures of cultivated area and rural

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1 Owing to paucity of data on Saudi Arabia and the other territories of the Arabian Peninsula, little reference will be made to them here.
populations are not available, it is known that the population pressure over current land resources is very great.

The pressure of population has been steadily increasing as a result of its growth at a more rapid pace than the growth of cultivated area. The annual rate of natural increase of population (urban and rural together) in these territories averages about twenty per thousand. At this rate a population would double itself in thirty-five years. In view of the growing density, it is not surprising that the already low per capita income in some countries should decline further. Poverty in Egypt (with a surplus rural population of five to six million) is increasing, as real wages show a tendency to fall. The average density of population in the Arab countries will rise appreciably if the Arab refugees from the Jewish regions of Palestine are not repatriated and have to be settled in the Arab parts of Palestine and the neighbouring Arab countries. No attempts have been made to solve the problem of population pressure by such measures as substantial increase in cultivated areas, industrialization, birth control, and organized emigration.

The effect of the pressure of population on poverty is intensified by lack of education, both liberal and technical. Illiteracy is rife in most of the Arab countries, particularly in the rural areas, where progress in education has been slow, and the little education given is misdirected and of inferior quality. The percentage of illiteracy in most rural areas ranges between 85 and 95 per cent. In fact, the lack of education is the chief reason for the survival of conservatism, fatalism, and improvidence in the rural areas, and is largely responsible for the persistence of primitive methods of agriculture. Elementary schools are increasingly being established in all the Arab countries, but their number in the rural areas is still considerably below need.

Poverty is also enhanced by unemployment and the immobility of labour. In normal times the fellah is employed for only the equivalent of one-third or one-half of the year. This is particularly true in the dry-farming zones of Syria, Iraq, and Jordan, where the main work is sowing and harvesting cereals;
and is true also of the congested irrigated areas of Egypt, where the holding of the average farmer keeps him busy for only about six months of the year. Livestock production and rural industries as supplementary works are not common in the Arab countries. For various reasons—attachment to environment, ignorance, lack of necessary funds, poor means of transportation—mobility of labour from less to more remunerative areas within a country is not frequent.

Next in importance to the meagerness of natural resources in relation to population as a factor for poverty comes the prevailing backward land systems. Of considerable consequence to economic and social conditions are the extreme inequality of land ownership and the feudalistic land tenancy system, which prevail to a greater or lesser extent in all the Arab countries. The share-tenancy system is largely an outcome of large estates. Under this system the tenant has no definite lease on the land, and is subject to eviction by the landlord at will. The insecurity of tenure and the fact that the rent is paid as a fixed share of the produce both discourage him from fertilizing the land or undertaking any long-term improvements. In the great majority of cases the landlord does nothing to improve the land or the efficiency of the tenants, and yet he takes ordinarily between one-third and one-half of the crop. Both the inherent defects of the system and the large share taken by the landlord contribute very largely to the meagerness of the tenant’s income.

The extreme inequality of land ownership and the extensive prevalence of share-tenancy may be illustrated by the conditions in some of the Arab countries. In Egypt about 75 per cent of the people actively occupied in agriculture own no land or less than one feddan (1.038 acres). In cases where the peasant does not own land, the usual form of lease is share-tenancy; but owing to the increasing dependence of agricultural production on markets, contract tenancy with rent paid in cash is coming more and more into use. In southern Iraq practically all land is owned by large owners or shaykhs, who let it to share-tenants—usually through the intervention of an inter-
mediary called the *sirkal*—and who contribute little if anything to the cultivation of the land. In Syria about 55 per cent of the land which has been surveyed is owned by big landlords and cultivated by share-tenants. The big landlord is almost always an absentee, a city dweller who rarely visits the land for purposes other than the collection of his share of the crops. In Lebanon possible owner-cultivation is relatively more prevalent than in any other Arab country, yet large estates and share-tenancy are frequent in the interior plateau and coastal plains, where less than two hundred persons own about half of the land surveyed.

Other backward land systems and institutions are the semi-collective ownership of village land by its inhabitants, known as *masha*¹, which exists in Syria, the Arab regions of Palestine, and Jordan, and the semi-collective ownership of land by a tribe, prevailing mainly in Syria and Iraq; fragmentary land holdings, prevailing in all Arab countries; the common charitable and religious *waqf* institution, known as *waqf khayri*; and the descendants’ *waqf*, known as *waqf dhurri*.

Where it exists, the *masha*¹ system is the greatest hindrance to agricultural development, because periodic repartitioning and reallocation of land among co-owners for the purpose of cultivation prevents investment in the land, such as trees or other long-term improvements. ‘The system misses the advantage alike of individualism and of co-operation.’¹ In the periodic repartitioning of *masha*¹ land, it is usual to divide it into a number of sites, in each of which the individual is allotted the due number of shares. When the number of shares is small, the allotments very often consist of uneconomic small holdings.

But by far the greatest fragmentation is due to the Muslim laws of succession, which prevent bequeathing to legal heirs. Accordingly, legal heirs receive prescribed shares in each piece of land of the deceased estate. Successive partitioning of land

among heirs results, in a great many cases, in ownership by an individual of several narrow and long strips of land unsuitable for intensive cultivation.

The waqf institution is peculiar to Muslim law. Waqf lands are mortmain property which has been dedicated to some religious or charitable object or family trust. The charitable or religious waqf requires an elaborate system of administration which is difficult to carry out efficiently, because waqf property is extensive and widely scattered. Very often, as a result of inadequate supervision, the waqf system offers a tempting field for the practice of fraud. In cases where waqf is dedicated by an individual for the benefit of his descendants, another problem arises. As time goes on and the number of heirs increases, the property is divided into minute shares of little value to their owners. In such cases interest in the property is lost and improvements discouraged.

Mention should also be made of the existence of vast areas where land titles have not been determined. This is true of all Arab countries except Egypt. Land settlement has been in operation for many years in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq, but the progress has been very slow. The undertaking of land settlement, including survey and registration, should be credited to the ex-Mandatory Powers. They also attempted the permanent partitioning and allotment of masha‘ land, and the consolidation of strips of land belonging to one individual by barter, or by requiring the owner of a small strip to transfer it to a neighbouring owner. The former effort was not very successful because of the fact that in some countries it was made conditional and in others it was actively opposed. The latter was fairly successful, but it does not help to reduce fragmentation in the future.

The Mandatory Powers neglected to deal with the problems of large estates and the insecurity of tenants. In part they strengthened the power of the landlords by legal recognition of their precarious rights in the lands they claimed to own. Worse still was the fact that in Iraq land settlement resulted in transfer of
the tribal semi-collective land-holdings to individual holdings by the shaykhs (tribal chiefs), and this increased the inequality of land ownership at the expense of the members of the tribes. Protection of tenants was provided for only in Palestine, but the law was frequently evaded. The Mandatory Powers failed also to provide plans for agricultural development; also irrigation, on which progress in agriculture very largely depends, was given but little consideration.

Since the termination of the Mandatory regimes, no extensive efforts have been taken by any Arab government to improve the land systems and, in particular, to reduce the extreme inequality of landownership and share-tenancy. It is worth mentioning, however, that the new Constitution of Syria provides for the encouragement of small and medium landownership, and for the distribution of private domain of the State to landless cultivators at reasonable rates. The Constitution also provides for setting up by law upper limits of land possession; but, unfortunately, this restriction is not retroactive, so it only means that the future heirs of the present large landowners will not be able to hold property above certain limits, and that no man can in the future own by purchase or gift land above these limits. In Iraq an experiment, called the Dujaylah Project, has been undertaken with the aim of finding a solution to the land tenure problem without antagonizing the landocrats. It involves the settlement of 1,200 families on public land, newly irrigated for this purpose. A few other similar projects are being carried out, but they seem to be too expensive to be copied on a large scale.

Partly as a result of backward land systems and partly because of the prevailing illiteracy and conservatism, agricultural methods are, generally speaking, very backward. In most rural areas the peasant still uses primitive implements and is ignorant of even the elementary technique of ploughing, sowing, irrigating, the use of fertilizers, and the control of plant and animal pests and diseases. This is not to speak of the use of expensive machinery and the long-term technical improvements which lie outside the fellah's reach. The usual measures used in more
developed countries, such as demonstrations and extension work, experimental stations, research laboratories, agricultural school education, and education in regard to animal husbandry, have scarcely been used in most of the Arab countries.

The limited amount of cultivated land in relation to rural population, the backward land systems, and the poor methods of cultivation are the chief factors responsible for the very low per capita cultivation output of the rural communities. On the basis of cereal production, Dr Doreen Warriner figures that the output from cultivation per head varies little between one Arab country and another (greater acre yield in Egypt being offset by excessive density of rural population), and estimates it for all, except the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, at about one-sixth of that in Western Europe and one-third of that in Eastern Europe.\(^1\)

The effect of this low output on the rural communities is multiplied by the extreme inequality of landownership and large under-employment already referred to, and by the exorbitant cost of credit and the poor marketing mechanism. In view of the fact that more than one-half of the land is owned by landocrats, who, as we said, receive normally between one-third and one-half of the produce, roughly only one-fourth of this already small output from cultivation goes to them.

The moneylender is by far the chief source of agricultural credit. Most of the land-owning farmers and all the landless tenant cultivators in need of credit have to resort to moneylenders—professional, semi-professional, landlord, or merchant—who exact extortionate interest rates under various forms. Where money is scarce the interest rate may be as high as 50 per cent or more per annum, and in periods of bad crops it may reach 100 per cent or higher. Roughly speaking, interest on loans takes away from owner-cultivators and tenant farmers about 25 per cent of their output from cultivation. Default of payment by owner-cultivators has often resulted in transfer of land to moneylenders, thus reducing freehold culti-  

vation and increasing the inequalities of landownership; while the frequent inability of tenants to pay their debts to their landlords has strengthened the grip of the landlords over the peasants and condemned them to a life of peonage.

The solution of the problem of usury has been attempted in most Arab countries by establishing state agricultural banks, but with little or no success. The agricultural bank, because of the great risk involved, cannot lend to landless peasants without some acceptable security, which they usually do not possess. Mortgage dealings with small landowners must continue to be expensive to the borrowers and troublesome to the bank. The typical Arab peasant, whether landless or landowner, does not possess the knowledge and strength of character required to limit his borrowing to his repaying capacity and to use the borrowed money productively. At the same time it is difficult for the bank to ascertain the character and capacity of the borrowers and to supervise their use of loans, because of the distances involved and the high overhead cost. No serious efforts have been made to encourage the establishment of co-operative credit societies.

Marketing of agricultural produce is, in general, very unsatisfactory. The producer of cereals is usually bound to sell to or through the merchant moneylender from whom he customarily borrows in cash or in kind. The producer of fruits and the grower of vegetables usually take their produce to the market and sell it through a middleman, called, in most Arab countries, *mu‘allim*. Both middlemen, particularly the merchant moneylender, are noted for their exploitation of cultivators. Consequently, the cultivator can rarely obtain a fair price for his produce. The situation of the vegetable and fruit growers is aggravated by the fact that they do not grade or properly pack their produce, either because of ignorance of the benefits that will be obtained, or because each cultivator produces a little of several things, which makes grading and packing not worth the effort involved. In addition they lose much time in making trips to the market for selling their products. Co-operative
marketing is little developed in some Arab countries and in others does not exist at all.

The effect of extreme poverty caused by the foregoing factors, in varied combination, on other social problems cannot be exaggerated. Undernourishment, bad sanitation, poor housing, and disease are rife in most of the rural areas; and the widespread disease caused by malnutrition and squalor has in turn further reduced the efficiency and income of the population and increased their misery. There matters are generally known, but their relation to the above economic factors do not seem to have been fully realized. Consequently, remedial measures have been in the nature of palliatives and minor ameliorations, or larger undertakings resulting in benefit chiefly to the big landlords.

Unless the misery of the masses is properly dealt with, it is bound to create grave social problems in the next ten to twenty years. Arab peasants are becoming less fatalistic and are beginning to understand the causes of their difficulties. Their dissatisfaction and desire to be freed from poverty and serfdom is shown by joining Communist and Nazi-type parties designed to bring about substantial changes in the social system. In spite of government repressive measures, Communist cells have been formed in industrial centers and adjoining rural areas in most Arab countries. Even ignorant and simple country peasants show their sympathy with Communism as a vague protest against the difficulties of their living. If the problems of the masses are not solved the germs of revolution will grow and multiply, and the explosion will take place—as it did in France, Russia, and other countries—with heavy losses to life and property.

The economic factors cannot be dealt with piecemeal. Because of their interdependence and because of urgency they should be tackled together and their solution should be comprehensively planned. Both long-term and short-term plans are necessary; the first to include the more expensive and time-consuming projects, and the second to comprise the relatively
less expensive projects and those which take less time to solve.

The long-term plan would provide for such major projects as
the full utilization of land and water resources, flood control
and drainage, and the utilization of the waters of overflow and
swamp lands; increasing the supply of water by storage; foresta-
tion and prevention of soil erosion; sanitary housing; improve-
ment of transportation and communication between the urban
and rural districts; development of urban industries to provide
employment for surplus population; and settlement of surplus
population and nomadic people on cultivable state lands.

The short-term plan would include the breaking up of large
estates and the substitution of freehold for share-tenancy culti-
vation; consolidation of fragmentary holdings; permanent par-
titioning of collective ownership; control of water for drinking
and irrigation; control of human disease and erection of hos-
pitals; encouragement of birth control and of migration from
less to more densely populated areas; improvement of methods
of cultivation and of raising livestock; adequate control of ani-
mal and vegetable pests and diseases; establishment of research
laboratories and experimental stations; development of agricul-
tural training and extension work; creation of better credit fa-
cilities to provide larger, cheaper, and safer credit; encoura-
gement of production and marketing co-operatives; and develop-
ment of rural industries to absorb rural labor when not in use
for agriculture.

In showing the need for such planning, six important questions
present themselves. First, are the available data and studies ade-
quate enough to serve as a basis for it? Secondly, is there a suffi-
cient feeling of social responsibility on the part of those in power
to implement it? Thirdly, who should be entrusted with plan-
ing and execution? Fourthly, are the finances of the Arab Gov-
ernments adequate to enable the carrying out of the plans?
Fifthly, what advantages can be secured from co-operation
among the Arab countries in dealing with the economic and
associated scientific and social problems? Sixthly, can the
United Nations be of help in promoting reforms?
In answer to the first question, it should be said that an overall scientific analysis of the causes of poverty and the most effective practical measures for its remedy requires a comprehensive and thorough economic and social survey, something which has not yet been fully made in any Arab country. In view of the urgency of reform, however, and of the fact that the chief problems are fairly well known, formulation of plans for their solution is justifiable, it being understood that plans can be adjusted as more intensive studies are made and more experience is gained.

The second question is answered by many scholars in the negative, and they are probably right; but they have overlooked the fact that the Arab countries have gained their independence only recently, and that subsequent political events have prevented concentration on economic and social problems. Furthermore, the political system in most cases has been inherited from the Mandate regime and has not had time to develop. In the face of these circumstances it is not strange to find deficiency in the feeling of public responsibility. But progressive public opinion is growing, and with it a sense of public responsibility. This is evidenced by the extension in most Arab countries of free education, the enactment of laws for protection of urban labor, the projects for social security in Egypt and Lebanon, and other social measures. It should be admitted, however, that a deeper sense of public responsibility is needed for carrying out economic and social reform of the kind required, especially where the interests of those in power seem to them to conflict with the interests of the masses, as in the case of reducing the inequalities of landownership.

In regard to the third question, it should be emphasized that economic planning for social reform should be entrusted to scientists, experts, and technicians, and its execution to efficient and honest administrators. A planned development would require extension of public functions and qualified personnel to undertake it. The Arab countries have relatively few qualified nationals, but suitable advisers can be recruited from abroad.
Great waste and injustice have occurred as a result of dependence upon unqualified economists, technicians, and administrators. Appreciation of these matters is developing, though slowly. A small number of foreign experts have been secured for various purposes and a fair number of nationals are being sent abroad for further study and specialization.

As regards the financing of such comprehensive plans, it is well known that Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine and Jordan have all accumulated large credit balances resulting from the wartime expenditure by Great Britain and France; and that Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrein are getting foreign currencies from oil royalties, and investment and operation expenditure in connection with oil, which are increasing at a rapid pace as extraction is developed and more pipelines are laid.1 The former assets, however, are partly owned and controlled by private individuals and companies—which made enormous war profits and paid little to the public treasuries—and partly represent a part of the note-circulation cover. It is impossible for the governments to be able to tax any reasonable portion of the war profits, and it is also improbable that they will be able to purchase at the official rates the foreign exchange held by private persons. They can, however, substitute public bonds for a large part of the currency reserve, and use the foreign currency thus secured to purchase some of the needed machinery and equipment for large-scale developments. There is also a possibility of gaining some of the foreign exchange in the note-circulation cover by revaluation of the

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1 The following is a brief account of crude oil production in the Middle East taken from Petroleum Press Service, Vol. 18, No 1, January, 1951:

Iraq's output rose from about 4 million tons in 1949 to about 6 million tons in 1950, and is expected to reach 20 million tons within the next two years, when the new 36-inch pipeline to the Mediterranean is finished and the Zubayr field is in operation.

Saudi Arabia's output rose from one million tons in 1944 to 27 million tons in 1950. (The income from oil royalties and share of profits in 1950 is estimated at about 90 million dollars and may rise to 100 million dollars in 1951.)

Kuwait's output has rapidly advanced from a small output in 1946 to about 17 million tons in 1950. Bahrein's output is steady at about 1.5 million tons.
currencies, which are at present overvalued. Some of the
money needed for internal expenditures may be raised by re-
form of the taxation systems and elimination of wasteful expend-
itures, and part may be raised in some countries by internal
public borrowing. Foreign exchange accruing to Iraq from oil
has helped the Iraqi Government to undertake development—
projects, but this income together with foreign exchange re-
serves will remain inadequate to permit full utilization of the
vast land and water resources. For Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and
Bahrein, income from oil will probably be sufficient for a full
development of their very meager land and water resources.
Accordingly, for most of the Arab countries external borrow-
ing will be needed—particularly dollar loans, as a considerable
part of the capital requirements must be financed with dollars—
if plans for a comprehensive development are to be carried out.
The answer to the fifth question is that since many of the
economic and other associated scientific and social problems
are common to most of the Arab countries, an over-all scientif-
ic and realistic study of these problems and the means for their
solution can be most economically undertaken by a regional
council of scientists and experts consisting of economists, so-
ciologists, geologists, soil scientists, engineers, biologists, en-
tomologists, bacteriologists, etc. Furthermore, it should be
remembered that there is a shortage of first-class scientists, and
therefore the use of some of them on a regional basis may be
necessary.

As regards help from the United Nations, it can be given in
four important ways. First, by encouraging political stability,
including the solution of the problem of Arab refugees; sec-
ondly, by assisting in the formation of the suggested regional
council through the Economic and Social Council; thirdly, by
providing, through the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development the needed money for the undertakings con-
templated in the plans; and fourthly by providing the technical
assistance needed in the different fields of economic and social
activities.
This discussion has been limited to the economic causes of social problems in rural areas. This is not because there are no social and economic problems in urban districts, but because the rural problems are more permanent, more extensive, and more fundamental. Some of the legacies of the war have indeed brought considerable hardship to urban areas. Wartime inflation has resulted in a fall of real wages of labourers and salaried employees, particularly of the latter; and the great excess of prices in the Arab countries over world prices has caused large trade deficits, which in turn have engendered considerable unemployment.

In closing it should be emphasized that 'material conditions are foundations of social welfare'; and unless the basic economic problems are solved, there is no hope for a substantial improvement in the social conditions of the Arab countries.
Chapter XVI

INDIA

U. L. GOSWAMI AND S. C. ROY

When a gardener sets about planting an orchard, he tests the soil and analyses the climatic conditions; he surveys the vegetation around and assesses the requirements of the present and of the foreseeable future. An orchard in the hands of a master gardener develops into a planned growth of the jungle. The seedlings, the plants, the giant trees—all find in the orchard well-defined places of anchorage, blossoming in the open air and sun, none elbowing the other out in a battle for survival.

A community is an orchard not merely of men, women, and children, but also of the birds and animals, of the green foliage, the tuft grass, of the palm trees and the cypress, of the banyan and the oak; of the poisonous weed and of the medicinal herb. Community is the antithesis of conglomeration. Community projects in India accordingly have to be planned on the past moorings of our society and integrated with its future trends, yet be a part of the larger whole—a section of the world orchard.

August 1947, and the events of the years immediately before, brought a convulsion. No more invaders. But the nation yet stands possessed. Legacies of two thousand years are hard to shake off. Compartments within compartments, subcastes within castes, are in conflict. Poverty, ignorance, and disease are the rule rather than the exception.

People of the West come to India at this juncture with their money, machines, and specialized techniques. The aim is to transform the picture overnight: synthetic manure for the fields, tractors for cultivation, jeeps for transport, plastics for
manufacturing, radio and screen for ready-made entertainment. From another side comes a new version of an old ideology: 'Surrender the individual; the state is supreme.' It finds expression in the guise of a common slogan: *Inqilab Zindaban*—'Long live revolution!' But the people hardly know what revolution means in flesh or spirit. Thus India stands: with yesterday behind, with tomorrow yet to come, on the border-line—the brink of a precipice.

Population notwithstanding, never has man been nearer to material freedom. Yet armies march and there is talk of hydrogen bombs. People revile one another. They count their stock-piles. Raw materials, power, labour, and techniques which could exterminate poverty, ignorance, and disease are producing weapons of annihilation.

The world community in the making can be achieved only if the East and the West are wedded afresh. The balance that would result might be a solvent of the conflicting ideologies that threaten to shatter our world.

India had arts, crafts, and techniques which at one time attracted visitors from many lands. These have to be revived and adapted to the changed times. Mediation between the past, the present, and the vision of the future must constitute the crux of the effort, or else the imported money and techniques will end in creating only a shell; substance will be missing. We do not want a house divided against itself. Money imported into India for community projects must come not as a one-way gift but as 'give and take'.

If it is to mean anything at all and to confer benefits which will endure, community development in India has to become a silent and bloodless revolution in the spirit and practices of her people. The three hundred and fifty million citizens of India who are refugees in their own homeland must be rehabilitated.

Technical assistance in India therefore has to be oriented on completely unorthodox patterns. It must not aim to uproot the refugees from what little moorings they have left. It should aim instead at the revival of the old techniques and their revitaliza-
tion and redirection. Friends who offer technical assistance to India must rid themselves of the crusader's zeal. They must come with humility.

Community projects in India should be conducted strictly on this line. Help from within or from without will have to fit into this pattern if it is to be accepted willingly. Irrigation, reclamation of land, use of improved techniques, implements, and fertilizers are all good means. So also are the new methods of production in industry, the plans for rural and urban housing, mass techniques of public health, adult and child education. But they are means to one basic end—man. True, man is the product of his environment. It is equally true, however, that his environment is the product of man. The physical environment offers relatively easy moulding. The human environment is more difficult. In the hustle of time this tends to be ignored, and we risk still-born offspring.

The work is here to be done. There is no frontier. Friends from all corners of the world are welcome.

*The Basic Characteristics of Indian Rural Society*¹

Peasant villages in India constitute a system of society with distinctive social values and economic characteristics. There are four features in their structure which bear particularly on the problem of peasant poverty. They are:

1. Peasant society is based on simple technique. Except for minor changes, the technique of agriculture is still at about the same level as it stood in Europe before the Industrial Revolution. Since Voelcker's penetrating study of Indian agriculture (1897), much valuable work has been done to further the application of science to the problems of agriculture. But science has not yet reached the average cultivator over the greater part of the country, and has scarcely affected the techniques of cultivation. In part at least this is due to the fact that,

¹ This section is taken from *Poverty and Social Change* by Tarlok Singh, Deputy Secretary of the Government of India Planning Commission; through the kind permission of the publishers, Messrs. Longmans, Green and Company Ltd.
within the limits of his present environment, the cultivator has little to learn.

2. Peasant society is based on individualistic petty farming.

3. Two ideas, which are closely linked together, have been fundamental to the existence of peasant society:
   (a) exercise of the right of free ownership, or, as in zamindari areas, of hereditary tenancy;
   (b) principle of equal inheritance between sons.

4. For centuries the peasant village remained a more or less self-contained unit in which economic development was in a state of arrest.

To these four facts, read against the background of a rapidly expanding and almost wholly illiterate population, we can trace the principal difficulties of our rural economy. Increase in population, unaccompanied by a corresponding growth in industries and other non-agricultural forms of work and service, is directly responsible for the dependence of excessive numbers on agriculture and ancillary services. The principle of equal inheritance leads to sub-division of land, so that in most provinces, and more especially in Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, and the United Provinces, the majority of holdings are now uneconomic even for the plough-and-bullock technique. To give effect

1 The manner in which our total population has grown and an almost corresponding burden thrown upon land may be seen from the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>INDIA</th>
<th>British India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>Percentage of rural to total population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>279,446,248</td>
<td>90.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>283,872,359</td>
<td>90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>303,012,598</td>
<td>90.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>305,693,063</td>
<td>89.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>318,119,154</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>388,997,935</td>
<td>87.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net variation 1891–1941 | 109,551,707 | –3.4 | 82,838,106 | –3.8 |
to the principle of sub-division we have a continuous process of fragmentation of individual holdings.

As farming becomes petty and uneconomic, the cultivator is increasingly forced into a hand-to-mouth existence. This explains why most cultivators have no margin for investment and suffer either from lack of credit or from indebtedness or, when the condition becomes chronic, from both. Soil deterioration, poor quality of animals, overstocking, waste and inefficient use of resources are implicit in such a situation. It follows too that the peasantry can be exploited easily by those who possess more social or economic power. In different ways, the moneylender and the middleman, the landlord and the petty official, the priest and the lawyer are able to exert pressure upon the peasant.

In varying degrees, all over the country, these features characterize the economic life of peasant owners and raiyats. In seeking their betterment, therefore, the most important point to emphasize is that, so long as units of cultivation and management continue to remain small and uneconomic, agriculture can be neither progressive nor profitable. Peasant society offered tolerably efficient solutions for the main problems of food and clothing so long as the environment was static. In the past sixty or seventy years it has been exposed to three principal influences. In the first place, at the very best, resources have barely kept pace with the increase in population. Secondly, peasant society has suffered severely from two disruptive influences—alienation and litigation. When land passes from peasants to non-agriculturist moneylenders or to large owners, small owners tend to be reduced to tenants and labourers. Litigation among peasants themselves, and between peasants and moneylenders, has been a serious disorganizing factor in rural social and economic life. In the third place, although subsistence farming is of great importance in our rural economy, the peasant’s prosperity depends to no small extent on the level of agricultural prices. In normal times he has to face competition from other countries without possessing
the organization, the knowledge, and the technique for meeting it on equal terms. The cumulative result of all these factors is to make the old order untenable under the new conditions in which it has to operate.

The four characteristics which we have observed in peasant villages are also found in areas held by substantial landlords. They too ordinarily parcel out their land to tenants-at-will. They possess large areas which could provide efficient units of production. When they divide their land among tenants-at-will, as a rule each worker gets a fair-sized peasant holding. Tenant farming is not in principle as efficient a system as direct management accompanied by adequate capital investment on the part of the landlord, but may easily be more efficient than the petty holdings which peasant owners are often obliged to cultivate. In practice, however, tenants-at-will do not receive an adequate share of the produce and landlords do not contribute to the improvement of the land. The result is that areas under landlords are operated on the whole with much less care than peasant holdings. Thus, the economic inefficiency of landlords is not inherent in the system under which they work, but arises primarily from mismanagement or lack of management. It is this fact which marks out areas under landlords from peasant villages and makes it necessary for us to work out different principles of reorganization in the two cases.

Some Problems of Change in Rural Society

Extension or community development projects aim at:

1. Introducing changes and undertaking works in villages which will lead to the economic, social, and cultural improvement of the life of the villagers.

2. Inducing the villagers to carry out by themselves as many of these works as possible.

3. Securing complete co-operation between the government agencies and the villagers in this effort.

Recent work in the various extension projects so far established
has shown that the villagers appreciate the need for rural improvement but do not find it easy to carry out the project programme and to co-operate with a governmental agency in that effort.

The villager is intensely suspicious, and he has good reason to be: he has been a sufferer in so many natural and man-made calamities, small and big, that he is careful about his attitude to anything new. He has been exploited by others to such an extent that he suspects even a person bearing gifts. In spite of four years of democratic freedom, he has not yet got out of his old feeling of awe for governmental agencies. This makes it difficult for him to co-operate genuinely in any Government-run project. His suspicions and fears were exemplified in one village where the village-level worker went to arrange for a demonstration plot to sow an improved variety of long-staple cotton in place of the local short-staple cotton. A farmer he approached did not have the courage to say, 'No, I will not do it.' He agreed and asked the village-level worker to come next morning. But the same evening the farmer completed the sowing of the field with local short-staple cotton seed.

Villagers can be gullible. This, combined with their suspiciousness, makes a happy hunting ground for rumour mongers. Vested interests such as the money-lender or the landlord may deliberately start fantastic rumours. Immediately the Bhadson Extension Project was announced, there were rumours that this was the first step to nationalization of land. When a census of persons was taken, there were rumours that anyone who gave his age as over sixty-five would be killed. When an American Point Four expert appeared on the spot, there were rumours that the villagers would be driven out and all land used for setting up an American colony. These rumours made the task of extension workers hard at the beginning.

About ninety per cent of the villagers are illiterate. This makes it impossible to use written matter on a large scale. Fundamental education has to be restricted to talks and visual

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1 In Patiala and East Punjab States Union.
demonstration. The task of counteracting rumours and in¬
ducing villagers to accept something new is difficult.

Past exploitation and the lack of access to knowledge of
happenings in other parts of the world make the villager con¬
servative. He fights shy of anything new. A few examples of
inexpert handling of new projects in the past strengthen the
villager’s impression that new-fangled things would not suit
him. Introduction of a tractor with no assured supply of spare
parts, the setting up of a mechanical pump without the possibil¬
ity of getting a good mechanic to run it, the use of in¬
ssecticides that proved ineffective because of the wrong dosage
advised by the ‘expert’, and other such ‘improvements’ lead to
the loss of valuable crops and inevitably to the villager’s hostility.

The villager does not yet feel that he and the Government
employees are members of one and the same community. This
is natural, considering that many Government servants have
exploited the villagers in the past, adopting a superior attitude.
In spite of the adult franchise, the villager does not feel that he
also is a part of the Government. Therefore, his ready and
willing participation in the project is not forthcoming. He still
considers it to be the Government’s project and not his own.

Even a communal effort to build something is not the tradition
of the village. Such communal efforts are seen occasionally in
constructing a religious building. Two centuries ago it was
quite common to dig the village ponds or construct an em¬
bankment to avert damage from floods through communal
effort. But now such communal efforts are not even old
memories. People have forgotten them. They are not
accustomed to getting together to do physical labour that
would benefit the whole village.

Another handicap for successful extension work is lack of
leadership in the villages. It is rarely that one comes across a
village where what one man says will be done by all. It would
have been easy for the extension worker to work through the
leaders. As it is, he has to talk to a large number of villagers and
convince the majority of them before any work is undertaken.
Another difficulty, happily encountered in only a small number of villages, is the existence of factions. The bitterness of the factious spirit often drives out the desire to improve the village. It becomes more important to cause annoyance to the other party than to get something done. Co-operation between the two parties is impossible; but often one party is keen to spoil the work undertaken by the other.

Lastly, we have no expert extension workers. The Government servant is as a rule unacquainted with the psychology of the villager. Government servants are mostly urban people. They are unwilling to visit the villages, much less stay there. They do not dress like the villagers, they do not eat the food of the villagers. Thus they are unable to gain the confidence of the villagers, and without confidence extension work is impossible.

Some of these handicaps have been anticipated. Others became known only after projects were underway. The following approaches to overcoming them are being made.

The extension workers are all rural people. They come from the villages. About eighty per cent of them come from the area of the project. This will enable them to get the confidence of the villagers more quickly than if they were strangers and urban people. Also, the selection of good local men for the posts of village-level workers has convinced the villagers that the project is not merely a new way to get some jobs for a few favourites of the Minister or other officers.

Secondly, a large number of meetings have been held, each attended by about 200 villagers, where the programme and ‘technique’ of the project have been explained. The extension workers talk individually to a large number of villagers. In all such talks emphasis is laid on the fact that village participation is more important than material achievement.

Thirdly, batches of college boys are being sent to villages in some projects to do manual labour on community works such as road building. The object is to encourage communal effort in building things useful to the village as a whole. Talks between villagers and these boys will also dispel suspicions about
any ulterior motive of Government in undertaking the project.

Visual demonstration is a major item in extension work. The benefits of sowing long-staple cotton or using ammonium sulphate, for example, will be appreciated by the villagers when they see the crops in demonstration plots. This will relieve their doubts about these new practices and encourage them to modify their conservative attitudes.

We are doing our best to give the villagers what they want, along with making them do what we consider good for them. The villagers wanted the wild cattle damaging their crops to be caught and taken away. We are doing it. They wanted a bridge over a canal. We are planning to give it to them. The villagers are being encouraged to ask for things. We modify our programme according to the villagers' suggestions. We gain their confidence by doing things they require.

In order to develop community spirit, we are encouraging the starting of co-operative societies and village councils.

Intense efforts to spread literacy will be made shortly, and this will help in our propaganda drives. We shall be able to make more use of printed matter.

If our extension workers are sincere, understand the psychology of the villagers, and carry the villagers with them, we are sure that the difficulties now experienced in extension work can be overcome and that good results will be achieved.

Experimental Projects: Nilokheri, Faridabad, and Etawah

Independence did not bring the millennium which the people had been looking forward to during the long years of political struggle. In fact, the partition of the country resulted in some food-producing areas going to Pakistan, and most of the areas producing jute and cotton also were lost. As time passed it was increasingly recognized that something would have to be done fairly quickly. The Five Year Plan, of which a draft outline was published in July 1951, was intended to serve as a guide to
the programme which India would have to adopt in order to achieve this objective.

The economic problem has many facets. Of them, none is more important than the problem of inadequate food supplies. Even at the existing low levels of consumption, India has to import approximately five million tons of food-grains annually, which represents a heavy foreign exchange liability. Apart from other undesirable consequences of such reliance on food imports, this large expenditure of foreign currency renders it necessary to curtail imports of essential industrial raw materials and of capital goods for replacement of antiquated plant and machinery for industries and essential lines of communications. The Five Year Plan, therefore, recognizes the vital importance of increased agricultural productivity.

Past experience has shown that agricultural development programmes do not produce a lasting impression on the people until they take the form of concentrated effort in selected areas. The objective which the Five Year Plan has accepted in respect of agricultural development is consequently one of ‘bringing certain areas, one after another, under intensive development’. As the basic objective of agricultural development is increased food production, it has been suggested that the areas should be selected where, on account of irrigation facilities or an assured rainfall, additional effort is likely to produce the best results. The intention is that in these selected areas the agricultural development programme should cover every aspect of rural improvement. These ideas constitute the nucleus of the present day concept of community projects in this country.

While agricultural development work in India has hitherto taken the form of efforts diffused throughout the country, some experiments along intensive lines have already been undertaken. The most notable examples of such efforts are provided by the refugee townships of Nilokheri and Faridabad and the pilot project launched in 1948 by the United Provinces Government in ninety-seven villages of Etawah. A brief mention
of what has been done in these three places will not be out of place here.

In the autumn of 1947, when there was a large influx of displaced persons from West Pakistan, the Government of India set up a large number of relief camps to receive these refugees and to provide them with shelter, food, clothing, and medical aid. The largest camp of this kind was in Kurukshetra, where at one time the population reached the figure of about three lakhs. For the purpose of assisting in the rehabilitation of these people, in December 1947 a vocational training centre was started in the camp and provision was made for training the displaced persons in various trades such as weaving, tailoring, soap-making, dyeing, and calico-printing. Mr. S. K. Dey, who had previously been a mechanical and electrical engineer in the employ of the American General Electric Company, was placed in charge. For the purpose of resettling these people, land adjoining Nilokheri Village in the Karnal District of the Punjab was acquired. This land was uninhabited, marshy jungle. On this site Mr. Dey planned a more or less self-sufficient township, to be integrated with the surrounding villages economically. He aimed at the organization of industries and crafts predominantly on co-operative lines or under public ownership.

Today the township has a population of nearly 6,000. It has developed a wide range of small-scale workers' co-operatives engaged in manufacturing handloom cloth, hosiery goods, ready-made garments, shoes, leather goods, and soap. Eighty families are engaged in agriculture. Most of the shops are co-operatively owned. The only industries which are still under the management of the Nilokheri Administration are the printing press and the tannery, other industries having been transferred to co-operative societies. There is practically no permanent unemployment. All this has been achieved at an expenditure of approximately Rs. 1,000 per capita, excluding the expenditure on the polytechnic which is expected to develop into a regular training institution for the use, not merely of displaced persons, but also of others. The intention
is that the total amount spent by the Government of India on the development of Nilokheri should be repaid by the colony in twenty-five equated annual instalments from April 1951, with interest at the usual rate.

At Faridabad the moving spirit was that of Mr. Sudhir Ghosh, who undertook the rehabilitation of 30,000 refugees from North West Frontier then residing in the Faridabad Camp. Faridabad today is a flourishing township with excellent educational and health facilities and practically full employment for its rehabilitated citizens. The construction work has almost entirely been done by the refugees themselves, with the help of small loans which were given to them by the Government. The loans will be repaid in about twenty years. The place now has primary schools for girls and boys, modern medical facilities, a socialized health service, and an engineering school. The township grows over half its food requirements. It has a power house, constructed of reparations machinery from Germany and re-erected with the assistance of the German engineer who first erected this plant in Hamburg. It is expected shortly to supply Delhi with additional electricity.

The circumstances which led to the growth of Nilokheri and Faridabad resulted in these two places developing as townships with very little organic connection, in the beginning, with the neighbouring villages. Therefore, while these experiments will be of very great use for the development of future community projects in this country, serving as models of what people can achieve by co-operative effort with very little help from the State, for a more suitable prototype of the community project of the future one has to look to Etawah, where the primary emphasis has been upon agricultural improvement, and the amount of financial support from the Government during the initial stages was small. This project owes a tremendous debt to the ideas of Mr. Albert Mayer, an American town planner, who came out to India during the war. He felt that the various Departments of the Government trying to help rural communities were functioning with insufficient co-
ordination and above the level of the needs and understanding of the ordinary cultivator.

Mr. Mayer conceived the idea of training ‘multi-purpose village-level workers’ who live in the villages and can understand the villagers’ problems on a practical basis before offering assistance. Mr. Mayer felt that the Indian farmer, in spite of his conservatism, could be induced to try new methods of farming, provided the utility of those methods were clearly demonstrated to him by people in whom he had confidence and in circumstances which reproduced the normal environment within which the farmer worked. In Mr. Mayer’s words, the objective was to raise ‘the level of the people and their performance (their economic, personal, social and public health practices and outlook) and to improve the physical things people have to work with and on (their soil and its enrichment and conservation; their tools and implements; their village roads, layout and drainage’.

The pivot of the work which the United Provinces Government started in ninety-seven villages in Etawah District in 1948 is the multi-purpose village-level worker (v.l.w.), agricultural diploma-holders and panchayat (village council) secretaries. These people are instructed at the training centre established for the purpose, where they learn, with their own hands the work of the agriculturist. In addition to agricultural operations, these v.l.w.s are given training in cattle breeding, running of schools, vaccination of human beings, inoculation of cattle, supervision of public health measures, and so forth. In short, these men are expected to be able to guide and direct practically every aspect of the life of the ordinary farmer. In the ninety-seven villages, there are twenty-four v.l.w.s, each looking after four villages. These men are under the expert guidance of four Deputy Development Officers—an engineer, an agronomist, the principal of the training centre (who is in charge of education, public health, and ‘village participation’), and a sanitary inspector—all under the District Planning Officer.

This simple and inexpensive organization has achieved re-
markable results. Practically all the acreage in these villages today is sown with improved seeds, a new system of rotation has been adopted, the use of fertilizers and green manure is greater, and the average yield per acre has increased by fifty to sixty per cent. Other economic and social innovations have resulted in better health conditions, improvement of cattle, improved roads and means of communication, and an increase in literacy. It is natural, therefore, that in embarking on a new programme of community projects, Etawah should be considered the basic model.

**Ultimate Object and Present Programme**

The ultimate object of the community development programme in India is the building up of integrated rural-urban communities. In the community projects, as they are intended to develop, there will be approximately 300 villages divided into three Development Blocks of approximately 100 villages each. Each village will have a population of approximately 500 distributed in about 100 families. The villages will be linked with a common market and a centre for other social and economic activities. These marketing centres will be called the Mandi Units, and will form a nucleus for about fifteen to twenty-five villages, depending on the population. Four to five Mandi centres, together with their attached villages, will constitute what is called a Development Block. The headquarters of the Development Block will be a rural-cum-urban township with an approximate population of 5,000, distributed in 1,000 families. Three Development Blocks, consisting of approximately 300 villages, will constitute the Project Area. This Area will approximate roughly to the Sub-Division under the existing District pattern of government.

Villages included within the Project will have adequate supplies of water from surplus wells, tube-wells, or tanks; adequate facilities for drainage; agricultural extension service at the rate of one agricultural extension worker for every five
villages; and the requisite veterinary and sanitary services. At least half the agricultural land normally will be served with irrigation facilities, agricultural waste land will be reclaimed, grazing fields and fuel forests will be planted, and the road system so developed as to link every village, by means of feeder roads, to the main roads provided by the State. There will be schools for primary education, adult education, and a recreation centre. The Mandi Unit will have a middle or secondary school; a dispensary connected with the primary health centre through mobile health units; an agricultural extension service sub-headquarters; a post and telegraph office; a transport service centre; a marketing centre; an arts, crafts, and cottage industry centre; a community recreation centre; a model farm, including a seed multiplication centre and a stock-breeding centre.

The rural-cum-urban township which will constitute the headquarters of the Development Block, will have residential accommodation for about 1,000 families; water works; electricity provided through a power station or a transformer substation; a shopping centre; small- and medium-scale industries; a post, telegraph, and telephone office; a transport centre; primary, middle, and high schools of the basic type; an agricultural school; a primary health unit consisting of fifteen beds; a dairy and poultry breeding centre; a nursery; a veterinary hospital; and a social education and community centre.

While the ultimate objective is as has been outlined above, on account of financial and other limitations the Mandi Unit has been omitted from the Government-sponsored programme, it being hoped that increased productivity in the Project Area as a result of the programme will, in due course, stimulate the growth of these centres through the initiative of the local population. For the same reasons, the rural-cum-urban township has also been omitted for the present from the current programme. Instead, a Mandi Centre has been provided at the headquarters of the Block. It is expected that this Mandi Centre will, in due course, develop into a rural-cum-urban township.
The intention is that the headquarters of the Project Area will be called the urban-cum-rural township. This township will have a population of 10,000 to 20,000. In addition to the features common to the rural-cum-urban township, Project headquarters township will have a basic teacher's training college; a technical training centre; a tractor service and supply station; a transport workshop; an engineering workshop; a secondary hospital equipped for all types of medical aid; a training centre for village-level workers; and a dairy, poultry, and agricultural experimental station, including soil research laboratories. The urban-cum-rural township has not been provided for under the current scheme, as it has been assumed to exist already under the present administrative set up. For the composite project, however, of which there will be only six to begin with, especially for the rehabilitation of displaced persons or those of very undeveloped areas, one urban-cum-rural township has been programmed at the centre of the Project Area.

For the purpose of implementing this programme, central direction and guidance will emanate from a Central Committee consisting of the members of the Planning Commission. The executive responsibility for the implementation of the projects will vest in the Administrator under the general guidance of the Central Committee. In order to ensure the maximum utilization of the executive and advisory agencies which already exist under the various Ministries of the Government of India, provision has been made for different Ministries to nominate their experts as advisers to the Community Projects Administration. For implementation in the field, the Administrator will be assisted by a group of technical men specializing in agriculture, irrigation, education, industries, health, housing, and social welfare. The basic work of implementation of the programme will, however, devolve on the States. The State Organization will more or less follow the pattern of the Central Organization as indicated above.

At the Project level, there will be a Project Executive Of-
ficer who will be responsible for the rural community programme.

The training of the men who have to undertake this gigantic task is a difficult problem in itself. This work will be done in thirty training centres which are being set up all over the country with the generous assistance of the Ford Foundation. The project-level workers, as well as supervisory officers, will be trained at these centres.

**Finance**

The estimated expenditure on a basic type of rural community project, i.e. a project without provision for an urban unit, is Rs. 65 lakhs, made up of the following components:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Rs. in lakhs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Personnel (supervisory and field workers)</td>
<td>5.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Equipment for personnel</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Equipment, construction, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor irrigation other than tube-wells</td>
<td>20.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reclamation of waste land</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking-water supply</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal husbandry</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drainage</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>11.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village arts and crafts</td>
<td>4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Equipment, construction, and supplies for three Mandi (Marketing) Centres</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing for staff</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispensaries and health units, one per Mandi Centre</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural extension service sub-headquarters</td>
<td>0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor and jeep service centres</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing centre</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community recreation centre</td>
<td>0.06</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1 rupee = £ 0.16 or $ 0.21; 1 lakh = 100,000; 1 crore = 10,000,000.
The estimated cost of an urban unit (which it is intended to provide in a few projects) is Rs. 46 lakhs. The programme will chiefly consist of land development, roads, residential housing, education, health, dairy and poultry breeding, etc.

The total estimated cost of the fifty-five projects proposed to be implemented during the three-year period is about Rs. 40 crores. The expenditure on foreign currencies is to be met through allotments from the Fund established under the Indo-U.S. Technical Co-operation Agreement. Necessary finance in respect of the rupee expenditure will be provided by the Central and State Governments.

**Summary**

From what has been said above, it will be clear that the basic idea is to develop new Etawahs round the nucleus of a rural-cum-urban township like Nilokheri, with small-scale industries serving the needs of the surrounding villages and providing a market for their produce. The intention is to draw into these townships the under-employed and unemployed agricultural population from the villages and find productive and gainful employment for them. These development areas will ultimately centre round a town somewhat on the model of Faridabad, with light and medium industries, with power supply, and linked to the main communication systems of the country. Even with generous United States assistance, it has been found possible to make only a modest beginning with fifty-five projects, forty-nine of which will be of the basic type and six of the composite type. It is hoped that this modest beginning will lead during the next five years to a development which will result in at least one-third of the total number of villages in the country being served by community projects.
Chapter XVII

INDONESIA

F. H. VAN NAERSSEN ¹

The question whether or not Indonesia forms a unity in a cultural sense used to be answered not so very long ago according to the political attitude of the person replying to it. To nationalists any idea of diversity was a barrier to a Greater Indonesia (Indonesia Raya). On the other hand, conservative Netherlanders and a group of privileged Indonesian nobility argued that Indonesian unity was utopian. This contradiction, born of sentiments and vested interests, has been an acute one during the long and tragic period of discussions over Indonesia’s sovereignty. When at last the ties were severed, Indonesia left the Netherlands realm as the United States of Indonesia. But within a few months the unitarians had won their cause: the new Republic of Indonesia is a political unity.

Today, as masters in their own house, Indonesians have to acknowledge realities. ‘When we consider the structure and composition of Indonesia’s population, we see immediately that there is no question of unity or homogeneity in a sociological sense. There is a large diversity in standard of living, in cultural level, and in social structure’, says Dr. Mulia, ² and he is not the only one to state such facts. The authorities, moreover, are taking them into account in framing their welfare policy.

Public opinion does consider this approach as being funda-

¹ The writer wishes to thank Miss Johanna Felhoen Kraal for her kindness in helping him with the translation of this chapter.

mentally different from the colonial period. The colonial approach used to be too one-sided and technical. Nowadays, any social welfare policy should be based on social reorganization stemming from local initiative. It should build from within, so as to have the mass of small producers interested in the trends of modernization. And since Indonesia is a specifically agrarian country, this means activating the rural population.

By far the larger part of the rural area is covered with more or less closed communities, each having its own distinct social structure. Thus Indonesia’s welfare policy is inclined towards community development (pembangunan desa) and rural social organization in general. Several services concerned with developing rural welfare depend on the different departments of administration. They are co-ordinated in a committee for rural development, while centres propagating these ideas are being distributed over the country. Owing to lack of trained personnel, however, not more than a hundred such centres are established, and in Java and Sumatra only.

Historical

It has been principally due to an intense study of Indonesian adat law that we have got a real insight into the different societies of Indonesia and the regional distribution of social institutions.¹

One finds communities organized along genealogical lines, in which family and clan are the more important factors, in East Indonesia. Villages (desa) in Java are territorial groups. Communities may be patrilineal (Batak) or matrilineal (Menangkabu)—both exist on Sumatra—or even bilateral (Dayak in Borneo). These are the more or less closed communities. The coastal areas and, of course, the modern towns have a population who have lost these traditional forms of communal life.

¹ The present social sciences, too, are indebted to the founder of the study of adat law in Indonesia, the late Prof. C. van Vollenhoven. Cf. ter Haar, B. Adat Law in Indonesia. New York, 1948.
But even so, one finds in the towns a tendency to form communities: in different 'quarters' (kampong), such as the Kaum, the commune (i.e. of orthodox Muslims), or Kampong Tjina, the Chinese quarter. Among the urban population of Indonesia any sociologist may find a large field for research.

It needs no stressing that, during their long history, the social patterns of Indonesia have been modified often by outside influences. As far as we can learn from Hindu-Javanese charters and other documents, it seems that Hinduism, in the period from the seventh to the sixteenth centuries, gradually spread over Indonesia by a process of—as we now might call it—community development.

The residencies (kraton) of the princes were centres of Hindu-Javanese culture. Other parts of the country came into contact with kraton culture through tax gatherers and, more so, through missionaries. But apart from this kind of penetration, large rural areas quite outside the sphere of the kraton spontaneously adapted themselves to the foreign culture. Persons respected for their saintliness—partly because they seemed to know something of this foreign Hinduism—founded mandala, a sort of convent. They gathered round them a circle of devoted pupils and thus organized a community which had its own institutions and which became self-supporting on its own lands. The next phase developed when daughter-mandala were founded along the same lines. It is remarkable that in the following period, when Islam entered the Indonesian archipelago (after 1500 A.D.) its spread took place along analogous lines. The inherent Indonesian sense of communal bonds is very clearly at the base of such a process.  

ture of social life directs the use of the means of production. This structure itself is closely bound up with values and concepts living within the community—whether or not the people are conscious of them. Their origin has little to do with economic considerations. One of the most uprooting factors during the colonial period has been the entering of commercialism into the life of the community, a factor which will come to the fore more and more as the Republic of Indonesia develops into a modern state. Growing individualism will break the old communal ties.

It is remarkable, however, that the individual’s sense of communalism appears to be by no means dead. The desire for some sort of bond within a society that has no room for it any more becomes apparent in different ways.

In modern cities, such as Jakarta, Surabaya, and Surakarta, one finds in the several distinct quarters a striking solidarity; festivities are celebrated together which remind one of the sumbangen, a typical feature of pre-modern times, when every guest made some contribution to his host. The host sometimes even benefited by the presents—which was one of the basic ideas of the feast. In rural areas co-operatives and farmers’ associations are being founded. In some cases they are extensions of old institutions, in others their organization goes contrary to the old system.

In the eastern archipelago co-operatives-for-work originated in former times. These societies are supported by customary law, e.g. in northern Celebes and in eastern Flores. They consist of a number of persons who, apart from their private farming, work a common field or who are paid for such work by others. The co-operative society benefits by the money earned from the harvest; in some cases the society maintains a common fund. In central and western Flores I have seen (1949) modern co-operatives founded by pemuda (youngsters). They are a new element in the old village community, and as such they have to overcome a good deal of resistance—especially from the side of the tuan tanah, the landlord, who, next to the
village headman, has the right of supervision over the village lands. Reducing the costly ceremonial sacrifices of buffalo on economic grounds especially meets with opposition. On the isle of Bali, ancient Hindu-Balinese charters mention a society organized in detail and governed by princes; today there is great effort to modernize and extend the old farmers' associations.

The communal feeling created special social ties which answered a very human need, but which, equally, made sense in a utilitarian way. Notwithstanding the new conditions, this feeling still exists. When new social relationships have to be made nowadays for economic reasons, this causes, of course, a certain 

Vergesellschaftung; nevertheless people feel these new business ties as satisfactory only when both parties conceive of them as personal. However, the sense of communalism causes also a very unfavourable form of social grouping. Before the war bands of plundering bandits occurred only rarely; during the absence of any authority after the war they sprang up like mushrooms and now form small states within the State of Indonesia. The bands are local in origin, so one may speak about certain regions of brigandism, but their actions range far beyond. The exactions to which they submit the populace are a kind of tax that the legal, but powerless, authorities are unable to gather. Solidarity and discipline among the members of the band demonstrate the vigorous sense of communalism in their case also.¹

Two Examples of Community Development

I

Timor, the most eastern of the so called Minor Sunda Islands, has a population with a firm genealogical structure. The clans have an important function. Nevertheless, a large part of the

people are Christians, since the Roman Catholic mission and later the Protestant missions started their work in these regions long ago. The entire island—the eastern half of which is a Portuguese colony—is divided into a number of principalities headed by *rajas*. Most rajas are Christian, and contrary to the situation in western Borneo (see below), where the heads of principalities are Muslims and ‘foreigners’, they are culturally akin to their people even though they adhere to a different religion.

As usual in Indonesia, the chieftains are entitled to gather taxes in kind and to have services (*corvées*) rendered to them.

In the north-central part of Timor the principality of Insana is situated, governed by a Christian raja Insana. Just before the Pacific war, in 1941, the Government stimulated the making of extra gardens for food supply. This was done in the plains at the cost of fairly heavy additional work in digging and fencing. The Japanese, however, as everywhere in Indonesia, opportunistic, did not care for the woods to be preserved and they allowed the population to open up *ladang* (shifting dry fields) in the forest reserves. As a result, the gardens laid out in the plains were soon left for easier forest grounds. After the Japanese capitulation chaos appeared to reign in this island, as elsewhere in the archipelago. Conditions were shamefully bad, especially the food situation. Allied aid was long in arriving. Government officers, and especially the energetic young raja Insana, decided to help themselves. The new spirit among the more intellectual persons drove them to act: when the new government became a reality, Timor should have reached a better economic position if it were not to fall behind.

The desire to show that they were capable of doing things for themselves, even before Indonesia became autonomous, resulted in a general meeting, held on 24 April 1946 at the chieftaincy of Insana. The raja presided, assisted by the veterinary civil servant, the missionary, and all the clan chiefs. An association for promoting Insana welfare was founded. In
order to increase the agricultural production it was decided to extend every garden in the plains by about one acre. One may assume that some gentle pressure on the part of the raja was not wholly foreign to the decision taken. The increase of labour was decidedly felt by the people as an aggravation of their condition.

From this reaction of the population against a measure introduced from above we may learn something.

The population, the very primitive Atoni, live in a closed village community. Money does not play a role except for paying taxes. The needs of an Atoni family are very few; they plant their field for home consumption and for the barter of the most primary necessities only. Spinning and weaving are done locally; no imported textiles are needed. Cattle does not form part of their economy, the possession of buffaloes being of social rather than economic importance. The average ladang per family does not exceed 0.8 hectare in the mountainous country; in the plains it is even less—about 0.5 hectare, since, as we mentioned above, tilling the grassy soil with a primitive stick is much heavier work than on the slopes grown with thicket. Opening up a grass ladang in the plains takes in the first year about ten times as much labour (and in the second and third years still perhaps five times as much) as one of the same size in the hills. Moreover, weeding is more difficult in the plains. The Atoni thus resort to the plains only when the hill-side fields are exhausted. Notwithstanding the unfavourable conditions of soil and climate, the ladang crops are just sufficient for family subsistence. Needs and their satisfaction are balanced, though on a very low level, so every further exertion is felt, in this society, as a vexation or, at best, as an evil necessity. These considerations are far from being new. Before the war, when the Government started planning mechanical cultivation, reports by civil servants and agricultural extension workers showed that they were aware of this. A meeting of the association for promoting Insana welfare was held in November 1946 at the request of the
authorities, presided over by the raja, with all the district chiefs and minor chieftains possessing land titles in the Sekon plain. It was decided—optimistically—partly to mechanize production in this region, i.e. the clearing and the ploughing would be done by bulldozers and other machines. The Atoni themselves would plant the rice, weed the fields, and harvest the crops. The advantages of the system were thought to be not only an increase of production but also a greater willingness on the part of the Atoni to return to the plains and leave the hillside to be re-afforested. Of course, the farmers cooperating in the Sekon project would receive part of the produce, while the association was going to use the other part for several further welfare plans.

Here again, it should not be assumed that the general consent of the meeting was proof that the people agreed. Even the minor chiefs present—who represented the population—may not be supposed to have spoken their minds openly.

In short, this large experimental project at Sekon has been a great failure, notwithstanding (or perhaps because of) important Government aid, which consisted of the provision of the complete mechanical factor (machines and their application).

The condition of the soil was not so good as had been expected, the climate was especially unfavourable that year, the weeding took a far longer time than calculated. So the Atoni, who had their own fields to look after as well, considered this labour a heavy duty. The raja forced them to weed and in the end to harvest, but the crop was small and people felt that they had done all the work without gain.

After a second experiment the following year also had proved a failure, the project was abandoned. One can understand that the population felt a burden had been taken from them. The association for promoting Insana welfare itself did not live very long owing to the lack of financial abilities of its board members.\(^1\)

The reports on the experiment ascribe the failure mostly to insufficient technical and economical research beforehand. It is disappointing not to see any sociological considerations mentioned by the agricultural extension officers.

Mechanization is such a wholly foreign concept to this people that well-founded sociological research should have been a prerequisite for the project. A people organized in their own strict social structure and living in a closed economy of kind and barter cannot mentally accept a mechanical enterprise; even less can they work it.

A sociologist might pose questions as to the following points. The demands of labour are wholly different in a large mechanized agricultural enterprise then in a small holding. Regularity and efficiency according to Western standards are different. Labour productivity of primitive people is determined by their low standard of needs and by environmental factors. Empirically, it is known how much a family needs till the next harvest; clearing has to be finished before the rains come. But to start every day, watch in hand, needs a Western discipline that is completely foreign to them. Was sufficient account taken of the mental opposition against such a different rhythm? It does not appear from any of the reports that attention—even the slightest—has been paid to the complex social structure of clans and its subtle social classification (e.g. male and female possessions and activities), and to the traditional ceremonies and tabus interwoven with agriculture. Has a foreign mechanical method any room for their religious customs? Have the farmers got the feeling that they have become wage-workers?

We cannot escape the conclusion that the possible reactions were accounted for as we foresee them—e.g. preparing a large field in the plains in order to decrease the labour necessary for planting—but that the desires of the population themselves were not taken into account.
Over against this example of technical assistance that failed, we may turn to one instance of an unpretentious start at community development, in Western Borneo, which sounds more hopeful.

The autochthonous population in this region consists of Dayak, organized in several tribes. The Malay ‘princes’ are Muslims, having a completely different culture. The third group of people living in this area are Chinese.¹

The latter were of old organized in powerful kongsi (more or less secret fraternities); they occupied themselves with gold digging in the north-western districts. The Netherlands Indies Government broke their power by the middle of the nineteenth century. For this reason, and because gold became scarcer, the Chinese started trading and cultivating land. Meanwhile, the Dutch Government tried also to put an end to head hunting and to vexations caused by the Malays. The interior of Borneo became safer.

Nowadays one finds Chinese middlemen trading deeply into the interior. An economic symbiosis exists between the Dayak and the Chinese. Instead of the forced taxes in rice and forest products which the Dayak had to pay to the princes and their kin, and for which they got in return salt and tobacco in an arbitrary way, a voluntary trade between Dayak and Chinese grew up, showing a real sense of community.

Originally, the Dayak delivered forest products and got foreign goods in return. But since rubber was introduced, in about 1910, it has replaced the other forest products. Today most Dayak produce in the first place rice for home consumption, and secondly they tap rubber, make slabs and sheets, and trade these to the Chinese.

This is also the case with the Mualang Dayak tribe who live to the north of the Middle Kapuas River and towards the frontier mountain range of Sarawak.

The Mualang are probably, like their neighbours the Ketungau, descendants by fission from the well-known Iban or Sea Dayak. They seem closely related in language and culture. They have no clans; their kinship system is bilateral.

The smallest social unit is the primary family (father, mother, children); next comes the personal kinship group, kaban, comparable to our family gathering. Every individual thus is the centre of concentric circles of relatives. Social relations depend on the more or less close kinship relations.

The third firm social core is the long-house group, the single-residence village in which fifteen or more families live together in separate apartments.

There may be several reasons for a long-house group to dislocate themselves or to divide by fission. One instance is the scarcity of ladang fields.

Part of the Mualang are Christian; the Roman Catholic mission has been working there since 1938. It is obvious that the Roman Catholic churches and schools are helping in community development. On holidays such as Christmas villagers from several long-houses come together at one central point. The schools also have a centralizing tendency; children, even from the pagan Ketungau villages, go to school at Mualang Merbang. Distance and the difficulties of the forest tracks necessitate a prolonged stay at Merbang. This causes a certain tension in the food situation. For here, too, one cannot produce more on the ladang than soil and climate will permit. Consequently, the mission persuades the people to have small gardens made by the youngsters who come to school.

Apart from this form of community development, another phenomenon of development is shown by the initiative of some villagers.

When a village called Ngkuning had exhausted their ladang fields, a small number of people moved to a new place some
miles away. This also proved insufficient after a short time, since rubber fields hemmed in the ladang area. The same group decided to look for a better place upstream. They found primary forest next to the Merbang River. Others from Ngkuning followed and the long-house Merbang was founded, while the intermediary place, Empadjak, was kept for the rubber gardens. This is normal procedure with the Dayak.

After the war the son of the first man who had moved into Merbang, who also had become first head of the village, started a very simple co-operative, two of his uncles and a few members of his personal kindred acting with him as a board.

During my stay at Merbang (January 1950) this co-operative consisted of twelve members. Their target is unpretentious and practicable: to clear a ladang just as large as the members are able to work besides their own fields. Generally, a ladang measures 100 by 100 fathoms, sufficient for a family of four or five to be fed during a year. The co-operative, for the moment, has to restrict itself to such a size; the crop is put up in a co-operative storage house. Members are allowed to get rice on loan in case of scarcity; non-members may have it at fifty per cent interest (the normal rate between villagers).

This co-operative has proved very useful to the village. In order to build a school for which the Dayak could not provide the material, the co-operative bartered rice to their Chinese tauke (trader) at Sekadaw.

It seems sound policy on the part of these Mualang not yet to involve rubber in their co-operative. They themselves live in an economy without money, but they are aware of the fact that rubber is subject to the fluctuations of a foreign market (to them ‘foreign’ is equal to ‘outside the tribe’) and they do not trust themselves to the economic activity that is needed to handle this situation. Rice is a substance they know; economic transactions in rice are limited to their village or tribe, at most to their ‘own’ Chinese trader.

The co-operative may show us, equally, the importance of the social structure. The people who took the initiative are
personal kindred of the village headman: his progressive son, two brothers, and another relative. Thus the kaban (personal kindred) prove to be functioning still, though the word is seldom heard; the Malay term or the Dutch-derived permili (family) is more often used.

We may draw the following conclusions.

Comparing the grand project of the Sekon Valley in Timor with the small-scale trial at Merbang, we see that the latter provides a sound core for community development, however unpretentious it may be. It originated from people’s own wishes and initiative, without any pressure or regulation from above. The co-operative has propaganda value as an example: by having a reserve store of rice in case of food scarcity and by its usefulness to the whole community. Targets are understandable to the villagers; they are not out of reach and do not conform to a Western money economy which is still a foreign concept.

We may learn from all this that as long as the population does not really desire it, introducing something quite new cannot be done from outside with impunity. Even if we are aware of the necessity of leading these closed communities to a money economy in the end, we should resist the temptation to forcibly graft new institutions onto old ones.
The term 'technical assistance' has traditionally carried two connotations. On the one hand, it has meant the introduction of techniques derived from physical and biological sciences for the solution of material problems. On the other hand, it refers to the use of methods developed by the social or behavioural sciences for increasing the smoothness and the rewards of social interaction and social organization.

In Latin America, until recently, outside and local agencies alike have tended to emphasize the first aspect and to place their confidence in the improvement of technology in engineering, industry, agriculture, and public health. During the last few years, however, experts and policy makers have become increasingly aware that technology of this sort does not operate spontaneously. It must be put into operation by the populations it is intended to serve; it must be assimilated to the customary behaviour patterns and social organization of the people. And if this is to take place, a systematic knowledge of the existing culture and social organization is required, as well as a scientific comprehension of how cultural and social systems may be changed under control. In such 'directed social and cultural change' the level of community development, particularly in predominantly rural areas like Latin America, is of first importance, for the reason that most innovations reach the people through their community organization and in terms of local culture patterns.

Here I shall briefly suggest some of the sources of our knowledge about the current culture patterns and community organi-
zations of Latin America, indicate representative programmes of directed change at the community level, and discuss certain implications for the future. In the space available this treatment is not intended to be exhaustive.

Latin America is here considered to include all the territory of the Western Hemisphere which is at present politically independent and which was originally colonized by either Spain or Portugal. It is more than eight million miles in extent and is inhabited by about 153 million people. French is the official language in Haiti, Portuguese in Brasil, while Spanish is official in the remaining countries. (Guaraní is also official for certain purposes in Paraguay.)

Several different types of culture are found in the region. First are the relatively untouched aboriginal cultures, of which there are a considerable variety; however, the number of people who are part of them is statistically insignificant, and the groups are at present mainly ethnological curiosities. Second, we have the so-called Modern Indian or Republican Native peoples, for the most part descendants of the members of the ancient high civilizations in Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. Taken as a whole, these people are of considerably more significance than the unacculturated aborigines. Although the political and religious institutions and many other aspects of the aboriginal civilizations were destroyed by the Conquest, the Modern Indians still live in their own communities withdrawn from the main currents of modern life, wear distinctive costumes, and speak their native language as their primary tongue (although most are bilingual). Perhaps twelve million people are to be included in this classification. A third culture type has been called New World African; it is a mixture of African cultural elements combined with traits derived from native Indian and European sources; examples of this general culture type are to be found in Eastern Cuba, Haiti, the Caribbean coasts of Central America, and in Northeast Brasil.

The fourth culture type of Latin America may be termed
Modern Latin American. In Spanish it is often called *la cultura criolla*. This is the dominant culture type of the area today. Although it shows many local and class sub-varieties, its fundamental characteristics are found in all significant parts of the area.

Until about 1930 most of the social science studies of communities, apart from historical investigations, were focussed upon those of the first three types. A very large literature on the customs and tribal organizations of the aborigines has been produced, and for South America has been summarized in the *Handbook of South American Indians* published in five large volumes by the Smithsonian Institution in Washington. Latin American field workers, as well as outsiders, were active in studying the communities of Modern Natives in Mexico and in the Andean region. Until recently, however, the approach to the Modern Native peoples has perhaps mainly been inspired by antiquarian interests, i.e. these peoples were studied primarily as a means of adding to our knowledge of the ancient civilizations of their ancestors. Latterly, the emphasis has shifted to the problem of adjusting or assimilating these peoples to the modern life of the nation. The Interamerican Indigenous Institute, with headquarters in Mexico, has been instrumental in directing and co-ordinating the studies and ‘applied anthropology’ of national institutes, indigenous services, and independent investigators in the various countries. Manuel Gamio in Mexico and Luis Valcárcel in Peru may be mentioned as leaders, while the active co-operation should be noted of such outside agencies as the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Institute of Social Anthropology of the Smithsonian Institution, the Unesco programme for indigenous education, and the International Labour Office’s section on native labour.

New World African cultures and community organization have also received scientific attention from both Latin American investigators and outsiders. In Brasil the work of Gilberto and Arturo Ramos is fundamental, in Cuba that of Fernando Ortiz, in Haiti that of Herskovits (who has also studied New
World African communities in Trinidad and Dutch Guiana). Recently a study of the Marbial Valley in Haiti was carried out by Alfred Métraux and others under the auspices of Unesco in connection with a technical assistance project.

Communities of the Modern Latin American Culture type were the last to receive systematic social science attention, but there is now a considerable body of scientific data, based on modern methods of sociological and anthropological field research. Most of the communities so far studied as wholes have been those of rural people—peasants and small landholders. In many cases the population is mestizo (mixture of white and Indian), but the way of life may be seen as a distinctive variety of Western civilization, with certain admixtures derived from the native cultures. No complete studies of urban communities, after the manner of Middletown or Yankee City, have been carried out, but anthropologists have made two partial studies of modern Latin American cities, and sociologists have made ‘surveys’ of several others. Meanwhile, an increasing volume of material has been forthcoming from other sciences to fill out the picture of the Modern Latin American Culture.

All the evidence indicates that there is a steady drift towards this pattern of life and organization and that within the foreseeable future the aboriginal, Modern Native, and New World African types of culture will be things of the past as integrated systems of life; they will be gradually absorbed into the general configuration of the Modern Latin American Culture.

This process would probably run its course spontaneously in the course of time, but it is being accelerated by current programmes of ‘technical assistance’ and ‘directed change’. Not only are these programmes intended to bring certain native and Negroid groups within the scope of the Modern Culture, but they are also expected to effect changes in that Culture itself in so far as they contemplate the introduction of new technologies, industrial and labour organization, social services, scientific method, and the like.

Before mentioning a few specific projects concerned with
community development, certain significant features of the present pattern of community organization should be noted.

1. Kinship ties are much more important than in present day United States or England, for example. Not only does the individual have important interaction patterns with kinsmen by blood and by marriage, but ‘ceremonial’ kinship plays an unusually important role (the so-called compadrazgo system). Until these kinship systems weaken it is impossible to organize effective units of co-operation without taking into account the affiliations (and the antagonisms) based on kinship.

2. Latin American society is strongly class-organized. The middle class is numerically small in most countries and middle class values, which are said to be dominant in the United States and England, do not permeate Modern Latin American Culture. Traditionally there has been a large gap between the upper and the lower classes, and the relationship between them has been one of dominance-submission and an unequal distribution of privileges in favour of the upper classes.

3. Wealth and economic power have been based on land, the larger part of which has been held by a relatively few owners in great estates worked by landless peasants or by small landowners ekeing out the returns from their own inadequate holdings. There are exceptions to this rule, of course, but latifundismo (the large estate system) is almost everywhere recognized to be not only an economic problem, but also a hindrance to community development. For the large estates are almost invariably organized on an authoritarian basis, with the owner or his administrator in complete charge. The workers, who in many cases number in the thousands, are allowed little or no opportunity for political freedom, individual or group economic initiative, or voluntary organization for community and civic welfare. The same patron (authoritarian) system was extended to mining and manufacturing industry. Labour organizations in some countries have within the last twenty years succeeded in obtaining certain rights for workers in industry, and more recently have advocated the right of
agricultural workers to organize into unions. (This right has been constitutionally guaranteed in Guatemala, for instance, since 1945.) However, experience in independent community organization, either by private citizens or in the form of cooperative or communal groups (*comunidades*), is not very widespread among the common people of the region.

4. The Roman Catholic Church is virtually ubiquitous among Latinos, all but an insignificant number of whom are at least nominal members. The Church, as an institution, is of course an authoritarian structure and during colonial times had a pervading influence in politics and economics as well as in religious life. Although the ‘liberal’ revolutions of the later nineteenth century reduced the Church’s official privileges in some countries, the tradition and practise (although sometimes indirect) of the Church’s influence in ‘worldly’ affairs can seldom be overlooked even today. Furthermore, the Church monopolized certain functions—education, charity work, administration of hospitals—which in certain other areas were much earlier regarded as obligations of the local community or of the state. The Church still attempts to carry on these activities, in some cases in competition with government or lay agencies. Sodalities and cults of saints are prominent and afford laymen an opportunity for voluntary participation.

5. Many so-called ‘bourgeois virtues’ do not exist in the form encountered in North American or British society, so that the planner of community development must attempt to instill them or else must capitalize on those virtues which are present. For instance, voluntary charity of the ‘civic’ type is not traditional; neither is the habit of thrift general, in the sense of saving money to be put into banks or insurance policies; service clubs of the Rotary type are recent innovations in some of the cities, but the secular organization supposedly devoted to civic betterment is not traditional. Since wealthy people do not identify themselves with the lower classes, they do not on the whole show much of that responsibility for the community as a whole which is expected of them in the United States. On
the other hand, there is in Latin America a tradition of cooperation in community work, as when all the able-bodied men turn out to clean up the plaza or repair a bridge. There is also a tradition of frequently getting together in fiestas and other forms of merrymaking. Social clubs for the more well-to-do exist in all but the smallest localities, while the cantina or bar serves as a daily meeting place for poorer people. In general, there is a great deal of sociability in Latin American life which can be channeled for community development.

Mention may be made of a few examples of directed community development in Latin America involving technical assistance of the social science type. With the help of Unesco, the Colombian Government in 1948 undertook to set up a model of community reorganization in the small town of Vianó, which is in a mountainous coffee-growing region some sixty miles from Bogotá. The bulk of the population is composed of relatively small landholders. The main part of the project, which was in charge of a Mexican anthropologist, was concerned with setting up a community centre for recreation and education, and with the establishment of a number of voluntary organizations among men, women, and children. At the time the writer visited the project in 1950 the new organizations were functioning smoothly, the populace expressed itself as enthusiastic, and the community centre was in constant use.

In the valley of the São Francisco River in the State of Baía, Brasil, an extensive series of hydroelectric works is being built, somewhat along the lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority. The officials of the Brasilian Government in charge realized that the new electric power and the new industries operated on it would change the entire economic life of the region, and called in Brasilian social anthropologists to make a thorough study of the human element and to draw up plans for community organization. These social scientists were joined by others through collaboration with Columbia University and Unesco.

Mexico was the first Latin American country to develop the
technique of ‘cultural missions’. These usually consist of teams including a physician or expert in public health, an agricultural expert, an educationist, and a social scientist specializing in socio-cultural adjustments. The team stays in a given community several weeks, months, even years. The aim, in addition to technological improvements, is to develop local leadership and initiative on a wide front of community projects designed to ‘bring rural and backward groups into full participation in the modern national culture’. The method has been so successful that it has been extensively copied by other Latin American countries. Mexico has also embarked on several ambitious projects for replanning the life of entire regions. For example, at the present time a very interesting project is being carried on in the State of Nayarit.

In Peru, the Ministry of Public Health, with the aid of the Rockefeller Foundation, has sponsored intensive community studies as a means of actually establishing modern health and sanitation practices as a part of the customs of the rural population. The field staff of the Smithsonian’s Institute of Social Anthropology is co-operating with the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau in a broad programme throughout Latin America concerned with the same problems.

In short, a long catalogue could be given of recent or current projects using applied social science in connection with technical assistance. Most Latin American agencies are becoming at least somewhat aware of the importance of problems of human behaviour and community organization in any programme of technological change. And they are being aided by a wide variety of international organizations. The fact that the technical assistance programme of the United Nations explicitly recognizes the necessity of applying the science of human relations has had a strong influence on Latin American thinking and planning.

At the present time one of the greatest weaknesses of Latin America is that it has few experts of its own in applied social science, and inadequate resources for training more. Modern
university training in anthropology, sociology, and psychology, either in the basic or the applied branches, exists on a significant scale only in Mexico and Brasil. The present writer, after making a field survey of South American social science in 1950 for Unesco, came to the conclusion that one of the forms of technical assistance most urgently needed was the establishment of facilities and programmes for the training of capable Latin American experts in community organization, cultural adjustment, and applied social psychology. If this type of talent has to be imported from foreign countries indefinitely, progress will lag and the Latin American area will be slow in achieving that degree of development which its people have a right to expect.¹

The Nayarit Project

Unesco has embarked upon a programme of directed cultural change in various parts of the world, approaching the problem of technical assistance in this respect in terms of ‘fundamental education’. This is conceived of not only as formal education in the usual sense, but also as the imparting of new forms and possibilities of community development, with emphasis on the human aspects of technological innovation. Two types of projects have been set up: (1) pilot projects staffed and financed by Unesco in co-operation with other United Nations Agencies and local governments; (2) ‘associated projects’ which are financed in each case by the government of the country concerned, but planned and organized in accordance with Unesco principles and often with advice and counsel of experts from that organization. None of these projects at the present time is completed, but it may be of interest, as an example, to describe

¹ A handbook for community organization workers in Latin America, Estudio de la Comunidad, by the well-known North American social welfare worker, Caroline F. Ware, has been published recently by the Division of Labour and Social Affairs of the Pan-American Union for circulation throughout the region.
briefly the work of the associated project now being carried out in the Valley of Santiago, State of Nayarit, Mexico.¹

This project was conceived during the Second Plenary Session of Unesco, which was held in Mexico City in 1947, but is financed by various departments of the Mexican Government and administered by the Mexican Department of Education. Directorship at first was in the hands of Professor Mario Aguilera Dorantes, one of the nation’s most competent men in the understanding of rural education and country communities. He has lately been called to other duties. Between September 1948 and September 1949 a year was given to careful planning of the procedures. Headquarters were set up in the city of Santiago, but the scheme of work comprehended primarily the ejido villages scattered throughout the valley. The general objectives were the raising of the general cultural level and mode of social life throughout the valley, of which Santiago is the capital city. It was explicitly stated that this meant a general change of the situation as a whole, and that little success could be expected if the project were confined to piecemeal alterations. ‘The final goal of the project will then be to form a mentality in the inhabitants of the valley receptive to human progress; to promote in them the development of knowledge, habits, and attitudes that are creators of new and more human forms of life; and to equip them to be active and effective agents of their own social betterment.’²

The municipio of Santiago in the State of Nayarit is inhabited mainly by mestizo farmers, the great majority of whom live in twenty-five ejido villages scattered over the valley. The cash

¹ An intensive study, as yet unpublished, has been made of this project by Glen Fisher. See his Programs of Directed Cultural Change in Latin America: The Application of Modern Theories of Culture Change to an Analysis of the Mexican Pilot Project in Santiago, Nayarit, Mexico. A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the University of North Carolina in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology. Chapel Hill, 1952. (On deposit in the Library of the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.)

crops are beans, corn (maiz), and tobacco. Most of the village dwellers are relative new-comers from other parts of Mexico, for the land was not open to settlement in ejido form until after 1917, and effective settlement did not begin until the early 1920’s. (Ejido is a community form of landholding established by the Mexican Revolution of 1910–17.) Although the village dwellers are all of Modern Rural Mexican Culture (no Indians), they came from a variety of places and built temporary dwellings in villages which, until the start of the project, had been bereft of any sort of community planning. For example, neighbours, because of their diverse origins, had little community feeling, and the villages were laid out haphazardly without the usual plaza, church, bar, and recreational facilities of the older Mexican towns. Meanwhile, the city of Santiago had developed into a prosperous trading centre with many of the ideals, attitudes, and amenities of urban Latin American culture. The gap in culture and community participation between the city and the surrounding villages had produced a condition of stagnation, if not disorganization, in the rural parts of the valley.

One cannot do justice to the work of the project in the short space available, but a very brief summary of activities carried out to date may be listed in order to illustrate how modern technical assistance in community development may operate in Latin America.

1. The plans were made and staff collected to attack the problem as a whole. Programmes and experts were alerted to deal with economic aspects, including improvement of agricultural products and methods; primary, secondary, and vocational education; health and sanitation; community planning; recreation; and house building.

2. The director of the project realized that plans will not work without the interest and co-operation of the people. He organized local leaders into an advisory council, involving representatives of both the city and the villages. The priests were not forgotten and co-operation of the Church was thereby
secured—an important point in a Latin American society, particularly in Mexico, which has had a history of church-state conflict. Likewise, the best-known physician was taken into the project on a part-time basis, so that he did not feel that outside medical and health experts were ignoring him. Considerable propaganda through valley newspapers and radio, and by word of mouth, preceded the active phase of the project.

The director of the project realized that real changes in community life do not occur suddenly, so no rigid time schedules was set up. Exact plans were regarded as plastic and experimental, to be changed as work progressed.

The project director, with most of his staff, made regular trips to the villages, where they would hold informal discussions with the inhabitants, who were brought together in a sort of ‘town meeting’. This non-authoritarian approach, with ample opportunity for questions and arguments, is believed to have had much to do with establishing rapport with the people.

3. During the first three years of the project the most effective results were obtained in village re-planning. It was decided to take one village at a time and reorganize it around a central plaza with a regular lay-out of streets. This involved surveying, moving numerous houses, building new school and other community buildings, digging new wells and filling old ones, embellishing the plaza and playground, and so on. The work was done by the men of the village themselves working in gangs under their own leaders. During the first year of the project this was the one activity in which the villagers actively cooperated as a group and with enthusiasm.

The resettlement of a village was followed by demonstrations and instruction in making furniture by handicraft methods from locally obtainable materials, and by object lessons in how the men could replace their old huts with new houses made of adobe bricks. It is reported that not only was the physical aspect and sanitation of the settlements greatly improved, but also that this was the most successful means of developing interest and participation in community affairs, such as re-
creation, kindergartens, grade and night schools.

4. Teacher training institutes were held on a democratic basis, at which time the participants worked out, with the help of project personnel, 'practical' methods of demonstration and teaching material applicable to rural life as a supplement to the almost purely formal and classical methods previously used. It is believed that much of the new material thus taught is being transferred into the homes, although it is too early to be conclusive concerning the effect of the school programme on the adults, apart from noting a marked increase in adult night school attendance. Agricultural plots were established at each school so that the pupils could learn new techniques by actual practise, and simple methods of disinfecting food and water were taught in the domestic science classes. School ceremonies and special events were tied in with the local pattern of fiestas and merrymaking, which had the effect of increasing the prestige of the new institutions and focusing the attention of the populace upon them. Thirty-five additional teachers were added to the ninety teachers of the valley during the first year, some thirty-three new school buildings are said to have been erected, about eighteen new kindergartens, as well as various other improvements. Visual instruction has been supplied by the project and by the Mexican Government cultural mission. However, it is recognized that such additions to the material facilities of education are significant only in so far as they aid in implanting new patterns in the culture.

5. Recreation was stimulated, both by the introduction of previously unknown team sports like volleyball, and also by organizing tournaments on a community basis of such traditional pastimes as rope-jumping and marble-playing.

It is understood on all sides that transformation of the life of a valley, involving twenty-five rural villages and a city, is not, under presently known techniques, a matter of three or four years. Although tangible 'progress' in terms of project objectives is already measurable, perhaps a generation must pass before it is possible to assess the permanent results. Exami-
nation of these pilot projects is of importance, however, in
determining improved social science techniques in community
change. In Nayarit, for example, various unanticipated resist-
ances were encountered and certain new methods had to be
developed on the spot. For example, land reform was blocked
by local political interests, with the result that little economic
improvement was immediately possible. The village people
were suspicious of ‘outsiders’ (i.e. Mexicans from outside the
valley), the fatalistic attitude that ‘it is God’s will’ stifled strong
motivation to improve sanitary and health conditions, and there
were professional rivalries and other tensions among the pro-
ject ‘experts’ themselves. Such difficulties in the smooth
operation of experimental projects must be viewed, not as
failures, but as data from which improved techniques can be
developed.

The contribution of social science to technical assistance in
community development is a relatively new application of
scientific knowledge. It is not yet an exact science. But the
results achieved, even under unfavourable conditions, indicate
that it will prove to be increasingly effective.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

"Community development" has not yet been given content as a specially designated field of study except in the United States, where the term and its equivalents are well-established and increasingly explored and elaborated. Consequently, little has been written on community development in underdeveloped areas; less that is worth reading.

Community development is a practical concern that derives its major theoretical components from sociology and economics. It is an amalgam of these two disciplines with physical science and technology. In addition, psychology provides experimental evidence of the effect of the human and non-human environment on the individual and, as 'group dynamics', techniques of reaching maximum agreement and co-operation in the attainment of community goals. It is allied with the pedagogics of fundamental education. Philosophy is the proper discipline to consult when we desire to systematically enquire into the basic assumptions that shape both the ends and the means of all directed social change.

Although there can and must be fruitful colloquy between these disciplines about the theoretical and practical aspects of community development, we should avoid the temptation to make of community development a self-sufficient hybrid. For in practice these intellectual hybrids, with their frequent carelessness for general ideas and primary sources, impoverish our education and our culture by concentrating attention on what is secondary and often second-rate. Consequently, a good bibliography on community development should not be limited to literature using that term or one similar.

An invaluable addition to the literature would be a number of carefully-prepared monographs on specific projects that record failures as well as successes and analyse them. Robert Redfield’s *A Village That Chose Progress* (University of Chicago Press, 1950) is a model of the kind of critical study I have in mind. And it is
also to be hoped that in the near future someone will assume responsibility for compiling and publishing a truly adequate general bibliography on community development, critically annotated, with special reference to the underdeveloped areas.

A tentative general bibliography on the sociological and economic aspects of development in underdeveloped areas will be found in the *International Social Science Bulletin*, a quarterly published by Unesco, Vol. IV, No. 2, Summer 1952, pp. 339-46. Unesco’s Education Clearing House specializes in literature on adult and fundamental education, and can supply bibliographical material in this field, principally through *Education Abstracts* and *Occasional Papers in Education*. See also the *Monographs on Fundamental Education* published by Unesco. Other Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization, also make available useful bibliographies of various types. The Technical Assistance Administration, United Nations Secretariat, should be of assistance to those seeking bibliographical information.

I shall mention only two non-governmental organizations in this connection. The Mass Education Clearing House of the University of London Institute of Education is a bibliographical source, principally through its *Community Development Bulletin*. Staff of the Illinois College Programme in Community Development will be happy to correspond with any who wish to pursue their reading in this field further or who are interested in checking bibliographies they have made against those made by others. A selected bibliography for further reading, specially prepared by Mona Hill Martin of Unesco, may be obtained from the Associate Director, Illinois College Programme in Community Development, Jacksonville, Illinois.

*The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas*, a symposium edited by Bert F. Hoselitz (University of Chicago Press, 1952), is a good introduction to the economic aspects of the development of underdeveloped areas. The volume of case studies which the Haverford College Graduate Curriculum in Social and Techni-
cal Assistance (Haverford, Pennsylvania) expects to publish during 1953 should serve as a complementary introduction to problems encountered and methods used in a variety of actual development projects. P. R.
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